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Tax and immigration law have a shared interest in defining commu-
nity. In order to implement a tax, we must know who belongs to the tax-
able community. At the same time, immigration law must define and
administer the requirements for membership in the national community.
Despite the differing objectives of tax and immigration law-raising
revenue and deciding who may enter, remain, and become a citizen in the
United States, respectively-both of these regimes uses a concept of
citizenship to define their respective communities.
Starting from this common thread of the relevance of citizenship to
both immigration and tax law, this Article draws upon social theory on
citizenship to explore the many links between these seemingly disparate
areas of law. Examination of these connections-what his Article calls
the tax-immigration nexus-reveals that both areas of law draw upon the
other to define citizenship. The interplay of tax and immigration citizen-
ship yields important insights for tax law and policy.
One of these insights is that the use of tax compliance as a factor in
immigration status, for example, revoking green card status for certain
violations of the tax code, is inconsistent with widely-held objections to
the taxation of U.S. citizens living abroad. Both green card holders and
U.S. citizens living abroad represent examples of people who blur the
line between citizen and noncitizen and their similarities and dissimilari-
ties compel re-evaluation of the current tax regime. This Article argues
that there are good reasons to treat potential taxpayers who occupy this
blurred space in a consistent manner. Along that line, this Article posits
possible reforms to the taxation of lawful permanent residents that would
help resolve the inequities within the tax-immigration nexus, as well as
avenues for further research.
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[I]f one sees law as exclusively concerned with the rules that regulate
disputes, rather than as a realm in which a society and its members
envision themselves and their connections to one another . .. then the
reification of our momentary view of how the world is composed will
triumph over our need to understand it from afar.
INTRODUCTION
Citizenship confers rights and responsibilities.2 The scope of those
rights and responsibilities is the focus of scholars across an array of dis-
ciplines. Citizen and citizenship-these t rms are powerful markers of an
individual's status that influence the extent to which she belongs to a
1. LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION xii (2006).
2. So frequently stated as to rise to the level of truism, stated examples of this idea are nearly
ubiquitous in the relevant literature. For one of many, see Thomas Faist, Shapeshifting Citizenship in
Germany: Expansion, Erosion and Extension, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP: A SLIPPERY
CONCEPT 193, 195 (Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann & Margaret Walton-Roberts eds., 2015)
("[C]itizenship comprises equal rights and obligations for all full members....Obligations com-
prise, for instance, tax liability .... .").
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community and the rights and responsibilities that she may exercise and
must uphold. The inclination may be to assume that citizenship is within
the purview of immigration and naturalization law3 with no relationship
to taxation. Citizenship is, however, a key point of connection between
these two areas of law.
Immigration law, by defining and policing the requirements of citi-
zenship, governs how an individual gains entry into and formal member-
ship in the national community.4 Tax law is similarly interested in com-
munity, namely the taxable community, and frequently uses citizenship
to define that community.s At times the immigration and tax concepts of
citizenship overlap, and at other points they diverge. This Article ex-
plores the ties between immigration and tax and their two distinct but
overlapping concepts of citizenship, labeling the space created by such
overlap the tax-immigration nexus.
To begin to understand the tax-immigration nexus, consider the ex-
ample found in the recent Supreme Court case of Kawashima v. Holder.6
The case involved two lawful permanent residents who pled guilty to a
criminal tax offense.7 Lawful permanent resident (LPR) is the immigra-
tion law label for individuals colloquially known as "green card holders."
LPRs are then, in short, authorized immigrants who have lived in the
United States for an extended period and may remain if they continue to
comply with certain laws. Though LPRs may apply to become natural-
ized citizens after meeting statutorily prescribed requirements, they are
not citizens under immigration law. Tax law takes a different view, how-
ever.
Under current law, the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) defines
LPRs as "resident aliens,"8 drawing them into a category this Article
terms "tax citizens." As tax citizens, LPRs are part of the taxable com-
munity and subject to the same laws and rates as individuals who are
born or naturalized citizens (hereinafter referred to as "formal citizens").
A tax citizen should be distinguished from another class of individuals
the Code terms "nonresident aliens." Nonresident aliens are taxable only
on their income that can be "sourced" as U.S. income.9 An individual
3. Throughout the rest of this Article, I use "immigration law" to encompass both immigra-
tion and naturalization law.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (providing that all individuals bon or naturalized in the
United States are citizens of the United States). See generally Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2012) (continuing where the 14th Amendment left off and fleshing out the
naturalization process).
5. See discussion infra Section IlI.B.
6. 565 U.S. 478 (2012).
7. For a full discussion of Kawashima v. Holder, see infra Part 1.
8. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2012).
9. Source rules help in the often challenging task of determining the location of and appro-
priate taxing jurisdiction for a given bit of income. See, e.g., REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH ET AL., U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 31 (3d ed. 2011) ("The source rules are provisions of the Code (and tax
treaties) that designate rules for assigning income to a particular jurisdiction.").
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may, then, be a tax citizen without being a formal citizen.t0 This disjunct
between the immigration concept of citizenship and tax citizenship was
the root of the challenges the LPRs faced in Kawashima and is the point
of focus of this Article.
Kawshima is essentially a relatively technical statutory interpreta-
tion case. In the case, the Supreme Court had to interpret a specific para-
graph of the Immigration and Nationality Act that defines so-called "ag-
gravated felonies." An LPR found guilty of an aggravated felony may be
removed at any point after being admitted to the United States." In con-
trast, an LPR found guilty only of a crime of moral turpitude-a category
of crimes that is distinct from but overlaps with aggravated felonies-
may be removed, on the basis of that crime, in a more limited time frame
after admission or after commission of multiple offenses.12 The Court
held that the tax offense to which the Kawashimas pled guilty qualified
as an aggravated felony, thereby rendering the Kawashimas deportable
even after they served their time for the offense.
Kawashima marked an expansion of the range of tax crimes that
count as aggravated felonies for the Immigration and Nationality Act (the
INA), but it did not create the tax-immigration nexus. Immigration law
has, for decades, used tax offenses as proxies for identifying individuals
who are or will be "good citizens"-who behave as we believe citizens
behave (or should). By being in the vulnerable position of tax citizens
who share the same tax responsibilities as formal citizens but who lack
formal citizenship, the Kawashimas, and all other LPRs, reside in an
insecure space. The government demands the same compliance of LPRs
as it does formal citizens but it punishes LPRs' noncompliance much
more severely.
The core questions raised by Kawashima, specifically, and the tax-
immigration nexus, generally are: What is the proper relationship be-
tween tax law and immigration? When does being a good tax citizen
come to bear on formal citizenship? Does it follow that a "bad" tax citi-
zen makes a bad formal citizen? Who is worthy of citizenship? Of per-
manent, full membership in the American community? Kawashima, and
10. The reverse does not follow. Though a formal citizen may not have positive tax liability,
she remains a "tax citizen" as defined by this paper-an individual subject to tax on her worldwide
income. Under current law, the U.S. government asserts the right to tax a U.S. citizen on her world-
wide income unless she renounces or loses that citizenship, a fact that may trigger a set of exit rules.
See generally I.R.C. §§ 877, 877A (2012), for the language of the expatriation taxes. Additionally,
see infra Section III.B for a discussion of the current tax regime as applied to tax citizens.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (defining one class of removable aliens as "[a]n alien
who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable").
12. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (defining one class of removable aliens as "[a]ny alien who-(I) is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case
of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 1255(j) of this title) after the date
of admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be
imposed, is deportable").
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the recognition of the tax-immigration nexus that it strengthens, illus-
trates that both tax and immigration law have something to say on these
issues.
Much of the recent scholarship on taxation and citizenship in the
United States explores the long-arm of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.1 3
Unlike most nations, the United States employs citizenship-based taxa-
tion on worldwide income. If you are a citizen, your income, wherever
earned, is taxable.14 Through the resident alien category, the Code ren-
ders certain noncitizens as tax citizens, making them taxable on the same
terms as born or naturalized citizens. Lastly, nonresident, noncitizens are
taxed on their United States source income, a tax concept defined by
multiple authorities. The result is an aggressive system of taxation that
constructs both citizens and noncitizen residents as tax citizens. More
pointedly, whether the individual has the full benefits, however con-
ceived, of U.S. citizenship, she may bear one of its burdens: to pay in-
come tax.
Five distinguishable communities exist within the current regime
and scholarship on citizenship-based taxation: resident citizens, nonresi-
dent citizens, LPRs, noncitizens who qualify as tax residents who are not
LPRs," and noncitizen, nonresidents. Though some scholars defend citi-
zenship-based taxation, an increasing number criticize the system as un-
13. For comprehensive discussion of citizenship and taxation, see generally Allison Chris-
tians, Drawing the Boundaries of Tax Justice, in QUEST FOR TAX REFORM CONTINUES: THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON TAXATION 50 YEARS LATER 53, 53 (Kim Brooks ed., 2013); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
The Case Against Taxing Citizens, TAX NOTES INT'L, May 2010, at 680; Cynthia Blum & Paula N.
Singer, A Coherent Policy Proposal for U.S. Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 705 (2008); Mark S. Hoose, Trading One Danger for Another: Creating U.S. Tax
Residency While Fleeing Violence at Home, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 827 (2012); Michael S. Kirsch,
Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX
REV. 117 (2014) [hereinafter Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad]; Michael S.
Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (2007) [hereinafter Kirsch,
Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy]; Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immi-
grants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2006); Ruth
Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169 (2016); Philip F. Postlewaite & Gregory E.
Stem, Innocents Abroad? The 1978 Foreign Earned Income Act and the Case for Its Repeal, 65 VA.
L. REV. 1093 (1979); Rende Judith Sobel, United States Taxation of Its Citizens Abroad: Incentive
or Equity, 38 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1985); Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation:
Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289 (2011); Almaz Zelleke,
Basic Income in the United States: Redefining Citizenship in the Liberal State, 63 REV. SOC. ECON.
633 (2005); Notably, scholars have also explored the impact of citizenship status on the provision of
benefits through the tax code, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit.
14. 1 use taxable rather than taxed deliberately. Importantly, due to international law norms,
treaties, and substantive tax law in the form of credits and an exemption, the determination that
income is taxable does not mean it will be taxed. See generally I.R.C. §§ 901, 911 (2012). The tax
treatment of citizens and noncitizens, whether resident or nonresident, will be discussed infra Sec-
tion IlI.B.
15. Both LPRs and resident noncitizens who are not LPRs fall under the category of "resident
alien" defined in I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2012), unless an exception applies. A nonresident nonciti-
zen is, in the language of tax, a nonresident alien per § 7701(b)(1)(B).
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fair and inefficient,16 citing particular concern for nonresident citizens.17
This Article focuses instead on the tax treatment of noncitizens, specifi-
cally LPRs-a group that has received little scholarly attention-as an-
other instructive group in evaluating the tax-immigration nexus and its
implications for tax law and policy.
To fully conceptualize the tax-immigration nexus requires expand-
ing our concept of citizenship with the help of social theory. Immigration
law uses culturally contingent concepts of what constitutes a citizen. Tax
law uses both formal, objective notions of citizenship and, I will argue,
informal, culturally contingent constructions of citizenship.'8 Formal
citizenship is sufficient to exercise the power to tax but is not necessary.
As in the case of the Kawashimas, an individual may become a taxpayer
because of her formal status governed by immigration law or because of
a determination that she behaves as a citizen per the Code.
Identifying the depth and breadth of the tax-immigration nexus re-
veals that tax law is more bludgeon than not. Citizenship-based taxation
and the characterization of tax noncompliance as deportable offenses or
offenses showing poor moral character both rely heavily upon a clear
benefit/tax nexus. As a citizen or potential citizen, you receive benefits
from the government for which you must pay. Under this approach, the
role of tax law in constructing citizenship is essentially a one-way street.
Failure to pay taxes may result in denial of citizenship status but compli-
ance is simply a bare minimum requirement on a path toward citizenship.
In its definition of resident alien, the Code severs any necessary ties be-
tween the concept of tax citizenship and formal citizenship. A practical
result of this tax citizen status is the heaping of one of the most salient
burdens of citizenship on noncitizens without conveying the full benefits
of citizenship. Stated differently, paying income tax does not make an
individual a citizen, but you will be hard-pressed to avoid paying for
benefits you are considered to have received.
The tax-immigration nexus places tax in the familiar but challeng-
ing position of being both revenue raiser and tool of social policy. While
the dual role is acceptable or even appropriate in other areas, such as
16. Compare Mason, supra note 13 (criticizing the system as unfair and inefficient), with
Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 13 (offering an argument in
favor of citizenship taxation).
17. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) has only strengthened the sense of
urgency of this discussion. See, e.g., Am. Citizens Abroad, Residence-Based Taxation: A Necessary
and Urgent Tax Reform 3 (Apr. 2015) (unpublished proposal submitted to the Senate Fin. Comm.
Individual Income Tax & Int'l Working Grps.),
https://www.americansabroad.org/media/files/files/9960ba5d/ACARBTproposalforsubmission
toSenateFinanceApril_2015.pdf. A potential reform spurred by FATCA and FBAR is discussed
infra Section IV.B.2.
18. This Article describes this informal construction of citizenship as "performative citizen-
ship." As will be discussed infra Part II, performative citizenship may be formalized into legal
requirements.
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wealth redistribution, tax law should proceed cautiously when the policy
at issue is a concept as foundational as who can be a citizen. To the ex-
tent we are concerned with the depth of the tax-immigration nexus, some
solutions may lie outside tax law. For example, immigration law and
policy theorists could reconsider whether tax crimes should constitute
removable offenses. Scholars focused on the emergence of "Crimmigra-
tion law" may further investigate the relevance of the tax-immigration
nexus to that discussion.19 But examining the tax-immigration nexus
through the case study of LPRs yields important lessons for mainstream
tax as well. A comprehensive understanding of the tax-immigration nex-
us could contribute to the emerging work on human rights and taxation.20
Specifically, this Article argues that the tax treatment of LPRs yields
multiple insights for tax law and policy: doing so undermines benefit
theory arguments against citizenship-based taxation, creates opportuni-
ties for strengthening compliance across populations, may support fiscal
citizenship, and suggests that fairness in tax policy compels different
treatment of tax citizens than exists under the current regime.
The stakes are high. The Department of Homeland Security Office
of Immigration Statistics most recent estimates provide that there are
13.1 million LPRs living in the United States.2 1 A population that is
regularly in flux as eligible LPRs naturalize and new individuals gain
LPR status, the overall number of LPRs is slow to change. Approximate-
ly two thirds of the 2013 LPR population was eligible to naturalize with
the remaining third not yet eligible.22 Of the portion of LPRs eligible to
naturalize, a majority will do so, but a significant number desire to com-
plete the naturalization process but struggle with language or cost barr-
ers.23 It is this population-LPRs who have yet to naturalize-who most
forcefully blur the line between citizen and noncitizen, while also facing
insecurity not shared by the formal citizens with whom they share the
same potential tax burden.
19. A brief introduction to crimmigration law is provided infra Part I.
20. In September 2016, New York University School of Law hosted a conference entitled
"Human Rights and Tax in an Unequal World." More information on the conference and paper
abstracts may be found at http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Human-Rights-Tax-in-an-
Unequal-WorldConference-Program-I.pdf.
21. BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: JANUARY 2013, at 3 (2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/oislpr_pe 2013_0.pdf.
22. Id. To be eligible for naturalization, an individual must satisfy a number of requirements
including: be legally present in country for the statutorily required period, be of good moral charac-
ter, and pass naturalization tests. For a comprehensive, non-technical discussion of the requirements
see generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., A GUIDE
TO NATURALIZATION 17 (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/M-476.pdf.
23. ANA GONZALEZ-BARRERA ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PATH NOT TAKEN: Two-




Part I details the scope of the Article and discusses the recent ex-
pansion of the tax-immigration nexus brought by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Kawashima. Part II lays the groundwork for conceptualizing
the tax-immigration nexus by examining citizenship in social theory. Part
III defines the boundaries of the tax-immigration nexus, applying social
theory to identify tax law's direct and indirect roles in defining citizen-
ship, as well as immigration law's contributions to the nexus. Part IV
argues that recognizing the existence and the depth of the tax-
immigration nexus requires reconsidering taxation of LPRs. Part IV then
addresses the relevance of the tax-immigration nexus to the citizenship-
based taxation debate, highlighting the ways in which both LPRs and
nonresident U.S. citizens blur the boundaries of citizenship. The Part
then concludes by evaluating potential reforms that respect the im-
portance of the tax-immigration nexus while remedying its inequities, as
well as identifying areas for further study.
I. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: TAXATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND
IMMIGRATION LAW
The relationship between taxation and citizenship is no stranger to
scholarly inquiry. This Article departs from the trend, however, of debat-
ing the fairness of citizenship-based taxation-the system used by the
United States that asserts the right to tax citizens on their worldwide in-
come-as applied to nonresident U.S. citizens.24 Instead, using the Su-
preme Court's 2012 decision in Kawashima as a frame, this Article turns
its focus back stateside to another population: LPRs. LPRs are, as will be
examined in further detail, classified as resident aliens, making them
what this Article terms tax citizens. As a group, the tax treatment of
LPRs has yet to be thoroughly addressed. The Article fills that gap in the
literature.
Reconsidering the fundamental fairness of the current tax regime's
treatment of LPRs is particularly timely. Immigration reform is on the
forefront of national political discussions, and the actions of the next
Presidential administration may significantly impact the lives of the ap-
proximately 40-45 million immigrants living in the United States.25 The
24. For further discussion, see infra Part IV. For scholarship on this topic, see sources cited
supra note 13.
25. The rhetoric of this election season alone places immigration at the forefront of debate, a
fact that many LPRs have noted. Ed O'Keefe, Citizenship Applications Soar in Trump's Wake,
WASH. POST (May 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2016/05/27/citizenship-applications-soar-in-trumps-wake/. In celebration of Hispanic
Heritage Month, President Obama gave a speech to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, alluding to
the possibility of a regressive subsequent administration. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Address at
39th Annual Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute Public Policy Conference and Annual Awards
Gala (Sept. 15, 2016) ("[B]ut if we're truly going to fix this system, we're going to have to push
back against bluster, falsehoods, and promises of higher walls."). The relevant part of President
Obama's speech begins at 7:51. See Felicia Escobar, Celebrating Hispanic Heritage Month: "Immi-
grants Are the American Character," WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 16, 2016, 4:47 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/09/16/immigrants-are-american-character. Estimates of the
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taxation of unauthorized immigrants presents a distinct though overlap-
ping set of concerns, as does the taxation of individuals present in the
United States on nonimmigrant visas. Indeed, both groups could be the
subjects of separate articles.2 6 What makes LPRs a good population of
focus is that they share both formal and substantive similarities with born
27or naturalized U.S. citizens. Because LPRs possess green cards, a pre-
requisite to naturalization for most immigrants, they are already further
along the path to citizenship than many other immigrants. Further, as this
Article argues, LPRs are performing citizenship though they lack the
protections of formal status as citizens.28
Though current law taxes LPRs the same as U.S. citizens, the con-
sequences of noncompliance with the tax laws results in markedly dis-
parate outcomes depending upon on which side of the citizen line an
individual stands.29 Herein lies a core concern of this Article: though
Congress may have valid reasons for wanting to tax LPRs and U.S. citi-
zens the same-reasons that will be explored later-the two groups are,
in fact, distinct in meaningful ways that undermine the validity of that
desire. Stated simply, an LPR's noncompliance with tax law may close
the door to naturalization or result in removal of that individual from the
United States, whereas the same noncompliance by a citizen results in, at
best, monetary penalties and, at worst, jail time. The fact that it is immi-
gration law that leads to these outsized punishments30 for the same
crimes does not negate the relevance of those potential outcomes to tax
immigrant population are available from multiple entities. The estimates used here come from the
following sources: PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN IMMIGRATION WAVE BRINGS 59 MILLION TO
U.S., DRIVING POPULATION GROWTH AND CHANGE THROUGH 2065, at 7 (2015),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/modem-immigration-wave-brings-59-million-to-u-s-
driving-population-growth-and-change-through-2065/; Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently
Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL'Y INST,
(Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-
and-immigration-united-states. As this Article goes to print, the impact of now President Trump's
actions on the desire to immigrate or naturalize cannot be determined, though is orders and rhetoric
suggest immigrants face even greater uncertainty.
26. For an excellent tax policy discussion of the taxation of unauthorized immigrants, see
Lipman, supra note 13. The topic has also been in the popular media. See, e.g., Alexia Femndez
Campbell, The Truth About Undocumented Immigrants and Taxes, ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/09/undocumented-immigrants-and-taxes/499604/
(discussing how the Social Security system has come to rely upon the funds contributed by undocu-
mented immigrants which they will not claim).
27. Much of the analysis of the fairness (or lack thereof) of the tax treatment of lawful perma-
nent residents may hold for the other class of what I describe as "tax citizens"-individuals taxed as
citizens by operation of § 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code but who do not have a green card (e.g.,
unauthorized immigrants or individuals present in the United States with authorization but who are
not exempt from resident alien status). See I.R.S. § 7701 (2012).
28. Of course, other immigrants may be performing citizenship in ways substantially similar
to U.S. citizens and LPRs. The rationale for focusing on LPRs at this juncture is that they combine
formal and performative citizenship in ways that are particularly relevant for a comparison with
nonresident U.S. citizens. Future work may focus, however, on the taxation of other resident nonciti-
zens.
29. See infra note 34 and accompanying text; see also infra Part Ill.
30. For a full discussion of the collateral immigration consequences of tax offenses, see infra
Section III.A.
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policy. Though tax noncompliance has had immigration consequences
for decades, the Supreme Court case of Kawashima has made evident the
fundamental insecurity of LPRs and has set the stage for re-evaluating
whether the current law fairly taxes LPRs in light of the significance of
the tax-immigration nexus.
Kawashima is not a tax case in the sense that it does not concern
matters of tax doctrine. Its relevance for tax law and policy is, neverthe-
less, significant. To immigration scholars, it is a story of administrative
law and proper deference in the immigration context or the failure of the
Court to respect the rule of lenity in immigration cases. 1 To criminal law
scholars, it raises questions of prosecutorial discretion or what constitutes
competent counsel when advising a client of the consequences of accept-
ing a plea bargain.32 To others, it may be one more case evincing the
march of crimmigration law-a term coined to describe the convergence
of immigration and criminal law -by further expanding the number of
offenses with grave immigration consequences.34 To tax scholars, it
should be understood as an opportunity-an opportunity to acknowledge
31. For scholarship discussing Kawashima and immigration law, see Kevin R. Johnson &
Serena Faye Salinas, Judicial Remands of Immigration Cases: Lessons in Administrative Discretion
from INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 44 ARtz. ST. L.J. 1041 (2012); Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the
Courts?: The Supreme Court's Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2012); Matthew F. Soares, Note, Agencies and Aliens: A Modified Approach
to Chevron Deference in Immigration Cases, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 926, 941-42 (2014). The
rule of lenity counsels that when an ambiguity exists in an immigration law it should be construed in
the immigrant's favor. For an early case invoking the rule of lenity in immigration law, see Bonetti
v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958) (drawing upon the rule of lenity developed in criminal law
statutory interpretation in stating "[w]hen Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to
Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this not out of
any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing
evil or anti-social conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve
doubts . . . against the imposition of a harsher punishment." (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S.
81, 83 (1955))).
32. For recent criminal law scholarship discussing Kawashima and these concepts, see gener-
ally Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit ofJustice for Noncitizen
Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1 (2012); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminaliza-
tion, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715 (2013); Hon. John H. Wilson, Are There Still Collateral
Consequences in New York After Padilla?, 29 TOURO L. REV. 545 (2013).
33. For an introduction to the concept of crimmigration law, see generally the oft-cited Teresa
A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sover-
eign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
34. Miller, supra note 33, at 620-35 (discussing the expansion of offenses giving rise to
removal); id. at 622 ("Although immigration law could, and often did, impose hardships on excluda-
ble and deportable aliens, the regime of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s was arguably less punitive
than it is today. The U.S. economy was robust, rates of migration to the United States were far lower
and public attitudes toward immigrants were far more welcoming. Immigration law of this period
has been characterized as liberal in its willingness to prioritize the natural rights of immigrants;
humanitarian; family-oriented; service-oriented; even procedurally exuberant. Indeed, the contrasts
are stark, yet to characterize this era as a due process 'revolution' overstates the fact. Immigrants,
particularly refugees and asylum seekers, enjoyed perhaps the fullest privileges than ever before (or
after). Even illegal immigrants were broadly tolerated on a level that was unprecedented in the
modem era. The grounds for deportation of criminal and illegal aliens were narrower, the use of
detention was less frequent, avenues for relief from detention were much broader, judicial review of
deportation orders was broader, and far fewer immigration violations were criminally punishable.").
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the connections of tax with other areas of law and to use the lessons
learned from examining those connections to strengthen tax law and pol-
icy.
Kawashima is, on its face, a statutory interpretation case where the
statute under consideration comes from immigration law. The petition-
ers in the case, Akio and Fusako Kawashima, were LPRs in the United
States but citizens of Japan.36 Thirteen years after becoming LPRs, the
Kawashimas pleaded guilty to making and subscribing a false tax return
and aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return, tax
crimes per § 7206(1) & (2).37 It was not the substance of their tax crimes
but the collateral immigration consequences of those crimes that took the
Kawashimas' case to the Supreme Court. After serving their time for
their violations of § 7206, the Kawashimas found themselves facing re-
moval as aliens convicted of an aggravated felony under § 1227 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.38 The connection to tax, and the statute
the Court interpreted, was the definition of aggravated felony under
35. See Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 486-89 (2012) (resolving a circuit split on the
issue of whether tax crimes other than § 7201 were aggravated felonies under the INA). In holding
that clause (i) incorporates other tax crimes, the Court overruled the Third Circuit's holding in Ki Se
Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004), in which that court found the statute ambiguous and
found the rule of lenity to apply. Id at 488-89.
36. Id. at 480.
37. Id.; I.R.C. § 7206 (2012) (providing the provision is punishable by monetary penalties
and/or imprisonment of up to three years). The statute reads as follows:
Any person who-(I) Declaration under penalties of perjury.-Willfully makes and sub-
scribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a writ-
ten declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not be-
lieve to be true and correct as to every material matter; or (2) Aid or assistance.-
Willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or presenta-
tion under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a
return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent or is false as to any mate-
rial matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the
person authorized or required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or document; or
(3) Fraudulent bonds, permits, and entries.-Simulates or falsely or fraudulently executes
or signs any bond, permit, entry, or other document required by the provisions of the in-
ternal revenue laws, or by any regulation made in pursuance thereof, or procures the same
to be falsely or fraudulently executed, or advises, aids in, or connives at such execution
thereof; or (4) Removal or concealment with intent to defraud.-Removes, deposits, or
conceals, or is concerned in removing, depositing, or concealing, any goods or commodi-
ties for or in respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed, or any property upon which
levy is authorized by section 6331, with intent to evade or defeat the assessment or col-
lection of any tax imposed by this title; or (5) Compromises and closing agreements-In
connection with any compromise under section 7122, or offer of such compromise, or in
connection with any closing agreement under section 7121, or offer to enter into any such
agreement, willfully.-(A) Concealment of property-Conceals from any officer or em-
ployee of the United States any property belonging to the estate of a taxpayer or other
person liable in respect of the tax, or (B) Withholding, falsifying, and destroying rec-
ords.-Receives, withholds, destroys, mutilates, or falsifies any book, document, or rec-
ord, or makes any false statement, relating to the estate or financial condition of the tax-
payer or other person liable in respect of the tax; shall be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a cor-
poration), or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prose-
cution.
I.R.C. § 7206.
38. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 481.
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§ 1 101(a)(43)(M) of the INA. 39 Though the concept of an aggravated
felony came into law in 1988,4 it was not until 1994 that tax crimes spe-
cifically entered the fray, as § 7201 tax evasion became a specifically
enumerated aggravated felony.41 After the majority handed down its
opinion, not only § 7201 tax evasion, but any tax crime involving fraud
or deceit and a loss to the government of more than $10,000 would quali-
fy as an aggravated felony.42 The tax-immigration nexus-the connec-
tions between tax and immigration law identified in the Article-existed
before Kawashima. However, Kawashima left that nexus stronger than
before the Court considered it and § 1101(a)(43)(M).
The outcome of Kawashima raises the question of the proper rela-
tionship between tax law and immigration. One could assume that the
answer to that question is one of immigration law and policy. Indeed,
that is the approach Justice Ginsburg takes in her dissent. Recognizing
the essential question underlying the outcome of Kawashima, Justice
Ginsburg poses the question: "One might also ask what reason Congress
would have for making a tax misdemeanor a deportable offense, while
more serious crimes do not jeopardize an alien's residency in the United
States.'A3 As an example, Justice Ginsburg notes that "driving while
drunk causing serious bodily injury" was found not to be an aggravated
felony 4 Justice Ginsburg doubts the wisdom of the majority opinion not
39. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(M) (2012) (identifying the following as an aggravated felony:
"an offense that-(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of Title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue
loss to the Government exceeds $10,000").
40. Miller, supra note 33, at 633 (providing at its outset, the category was much more limited,
including only "murder, drug trafficking and firearms trafficking crimes"). Miller notes, however,
that "[t]he scope of crimes defined as aggravated felonies has continued to grow in waves of subse-
quent legislation." Id. Kawashima may then be understood as part of the expansion described in
Miller's article. 565 U.S. at 487-89 (suggesting that tax crimes fall under the definition of aggravat-
ed felony).
41. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416,
§ 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4322 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(M) (2012)) ("(M) an
offense that-(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$200,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to tax
evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $200,000."); OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION LITIG., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 23 (2010),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/05/03/REVISED%20Padilla%20v.%20
Kentucky%20Reference%20Guide 11-8-10.pdf.
42. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(M). See generally Kawashima, 565 U.S. 478.
43. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 497 n.2. An example of one such tax misdemeanor taken from
my own home state of South Carolina provides, in pertinent part:
(3) A person required under any provision of law administered by the department and
who wilfully fails to pay any estimated tax or tax, or who is required by any provision of
law or by any regulation and who wilfully fails to make a return, keep records, or supply
information, at the time or times required by law or regulation, in addition to other penal-
ties provided by law, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not
more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, together
with the cost of prosecution.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-54-44(A)(3) (2016). A court could plausibly, post-Kawashima, find the requi-
site fraud and deceit present in commission of the misdemeanor to satisfy § I 101(a)(43)(M).
44. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 497 n.2.
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only because of its take on statutory interpretation but also because of its
strengthening of the tax-immigration nexus by expanding the range of
tax crimes that constitute aggravated felonies. As the Kawashima deci-
sion strengthens the tax-immigration nexus, it gives rise to significant
proportionality concerns.4 5 With a strengthened nexus comes even great-
er proportionality concerns because, as the scope of tax crimes that lead
to removal broadens, the chance an LPR will face harsher consequences
than a formal citizen for the same conduct increases.
Justice Thomas addresses the tax-immigration nexus indirectly.
Writing for the majority, he implies the distinction between drunk driv-
ing and the range of tax crimes that may lead to removal: the presence or
absence of fraud and deceit.4 Certainly one can cause a crash that results
in serious injury or death without engaging in any willfully fraudulent or
deceitful conduct. To commit tax evasion without engaging in fraud or
deceit would, however, be an impressive feat.47 Stated differently, to the
majority, the relevance of tax crimes is not that they violate tax law but
simply that a tax crime is a violation of law, an act that casts the individ-
ual as unworthy of citizenship, a "bad citizen."
The concerns of proportionality and morality that give rise to the
majority and dissenting opinions ultimately center upon a core concern:
Who is worthy of citizenship? Of permanent, full membership in the
American community? These questions alone support exploring the tax-
45. Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 415, 416 (2012) (providing that proportionality is the idea that "the severity of a
sanction should not be excessive in relation to the gravity of an offense"). There is a healthy immi-
gration law literature on proportionality and its relevance to immigration law and policy. As a point
of entry into this discussion, see generally Wishnie, supra, and Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1732-40 (2009).
46. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 482-87 (writing for the majority in a 6-3 opinion, Justice Thom-
as addresses the fraud and/or deceit inherent in certain tax crimes as he rejects the petitioners' argu-
ments that Congress, writing in the disjunctive, intended to exclude tax crimes from clause (i) of 8
U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(M)).
47. Id. at 484-85 (holding that clause (ii) intended to clarify that § 7201 tax evasion was an
aggravated felony in the event that crime was committed without involving fraud or deceit). Earlier
in his opinion, Justice Thomas tates that the absence of fraud or deceit as elements of § 7206 does
not defeat the respondent's position that § I 101(a)(43)(M)(i) applies to the petitioners because, he
states without extensive reasoning: "The elements of willfully making and subscribing a false corpo-
rate tax return . . . establish that those crimes are deportable offenses because they necessarily entail
deceit." Id. at 484-85. It is hard to imagine satisfying the elements of § 7206 without engaging in
fraudulent or deceitful conduct but hen, so to, is it hard to imagine satisfying the elements of § 7201
without engaging in the same. See id at 493-95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg ques-
tions the majority's reasoning on this point, stating:
The Court acknowledges that evasion-of-payment cases almost always "involve some af-
firmative acts of fraud or deceit." Still, there may be a rare case in which that is not so.
Rare, indeed: imaginary would be an apt characterization. The Government conceded
that, to its knowledge, there have been no actual instances of indictments for tax evasion
unaccompanied by any act of fraud or deceit.
Id at 495 (citations omitted). That Justice Thomas easily finds fraud or deceit to be satisfied by the
elements of § 7206 but raises the specter of their absence in § 7201 as the motivating factor for
Congress to create a largely redundant clause (ii) undercuts the logic of his opinion. "In other words,
in holding that Clause (i) includes tax offenses, the Court finds Clause (ii) largely, but not totally,
redundant." Id at 494.
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immigration law nexus. After all, "[t]axes formalize our obligations to
each other... . [S]ignify[ing] who is a member of our political communi-
ty, [and] how wide we draw the circle of 'we."' 48 Investigating the tax-
immigration nexus and immigration law's reliance upon tax offenses in
defining a citizen could be the substance of an entire article (if not a
book). But Kawashima, and the substantive immigration law provisions
it interprets, is not the only point of connection between tax and immi-
gration. Tax law itself draws upon the concept of citizenship and immi-
gration law as it works to define the taxable community. This Article
argues, however, the existing literature on citizenship in tax suffers two
shortfalls: first, it relies too heavily upon a formal, legalistic definition of
citizenship, and second, it fails to appreciate the full extent of points of
overlap between tax and immigration law that constitute the tax-
immigration nexus. This Article seeks to address these shortfalls and
contribute to the tax literature by exploring the implications of the tax-
immigration nexus for substantive tax law and policy, the fiscal sociolo-
gy49 literature by describing tax law's active role in constructing citizen-
ship,50 as well as the immigration and crimmigration policy literature.
Doing so requires (1) expanding our notion of citizenship in tax beyond
the formal status determined by immigration law, an expansion that so-
cial theory on citizenship allows, and (2) acknowledging5 I and defining
the tax-immigration nexus. The next two Parts address each of these
points in turn.
II. BEYOND LEGAL STATUS: THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP
Line drawing is a critically important aspect of tax law. Sorting or-
dinary assets from capital assets impacts, among other things, the rate
applied to gain from that asset.52 Debt receives markedly different treat-
48. Isaac William Martin et al., The Thunder of History: The Origins and Development of the
New Fiscal Sociology, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Isaac William Martin et al. eds., 2009).
49. Id. at 2 (describing how fiscal sociology embraces the idea that tax should be studied in an
interdisciplinary fashion: "We chose the name fiscal sociology . .. to suggest a science that would
transcend increasingly narrow disciplines and unite the study of economics with the study of history,
politics, and society").
50. Id. at 2-4. Exploring the active role tax law plays in constructing citizenship situates this
Article squarely within the goals of what the editors term the "new fiscal sociology." Id. at 3 ("What
is new about the new fiscal sociology is its recognition that taxation has a theoretical or causal-and
not just a symptomatic or methodological-importance.").
51. Stumpf, supra note 33, at 377 (describing how crimmigration law scholars note that
immigration and criminal scholars have similarly failed to acknowledge the overlap of their respec-
tive areas of law). Stumpf writes:
Yet little has been written about why this merger has occurred, and what are its theoreti-
cal underpinnings. Scholars of criminal and immigration law have tended to stay on their
own sides of the fence, focusing on developments within their fields rather than examin-
ing the growing intersections between these two areas.
Id.
52. See Nobel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Prefer-
ence, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 322-24 (1993) (providing an excellent discussion of the definition and
tax treatment of capital gains). The concept of capital gains holds that certain types of income (such
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ment than equity-a fact that creates frustration for tax students and op-
portunity for practitioners.53 A complex system of rules and standards
pervades tax law to assist in the line-drawing project.5 4 Drawing the line
between those inside and outside the taxable community is part of that
project, and tax law uses citizenship to tackle it. Superficially, tax relies
upon a simple rule to identify citizens: any person defined as a U.S. citi-
zen under the Constitution or by immigration law is a U.S. citizen for tax
purposes. But to say tax uses only a formal concept of citizenship would
be error. Examining tax law and scholarship through the lens of social
theory, specifically anthropological and sociological theory, reveals that
tax relies upon both the legalistic, formal concept of citizenship as legal
status and its own more standard-like concept of citizenship as a status an
individual achieves through performance.
Accepting that tax law relies upon a non-legalistic view of citizen-
ship requires unpacking the very concept of citizenship. Citizenship is, in
some ways, a deceptively complex concept. At first blush it may seem to
be limited to a legal status that creates a clear division between citizens
and noncitizens. Yet citizenship is more than a formal legal status.5 A
brief survey of social theory understandings of citizenship illustrates the
complexity of citizenship as a concept and provides a point of departure
for developing a nuanced concept of citizenship in tax.
as gains from investment property or activities) should be taxed at lower rates. The rationale behind
a preferential rate is the subject of a healthy body of scholarship. The statutory definition of capital
assets that gives rise to capital gains is found at I.R.C. § 1221 (2012) and the rate schedule in I.R.C.
§ 1(h) (2012).
53. See STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION 122-25 (8th ed. 2012) (providing an introduction to the topic debt and equity with an eye
toward its importance for tax law). Subchapter C of the Internal Code provides the law governing
taxation of corporations but does little to distinguish debt and equity. See generally Shu-Yi Oei &
Diane Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share Agreements, 68 VAND. L. REV. 681
(2015) (providing a recent discussion of the challenges of sorting debt from equity in the realm of
income share agreement).
54. For example, consider I.R.C. § 302 (2012), a corporate tax provision that determines
whether a sale of shareholder stock back to a corporation for property or cash or a partial liquidation
that results in a distribution to shareholder should be taxed as an exchange or a dividend. To distin-
guish between redemptions and dividends the section uses a mix of safe harbor rules and standards.
See id.
55. See Irene Bloemraad et al., Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation,
and Challenges to the Nation-State, 34 ANN. REV. Soc., Aug. 2008, at 153, 155 (providing citizen-
ship may be analyzed simply as status but an extensive and diverse literature recognizes that legal
status does not fully explain citizenship); id. ("Citizenship debates today continue to reflect tensions
between citizenship as participation, political or otherwise, and citizenship as legal status, with or
without accompanying rights and obligations."); see also Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Introduction
to THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP: A SLIPPERY CONCEPT, supra note 2, at 1-2 (stating that on
the one hand "citizenship is a legal status through which the individual can access rights and goods
in the state of her nationality or nationalities," but also, that "citizenship [is not] a simple binary
entity that one either possesses or does not; citizenship can be partial, soft, obscured by political
realities, or nonexistent").
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Sociologists define citizenship generally as a concept that groups
56
individuals into geographical and political communities. That sociolog-
ical concept of citizenship is then further deconstructed into potentially
but not necessarily overlapping parts57 : "[1] legal status, [2] rights, [3]
political and other forms of participation in society, and [4] a sense of
belonging."5 8 Full citizenship, then, is the presence or exercise of each of
these four aspects. Certain disciplines may, however, elevate one form of
citizenship over others. Law, for example, may elevate legal status and
access to rights over participation or belonging. An individual may have
formal legal status but lack a sense of belonging, thereby existing in a
type of "second-class citizenship."5 9 Alternately, a sense of belonging
and acceptance by one's community may provide a basis for achieving
formal legal status as a citizen.
Anthropologists take a slightly different approach, instead focusing
on the ways in which law shapes and reflects culture. Influential legal
anthropologist Sally Falk Moore, herself both a trained attorney and an-
thropologist, identified three general approaches anthropology6' takes in
its study of law that inform the discussion of citizenship and the law:
56. See generally Bloemraad et al., supra note 55; Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 2
("[C]itizenship in its sociological sense [is] that set of practices (juridicial, political, economic and
cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society. . . ." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
57. Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 154, 157 ("Citizenship is usually defined as a form of
membership in a political and geographic community. It can be disaggregated into four dimensions:
legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation in society, and a sense of belonging.
The concept of citizenship allows us to analyze the extent to which immigrants and their descendants
are incorporated into receiving societies."). These oft-cited dimensions derive from T.H. MARSHALL,
CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950).
58. Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 154 (providing an excellent review of trends in socio-
logical study of citizenship and potential avenues for future research).
59. Id. at 162; see also Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 17-18 ("So citizenship is slip-
pery, even though, legally speaking, you are a citizen or you are not.... Citizenship rights can vary
by 'race,' ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, stage of life, or social status.... And it is much
easier to slide down the slippery slope of citizenship rights than to climb back up again."). For a
discussion on the influence of belonging on citizenship, see Faist, supra note 2, at 196 ("A third
component of citizenship is affiliation. It concerns the buttressing of the political and legal dimen-
sions through expressive and moral components articulated, for example, through feelings of belong-
ing to a collectivity such as a nation.... This third dimension highlights the fact that citizenship is
not solely based on relations between states and citizens, that relations among citizens are decisive
for guaranteeing equal political liberties, rights and obligations."). See generally Martha T.
McCluskey, Razing the Citizen. Economic Inequality, Gender, and Marriage Tax Reform, in
GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 267, 267-85 (Linda C. McClain
& Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009) (discussing gender and dependency as a less-than citizenship).
60. See Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 162 ("Conversely, participation in the labor market
or business sector, payment of taxes, participation in local schools, raising families, or other activi-
ties that make people an integral part of their local communities and institutions can be understood
as a form of participatory citizenship that allows immigrants to make citizenship-like claims on the
state and others, even in the absence of legal citizenship status, and perhaps even in the absence of
legal residence." (citation omitted)).
61. Though Anthropology is, at its core, a descriptive discipline, it has a complicated political
and social history arising from the normative judgments of its scholars (whether implicit or explicit)
and the roles it has played as both challenger and supporter of colonial and post-colonial regimes. Its
work on citizenship as a concept can, however, provide helpful insights.
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"law as culture," "law as domination," and "law as problem solver."62
When we narrow our view from law broadly to legal definitions of citi-
zenship specifically, each of these three anthropological understandings
of law holds a potential insight.
Law or citizenship as culture suggests that each definition of citi-
zenship within law reflects and supports a broader cultural understanding
of belonging. When one views law as culture, the laws of citizenship
may be understood as social phenomenon or a "social dynamic" not un-
like race or gender.63 Whether a definition of citizenship comes from
immigration or tax law, it provides insight into the culturally contingent
categories of us/them as it structures those categories, either by reifying
or challenging them. Anthropology that advances the law as culture view
may see legal definitions of citizenship as mirrors of the culture that gave
rise to those definitions or as part of a common cultural structure that
reproduces itself across disciplines and realms within that cultural con-
text. Regardless of if one takes the interpretivist " or structural-
functionalist view, 65 the core idea-that law is both a product of and
plays a constitutive role in its cultural context-is consistent.
Citizenship as domination suggests the laws of citizenship may par-
ticipate in a disciplining or exploitative project of those with less power
by those with more.66 Certainly, immigration laws may be used to delib-
erately shape individual behavior or exclude groups from membership
within a given community because of discriminatory views or as part of
62. Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology,
1949-1999, 7 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 95, 96-97 (2001); see also ROSEN, supra note 1,
at 6-7 (writing in his brief but rich introduction to legal anthropology on the tendency of lawyers to
understand the law as something apart from culture: "When we hear a court speak of 'the conscience
of the community,' 'the reasonable man,' or 'the clear meaning of the statute,' when we watch
judges grapple with parenthood as a natural or functional phenomenon, or listen to counsel debate
whether surrogate motherhood or a frozen embryo should be thought of in terms of 'ownership,' we
know that the meaning of these concepts will come not just from the experience of legal officials or
some inner propulsion of the law but from those broader assumptions, reinforced across numerous
domains, that characterize the culture of which law is a part"). The "we" in this statement seems to
be anthropologists but may also include legal scholars. Certainly there is disagreement within the
legal academy, much less the tax academy, as to the extent to which law is culturally-contingent.
63. See Andrew Kipnis, Anthropology and the Theorisation of Citizenship, 5 ASIA PAC. J.
ANTHROPOLOGY 257, 258 (2004).
64. Geertz was a highly influential anthropologist writing in this area. For an example of such
work, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 1, 6-13 (1973) (discussing his
view of the goal of anthropology and famously discussing the possible ways of analyzing a wink).
65. For key works in the structural-functionalist literature, see generally V.W. TURNER,
SCHISM AND CONTINUITY IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY: A STUDY OF NDEMBU VILLAGE LIFE (1957);
Claude Livi-Strauss, Structural Analysis in Linguistics and Anthropology, in STRUCTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 31 (Clair Jacobson & Brooke Grundfest Shoepf trans., Basic Books 1963) (1945).
66. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (seeing power as part of a structure great-
er than individuals themselves, Foucault would, to a degree, deny agency to even those ostensibly in
positions of power); Assaf Likhovski, "Training in Citizenship ": Tax Compliance and Modernity,
32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 665 (2007) (suggesting that a possible link between tax compliance and the
construction of modem nation states and citizenry can be found in the Foucauldian-type disciplining
of the individual through mechanisms of compliance).
2112017]
212 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:2
exploitative aims. Take, for example, the process of shifting toward us-
ing a heavily-racialized concept of "illegality" to exclude targeted groups
of immigrants from arriving or staying in the United States.67 However,
this Article takes the view that the concepts of citizenship found in tax
are not shaped by any intentional animus. However, the disciplining role
of law is relevant in the citizenship realm to the extent that legal re-
quirements for obtaining citizenship, by their very nature, direct an indi-
vidual's behavior if she desires naturalized citizenship status. Laws de-
fining citizenship in immigration and tax thus play a role in disciplining
individual behavior in the citizenship as domination view.
Law as problem solver derives from the ethnographic work on dis-
pute resolution that was a focus of early legal anthropology. The law as
problem solver view holds that "law is a problem-solving, conflict-
minimizing device, consciously arrived at through rational
thought.. .."6 Stated differently, law takes the place of violent conflict
as a tool for resolving disputes. Where citizenship intersects with tax, the
greatest potential conflict is over competing sovereigns who both desire
to tax a given individual. Citizenship, in this conflict, represents a poten-
tially relevant legal category for resolving that conflict based upon rec-
ognized principles such as justice, administrability, fairness, or sover-
eignty. Indeed, attempting to resolve double taxation that could result
from two sovereigns that both assert the right to tax an individual's in-
come is a core challenge of international tax law and its system of trea-
ties.69 The law as problem solver view advances what is a commonly-
67. NICHOLAS DE GENOVA, WORKING THE BOUNDARIES: RACE, SPACE AND "ILLEGALITY" IN
MEXICAN CHICAGO 228-29 (2005) ("The treatment of 'illegality' as an undifferentiated, transhistor-
ical thing-in-itself colludes with state power in creating a remarkable visibility of 'illegal immi-
grants' swirling enigmatically around the stunning invisibility of the law."); see also Miller, supra
note 33, at 652-53 (noting a shift within immigration law terminology fits within the anthropological
view that law can be deployed to exclude). Miller notes that deportable (removable) aliens were, up
until the 1970s, known instead as "convicted aliens." Miller, supra note 33, at 652. The more com-
mon, contemporary term is now "criminal" or "illegal" aliens. As Miller notes, the term "criminal
alien" is arguably "more pejorative" than "convicted alien" which "emphasizes the past na ure of the
criminal conviction." Id.
68. Moore, supra note 62, at 97.
69. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY 11 (2016) ("[T]he fundamental dilemma of
international taxation that confronted Thomas Sewall Adams, his Treasury colleagues, and the
Congress in the infancy of the income tax remains essentially unchanged. When income is earned in
one country by a citizen or resident of another country, both the country where the income is earned
(the source country) and the country where the investor or earner resides (the residence country)
have legitimate claims to tax the income. The basic task of international tax rules is to resolve the
competing claims .. . in order to avoid the double taxation that results when both fully exercise their
taxing power."); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Pro-
posal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1305-06 (1996) (discussing the origins of our cur-
rent system and noting "[i]n 1923, a committee of four economists submitted a report to the League
of Nations that set out the basic principles underlying international tax jurisdiction for the first time.
The report pointed out that an income tax based on ability to pay does not answer the question of
whose ability to pay is to be considered in each taxing jurisdiction. To answer this question, the
report developed the 'doctrine of economic allegiance,' which underlies modern discussions of
jurisdiction to tax. Fundamentally, the report endorsed two bases for economic allegiance, which
justify a country's imposition of tax: where income is produced (the source jurisdiction) and where it
is consumed or saved (the residence jurisdiction)."); id at 1311-12 (discussing the preference for
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held understanding of the law generally and citizenship in tax specifical-
ly. 7 0 Though it is an important view, the focus of this Article is on ex-
panding our understanding of citizenship in tax beyond the traditional
view.7 As such, law as culture and law as domination or discipline are
more important to that project.
Law as culture and law as domination/discipline ground the sub-
stance of citizenship outside formal legal status. That laws regarding
citizenship reflect and create the boundaries of citizenship, suggests that
the legal status of citizen is a label of a set of behaviors or socially as-
cribed characteristics. Social theory suggests that those behaviors or
characteristics that create citizenship arise from the foundational idea
that citizenship represents a bargain between the government and its
people.72 The relationship between the State and its citizens is one of
mutual obligation.73 This two-way street of rights and responsibilities
residence as applied to individuals rather than businesses). See generally AVI-YONAH ET AL., supra
note 9, at 1, 18, 31; Allison Christians, Measuring a Fair Share, BIG PICTURE (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/68ti0095.pdf; Christians, supra note 13.
70. See infra Part Ill; see also Moore, supra note 62, at 97 ("This rationalist framework is
widely used in the legal profession . . . .").
71. Again, this effort situates this Article squarely within the fiscal sociology project. Fiscal
sociology projects utilize a similarly interdisciplinary approach to situate tax in its historical, cultur-
al, and social contexts in different countries. For an introduction to this literature, see generally
Martin et al., supra note 48, at 1.
72. See Charles Tilly, Foreword to THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN
COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 48, at xi (discussing the influence of
Locke's theory of social contract). John Locke addressed the social contract and, specifically, the
need for an authority to tax in his Second Treatise of Civil Government:
Tis true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one
who enjoys a share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the
maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e., the consent of the ma-
jority giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them. For if any
one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and
without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property,
and subverts the end of government. For what property have I in that which another may
by right take when he pleases to himself?
Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 140 (1690)). For a discus-
sion going beyond Locke, see NIALL FERGUSON, THE CASH NEXUS 79 (2001) ("Ever since the time
of ancient Athens, the link between taxation and political representation has been the crux of democ-
racy.... "); AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS,
AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 1877-1929, at 13 (2013) (describing the historical origins
of progressive taxation and noting that "[t]ax reform, simply put, was used to reconfigure the rela-
tionship between citizens and the state. It was used to renegotiate the 'imagined community' of the
modem American polity.").
73. Compare Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 156 ("A more expanded understanding of
legal citizenship focuses on the rights that accompany citizenship. This perspective, dominant in
much theorizing on citizenship, resonates with liberalism's understanding of the relationship be-
tween individuals and the state as a contract in which both sides have rights and obligations. To
maintain the citizenship contract, the state guarantees basic rights to individuals, while the individual
has the obligation to pay taxes, complete compulsory education, and obey the laws of the country.
The rights approach holds out the promise of full equality before the law for all members of a state
but leaves unresolved how to transform formal into substantive equality." (citations omitted)), with
Audrey Macklin, Sticky Citizenship, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP: A SLIPPERY CONCEPT,
supra note 2, at 223 (discussing the recent problem of "sticky citizenship" in the modem era and
noting that "[f]ew legal duties specifically attach to citizenship in the many states that have abol-
ished conscription. The benefits of citizenship seem easily to outweigh its burdens . . . ."). Though
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creates the potential for distinguishing between good and bad actors. A
State may default on its agreement o provide goods and services, just as
a citizen may not hold up her end of the bargain.74 Empirical work sup-
ports the theoretical work that views citizenship as more than legal sta-
tus.7 5 The action or inaction that distinguishes good citizens from bad is
the most important aspect for this Article, because it makes evident that
there is a distinction betweenformal citizenship-defined here as having
legal status as a citizen of a country-and performative citizenship-
defined here as meeting socially and culturally required expectations of
citizenship and belonging.76
Distinguishing between formal and performative citizenship allows
us to recognize more nuance in the concept of citizenship and, in turn,
the different concepts at play in doctrine. For example, an individual may
have formal citizenship but may not engage in "active citizenship." Tak-
en from literature on development policy, "active citizenship" requires
formal status as well as participation in government and/or community.7 7
Scholars distinguish between formal citizenship and "meaningful citizen-
ship"78 or "substantive citizenship" to draw attention to individuals who
may have formal status but are effectively-either deliberately or
through structural violence79 -denied the full rights of citizenship. Each
of these concepts emphasizes different aspects of what we mean when
we say citizenship but distill into a single idea: confining citizenship to a
formal, legal status ignores much of its substance.
Macklin makes the statement in the context of addressing why we might be concerned with sticky
citizenship-citizenship that remains with a person after not being desired-the statement, if correct,
weakens the assertion that citizenship is truly a mix of roughly equal burdens and benefits. See
LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP 8 (1998) (discussing the fiction of the assumption of burden in exchange for the bene-
fits of citizenship); id. ("It is rather a wonderfully dynamic fiction. Except for naturalized citizens,
there is no particular moment when most individuals can be said to assume obligations to the state.
Instead we take consent as implied by our failure to refuse (to pay taxes, for example... ) and by
continued acceptance of services the state provides.").
74. See generally MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1989); McCluskey, supra note
59, at 267-85.
75. See RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 159-63 (George E. Marcus & Russell
L. Hanson eds., 1993) (discussing how individuals may not agree on what duties citizenship compels
or how one distinguishes between a good citizen and a bad citizen but the general division, and the
extra-legal concept of citizenship that it implies, is observable).
76. Different areas of scholarship embrace the term performative citizenship. I do not intend
to draw upon all the different uses of the term found therein, but instead limit the term to the defini-
tion provided above. See, e.g., Kathryn R. Abrams, Performative Citizenship in the Civil Rights and
Immigrant Rights Movements (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2409971, 2014),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=2409971 (for a different use). See generally
DARREN J. O'BYRNE, THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP: POLITICAL IDENTITY BEYOND THE
NATION-STATE 191-201 (2003).
77. Matthew Clarke & Bruce Missingham, Guest Editors' Introduction: Active Citizenship
and Social Accountability, 19 DEV. PRAC. 955, 955 (2009).
78. McCluskey, supra note 59, at 270, 276-77.
79. See generally PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR (2005), for an extended discussion of structural violence and its impact
on healthcare and human rights; Paul Farmer, An Anthropology of Structural Violence, 45 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 305 (2004).
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The proposition that citizenship has a performative aspect may, to
many, seem uncontroversial. The simple fact that an individual may be-
come a naturalized citizen in the United States -that she may acquire
citizenship outside of the common avenues of jus sanguinis (by blood) or
jus soli (by birthright) citizenship8 -implies that citizenship can be
earned. Stated differently, the mere option of naturalized citizenship as-
sumes that one can "behave like" a citizen. But tax is an area that, how-
ever necessary standards may be, frequently expresses a preference for
rules, predictability, and clear distinctions over subjective analyses of
intent or, in the context of citizenship, belonging. Formally, if briefly,
examining the broader social theory concept of citizenship opens the
door to recognizing that ax, despite its preference for clear lines, utilizes
both a formal and performative understanding of citizenship.
Lending further support to the concept of performative citizenship is
the fact that it surfaces outside social theory. Op-eds read that
"[d]emocratic citizens owe it to each other to vote."82 Discussions on
immigration reform speak of earning citizenship.83 In his 2013 com-
mencement speech at Ohio State University, President Barack Obama
drew upon a sense of performative citizenship, saying:
Consider that graduates of this university serve their country through
the Peace Corps, and educate our children through established pro-
grams like Teach for America, startups like Blue Engine, often earn-
ing little pay for making the biggest impact. Some of you have al-
ready launched startup companies of your own. And I suspect that
those of you who pursue more education, or climb the corporate lad-
der, or enter the arts or science or journalism, you will still choose a
cause that you care about in your life and will fight like heck to real-
ize your vision.
There is a word for this. It's citizenship.84
80. Compare RUTH MANDEL, COSMOPOLITAN ANXIETIES: TURKISH CHALLENGES TO
CITIZENSHIP AND BELONGING IN GERMANY (2008) (discussing ethnographic exploration jus sangui-
nis principles in historical German citizenship law), with Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 6
("Citizenship is further complicated by the legal statuses of jus soli, or right of the soil, that is, citi-
zenship by virtue of having been born in a particular place, as opposed to jus sanguinis, or the right
of the blood, citizenship by virtue of bloodline or inheritance of a parent's citizenship status."). See
also Dual Citizenship in Germany: Jus Sanguinis Revisted, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21572822-how-not-treat-people-more-one-passport-jus-
sanguinis-revisited.
81. See Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 156; see also Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at
6 (noting that the United States grants citizenship on the basis of jus soli principles).
82. Lisa Hill, What We've Seen in Australia with Mandatory Voting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/11/07/should-voting-in-the-us-be-mandatory-
14/what-weve-seen-in-australia-with-mandatory-voting.
83. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/19immig.html?_r-0.
84. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Spring Commencement Speech at The Ohio State Univer-




Here President Obama appeals to the idea that citizenship is some-
thing you do, not just a status you possess. And these are simply a few of
many examples of such rhetoric on the performative aspect of citizen-
ship.
A nation constructs its citizenry through a number of means, of
which law is one. This relatively brief discussion of citizenship and
social theory yields two important insights for the purposes of this Arti-
cle. First, citizenship is not only a formal legal status but also a social
practice that individuals perform to varying degrees. These formal and
performative concepts of citizenship exist within tax and immigration
law as avenues for accomplishing different goals. Second, law both re-
flects and constitutes the culture in which it is imbedded. Both insights
from social theory lay the groundwork for arguing that tax law has a di-
rect and indirect role in defining citizenship. The definition of tax resi-
dence, which, in turn, identifies tax citizens is one example. When citi-
zenship is understood as more than a formal legal status, laws that do not
define citizenship on their face can be seen in a new light. Such laws, as
they rely upon behaviors that constitute performative citizenship to allo-
cate the taxpaying burden of citizenship, can be seen as part of a broader
social project of constructing citizenship.
III. DEFINING THE TAX-IMMIGRATION NEXUS
Both tax law and immigration law create the tax-immigration nexus.
Armed with a more nuanced concept of citizenship, we are poised to
recognize the contributions of both areas of law to what I term the tax-
immigration nexus-the network of connections between immigration
and tax law. Where immigration law relies upon tax offenses to deter-
mine whether an individual is removable or eligible for citizenship, it
creates multiple points of connection between the separate areas of law.
Similarly, when tax uses immigration and citizenship categories to assess
taxability and tax liability, it contributes to the tax-immigration nexus.86
This Part defines and describes the tax-immigration nexus, therein
providing the groundwork for analyzing the implications of that nexus
for tax law and policy in Part IV.
A. Citizenship in Immigration Law
Citizenship, immigration, and naturalization laws define who is and
can be a formal member of a national community. Unsurprisingly, these
laws have changed over time and reflect the shifting attitudes of voting
85. DE GENOVA, supra note 67, at 227 (noting "law's productivity"); Stumpf, supra note 33,
at 398 ("Immigration law defines membership , . . by establishing a ladder of accession to permanent
resident and then formal U.S. citizenship, and a set of criteria to determine whether an individual
meets the requirements .... ).
86. As this Article focuses on the implications of tax-immigration nexus for tax law and
policy, I chose tax-immigration nexus rather than the equally valid immigration-tax nexus.
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citizens and the government.87 Immigrants seeking U.S. citizenship must
meet the requirements set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act
that range from filing necessary forms to establishing good moral charac-
ter. A comprehensive discussion of the requirements for entry to the
U.S., acquisition of LPR status, and naturalization is beyond the scope of
this Article. Instead, this Article focuses on the connections between tax
and these requirements. Where immigration law draws on tax, it is doing
so with one apparent goal: to determine if an individual is the type of
citizen "we" collectively desire. Essentially, immigration law uses tax
compliance or noncompliance as a proxy for determining whether an
individual would be a good citizen or, in the terms of social theory,
whether an individual is performing her citizenship. The role, then, of tax
offenses in constructing citizens is one where tax offenses are foot sol-
diers in the immigration law task of regulating immigration and citizen-
ship. Examining the scope of tax crimes that may result in removal flesh-
es out the behaviors that we expect of citizens and the seriousness with
which we view transgressions.
Recall that the focus of this Article is on the tax-immigration nexus
and its impact on LPRs. Accordingly, considering each of the potential
points of intersection of immigration and tax law within the life of a giv-
en LPR provides a helpful framework for understanding the nexus. Imag-
ine Ishita, a lawful permanent resident living in South Carolina. Ishita
has been living in South Carolina for five years, the required statutory
period for her naturalization.89 Ishita desires to become a naturalized U.S.
citizen and begins the process of applying for citizenship.
Assuming Ishita has complied with all tax laws, Ishita may only be-
come aware of the tax-immigration nexus upon beginning her naturaliza-
87. MIGRATION POLICY INST., MAJOR U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS, 1790-PRESENT (2013),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/timeline- 1790. Examining even this relatively straightfor-
ward timeline illustrates the impact of historical and cultural context on immigration laws. Citizen-
ship was, for example, granted only to "free white persons" or revoked from women who married
foreign nationals. See KERBER, supra note 73, at 81-92 (discussing the story of two sisters arguing
for women's right to vote as a "privilege of citizenship;" arguing, in part, that their status as taxpay-
ers justified their right to full citizenship). See generally KEVIN JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
IMMIGRATION LAW 459-507 (2009); Peter F. Asaad, A Selected History ofImmigration Law and Its
Relationship to Modern Immigration Law and Policy, in WHAT EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW
ABOUT IMMIGRATION LAW 17-32 (Jennifer A. Hermansky & Kate Kalmykov eds., 2014).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012) (detailing the requirements for naturalization).
89. Id. § 1427(a) ("Residence[-]No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,
shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his applica-
tion for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preced-
ing the date of filing his application has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least
half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the
United States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has resided
continuously within the United States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to
citizenship, and (3) during all the periods referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person
of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.").
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tion application. If she has received assistance on her path to citizenship,
however, she may understand how important tax compliance is to citi-
zenship." The means by which immigration authorities obtain her com-
pliance information is routine and well known in tax: a simple, though
lengthy, form. Though seemingly mundane, naturalization forms provide
ready evidence of the tax-immigration nexus. An LPR seeking naturali-
zation must complete the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), a part of the Department of Homeland Security, Form N-400.
Among a host of other questions spanning topics from marital history to
voting activity, Part 12 of the form (Additional Information) asks appli-
cants three tax-related questions.
Excerpt from Form N-400:
6. Do you owe any overdue Federal, State, or local taxes? D Yes ] No
7. A. Have you ever not filed a Federal, State, or local tax return since you became a Peranent Resident? O Yes E No
B. If "Yes, "did you consider yourself to be a "non-U.S. resident"? E Yes O No
8 Have you called yourself a "non-U.S. resident" on a Federal, State, or local tax return since you becarne a 0 Yes O No
Permanent Resident?
The questions center upon compliance, both payment and filing, and
proper characterization of the applicant as either a nonresident-a tax
category-or permanent resident-an immigration category. Agency
factsheets further emphasize the importance of tax compliance on the
path to naturalization.92 Though only a part of the assessment of eligibil-
ity for citizenship,9 3 the presence of the questions in Part 12 and the em-
phasis seen in unofficial explanatory materials, evince the importance of
tax compliance in sorting "good" would-be citizens from "bad." Tax is
special. By including questions regarding tax compliance, the USCIS is
attempting to establish whether we, as a society, would want Ishita as a
fellow citizen. If Ishita is compliant with the tax laws, these three ques-
90. Practice area guides give varying levels of information on the connection between tax and
immigration. See Vlad Frants & Brandon D. Hadley, Tax Rules for Immigration Law Practitioners,
in WHAT EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 87, at 495-507.
This text is published by the ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. Chapter
18 of this same text specifically lists tax compliance as a relevant consideration to the good moral
character assessment aspiring citizens face. Jennifer A. Hermansky, U.S. Citizenship and Naturaliza-
tion, in WHAT EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 87, at 361.
91. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Form N-400:
Application for Naturalization (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/n-
400.pdf.
92. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Thinking About
Applying for Naturalization?: Use This List to Help You Get Ready! (Nov. 2016),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Office%20of
%20Citizenship/Citizenship%20Resource%20Center/o20Site/Publications/PDFs/G- 1151 .pdf ("Have
you reported your income on your income tax forms? Your tax returns are very important proof that
you are eligible for naturalization. On the day of your interview, bring certified tax returns for the
last 5 years (3 years if you are married to a U.S. citizen). Certified tax transcripts may be ordered by
using Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 4506-T available at www.irs.gov or calling 1-800-829-
1040.").
93. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1381 (2012) (listing offenses that may bar admission or naturaliza-
tion or result in deportation).
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tions will provide no bar to her naturalization-she has checked one box
on the good citizen checklist. If she is not, however, she may experience
the full-force of the tax-immigration nexus through any of three immi-
gration concepts: aggravated felony, crime of moral turpitude, or the
concept of good moral character.
1. Grounds for Removal: Tax Crimes as Aggravated Felonies and
Crimes of Moral Turpitude
Considering the most damning use of tax offenses in immigration
first takes us to § 1104(a)(43)(M), the INA section defines an "aggravat-
ed felony." Clause (ii) of subparagraph M identifies a specific offense as
an aggravated felony-§ 7201 tax evasion94 where the government loses
more than $10,000-while clause (i) describes a class of crimes: crimes
"involv[ing] fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims
exceeds $10,000."9 5 Thus, only one of the two clauses is, by its terms,
tax specific. Paragraph 43 then continues its voluminous list of potential
aggravated felonies without another mention of tax crimes. As intro-
duced in Part I, Kawashima broadened the range of tax crimes that can
count as aggravated felonies under the INA, thus deepening this point of
connection in the tax-immigration nexus. Committing an aggravated
felony at any point after admission renders an LPR removable, meaning
the consequences of being found guilty of these offenses is profound.96
Looking to the substance of the offenses that qualify gives a better sense
of the scope of this part of the tax-immigration nexus and the conduct
that immigration law believes makes for a "bad" citizen.
Section 7201 defines the "capstone" offense of tax evasion as fol-
lows:
94. Section 7201 is discussed further infra Part 111. The statutory language defines the crime
and potential penalties:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by
this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000
($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, to-
gether with the costs of prosecution.
I.R.C. § 7201 (2012).
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(M) (2012). Interestingly, the required financial loss was greater
before a 1996 change in law. In that year, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996 lowered the (a)(43) amounts from $200,000 to $10,000. Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(M) (2012));
see also Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 497 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that an
LPR could quickly reach the required threshold: "Nor would the $10,000 threshold set in 8 U.S.C.
§ I l01(a)(43)(M) prevent deportation for tax crimes far less serious than willful tax evasion, for as
many as six years may be included in the amount-of-loss calculation").
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (listing classes of "deportable aliens"). The consequences of an
aggravated felony differ depending upon the immigration status of an individual. The Supreme Court
notes that deportation (or removal) has consistently been recognized as a "particularly severe 'penal-
ty."' Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (addressing whether an individual was entitled
to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to inform
him of the collateral immigration consequences of his guilty plea in an unrelated crime).
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Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000
in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both, together with the costs of prosecution.
97
In subsequent sections, Congress articulated lesser-included offens-
es such as the failure to file a return or pay tax.98 The relationship of the-
se lesser-included offenses to tax evasion is a matter of scholarly and
prosecutorial interest but is not particularly relevant here.99 Most im-
portant for this Article is the key takeaway that these offenses target will-
ful, fraudulent attempts to evade assessment of payment of tax liabil-
ity. 100
Taking Kawashima alongside the INA makes clear that tax compli-
ance is a significant aspect of performing and being eligible for citizen-
ship. So significant, in fact, that committing a tax crime justifies both
closing the door to citizenship and uprooting an individual from the
community to which she may have belonged for decades. This outcome,
though severe, may be appropriate. Perhaps flagging "bad" tax citizens
as "bad" citizens by use of aggravated felonies is right as a matter of
immigration policy.101 Many may wish the same fate on U.S. citizens
who regularly flout the income tax laws.102 But does the same logic re-
main true as the offense becomes less grave or, as in the case of civil
penalties, may be due to inadvertent noncompliance?
Aggravated felonies are not the only crimes that result in removal.
INA § 1227(a)(2) states that an LPR who commits a crime of moral tur-
97. I.R.C. § 7201.
98. See I.R.C. § 7203 (2012) ("Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax
or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep
any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make
such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or
regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corpora-
tion), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. In the case
of any person with respect to whom there is a failure to pay any estimated tax, this section shall not
apply to such person with respect to such failure if there is no addition to tax under section
6654 or 6655 with respect to such failure. In the case of a willful violation of any provision
of section 60501, the first sentence of this section shall be applied by substituting 'felony' for 'mis-
demeanor' and '5 years' for '1 year."').
99. See generally OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, CRIMINAL TAX Div., TAX CRIMES HANDBOOK
(2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_crimes handbook.pdf.
100. See I.R.C. § 7201.
101. To be clear, I am not arguing in favor of this view. Instead, I am simply acknowledging
that tax policy is not the only driver in this discussion. Immigration law policymakers must assess
the degree to which they believe tax compliance is a reliable proxy for "good" citizenship. As the
next subpart discusses, however, the decisions that immigration policymakers have made have
import for tax law and policy and, as this Article argues, are particularly problematic when the
noncompliance is inadvertent.
102. This statement was made by many colleagues as this paper was in development, though
perhaps with tongue in cheek.
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pitude within five or ten years of admission that may result in a sentence
of a year or more, is deportable.'0 3 So too is an LPR with multiple con-
victions of crimes of moral turpitude regardless of whether the crime can
or does result in imprisonment.'04 Courts have defined the bounds of
crimes of moral turpitude and have regularly considered state and federal
tax offenses as such.0 5 A recent Ninth Circuit opinion succinctly sum-
marizes the doctrine: "Crimes of moral turpitude are of basically two
types, those involving fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness
or depravity."'06 Tax offenses fall into the former category. In the same
case, Carty v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit considered whether, under a
California statute, failure to file a return with a willful intent to evade tax
was synonymous with intent to defraud, thereby rendering the offense a
crime of moral turpitude.'07 Finding the two to be synonymous, the LPR
taxpayer remained removable.'0 8 A key insight illustrated by this and
other similar opinions, is that an offense need not include fraud as a spe-
cific element for the offense to constitute a crime of moral turpitude.
Employing an analysis similar to that of the majority opinion in Ka-
washima, courts have found that if fraud is a necessary though unstated
element of the tax offense, such an offense may be a crime of moral tur-
pitude."1 0
103. The time limit depends upon the individual's particular path to LPR status. For example,
see 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (2012), which governs residents who are married to U.S. citizens. The statute
reads:
Any person whose spouse is a citizen of the United States, or any person who obtained
status as a lawful permanent resident by reason of his or her status as a spouse or child of
a United States citizen who battered him or her or subjected him or her to extreme cruel-
ty, may be naturalized upon compliance with all the requirements of this subchapter ex-
cept the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 1427(a) of this title if such person imme-
diately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continu-
ously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for
at least three years, and during the three years immediately preceding the date of filing
his application has been living in marital union with the citizen spouse (except in the case
of a person who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a United States citi-
zen spouse or parent), who has been a United States citizen during all of such period, and
has been physically present in the United States for periods totaling at least half of that
time and has resided within the State or the district of the Service in the United States in
which the applicant filed his application for at least three months.
Id.
104. I.R.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
105. As the Fourth Circuit succinctly stated: "Generally, violations of the federal tax law
constitute crimes of moral turpitude, which, in turn, demonstrate a lack of good moral character." El-
Ali v. Carroll, No. 95-1013, 1996 WL 192169, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (per curiam).
106. Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005).
107. Id. at 1082.
108. Id. at 1085 ("Having determined that willful failure to file a tax return, with the intent to
evade taxes, involves fraud, and thus constitutes a crime of moral turpitude, we dismiss the petition
for lack ofjurisdiction.").
109. Id. at 1084 ("We have held that [e]ven if intent to defraud is not explicit in the statutory
definition, a crime nevertheless may involve moral turpitude if such intent is implicit in the nature of
the crime." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. See Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012); see also Chhabra v. Holder, 444 F.
App'x 493 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that willful tax evasion met the crime of moral turpitude standard
because willful evasion requires intent to defraud); Costello v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
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This broad understanding of crimes of moral turpitude can encom-
pass a number of tax offenses. But a broad sweep may be appropriate
when considered alongside the limitations on the impact of commission
of crimes of moral turpitude. An LPR will only be removable for com-
mitting crimes of moral turpitude within a particular limited time frame
after admission, or if she or he commits multiple offenses. The law, thus,
seems designed to catch individuals before they are fully entrenched in
their lives in the United States or, even if they have been performing
citizenship, if they show themselves to be repeat offenders. This stands
in contrast to even one commission of an aggravated felony being suffi-
ciently severe to establish bad character. When, however, a crime is con-
sidered a lesser crime of moral turpitude, we need to see a pattern of bad
actions before we pass judgment on the individual's character.
Lawful permanent residents who commit an intentional or willful,
fraudulent tax offense may not be the most sympathetic group. If tax
compliance is a significant aspect of performative citizenship-as the
tax-immigration nexus suggests it is-an offending LPR's failure to per-
form this aspect of citizenship may outweigh the other social, civic, and
economic connections that comprise that citizenship. Paired with the
LPR's lack of formal citizenship, she finds herself facing a simple equa-
tion "bad tax citizen"="bad citizen." But the equation does not necessari-
ly balance as easily when the offenses are civil and the character assess-
ment by immigration authorities is discretionary. In that case, the weight
of the performative citizenship of an individual and the disproportionate-
ly lenient punishment of formal citizens for the same offense looms
large.
2. Grounds for Removal: Taxation and "Good Moral Character"
Commission of an aggravated felony or crime of moral turpitude
provides a statutory ground for removal, but the tax-immigration nexus
goes beyond tax crimes. To be eligible for naturalization, an immigrant
must be of "good moral character.".. The fact that no statutory ground
311 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1962) ("There can be no 'wilful' evasion without a specific intent to de-
fraud."), rev'd, 376 U.S. 120 (1964).
111. Good moral character is one of multiple requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012) reads:
(a) Residence[-]No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be
naturalized unless uch applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his appli-
cation for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years
immediately preceding the date of filing his application has been physically present there-
in for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or
within the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the ap-
plication for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States
from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during
all the periods referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral
character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
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for removal exists does not establish that the individual is of good moral
character.112 Rather, the individual immigrant bears the burden of estab-
lishing good moral character for at least the five years preceding the nat-
uralization application, though conduct outside that period may be rele-
vant as well.' 13
Returning to § 1101 of the INA yields a list of behaviors or actions
that establish statutory poor moral character.114 None of the listed offen-
sive behaviors are tax-related, though there is a cross reference to the
now familiar definition of aggravated felony which, by its definition,
includes tax crimes."' If the § 1101(f) list of behaviors that establish
poor moral character were exhaustive, subsection (f) would add little to
the tax-immigration nexus. Flush language in subsection (f) creates a
"catch-all" category of behavior, however, stating that "[t]he fact that
any person is not within any of the foregoing classes hall not preclude a
finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral
character.""6 This language opens the door to an even more robust tax-
immigration nexus; a door regularly utilized by immigration authorities
to cast a range of tax offenses as evidence that an individual lacks the
requisite good moral character to become a naturalized citizen.
USCIS can use findings or allegations of civil tax offenses-
violations of law that fall outside the aggravated felony standard ule in
112. Id. § 1427(d) ("No finding by the Attorney General that the applicant is not deportable
shall be accepted as conclusive evidence of good moral character.").
113. Id. § 1427(e) ("In determining whether the applicant has sustained the burden of establish-
ing good moral character and the other qualifications for citizenship specified in subsection (a) of
this section, the Attorney General shall not be limited to the applicant's conduct during the five years
preceding the filing of the application, but may take into consideration as a basis for such determina-
tion the applicant's conduct and acts at any time prior to that period.").
114. To be precise, these traits or behaviors show a lack of good moral character, the absence
of which is assumed to be poor moral character. I intend to imply no judgment but rather simply the
opposite of the required moral character for naturalization. See I.R.C. § 1101(f) (2012) ("For the
purposes of this chapter-No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral
character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, is, or
was1-() a habitual drunkard ... (3) a member of one or more of the classes of persons, whether
inadmissible or not, described in paragraphs (2)(D), (6)(E), and (I 0)(A) of section 1182(a) of this
title; or subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section I I82(a)(2) of this title and subparagraph (C) thereof of
such section [8] (except as such paragraph relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30
grams or less of marihuana), if the offense described therein, for which such person was convicted or
of which he admits the commission, was committed during such period; (4) one whose income is
derived principally from illegal gambling activities; (5) one who has been convicted of two or more
gambling offenses committed during such period; (6) one who has given false testimony for the
purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter; (7) one who during such period has been con-
fined, as a result of conviction, to a penal institution for an aggregate period of one hundred and
eighty days or more, regardless of whether the offense, or offenses, for which he has been confined
were committed within or without such period; (8) one who at any time has been convicted of an
aggravated felony (as defined in subsection (a)(43) of this section); or (9) one who at any time has
engaged in conduct described in section I I82(a)(3)(E) of this title (relating to assistance in Nazi
persecution, participation in genocide, or commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial killings) or
II 82(a)(2)(G) of this title (relating to severe violations of religious freedom).").
115. See id. § l101 (f)(8) ("[O]ne who at any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony
(as defined in subsection (a)(43) of this section).").
116. Id. § 1101(f) (emphasis added).
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§ 10 1(a)(43)-to establish lack of good moral character.117 Case law in
the area illustrates two key points: (1) immigration authorities regularly
use and accept civil tax offenses as evidence of a lack of good moral
character and (2) no finding of liability is required for the alleged offense
to count against moral character. Such offenses, ranging from errors in
assessing liability to failing to pay taxes owed,118 fall under the catch-all
category of behaviors showing poor moral character under § 1101(f)." 9
Detailing a few illustrative examples gives a better sense of the relevance
of tax compliance to the good moral character assessment.
The use of civil tax offenses, whether established or alleged,120 to
challenge an individual's good moral character is a widespread occur-
rence. Though courts look favorably on a record of payment of taxes,12 1
the more frequent use appears to be to cast doubt on an individual's
character.122 Circuit courts have confirmed, for example, that failing to
pay tax owed is an act that is within the immigration judge's discretion to
117. 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(l)-(3) (2012). Note the absence of a requirement of conviction or
charge of unlawful acts, but rather simply that the individual committed acts showing a lack of good
moral character. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
USCIS POLICY MANUAL, vol. 12, Pt. F, ch. 5 (2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volumel2-PartF-Chapter5.html ("This
provision does not require the applicant to have been charged or convicted of the offense. An 'un-
lawful act' includes any act that is against the law, illegal or against moral or ethical standards of the
community. The fact that an act is a crime makes any commission thereof an unlawful act.").
118. Okoloji v. Chertoff, No. 3:07CV24(WWE), 2007 WL 1851216, at *1 (D. Conn. June 25,
2007) ("Failure to pay owed taxes is an unlawful act that adversely reflects upon your moral charac-
ter. In light of the lack of evidence concerning any extenuating circumstances that would have
caused petitioner's failure to pay taxes timely, the USCIS found that plaintiff had not sustained his
burden of proof to establish good moral character during the statutorily prescribed period.").
119. See, e.g., Cardenas-Morfin v. Ashcroft, 87 F. App'x 629, 631 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2004)
(showing an example of USCIS introducing allegations of tax offenses to negate good moral charac-
ter).
120. Id. ("At the hearing, the INS accused Cardenas of intentionally making false statements
on old tax returns. Although these alleged misrepresentations occurred before the five year statutory
period for assessing moral character required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B), the U nevertheless
concluded that Cardenas lacked good moral character."). Though the Ninth Circuit ultimately re-
manded the case for further proceedings, it is illustrative of the tendency of the Immigration Judge to
accept and immigration authorities to use alleged violations. Id. at 632.
121. Angel v. Chertoff, No. 07-cv-168-JPG, 2007 WL 3085962, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2007)
("He pays his taxes and employs dozens of workers.").
122. See, e.g., Dominguez-Capistran v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 808, 809 (8th Cir. 2005) (discuss-
ing an example of a court favorably noting that a woman "diligently paid state and federal taxes in
this country" when considering her cancellation of removal proceedings), vacated, 428 F.3d 876 (8th
Cir. 2006); see also Abuhekal v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 10-4687 ADM/TNL,
2011 WL 2600709, at *5 (D. Minn. June 30, 2011); Abulkhair v. Bush, No. 08-CV-5410
(DMC)(MF), 2010 WL 2521760, at *9 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) ("The Court notes that failure to file
tax returns or otherwise comport with civic responsibilities can in some instances prevent a naturali-
zation applicant from demonstrating 'good moral character."'), aff'd, 413 F. App'x 502 (3d Cir. Feb.
9, 2011); Gizzo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 02 Civ. 4879(RCC), 2003 WL
22110278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2003) (using a prior criminal incidence of noncompliance to
argue a lack of good moral character; despite the incident being outside the statutory period "[tihe
District Director stated that a failure to report income constitutes a crime involving moral turpi-
tude").
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consider when evaluating good moral character.123 Neither the amount of
tax owed because of the error being significant nor a legal finding of
intent to commit the tax offense are requirements for the offense to count
as a strike against the good moral character of the individual.1 24 Some-
what concerning is the inconsistency of opinions regarding just how
much noncompliance is relevant-sometimes errors are sufficient,
whereas in other instances they are not-an inconsistency that is due to
1 25the discretionary nature of the moral character assessment1. Important-
ly, the fact that an individual amends her return to correct any errors will
not necessarily assist her in immigration proceedings.12 6 Further, doubts
as to the relevance of the act on the individual's moral character will be
resolved against he applicant.127 Taken together, case law on the use of
123. See Marji v. Gonzales, 166 F. App'x 197, 200 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2006) ("[F]ailing to pay
taxes can be grounds for an adverse character finding, [and] the IJ did not err in considering these
facts.").
124. Sumbundu v. Holder, 602 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2010).
125. Id. (upholding a finding of lack of good moral character where the individuals had a
history of underreporting where "whatever intent requirement may apply could be found"); El-Ali v.
Carroll, No. 95-1013, 1996 WL 192169, at *6 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (per curiam) (holding where
errors regarding the address on the return were accepted as evidence of a lack of good moral charac-
ter); Sekibo v. Chertoff, No. H-08-2219, 2010 WL 2196271, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2010) (allow-
ing for some dishonesty regarding compliance and stating "[w]hile it is likely that, for example,
filing a late tax return one year and then neglecting to acknowledge that fact on a naturalization
application would not, standing alone, prevent an applicant from showing good moral character, the
Court finds that failing to file tax returns for five consecutive years and then denying that fact under
penalty of perjury is not indicative of an applicant with 'good moral character, attached to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of
the United States"' (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012))); Gambino v. Pomeroy, 562 F. Supp. 974,
985 (D.N.J. 1982) ("The mere existence of errors in tax returns could not rationally be regarded as a
basis for saying that a petitioner was not of good moral character. Failure to file, however, is quite
another matter so long as there is any indication of an obligation to file. Continued failure to file is
even worse."). For a recent discussion of the good moral character assessment, see Kevin Lapp,
Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571, 1574
(2012) (noting "[USCIS'] current penchant for punitive discretion" and calling for reform).
126. Sumbundu, 602 F.3d at 56 (upholding a finding of lack of good moral character where the
individuals had a history of underreporting where "whatever intent requirement may apply could be
found"). The Second Circuit also determined that he sum of taxes owed was not determinative. Id.
The petitioners in the case asserted that, to be a strike against their moral character, the amount owed
needs to be "substantial." Id. at 50. The court rejected this argument, stating: "We conclude that
misrepresenting a 'substantial sum' may certainly be a factor in the IJ's moral character determina-
tion. We nevertheless reject Petitioner's suggestion that he agency's discretion under the catchall
provision is so narrow, as to entail any such requirement." Id. at 56.
127. The discretion given to the courts derives from the fact that naturalized citizenship is
something an individual eams, as opposed to a given right. See, e.g., United States v. Spohrer, 175 F.
440, 441-43 (C.C.D.N.J. 1910) ("An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of
citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed
conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon
and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege is bound,
therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone the right he seeks can be conferred."), cited with
approval in Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912); see also V. Woemer, Annotation,
What Constitutes Showing of "Good Moral Character" on the Part of an Applicant for Naturaliza-
tion, 22 A.L.R.2d § 2 (2014) ("Consequently, the courts agree that naturalization is a matter of grace,
not of right, a privilege to be granted only upon compliance with all the terms prescribed by the
Congress; that he good moral character requirements continue p to and including the date of final
hearing upon the petition for naturalization; that the petitioner has the burden of proving good moral
character; and that all doubts as to his good moral character must be resolved against the petition-
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tax compliance in the good moral character evaluation illustrates that
noncompliance, or even merely alleged noncompliance with a broad
range of tax offenses, is held to be a marker of bad character.128
For each sympathetic petitioner in the cases just cited there is one
who may seem less so.12 9 Though many may be unsympathetic to LPRs
like the Kawashimas, being similarly unsympathetic to the LPRs who
fall into the good moral character space of the tax-immigration nexus
seems unnecessarily harsh. Our tax code is notoriously complex and
there are a multitude of potential footfalls. Indeed, petitioners in many
good moral character cases note the complexity of the Code and the dif-
ficulty of compliance.13 0 Should an individual fail to comply, there is
also a range of civil penalties at the IRS's disposal to support tax compli-
ance by making noncompliance costly. The Code lays out accuracy and
fraud penalties including, § 6651 for failure to file a return or pay tax,
§ 6662 which imposes, in part, penalties for underpayment of tax due to
negligence or substantial understatements, and a fraud penalty under
§ 6663 when the Service can show that even part of an understatement is
due to taxpayer fraud. Even with the help of tax preparation software, it
is not unreasonable for individuals to make inadvertent mistakes that
result in noncompliance.131 Financial penalties may be appropriate in
er."). See generally United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931), overruled in part on other
grounds by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
128. The use of the good character requirement (and the aggravated felony and crime of moral
turpitude concepts used to support it) is to identify "good" citizens. For an express statement of this
idea, see In re Nybo, 34 F.2d 161, 163 (E.D. Mich. 1929) ("Granting of citizenship is a question
which must be approached from the standpoint of the advantages to result to this country rather than
the benefits which would flow to the petitioner."), affd, 42 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1930); Woerner, supra
note 127, § 2 ("It has been frequently stated, and without dissent, that the purpose of the naturaliza-
tion statutes is to admit to citizenship those aliens who, having met other requirements, it appears
will make good American citizens."). Courts struggle with the standard by which to judge moral
character but the consensus seems to be immigrants should be judged by the "average" citizen and
morality of the time. For a discussion of the range of cases addressing the standard, see Woemer,
supra note 127, § 3. Judge Learned Hand, speaking then for the Second Circuit, articulated the
inherent challenges of such speculation in Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir.
1949) ("[W]e thought that such conduct did not conform to 'the generally accepted moral conven-
tions current at the time'; but we added: 'Left at large as we are, without means of verifying our
conclusion, and without authority to substitute our individual beliefs, the outcome must needs be
tentative; and not much is gained by discussion."').
129. See, e.g., Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 706 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Santana-
Albarran argues that the back tax returns are reliable because 'no one is going to hang a large tax
liability around his or her neck unless the tax is owed.' Analogizing to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, he states that filing the tax returns is a statement against interest and therefore is credible
proof that he was in the country during those times. We find this argument to be wholly unpersua-
sive. One would certainly 'hang a large tax liability around his or her neck' if it means that one could
avoid removal from the country, as was evidenced by the fact that these returns were filed in the first
place only in response to the IJ's concern." (citations omitted)).
130. See, e.g., Mateo v. Gonzales, 217 F. App'x 476, 485 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2007).
131. For example, many business deductions require the taxpayer to maintain adequate records
to substantiate the business use of an asset, such as a car that may have personal use value as well.
When the Service attempts to establish fraudulent intent under the civil § 6663 fraud penalty it uses
"badges of fraud" including failure to maintain adequate records. Morse v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M.
(CCH) 673 (2003). Failing to maintain adequate records may not, alone, be enough to establish fraud
but can support a finding. Id. But see Gambino, 562 F. Supp. at 985 ("The mere existence of errors
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such cases, but are all tax offenses sufficiently concerning, or is the evi-
dence required to establish willfulness for civil tax offenses strong
enough that they should be able to outweigh the myriad of ways in which
the individual has performed her citizenship (which may include compli-
ance with other tax laws)? 32 If the answer from immigration law is yes,
tax law should respond by evaluating the impact of such grave collateral
consequences on the fairness of its own laws.
Understanding the collateral consequences of tax law in immigra-
tion and the extent to which immigration law uses tax as an indication of
whether an individual is performing her citizenship, give us a sense of
the tax-immigration nexus from the standpoint of immigration law. At its
core, the tax-immigration nexus created by immigration law illustrates
that immigration law uses tax law to help define its view of community.
Through the tax-immigration nexus, immigration law uses tax to police
the boundaries of the U.S. community by granting or denying member-
ship to individuals based, in part, on their tax compliance. By including
questions regarding compliance on the naturalization form, immigration
law uses the tax-immigration nexus to discipline and train "good citi-
zens" as it requires compliance.133 Thus, the substance of the tax-
immigration nexus that immigration law provides fits well into the per-
formative citizenship mold-citizenship is both a status you have and
something you do. The next subpart fleshes out ax law's contribution to
the tax-immigration nexus.
B. Citizenship in Tax Law
Tax law contributes to the tax-immigration nexus in two ways.
First, by relying upon immigration categories to define the taxable com-
munity-the group from whom the government asserts the right to col-
lect tax-tax law directly creates a point of connection in the nexus. Se-
in tax returns could not rationally be regarded as a basis for saying that a petitioner was not of good
moral character."). There is, however, no statutory bar to considering errors as evidence of a lack of
good moral character and, most importantly, tax authorities may use repeated errors to establish an
intent to defraud the government, as discussed above.
132. El-Ali v. Carroll, No. 95-1013, 1996 WL 192169, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (Hall, J.,
concurring) (per curiam) (writing separately and questioning the sufficiency of evidence used to
establish willfulness in stating: "From the moment of his confrontation with the interview examiner,
El-Ali has steadfastly denied any wrongdoing. In truth, the only evidence of guilt that the INS has
before it are El-Ali's signed tax returns bearing his in-laws' address; however, that El-Ali intention-
ally signed a tax return containing incorrect information does not mandate a conclusion that he
specifically intended to deceive or defraud the government by doing so. Indeed, the circumstances in
this case appear to indicate just the opposite. EI-Ali came to this country, diligently found employ-
ment (which he yet retains), started a family, and strove to assist his new father-in-law by purchasing
a grocery store for him to run. There is abundant evidence in the record from which the trier of fact
could conclude that El-Ali simply made an innocent mistake, perhaps as a result of giving his father-
in-law too free a rein, or by relying too much on the tax preparer. Moreover, it strains credulity to
posit that El-Ali would willfully file a false tax return, then, unbidden, bring a copy of it to the
immigration interview." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
133. Similar overlap has been explored in the context of crimmigration law. For an excellent
discussion of the importance of such overlap, see Miller, supra note 33, at 617.
2017] 227
DENVER LAWREVIEW
cond, tax law indirectly deepens the tax-immigration nexus by codifying
a concept of performative citizenship in its definition of resident alien
and exclusions therefrom.
An individual need not have a formal immigration status to be a
taxpayer. Stated differently, tax citizen and formal citizen need not over-
lap as categories. If we understand citizenship as both formal and per-
formative, this lack of correlation leads to two different but potentially
overlapping concepts of citizenship. An individual may have one formal
immigration status as citizen or noncitizen and a separate performative
citizenship status as a tax citizen. In the simplest case-a U.S. citizen
living in the United States-citizenship as formal immigration status and
tax citizen status overlap perfectly-this person is both a U.S. citizen per
immigration law' 34 and a "United States person" subject to tax as a citi-
zen under § 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Reality is, as ever,
a bit more complex. An individual may be present in the United States as
a noncitizen and still perform her citizenship so as to be classified as a
tax citizen; owing tax on the same terms as a U.S. citizen.'35 LPRs best
exemplify this lack of overlap by representing a unique mix of formal
immigration status just shy of citizenship, paired with an extended histo-
ry of performing citizenship in meaningful ways by living, working and
participating in their local and national communities. 136 The fact that
LPRs fall into the gap between formal and tax citizenship raises concerns
for tax policy that become evident as one examines tax law's contribu-
tions to the tax-immigration nexus.
1. Tax Law's Direct and Indirect Connections to Immigration Law
Tax law's direct contribution to the tax-immigration nexus is readily
identifiable. Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on
individuals, but it is § 7701 that clarifies who constitutes an individual
134. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2012).
135. Indeed, LPRs perform their citizenship in more ways than simply owing taxes on the same
terms as citizens. While LPRs cannot vote, they are required to register for the selective service
alongside citizens and all other immigrants. For more information on selective service requirements,
see Immigrants and Dual Nationals, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS.,
https://www.sss.gov/Registration/Immigrants-and-Dual-Nationals (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
136. Certainly individuals whose immigration status is authorized but who do not have LPR
status or unauthorized immigrants may participate in and contribute to their communities in mean-
ingful ways that track performative citizenship. Indeed, there are numerous studies quantifying the
contributions unauthorized immigrants make to federal, state, and local revenues. See Lipman, supra
note 13, at 2; see also Campbell, supra note 26; Juila Preston, Immigrants Aren 't Taking Americans'
Jobs, New Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/immigrants-arent-taking-americans-jobs-new-study-
finds.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r-0 (summarizing the economic and
fiscal consequences of immigration). However, the fact that LPRs have already obtained a necessary
pre-requisite to citizenship-the green card-means they are further along the path to formal citizen-
ship and, therein, uniquely situated.
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subject to tax.137 Section 7701 starts by defining a "person" as a natural
person or individual (as well as trusts, estates, and business entities).138
Section 7701 also defines the term "taxpayer" as "any person subject o
any internal revenue tax."'39 Neither of these paragraphs truly gives a
clear sense of the taxable community. In § 7701(a)(30) the Code begins
to clarify the boundaries of that community as it defines "United States
person" as a "citizen or resident of the United States ... ."140 Through
subparagraph 30, the Code identifies citizens as falling within the bounds
of the taxable community while it also adds another category-
resident.141
The Code defines a resident, specifically a resident alien, in two
ways. Section 7701(b) sets out these two definitions of resident status, as
well as provides for an election into such status.142 Clause (1) uses the
immigration law definition of LPR to identify such persons as tax resi-
dents. 143 Clause (ii) sets out a substantial presence test'4 while clause
(iii) provides an election for resident status.145 A nonresident is, by ex-
tension, an individual who fails both the formal and substantial presence
tests. 146
Section 7701's core contribution to the nexus begins with clauses (i)
and (ii). Clause (i) creates tax law's direct connection to immigration
law. The connection is direct because it is tax law that forces the overlap
between an immigration category and a tax result. To define resident
alien, § 7701(b) uses the immigration category of LPR to identify a taxa-
137. For the purpose of this Article, I am focused on natural persons. Section 1 of the Code
imposes a tax on individuals and prescribes different rate schedules for persons based upon their
marital status and whether they care for qualifying dependents. I.R.C. § I (a)-(d) (2012).
138. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2012).
139. Id. § 7701(a)(14).
140. Id. § 7701(a)(30).
141. The regulations clarify beyond any doubt that citizens, resident aliens, and nonresident
aliens are all part of the taxable community. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-l(a)(1) (2008) ("Section I of the Code
imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United
States and, to the extent provided by section 87 1(b) or 877(b), on the income of a nonresident alien
individual.").
142. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) ("(b) Definition of resident alien and nonresident alien.-() In
general.-For purposes of this title (other than subtitle B)-(A) Resident alien.-An alien individual
shall be treated as a resident of the United States with respect to any calendar year if (and only if)
such individual meets the requirements of clause (i), (ii), or (iii).").
143. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) ("Lawfully admitted for permanent residence.-Such individual is a
lawful permanent resident of the United States at any time during such calendar year."); see also
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(b)-1 (2008) ("An alien is a resident alien with respect to a calendar year if
the individual is a lawful permanent resident at any time during the calendar year. A lawful perma-
nent resident is an individual who has been lawfully granted the privilege of residing permanently in
the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws.").
144. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii) ("Substantial presence test.-Such individual meets the sub-
stantial presence test of paragraph (3).").
145. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(iii) ("First year election.-Such individual makes the election provid-
ed in paragraph (4).").
146. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(B) ("Nonresident alien.-An individual is a nonresident alien if such
individual is neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident of the United States (within the
meaning of subparagraph (A))."). See generally I.R.C. § 871 (2012).
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ble resident alien.14 7 Stated simply, the fact that an individual has been
vetted by and identified as a member of the national community by
USCIS provides a proxy for membership in the taxable community.
Thus, a resident alien becomes, by operation of § 7701(b) a tax citizen-
someone understood to be sufficiently enmeshed in the community as to
be taxable.
The substantial presence category gives shape to the tax citizen cat-
egory. It does so by making evident he assumptions underlying tax law's
use of the LPR status as a proxy for community membership. The second
clause of § 7701(b)(1)(A) identifies individuals who satisfy the substan-
tial presence test as resident aliens. In doing so, it provides the founda-
tion of tax law's indirect contribution to the tax-immigration nexus.148 it
does so by creating another category of tax citizens: individuals who
attain resident alien status because of their "substantial presence" in the
United States.14 9 Jumping ahead to paragraph 3 of the same subsection
gives the definition of substantial presence-a mechanical test that
measures the number of days an individual is present over a three-year
period ending in the current year.150 Exceptions are available to this rule
for certain individuals, such as students, or for those who are present for
less than half of the current year and can demonstrate a "closer connec-
tion" to another foreign country.15'
The substantial presence test operates to pull individuals, other than
formal citizens and LPRs, into the taxable community to render them tax
citizens. But the substance and outcome of that determination is critically
important for evaluating the fairness of our tax citizen definition. One of
a set of fundamental questions of tax policy is who should pay taxes to a
given government.152 Stated differently, who belongs to the taxable
147. I.R.C. § 7701(b) ("Definition of resident alien and nonresident alien.-(1) In general.-
For purposes of this title (other than subtitle B)-A) Resident alien.-An alien individual shall be
treated as a resident of the United States with respect to any calendar year if (and only if) such indi-
vidual meets the requirements of clause (i), (ii), or (iii): (i) Lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence.-Such individual is a lawful permanent resident of the United States at any time during such
calendar year.").
148. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(A). We might also characterize tax law's role in providing immigration
law grounds for removal or bars to naturalization as indirect as well. Here, however, I confine indi-
rect to decisions made within tax law and policy as opposed to instances when tax law is conscripted
for use in another area of law.
149. Id. § 7701(b)(3)(A).
150. Id. The days of the preceding years are weighted to reduce their import.
151. Id. § 7701(b)(3)(B) ("Exception where individual is present in the United States during
less than one-half of current year and closer connection to foreign country is established.-An indi-
vidual shall not be treated as meeting the substantial presence test of this paragraph with respect to
any current year if-(i) such individual is present in the United States on fewer than 183 days during
the current year, and (ii) it is established that for the current year such individual has a tax home (as
defined in section 911 (d)(3) without regard to the second sentence thereof) in a foreign country and
has a closer connection to such foreign country than to the United States.").
152. Christians, supra note 69, at 97 ("This involves a very different and more difficult meas-
urement of the representative whole for the purpose of determining fair shares. It involves first
identifying whom a government can and should tax.. . . This definition means that deciding what is
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community? An overly simplistic and revenue-focused answer to that
question might be that nations should tax everyone they can. Doing so,
however, would run afoul of a guiding principle of tax policy: fairness.
Taxing everyone over whom a nation can assert jurisdiction would also
conflict with international norms and agreements, as well as raise effi-
ciency concerns that could ultimately minimize revenue collection.'53
The question that arises then, is why are resident aliens a part of the tax-
able community?5 4 The inescapable Supreme Court case of Cook v.
Tait5 1 provides an early but incomplete response and points toward rec-
ognizing resident alien status, or tax citizenship, as codified performative
citizenship.
2. Benefits and Tax-The Relevance of Cook v. Tait
Any discussion of citizenship and taxation would be remiss not to
address the Supreme Court's opinion in Cook. The case involved a U.S.
citizen living in Mexico who argued against assessment of income tax
from property he held in Mexico. In its opinion, the Court rejected a ter-
ritorial limit to the taxing power, holding that citizenship of the individu-
al, not the location of him or his property, was the key concern. In doing
so, the Court gave credence to the view that the benefits of citizenship
extend beyond national boundaries'56: "[T]he government, by its very
nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found .... [T]he
basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the
situs of the property . .. [nor] upon the domicile of the citizen . . . but
upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation to the
latter to him as a citizen."l157 Cook continues to provide a judicial founda-
tion for citizenship taxation as it articulated a strong benefit theory ra-
tionale for the justification to tax and attaches significant benefits to citi-
zenship itself. One may dispute (and many have) the validity of the clear
fair can only be undertaken after identifying first a pool of taxpayers and then the pool of resources
available to them.").
153. See generally Christians, supra note 13; sources cited supra note 65.
154. Since its inception in 1913, the modem income tax has always sought to tax individuals
living in and who have substantial connections to the United States. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch.
16, sec. 11, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913) ("A. Subdivision 1. That there shall be levied, assessed, collect-
ed and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding
calendar year to every citizen of the United States, whether residing at home or abroad, and to every
person residing in the United States, though not a citizen thereof, a tax of I per centum per annum
upon such income .... ).
155. 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
156. Id. at 56 ("The contention was rejected that a citizen's property without the limits of the
United States derives no benefit from the United States. The contention, it was said, came from the
confusion of thought in 'mistaking the scope and extent of the sovereign power of the United States
as a nation and its relations to its citizens and their relation to it. And that power in its scope and
extent, it was decided, is based on the presumption that government by its very nature benefits the
citizen and his property wherever found, and that opposition to it holds on to citizenship while it
belittles and destroys its advantages and blessings by denying the possession by government of an





benefits and burdens relationship the Court so readily found, but the case
endures as a statement of the relevance of the concept.'58
Benefit theory remains important in international tax law and poli-
cy. Intuitively appealing, the theory suggests that the benefits an individ-
ual receives from her government-infrastructure, education, healthcare,
to name a few-justify taxation. Numerous scholars challenge the utility
of benefit theory, particularly in setting the proper rate(s) for the individ-
ual income tax,1 59 and ability to pay is now the favored principle for sup-
porting progressive taxation. 160 Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that
benefits provided to individuals-whether citizens or residents-at least
partially justify pulling individuals into the taxable community to be
taxed on benefits received.161 Thus, though benefit theory does little to
help set a rate of tax, it should and does impact the assessment of whom
to tax. Accordingly, the theory has been an integral part of international
tax policy discussions and remains relevant in discussions of citizenship
*162
taxation.
The rough benefit/burden aspect of benefit theory does more work
in the context of the tax-immigration nexus, however. Arguably, it un-
derlies why Justice Thomas's majority opinion in Kawashima may mis-
take the relevance of tax crimes to immigration law. Armed with the
more nuanced concept of citizenship developed by social theory, we can
recognize that laws governing citizenship participate in the process of
"making" citizens.'63 Laws that define the requirements for citizenship
police the boundaries of membership in a given community-an act that
may reflect the values of that community (law as culture) or may, more
158. See AVI-YONAH ET AL., supra note 9, at 21-22.
159. Id. at 19-20; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The International Tax Regime: A Centennial
Reconsideration (Univ. Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 462, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2622883 (discussing the shifting relevance of
benefit theory for determining the taxation of individuals and contrasting that with its relevance for
corporations). See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES
AND JUSTICE 18 (2002) ("[Th]e benefit principle gives us no guidance on what the tax rate or rates
should be. . . .").
160. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 159; see also MEHROTRA, supra note 72, at 10
(discussing how advocates of a progressive tax system "played a pivotal role in supplanting the
prevailing 'benefits theory' of taxation").
161. See AvI-YONAH ET AL., supra note 9, at 20 ("In most of the modem literature the 'ability
to pay' theory is preferred. In the international context, however, the 'ability to pay' is meaningless
until one has identified the persons or the enterprises whose wealth is to be taken into ac-
count .... As a generalizing principle to deal with questions of selecting from among a world full of
potential taxpayers those who will be taxed by a particular nation, the 'cost-benefit' analysis remains
valuable."). Administrability of policing compliance is another consideration.
162. Id.; Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13, at 478 ("More funda-
mentally, as discussed above, a benefits analysis generally does not dictate the proper level of in-
come-based taxation. Rather, it merely determines whether sufficient grounds exist for exercising
some kind of tax jurisdiction."); Mason, supra note 13, at 173 (stating that benefits theory "carries
some weight" in justifying keeping nonresident U.S. citizens in the taxable community); cf Chris-
tians, supra note 13, at 9 (stating that benefit theory has not provided a normative principle for
source jurisdiction).
163. For an introduction to this discussion, see THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CITIZENSHIP: A
READER 10 (Sian Lazar ed., 2013); sources cited supra notes 12-16; discussion supra Part II.
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aspirationally, attempt to discipline individuals to be more ideal versions
of themselves (law as domination/discipline).' A statement that borders
on truism is that paying taxes is part of the fundamental bargain individ-
uals make with their government. In exchange for the benefits of citizen-
ship, the individual takes on the responsibility of paying taxes.1 65 There
is, then, something special about tax. Moreover, the purchase that this
idea has in popular rhetoric, case law, and the presence of the tax-
immigration nexus itself suggests that we, as tax scholars, must continue
to wrestle with its implications, despite its weaknesses.
A district court in Hawaii captured the special relevance of tax
compliance to citizenship as it considered whether debt to a private party
barred naturalization. In evaluating the petitioner's denial of naturaliza-
tion for a lack of finding of good moral character, the court noted that the
petitioner had "paid his taxes dutifully."l 66 As it granted the naturaliza-
tion petition, the Court reasoned:
Taxes and traffic fines are obligations owed to the government. They
fund public expenditures that help all residents. The civil judgment
here was owed to a private party. Even ignoring the apathy of this
judgment creditor and Plaintiffs contentions about the wrongfulness
of the judgment in the first place, failure to satisfy a debt to a private
party is less of an "evil" against the good order of the United States
than failure to pay taxes or traffic fines. 167
Tax offenses are relevant to immigration not only because they are
illegal or because they involve fraud or deceit, but because they represent
a breach of the basic benefit/burden agreement between the State and its
citizens; because noncompliance with tax harms the "good order" of the
sovereign and all its citizens. To be sure, this benefit/burden bargain may
not be in the mind of every immigration official applying the immigra-
tion laws or every Congressman or woman as he or she drafted or voted
on the passage of relevant provisions of the INA. Rarely are cultural
concepts so neatly uniform. But the commonplace nature of the assertion
that we pay taxes because of the benefits we receive from the govern-
ment, and the enforcement of that idea found in immigration law's con-
tributions to the tax-immigration nexus, support he idea that tax does
play an important and unique role in "making" citizens-a role that it
should acknowledge and account for in its own law and policy.
164. THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CITIZENSHIP, supra note 163, at 12-16 (summarizing a range of
important anthropological work on the subject).
165. See Abulkhair v. Bush, No. 08-CV-5410 (DMC)(MF), 2010 WL 2521760, at *9 (D.N.J.
June 14, 2010), affd, 413 F. App'x 502 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2011). Across disciplines, this idea is ever-
present.
166. Puciaty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (D. Haw. 2000).
167. Id. at 1041.
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Recent legislation provides further evidence of the depth of pur-
chase of the benefit/burden argument and tax compliance. The recently
enacted FAST Act created § 7345, a section that authorizes the revoca-
tion of an individual's passport for "seriously delinquent tax debt."'6 8
Among other requirements, the debt must be at least $50,000.169 The
efficacy of the provision, which was signed into law in December 2015,
is yet to be seen.170 The desire to keep those with tax debts in country
likely stems, at least in part, from a desire to keep tabs on the person and
his assets. It also, however, seems to fit within a trend, discussed at
length in Professor Joshua Blank's excellent Collateral Compliance, to
more expressly tie tax compliance (the burden) to the conveyance of
government benefits (herein, the passport).171
Though Cook addressed the taxation of a nonresident citizen, the
principle upon which it relied-that benefits provided justify taxation
and keep a person in the taxable community-applies to taxation of resi-
dent noncitizens as well. In name, we tax resident noncitizens upon the
basis of their presence as residents (residence-based taxation). Taxation
upon residency is a widely accepted principle and I do not dispute the
validity of that principle.172 What I do problematize, however, is how we
should understand the substance of connections for which we use resi-
dence as a proxy.173 Existing scholarship accepts residence as such, or
views citizenship as a proxy for residence or domicile. In the language of
social theory, residence in tax is commonly viewed as an example of law
as dispute resolution. More than one sovereign may lay claim to the in-
come of individual-the country "where income is produced (the source
168. I.R.S. § 7345(b) (2012).
169. Id.
170. Family law uses a similar tactic to attempt to enforce child support. 22 C.F.R. § 51.60
(2012) ("The applicant has been certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services as notified
by a state agency under 42 U.S.C. 652(k) to be in arrears of child support in an amount determined
by statute."). The tactic is generally held to be unsuccessful. See Drew A. Swank, The National
Child Non-Support Epidemic, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REv. 357, 367 (2003) ("Others, such as pass-
port denials or revocations, result in payment of child support so infrequently that it is nearly impos-
sible to do a quantitative analysis.").
171. Joshua D. Blank, Collateral Compliance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 740-42 (2014) (analyz-
ing when tax compliance may benefit from non-tax (collateral) sanctions for specific behavior and
discussing whether revocation of a driver's license for tax noncompliance may support tax compli-
ance).
172. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 1291 ("[O]ther nations tax individuals on their global income
and holdings only if such individuals reside in these nations.").
173. 1 am not the first to challenge the concept of residence. Allison Christians succinctly
states: "[R]esidence is a thin concept that can be defined by almost any metric." Christians, supra
note 13, at 7. Christians highlights the failings of past and current attempts to articulate a principled
concept of the appropriate bounds of "taxpayer." As part of that project she challenges the concept
of residence and the impacts of that weakness on tax justice. This issue is also explored in Allison
Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (2013) ("One of the
enduring problems for those who study international taxation from a normative perspective is that
states have constantly and consistently failed to assert a comprehensively justifiable definition for
the taxing jurisdiction."). If residence is essentially a proxy for domicile, as Edward Zelinsky per-
suasively claims, and citizenship is a more administrable proxy for the same, query how substantive-
ly distinct are these three concepts.
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jurisdiction)" or the country in which the income is "consumed or saved
(the residence jurisdiction)."l74 Defining residence and source are, then,
means of determining when a nation should yield its taxing jurisdiction.
Or, in more general terms, source and residence are mechanisms of con-
flict resolution.1 7 5
Considering residency within the context of the tax-immigration
nexus leads to the following conclusion: residence, particularly in the
case of LPRs, should also be understood as a proxy for performative
citizenship.'7 6 In the terms of social theory, residence is an example of
law as culture and law as discipline/domination. A legal expression of
the belief that those who fall within the resident definition are, in sub-
stance citizens, if not legally so. And, that as performative citizens, they
must fully perform their citizenship by complying with the tax law. Ar-
guing that residency is a proxy for performative citizenship does not di-
minish the role that the residency definition serves in determining the
proper taxing jurisdiction. Legal rules can serve more than one purpose.
But, by embracing a more nuanced understanding of the substance of the
residency rules, we are better poised to evaluate the fundamental fairness
of our tax regime as applied to those individuals who we pull into the
taxable community. To support this proposition, let us return to the sub-
stantial presence definition.
The substantial presence t stl77 is what renders authorized and unau-
thorized immigrants tax citizens, pulling them into the taxable communi-
ty. The test is the product of an attempt to clarify an area of law that had
174. Avi-Yonah, supra note 69, at 1305-06.
175. Much of the theory of residence and source developed with a focus on business income.
For an excellent history of international taxation and the concepts of residence and source, see
GRAETZ, supra note 69.
176. Edward Zelinsky argues that the United States is not out of step with the rest of the world
because other nations' concepts of residency target an individual's domicile. Citizenship, in Zel-
insky's view, is essentially just "an administrable, if sometimes overly broad, proxy
for . .. domicile." Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 1291.
The United States' worldwide taxation of its citizens is less different from international,
residence-based norms than is widely believed.. . . Because citizenship and domicile re-
semble each other, and because other nations define residence for tax purposes as domi-
cile, the U.S. system of citizenship-based taxation typically reaches the same results as
the residence-based systems of these other nations, but reaches these results more effi-
ciently by avoiding factually complex inquiries about domicile.
Id. at 1289.
177. Though short-lived, the Code has been in the business of explicitly defining citizenship. In
a 2006 article, Michael Kirsch details the enactment of two Code provisions that severed the Code's
definition of formal citizenship from that of immigration and nationality law:
New Internal Revenue Code section 877(g), also enacted by the AJCA, creates a second
tax code departure from the nationality law definition of citizenship. Whereas section
7701(n) focuses on the timing of citizenship loss, section 877(g) addresses the period fol-
lowing citizenship loss. Pursuant to section 877(g), certain individuals who lose citizen-
ship under the nationality law and have that loss recognized for tax purposes under sec-
tion 7701(n) may, nonetheless, be treated as citizens for tax purposes in future years.
Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Code as Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 386 (2006).
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been highly fact-intensive and led to inconsistent outcomes.78 Substan-
tial presence thus arose as an objective proxy for a subjective inquiry.
Prior to the adoption of the test, courts looked to a range of factors to
determine whether an individual was a resident: whether the individual
had benefitted economically from being in the United States,179 whether
the individual had an intent to remain in a given country,80 and where an
individual owned a home or where her family lived.'8 1 Pre and post-
adoption of the substantial presence test, the law labels the metric for an
individual's investment, both social and economic, in the country in
which she lived as residence. But substance sometimes differs from la-
bels. Though courts struggled with distinguishing residence from domi-
cile, or defining the scope of relevant facts and circumstances to consid-
er, the key question they were trying to assess was: are you invested and
integrated in the national community enough to justify taxation? Put in
the language of a social theory of citizenship: are you acting like a citi-
zen such that you should bear one of citizenship's burdens (or privileg-
es), namely, paying taxes?
The closer-connection exception to the substantial presence test
gives more insight to the factors Congress deems relevant to determine
whether an individual is a tax citizen. Part IV of Form 8840-the form
an individual must file to attempt to avoid resident status under the sub-
stantial presence test-asks a number of questions regarding the individ-
ual's ties to a foreign country. Those questions include social and eco-
nomic connections: Where was your family located in the relevant
178. Preece v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 594, 602 (1990) ("Section 7701(b)(3)(A) was intended to
replace the more complex facts and circumstances test of section 1.871-2, Income Tax Regs., for
purposes of determining whether an alien was a resident of the United States. H. Rept. No. 98-432,
vol. 1 at 222 (1983)."). For further discussion of the history of the test and a proposal for a humani-
tarian exemption when individuals flee violence in their home countries, see generally Hoose, supra
note 13.
179. Comm'r v. Nubar, 185 F.2d 584, 586 (4th Cir. 1950) ("Upon these facts, we think that the
conclusion of the Tax Court that taxpayer was an alien non-resident and was not engaged in business
in the United States was clearly erroneous, whether regarded as a conclusion of fact or as a conclu-
sion of law. We find nothing in the law or in the facts to justify the exemption of this alien, who had
lived in our country during the war years because of the difficulties and dangers of departure, and
who had availed himself of his presence here to make a fortune by trading on our exchanges, from
taxes required of others by the country who protection he had enjoyed and whose economic organi-
zation he had utilized for his profit. On the contrary, we think it clear that he was not a non-resident
alien within the meaning of the statutory exemption and that he was engaged in business within the
United States so as to take him without the exemption even if he were properly considered a non-
resident alien." (footnote omitted)). The Fourth Circuit does make a distinction between residence
and domicile, finding residence to be the more impermanent of the two concepts. See id. at 587.
Such a view runs counter to my argument that residence is a proxy for performative citizenship.
However, the court itself says the distinction between the two is hard to discern. See id. ("The word
'resident' (and its antonym 'nonresident') are very slippery words, which have many and varied
meanings."). Importantly, the tie breakers for resident alien status seen in treaties, case law, and the
closer connection exception track traditional markers of performative citizenship. As such and in
light of the tax-immigration nexus, I resolve the ambiguity by understanding residence as a proxy for
citizenship rather than a less permanent connection.
180. Seeley v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 175, 180 (1950), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 186 F.2d 541 (2d
Cir. 1951).
181. White v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 585, 592-93 (1954).
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year(s)? Where were your belongings? Where were you registered to
vote? Where were your bank accounts? Where did you earn the majority
of your income? Where, if applicable, were you entitled to the benefit of
national health care?1 82 These questions, taken together, attempt to iden-
tify the community in which an individual is substantially invested per a
comprehensive concept of citizenship. The one in which she lives her
life, conducts business, exercises civil rights, and where she has deep and
significant social ties. These types of connections, taken together, consti-
tute the multiple aspects of a social theory of citizenship.
Of course an individual may have deep economic and social ties to
a nation of which she is not a citizen.'83 In that case, then, perhaps resi-
dence is just residence-a sufficient tie to subject an individual to tax or
to solve the problem of determining the appropriate taxing authority, but
not a proxy for an individual being a citizen in all but name. But to come
to this conclusion would mean adopting a narrow, legalistic, status-based
definition of citizenship-the very definition of citizenship social theory
suggests is incomplete at best.
When we understand citizenship as a mix of legal status, rights, ob-
ligations, and belonging, then where we see attempts to identify these
ties, we find an effort to identify citizenship. Unsurprisingly, the legal
status looms large in tax as it provides the statutory basis for citizenship-
based taxation (CBT). But we do not confine CBT to formal citizens
alone. Instead, tax looks to markers of the other connections and actions
through which we identify citizenship and through which individuals
perform their citizenship. Though it labels LPRs and those who are sub-
stantially present as resident aliens, the substance of the connections
§ 7701 defines as residence, in fact track and codify a concept of per-
formative citizenship. Thus, we assert a right to tax because individuals
are living and acting like citizens. In brief, the concept of tax citizenship
inherent in the resident alien status and its codification of performative
citizenship flags LPRs as essentially indistinguishable from formal citi-
zens and taxes them accordingly.
The robust tax-immigration nexus supports reconceptualizing resi-
dence as performative citizenship. The nexus makes very clear that tax
compliance is a critical aspect of defining who is worthy of citizenship
182. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury, Form 8840: Closer Connection Exception
Statement for Aliens (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8840.pdf.
183. An individual may have deep connections to multiple nations and depending upon the
citizenship laws of those countries may simultaneously be a citizen of such countries. The fact that
an individual has citizenship, whether performative or legal, in multiple jurisdictions does not defeat
the argument that he United States' definition of residence relied upon a concept of performative
citizenship. Rather, it simply implies the need for tiebreaker or apportionment rules. See, e.g.,
MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL ch. 2, art. 4.2 (ORG.
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2003), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/2014-model-tax-convention-
articles.pdf (describing examples of tiebreaker rules and procedural requirements); Internal Revenue
Serv., supra note 182.
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and what it means to be a citizen. In the language of anthropology, the
tax citizen category-by treating noncitizen residents the same as formal
citizens-serves two purposes. First, it draws immigrants into the full
responsibilities of citizenship, respecting the understanding that tax citi-
zens lack only formal status but are substantively citizens in a performa-
tive way. Second, it supports the immigration law project of directing
individuals into the behavior expected of citizens-herein, tax compli-
ance-where violation of that norm results in expulsion from the
group.18 Both goals impact the fundamental fairness of the foundational
question that runs throughout this Article: who should be subject to tax?
The answer, suggested by the tax-immigration nexus, is that it is those
individuals who are formally or substantively citizens. When tax law
lacks a formal marker of citizenship, it turns then to the informal one of
performative status found in the resident alien definition.
Taking stock of the contributions of the tax-immigration we find the
following: immigration law elevates tax compliance as a key factor in
defining who is eligible for citizenship or even who may remain in the
country. Further, tax law uses both a formal and informal definition of
citizenship to achieve two ends: (1) to identify those who belong to the
taxable community; and (2) to support the disciplinary project of immi-
gration law. The impact of these insights for tax law and policy is the
subject of Part IV.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING CITIZENSHIP AND
TAXATION
Recognizing the existence and extent of the tax-immigration nexus
provides an opportunity to reassess the fairness (or unfairness) of the
current tax regime as applied to lawful permanent residents. Recall that
the United States taxes formal citizens and tax citizens alike, at the same
rates and by the same laws. Born or naturalized citizens are, in effect,
considered essentially indistinguishable from tax citizens for tax purpos-
es. But full recognition of the tax-immigration nexus challenges the no-
tion that LPRs, who are only tax citizens but not formal citizens, are in-
distinguishable. This final Part explores the meaningful distinctions be-
tween tax and formal citizens for tax policy and suggests changes to re-
flect these differences.
A. Benefit Theory, the Tax-Immigration Nexus, and the CBT Debate
Recent scholarship on citizenship and tax overwhelmingly focuses
on whether the U.S. system of worldwide taxation based upon citizenship
is an appropriate principle for individual taxation.'85 Scholars defending
184. See supra Parts II & III (discussing anthropology, law, and citizenship).
185. See supra note 13, for the principle articles on this topic. Notably, however, a few tax
scholars have addressed other aspects of the citizenship and taxation discussion. See, e.g., Nancy C.
Staudt, Taxation and Gendered Citizenship, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 533 (1997) (dis-
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CBT do so on the grounds that citizenship confers significant benefits,
that it serves as an administrable proxy for residence or domicile, or that
it indicates membership in the community of taxpayers to whom ability
to pay principles should apply.' 86 Scholars who challenge worldwide
taxation on the basis of citizenship find the benefits of citizenship to be
inadequate, citizenship to be a poor proxy for community membership,
or the regime to be inefficient and inadministrable in practice." And
while scholars in both camps recognize the role of social theory in defm-
ing citizenship and the benefits and burdens of citizenship, they focus
largely on a formal, legal definition of citizenship in tax.
Driving much of the recent tax scholarship and news coverage of
CBT1 89 is a concern for the system's impacts on nonresident U.S. citi-
zens. This focus is too narrow, and a shift to view nonresident citizens
alongside LPRs illustrates the negative equity impacts of that narrow
view. Both nonresident U.S. citizens and LPRs have a version of imper-
fect citizenship. Nonresident U.S. citizens possess formal citizenship but
do not or cannot avail themselves of the full array of benefits that citi-
zenship affords and, though they may have deep ties to the United States,
cannot perform their citizenship in the same way as a resident individual.
Resident LPRs may benefit more extensively from government services
and more easily perform their citizenship but lack the formal status of
being a citizen. Both groups, then, have grounds to argue that the bur-
dens of their imperfect citizenship, whether formal or performative, out-
weigh the benefits. Despite this commonality, however, the impact of
CBT on LPRs is largely unexplored. The focus of this part is to remedy
that fact.
Benefit theory, introduced in Part III, is one of the factors consid-
ered in current evaluations of citizenship-based taxation. The set of rele-
vant benefits for consideration in CBT (or other attempts to define simi-
cussing how tax law may shape women's participation in public and private life and, thereby, influ-
ence their ability to achieve full citizenship).
186. See, e.g., Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13; Zelinsky, supra
note 13, at 1320-24. Scholars may combine or refine these grounds for citizenship-based taxation
but the drivers of these grounds are the bigger principles of tax policy of fairness and administrabil-
ity. Supporters of citizenship-based taxation also discuss efficiency concerns regarding the incen-
tives created by departing from the current regime but the goals of faimess and administrability seem
to dominate. See, e.g., Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13.
187. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 680-85; Blum & Singer, supra note 13, at 705-11;
Mason, supra note 13, at 189-224.
188. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13, at 480-84 (describing the
challenges of defining the taxable community); Mason, supra note 13, at 228 (noting the implica-
tions of noncompliance for immigration); id. at 189-211 (discussing more generally the balance of
burdens and benefits of citizenship and challenges of delimiting community membership); Zelinsky,
supra note 13, at 1303-12 (discussing different models of citizenship and their implications for the
benefit theory assessment of citizenship-based taxation).
189. In addition to scholars writing on the topic, there are a number of vocal advocacy groups
for U.S. citizens who live abroad, most notably, American Citizens Abroad. To learn more of their
views on CBT and other issues affecting nonresident U.S. citizens, see AM. CITIZENS ABROAD,
https://www.americansabroad.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
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larly situated individuals) is subject to debate, as is valuation of those
benefits. Nevertheless, if we accept that benefit theory is relevant in de-
fining the taxable community-as case law, scholarship, and the tax-
immigration nexus suggest we must, at least in part-we have to attempt
the project. One goal of tax policy is to achieve horizontal equity-
meaning taxing similarly situated individuals the same.'1 Knowing the
benefits available to and utilized by individuals helps us define similarly
situated individuals. Though determining who is similarly situated to
whom is an immensely challenging task, it is one we continue to wrestle
with as we evaluate one of three core considerations of tax policy: fair-
ness or equity.191 The tax-immigration nexus contributes to this difficult
work.
Current scholarship takes stock of the benefits of citizenship and
leans toward the view that the burdens of CBT outweigh the benefits for
U.S. citizens abroad. But considering the taxation of LPRs informs this
discussion by identifying the value of a heretofore unexplored benefit
LPRs lack: permanence of status. Compare an LPR living in Montana to
a U.S. citizen living in Paris. We may be inclined to say that the LPR
receives more benefits from the United States that justify taxing her than
does the U.S. citizen abroad-the LPR utilizes U.S. infrastructure, may
send her children to public school, and enjoys the protection of U.S.
laws, to name a few.1 92 But U.S. citizens, whether resident or not, wheth-
er performing their citizenship or not, have a permanent status, should
they choose to retain it. As mere tax citizens, LPRs lack that same per-
manence of status accorded formal citizens, though they may have
stronger purchase on community membership because of their performa-
tive citizenship. Permanence of status1 93 is thus a key distinction between
resident tax citizens and U.S. citizens, and the inherent insecurity of sta-
190. Like many policy concepts, horizontal equity has been the subject of criticism. See, e.g.,
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 159, at 37-39. It persists, however, as one of many tools used to
assess the fairness of a given provision or tax regime. Id. at 37.
191. Tax systems are regularly evaluated by how well they satisfy three key concepts: equi-
ty/faimess, efficiency/neutrality, and administrability (simplicity/complexity).
192. See, e.g., Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 188, at 478 ("While
citizens abroad do not enjoy some of the benefits available to citizens within the United States, U.S.
citizens at home do not enjoy some of the benefits provided to citizens abroad such as the personal
and property protection discussed above."); Mason, supra note 13, at 193-94 (stating that even if
there are residual benefits of citizenship for nonresident U.S. citizens, those benefits cannot justify
taxation to the same extent as resident U.S citizens).
193. The right to re-enter is often cited as one of few or two benefits (voting being the second)
a nonresident U.S. citizen enjoys. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 188, at
478. Permanence of status should be distinguished from the right to re-enter the United States, a
benefit discussed by both opponents and supporters of citizenship-based taxation in evaluating
whether the benefits of U.S. citizenship support the current regime. Permanence of status is broader
than right to re-enter as it encompasses the right to remain in the United States regardless of non-
compliance with the tax laws as well as the right to re-enter.
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tus that tax citizens face, made even greater post-Kawashima, should be
treated as a relevant difference for tax benefit/burden assessments.194
Permanence of status and the ability to re-enter the country are dif-
ferent aspects of a core benefit: security. Formal citizenship grants secu-
rity-the right both to re-enter the nation of one's citizenship and the
right to remain there. An LPR may be secure in her nation of citizenship
but lacks that same security in the nation to which she immigrates. Writ-
ing on the role emigrants play in constructing citizenship, Kim Barry
eloquently captures the value of this security and, by extension, the ef-
fects of insecurity: "The import of that security for emigrants (and its
concomitant insecurity for even those emigrants who are long-term non-
citizen residents of immigration states) should not be underestimated.
Only where residence is legally secure can individuals 'plan their lives
accordingly."'l95 In other words, security of permanent status, not simply
the right to re-enter, is a meaningful benefit of citizenship that emerges
in the comparison of LPRs and U.S. citizens in light of the tax-
immigration nexus.
Now consider the following comparisons and distinctions: resident
citizens and legally present noncitizens have essentially equal access to
many benefits and are taxed similarly,' 96 an outcome benefit theory and
ability to pay can support. Yet if we understand the security of perma-
nent status as a benefit, a distinction emerges between resident citizens
and noncitizens-one that may justify differing tax treatment. Both
groups perform their citizenship but performative citizenship results in
tax citizenship, not formal citizenship. Nonresident citizens, the popula-
tion of concern in the current literature, may avail themselves of fewer
benefits than do resident noncitizens, perhaps justifying a lower tax bur-
den.197 But does that assessment change when we add into the mix the
security of permanent status denied LPRs? Perhaps. The difficulty of
using benefit theory to assess horizontal equity makes it an imperfect
194. Cf Peter J. Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citizenship, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 899, 900 (2013). Spiro sees the distinction between citizens and -noncitizens as
largely formal, stating "the leakiness of immigration enforcement mitigates the consequence of this
important formal differential [the fact that citizens enjoy absolute locational security]." Id.; see also
Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 166 ("The challenges faced by undocumented migrants highlight
the continued salience of the state, which through granting or withholding residency and citizenship
status profoundly affects immigrants' life chances.").
195. Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 25 (2006).
196. For a full discussion of immigrant access to federal benefits such as TANF or SNAP, see
RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34500, UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS' ACCESS TO
FEDERAL BENEFITS: POLICY AND ISSUES 1-21 (2012).
197. Mason alludes to this idea, stating that that CBT advocates "argue that because nonresi-
dents receive benefits from the Unites States, they should pay U.S. tax. Although this argument
carries some weight, it cannot justify taxing nonresident Americans similarly to resident Americans
who receive far more benefits." Mason, supra note 13, at 173. Based upon her arguments advanced
in the rest of the paper and our discussions, however, I doubt Professor Mason would see this as an
acceptable response to CBT.
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tool. Nevertheless, as it remains part of the international tax discussion,
permanence of status should be considered a distinguishing benefit be-
tween U.S. citizens and LPRs.
Introducing permanence of status to the CBT morass-an out-
growth of the tax-immigration nexus-gives rise to at least two potential
responses. First, those who argue against CBT might use the unfairness
of the regime as applied to LPRs to bolster their argument against the
status quo, as an additional weight on the scale that justifies overhaul of
an unfair and inefficient regime. Second, pro-CBT scholars might use the
same insight to argue, as I did above, that nonresident U.S. citizens are
not so unfairly burdened as it may seem; that keeping citizens abroad
within the taxable community is on par with subjecting LPRs to the same
tax laws as citizens, despite their fundamental insecurity. Stated differ-
ently, both have weaknesses in the citizenship burden/benefit bundle but
the current regime properly accounts for those weaknesses. This Article
does not delve into a full-fledged analysis of CBT and, as such, I do not
take a hard stance on CBT but rather suggest that the discussion requires
analyzing the tax-immigration nexus and its implications.
. Inequities of the Tax-Immigration Nexus: A Way Forward
Tax law in itself cannot and should not determine the proper rela-
tionship between tax, immigration, and citizenship. Allowing individuals
to live in the United States, whether temporarily or permanently, creates
a ripple effect of collateral consequences, as each individual may be un-
derstood as a package deal of burdens and benefits. Each individual plac-
es his own demands upon the government, infrastructure, and public
goods while making his own contributions. Immigration law, fiscal poli-
cy, political theory, anthropology, and sociology are clear contributors to
the discussion of the relationship between tax, immigration, and citizen-
ship.198 A state must balance its desire to attract immigrants for economic
and/or humanitarian reasons with t e implications of the responsibilities
that state bears to its residents and citizens. Revenue, and by extension,
tax law and policy, are only part of that calculus.
Revenue is not the only goal tax law considers, however. Accepting
that revenue is the primary goal of any tax system, U.S. tax law must
also be cognizant of its intersection with immigration law and the equity
concerns created therein. The tax-immigration nexus helps conceptualize
a new benefit of formal citizenship: permanence of status. But the contri-
bution of the tax-immigration nexus goes beyond benefit theory assess-
ments, to push us to see the positive role tax law plays in defining citi-
198. See Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 170 ("Finally, the study of citizenship and immi-
gration cannot be viewed as uniquely the domain of immigration scholars. Rather, the intersection of
citizenship and immigration raises broad issues of inequality, state power, and social cohesion.").
Accordingly, to the extent immigration law scholars view the tax-immigration nexus as too punitive,
such scholars and policymakers could propose reforms from within immigration law.
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zenship and making citizens. Specifically, the tax-immigration nexus
suggests that treating LPRs fairly may require reforming existing tax
law.
1. Considering an Immigration Law Solution
Before addressing the implications of the tax-immigration nexus for
tax law and suggesting some avenues for reform or future research, it is
prudent to pause and address a potential objection: can the inequities of
the tax-immigration nexus be solved by immigration law? If one agrees
that collateral immigration consequences lack proportionality with the
tax offense(s) committed, should or could immigration law remedy the
problem by deciding tax offenses are immaterial to deportation or natu-
ralization considerations? Bypassing the debate of the unlikelihood of
such reform, the answer is no. First, removing immigration law's contri-
butions to the tax-immigration nexus would be an overreaction to the
current inequities. There is value in immigration law emphasizing the
importance of tax compliance to aspiring citizens-doing so serves an
important expressive (law as culture) and training (law as discipline)
function. In short, the tax-immigration nexus plays an important role in
immigration law that should not be abandoned without careful considera-
tion.
A different iteration of the objection may then arise, however, tak-
ing the view that a lack of proportionality in punishment created by im-
migration law is not a tax concern. This is also error. Disproportional
sanctions for tax offenses can undermine the perceived fairness of the
system, which can, in turn, have negative implications for tax compli-
ance, even when those sanctions arise outside of the tax system.'" The
fact that it is immigration and not tax that punishes an individual differ-
ently for the same tax offense should not preclude considering a lack of
proportionality for tax policy purposes. Indeed, tax policy scholars and
advocates frequently consider the interaction of exogenous factors with
substantive tax law.200 Further, the fact that tax plays such an important
199. Blank, supra note 171, at 778.
200. Examples of scholarship in this vein include discussions of the single-eamer bias that note
that the bias takes on a more problematic gender aspect in light of the social patterns of household
work. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2002-67 (discussing the single-eamer bias and efficacy of common proposals
to remedy gender discrimination in the Code). Edward McCaffery provides an excellent discussion
of this bias in his article, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Biases in the Code.
Noting the gendered impact of the bias, McCaffery writes:
There is no priori reason to assume the wife should be the marginal eamer . . . But the
current tax structure tends to push toward a "primary-secondary" delineation among
working spouses, marginalizing the lesser-earning person. Here, as elsewhere, it is crucial
to consider social context in evaluating the tax laws-it is by failing to do so that ostensi-
bly "neutral" ideology entrenches discriminatory patterns.... Historically, of course,
wives have usually been the marginal earners.... The general lesson of the story is that
married women are at the margins of the workforce-in terms of wages, power, and
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role in policing citizenship and structuring its requirements supports the
relevance of the nexus for tax policy purposes. The legitimacy of a tax
system depends, in part, upon the legitimacy of the means it uses to de-
fine the taxable community. That community is defined both by tax and
immigration law, and tax must acknowledge that fact.
Third, removing all collateral immigration consequences for tax of-
fenses would not solve the problem that looms large for tax policy: that
LPRs and U.S. citizens are distinguishable though they are treated as
indistinguishable by current tax law. Even if tax offenses could not lead
to removal or denial of citizenship, the insecurity of LPRs as compared
to U.S. citizens would remain. The tax-immigration nexus allowed iden-
tification of this important distinction between LPRs and U.S. citizens,
but dissolving the nexus would not dissolve that distinction. Further, tax
policy may be able to benefit from a more finely-tuned tax-immigration
nexus, as will be explored later in this part.
In the following subparts, I introduce three potential reforms, modi-
fied reporting requirements for LPRs, a credit, and a rate change, as well
as identify areas for future research, both theoretical and empirical. The
goal of these subparts is not to unequivocally endorse one or more spe-
cific reforms. Instead, I offer frameworks for reforms that respect and
further develop the value of the tax-immigration nexus to both immigra-
tion and tax law, while reigning-in its inequitable effects.
2. Reducing the Likelihood of Tax "Footfalls"
The first proposal is, in some ways, the most modest. While, as
subsequent discussion will show, a credit may be too limited in scope to
achieve true equity for LPRs, a rate schedule change may swing too far
in the opposite direction, granting too extensive relief in light of the simi-
larities between LPRs and resident formal citizens. Even if we were in-
terested in pursuing a different rate schedule for LPRs, the difficulty of
valuing benefits, and, by extension, using benefit theory to set a rate,
could make such reform unattainable. Another option presents itself,
however, in the form of modified filing requirements as a middle ground
solution between a credit and a rate schedule change.
Section III.B introduced the role tax law plays in the good moral
character assessment for naturalization. The tax-immigration nexus runs
a significant risk of an outcome-denial of naturalization-that is dis-
proportionate to the offense-an alleged or established civil tax of-
fense-at this point of connection. Accordingly, tweaking the nexus at
this point would do much to remedy its inequities. Scholarship that ar-
costs-and the tax laws contribute to this marginalization by putting the wife's income at
the margins of the family's.
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the
Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 993-94 (1993).
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gues against CBT provides a potential direction for such a reform: For-
eign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and Foreign Bank Ac-
count Report (FBAR) filing requirements.
A great deal of contemporary arguments against CBT draw upon
the complexity of complying with FATCA and FBAR as support for
abolishing CBT. Both FATCA and FBAR ostensibly target tax evaders
by requiring individuals and, in some instances, third parties, to disclose
information regarding foreign accounts and assets.201 The general thrust
of the criticism holds that the complexity of the regimes leads to inad-
vertent noncompliance and generates too significant a burden for well-
meaning taxpayers.202 An oft-cited standard for the required good moral
character assessment in immigration is the conduct of the average citi-
zen.203 If there are widely held and legitimate concerns of whether U.S.
citizens can comply, LPRs should receive the same concern. One may
reasonably assume that LPRs, like the nonresident U.S. citizens who are
commonly the focus of this literature, are likely to have properties or
accounts in their country of citizenship. They are, then, likely to have to
interact with this complex and deeply criticized regime. Acknowledging
the tax-immigration nexus provides further support for arguments against
FATCA and FBAR regimes. Short of overhaul, however, tax law can
respond by creating a grace period of reduced reporting requirements for
LPRs. Such a reform would address the insecurity of LPRs as compared
to U.S. citizens, while respecting the overarching compliance goals that
FATCA and FBAR aim to support.
Congress could enact provisions modifying the FATCA and FBAR
rules as applied to LPRs.204 LPRs could, for example, be exempt from
reporting otherwise reportable foreign accounts or interests for five
years, the same period discussed in the following rate schedule proposal.
201. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS FBAR REFERENCE GUIDE,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irsfbarreferenceguide.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2017); Allison Chris-
tians, Paperwork and Punishment: It's Time to Fix the FBAR, TAX NOTES INT'L, Oct. 2014, at 147,
147. To access the FBAR form, see File the Report ofForeign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)
as an Individual, BSA E-FILING SYSTEM,
http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFilePDFIndividualFBAR.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). To
access FATCA Form 8938, see Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury, Form 8938: State-
ment of Specified Foreign Financial Assets (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8938.pdf.
FATCA also imposes third-party reporting requirements. Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, Exporting
FA TCA, 142 TAX NOTES 1245, 1246 (2014).
202. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 201, at 147-48; Mason, supra note 13, at 213-15; Allison
Christians, Assoc. Professor, H. Heward Stikeman Chair in Tax Law, McGill Univ., Address at the
International Conference on Taxpayer Rights: Understanding the Accidental American: Tina's
Story, (Nov. 18, 2015) (transcript), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/understanding-accidental-
american-tinas-story.
203. Hussein v. Barrett, 820 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing 8 C.F.R.
§ 316.10(a)(2) and noting that "[t]he regulation instructs the USCIS to evaluate claims of good moral
character on a case-by-case basis taking into account the enumerated elements in the section as well
as the standards of the average citizen in the community of residence"); see supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
204. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2012); I.R.C. § 6038D (2012).
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The benefits of such a reform are twofold. First, foreign properties or
interests have a more tenuous connection to the United States-their
connection stemming from the presence of the taxpayer-than, for ex-
ample, the wages an LPR earns at her job in her U.S. hometown.205 A
grace period of modified reporting is, then, a better-targeted reform than
a rate reduction. A grace period would ensure the income with strong ties
to the United States is taxed the same to LPRs and citizens on the same
terms. Second, to the extent the complexity of FBAR and FATCA regu-
larly give rise to inadvertent noncompliance, modified reporting re-
quirements remove that point of nexus and potential inequity of the tax-
immigration nexus, albeit temporarily. Stated differently, a modified
reporting regime would lessen the possibility of FBAR and FATCA non-
compliance being used to demonstrate lack of good moral character-a
result that brings greater proportionality to the tax-immigration nexus by
limiting the severe consequences of potentially excusable footfalls, with-
out sacrificing its expressive and disciplinary aspects.
A modified reporting regime or similar reform need not be confined
to FATCA and FBAR. Were other scholars, with different points of fo-
cus or expertise, to take up discussion of the tax-immigration nexus, oth-
er areas of potential footfalls might emerge which place LPRs at unnec-
essary risk of disproportionate consequences for their noncompliance. By
remedying such concerns, tax law could find itself on stronger footing
when it does assert the right to tax a given individual or item of income.
3. Tax Credit for Naturalization Costs
The path to citizenship is riddled with costs, many of them mone-
tary. A recent Pew Research Center report indicates that many LPRs cite
the costs of naturalization as a roadblock to becoming a U.S. citizen.206
207Filing fees for the Form N-400 alone can be as high at $680. Any costs
for counsel or other assistance to complete the naturalization process add
to the total price tag of naturalization. The financial cost of naturalization
is not a tax issue but tax law could provide relief. Specifically, Congress
could craft a refundable or partially refundable tax credit for qualifying
naturalization costs. Consider the following hypothetical:
Ishita has been an LPR of the United States for twelve years. She
averages taxable income of $35,000 a year. Ishita has one child who
qualifies as a dependent so her taxable income puts her in the 15% tax
205. Exempting certain foreign accounts would not, of course, mean exempting money earned
in the United States or derived from U.S. properties that was funneled into such accounts. Any
modified reporting regime would have to take into account the creative force that is tax avoidance
and evasion.
206. GONZALEZ-BARRERA ET AL., supra note 23, at 7,
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/02/04/the-path-not-taken/.
207. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra note 91; Additional Information on Filing a
Fee Waiver, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/feewaiver (last updat-
ed June 2, 2016).
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bracket.208 To put that cost in perspective, assuming Ishita is a single
parent who uses daycare services, the $680 filing fee represents almost
an entire month's daycare costs.209 Childcare costs are only one example
of the potential budget challenges an LPR might face when trying to find
the money to complete the naturalization process. A credit could increase
Ishita's tax refund, perhaps freeing up the necessary funds to apply to
210become a citizen. Such a credit could be keyed an individual's ability
to pay, phasing out as an individual's taxable income increases.
The policy of subsidizing the costs of naturalization has support in
current law. Indeed, UCSIS provides the possibility of a fee waiver for
qualifying individuals.211 To receive a waiver an individual must meet
one of three requirements: he or a qualifying individual in the individu-
al's household receives means-tested governmental benefits, the individ-
ual's household income is at or below 150% of the federal poverty level,
or the individual is facing a qualifying financial hardship such as unex-
pected medical bills.2 12 A credit would further the policy of recognizing
financial restraints by extending it to another population: those individu-
als whose income exceeds current fee waiver limits, but for whom fees
still present a significant challenge.
There are multiple benefits to a naturalization costs credit. First,
such a credit would be a relatively minor change that would provide tar-
geted relief to some LPRs. As such, it would join a number of credits that
take account of costs taxpayers incur that the government deems worthy
of subsidy, such as child care costs or investments in energy-efficient
213
appliances. It also represents a small nod to the fact that LPRs are
meaningfully distinct from U.S. citizens and that the differences between
208. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. This hypothetical assumes I hita files as a head
of household.
209. CHILDCARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE: 2014
REPORT, 40-41 (2014),
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cyf/2014_Parentsand theHighCost ofChild_Care.pdf. My
analysis uses one of the least expensive states on which the state reported. Id. In one of the most
expensive states the fee represents about half of the average monthly cost. Id.
210. Of course there would be a mismatch between the time of payment of the filing fee and
credit. Recent changes, however, permit LPRs to pay naturalization fees by credit card. Presumably,
then, an individual would aim to pay the fees toward the end of the taxable year to reduce the
amount of time between payment and refund. Though this is an imperfect solution to the problem of
supporting the naturalization costs of LPRs, it is at least a step in the direction of increased support.
211. Additional Information on Filing a Fee Waiver, supra note 207.
212. Id.
213. I.R.C. § 24 provides a child tax credit while § 25D defines a credit for qualifying residen-
tial property. See I.R.C. § 24 (2012); I.R.C. § 25D (2012). The wisdom of such credits that make tax
a social policy tool is hotly debated. Whether or not tax should be a tool of social policy is not,
however, the focus of this Article. For examples of this discussion, see STANLEY S. SURREY,
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973); Edward D. Kleinbard,
The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political
Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (2010); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (1986).
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the two groups may justify a slightly lower effective tax rate (created by
214a limited credit).
Second, the presence of a credit for naturalization costs could have
tax compliance benefits. Providing a targeted credit to low and lower
income individuals would signal that the government supports the pursuit
of citizenship by qualified individuals as it would show a willingness to
subsidize that process where appropriate. The credit therein recasts the
tax system from simple potential bludgeon to a partner in the path to
citizenship. To the extent respect for the tax system and a perception of it
as fundamentally fair have positive implications for tax compliance, such
a credit could further incentivize compliance by the immigrant popula-
tion by engendering a positive view of the Code, rather than just fear of
the immigration consequences of noncompliance.215
Third and last, a credit has the benefit of being highly customiza-
ble.216 A naturalization costs credit could be limited to only the Form N-
400 filing fee or expanded to include the filing fee and some fees paid to
a lawyer for assistance in the naturalization process. A credit could uti-
lize a gradual phaseout as an individual's adjusted gross income increas-
es to better target the identified population of need.217 The possibilities
214. Some may challenge such a preference as unjustified or bad policy for its potential to
encourage immigration. To the extent the reader does not consider immigration or naturalization to
be a generally positive force, she may object to any subsidy in this area. However, to the extent we
view immigration or naturalization of individuals already present in the United States to be a posi-
tive, subsidizing those costs to some degree could reap rewards.
215. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 171, at 769-71; Andrea Monroe, Integrity in Taxation: Re-
thinking Partnership Tax, 64 ALA. L. REv. 289, 293-94 (2012) ("Integrity seeks to create a cohesive
and unified legal system that its members consider just and fair even when the pursuit of system-
wide coherence demands the sacrifice of some justice or fairness in individual instances. Integrity
thus fosters a legal system's legitimacy, cultivating loyalty to the system despite disagreements
about particular laws. The principle of integrity is seldom applied in tax scholarship. Yet integrity
has a natural appeal in thinking about the discordant values of partnership taxation, which have left
the system complicated, fractured, and bereft of a unifying core. Integrity also highlights the im-
portance of legitimacy in subchapter K, where a system of voluntary compliance allows most part-
nerships to operate under an 'honor code,' with little risk of government audit." (footnote omitted)).
216. What follows is draft language for a naturalization costs credit.
26 U.S.C.A. §_ Naturalization Costs Credit
(a) Allowance of Credit
(1) In General-In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a credit against
tax imposed by this chapter, the amount of qualified naturalization expenses paid by the taxpayer in
the taxable year. [Note: if Congress decided to allow a credit for legal fees tied to naturalization, this
language could be modified to allow the credit in the year after expenses were paid or delayed until
naturalization is finalized.]
(b) Definitions
(1) Qualified naturalization expenses-The term "qualified naturalization expenses"
means expenses paid by the taxpayer which are directly related to the taxpayer's naturalization
application and the naturalization application(s) of family member of the taxpayer.
(2) Family member-[Herein another decision would need to be made regarding how
expansive the credit should be. A more conservative credit could limit the definition of family to that
of § 267. A more extensive credit could adopt a broader view of family such as that of § 152.]
(c) Limitations
217. Tax expenditure analysis could inform the proper availability and amount of the credit.
This Article makes no attempt to quantify revenue costs or dictate the appropriate scope of the
credit.
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are numerous, and more work would be necessary to take the preliminary
concept of a naturalization costs credit to fruition. Nevertheless, it seems
a conservative, nimble response to provide some relief to LPRs who face
the insecurity and disproportionate burdens of tax citizen status.
4. Tax Rates
This third, broader reform response is likely the most controversial
of the three. Policymakers and scholars should consider whether the cur-
rent tax regime-taxing tax citizens and U.S. citizens the same-is justi-
fied in light of the key differences between citizens and LPRs. There is
little question that we can tax LPRs. But the decision that we should does
not follow from the fact that we can. Nor does saying we should tax
noncitizens answer the question of what is the proper rate of tax.218
The tax-immigration nexus makes evident that LPRs face dispro-
portionate punishments-ineligibility for naturalization and removal-
for the same offenses that result in monetary or criminal penalties for
U.S. citizens. What to make of the lack of proportionality is less clear.
An overreaction to the unfairness of the insecurity and disproportionate
punishments LPRs face would be to exclude them entirely from the taxa-
ble community. A tax system that does not tax noncitizens living, work-
ing in, and benefiting from its economy and laws would shift the income
tax burden entirely to citizens; a result that seems unfair to citizens and
would be bad economic policy. Thus, tax law's codification of performa-
tive citizenship in the resident alien definition seems justified. After all,
LPRs and U.S. citizens may be indistinguishable when judged by their
enmeshment in their communities and both receive many of the same
benefits. Tax citizen status is, herein, an example of law as culture-we
tax LPRs the same as citizens because we believe they are, in many
ways, substantially similar. Tax citizen status also performs a discipli-
nary role: if you want to become a citizen you have to play by the same
rules as citizens. The significant role tax compliance plays in the tax-
immigration nexus shows that paying taxes is a key part of the process of
constructing good citizens. But the tax-immigration nexus also drives
home that despite all the ways in which LPRs may resemble citizens and
why it may be good immigration policy to tax them as such, they are not
full, formal citizens. Taxing LPRs by the same laws and at the same rates
may then emerge as being fundamentally unfair, as it fails to account for
the significant ways in which tax citizenship falls short of formal citizen-
ship-most notably permanence of status (or lack thereof). Perhaps, then,
218. Scholars recognize the same issues are at play in the discussion of taxation of nonresident
citizens. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13, at 446-48; Mason, supra note
13, at 175-77; Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 1314-16. A founding principle of international taxation
that persists in tax treaties is that a source country's laws "must not tax such income in a manner that
discriminates against foreigners." GRAETZ, supra note 69, at 33. Taxing noncitizens at a lower rate
would not seem to run afoul of this principle.
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the appropriate reaction to the challenge of taxing LPRs-clear members
of the taxable community but insecure as compared to formal citizens of
that community-is to tax LPRs at lower rates.
Before addressing the likely objections to this proposed reform, let
me set forth a basic structure. Taxing noncitizens at modified rates could
be accomplished without overhauling the current tax regime.219 Lowering
the tax rate on LPRs could take the form of an additional rate schedule
and filing status added to § 1 with modified income thresholds. Recall
Ishita whose $35,000 of taxable income places her in the 15% bracket as
a head of household filer. Under the head of household rate schedule,
Ishita jumps into the 15% bracket with taxable income over $13,250.220
If we believe LPRs should have the opportunity to earn more income
before having that income taxed at a 15% rate we could set the threshold
for the 15% bracket at a higher point-$17,250, for example. As such,
where Ishita's taxable income results in liability of $4,588 in the head of
household brackets her "LPR" brackets would lead to only $3,988 of tax
liability. 22 1 Other options for reducing tax rates on LPRs include allow-
ing exclusion of or a deduction for some portion of an LPR's income not
unlike the foreign earned income exclusion of § 911.222 As with a credit,
the options for how to structure tax relief to reduce LPRs' share of the
tax burden are multiple and this Article does not detail specifics, but ra-
ther simply suggests that such a reform may be appropriate. With the
broad sweeps of a rate reduction in mind, let us turn now to potential
objections to such a reform.
Three significant objections arise when considering tax relief tar-
geted at individuals with a particular status (or lack thereof). First, that
223
providing tax relief to LPRs is unfair to citizens. To the extent an LPR
and resident citizen receive substantially the same benefits from their
local, state, and the federal governments, perhaps they should be taxed at
the same rates. Or to the extent an LPR earns the same amount of taxable
income as a citizen, then both share a similar ability to pay and should be
taxed at a given rate. Why then, should an LPR receive a tax cut? The
219. The European Union has seen differing treatment on nonresidents and residents in mem-
ber countries. HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 521 (3rd ed. 2010). Attempting to balance sovereignty of member countries
with the goal of free movement for individuals, the Court has found that tax provisions that treat
nonresident taxpayers differently than resident taxpayers violates prohibitions against discrimination
on the basis of nationality. Id. Among the differing treatment the Court prohibited are laws that taxed
nonresidents at higher rates than residents. Id. at 522-21.
220. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.
221. Depending upon how the brackets are set, it is possible an existing status could result in
lower tax liability than the LPR status. In that case, an LPR could be permitted to simply elect the
more favorable schedule.
222. I.R.C. § 911 (2012) (excluding qualifying foreign income from U.S. tax).
223. Whether such a reform could pass with the current Congress is a different issue than
whether it would make for a more equitable tax system. I do not attempt herein to address that issue.
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answer to that question goes back to the significance we ascribe to the
insecurity LPRs face because of the tax-immigration nexus.
Using benefit theory to support a different rate schedule departs
from policy justifications for differences in existing rate schedules. For
example, ability to pay, not benefit theory, supports the separate head of
household rate schedule. Is an LPR's status as a tax citizen similarly rel-
evant? LPRs face naturalization costs that impact their ability to pay tax,
but those costs come in isolated years. Additionally, those costs may be
seen as elective consumption decisions distinct from dependent support
costs, a view that would cast naturalization costs as a nondeductible per-
sonal expense or an issue better remedied by the proposed credit.224 The
insecurity LPRs face on account of tax law's role in immigration law and
policy persists unless or until that LPR naturalizes, however, at which
time she transitions from tax citizen to formal citizen. It is not, then, a
one-time cost or investment easily solved by a credit. An LPR rate
schedule would ultimately be based upon the inequities seen by applying
benefit theory in light of the tax-immigration nexus, rather than ability to
pay. As such, the LPR schedule and filing status would be a departure
from the norm of current tax policy, though not necessarily an unwar-
ranted one.
Second, one might object to a different rate schedule for LPRs out
of a concern for the incentives it could create to remain an LPR rather
than naturalize and the corollary revenue effects. Proponents of marriage
penalty relief levy similar criticisms of the current tax outcomes of the
married filing jointly schedule for some couples. The logic goes a fol-
lows: because being married increases tax liability for some couples, tax
law disincentivizes marriage in a meaningful way.225 I (and others) be-
226lieve this argument assumes too much. Marriage and citizenship are
emotionally, social and culturally-charged statuses that individuals desire
for any number of rational and irrational reasons. Despite my own incli-
224. See I.R.C. § 262 (2012) (specifying that personal expenses are not deductible). Drawing
the line between consumption decisions that are ignored for tax and those that should give rise to
some adjustment to tax liability is no easy task. To some scholars, children are a personal consump-
tion decision. See, e.g., HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938). Ultimately, resolving
these conflicts requires returning to foundational philosophical and social policy discussions that are
subject to significant disagreement.
225. See, e.g., James Pethokoukis, Here's Exactly How Marriage Penalties Discourage Mar-
riage, AEIDEAS (Feb. 25, 2014, 11:26 AM), https://www.aei.org/publication/heres-exactly-how-
marriage-penalties-discourage-marriage/.
226. There are many compelling reasons to be concerned with the relevance to and treatment of
marriage under the tax code. See Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
805, 805-07 (2008); Tessa R. Davis, Mapping the Families of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 179, 191-93 (2015); Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpay-
er in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 652-53 (2010); Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronorma-
tivity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 131-34 (1998); Theodore P. Seto, The
Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1568 (2008); Law-
rence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties. A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L.
REV. 1, 1-2 (2000).
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nation to believe that tax law and policy matter to the daily lives of indi-
viduals, there are limits. A less speculative response to this objection
would be to simply limit the availability of the preferential rate schedule
to a set period of time, not unlike the surviving spouse rules that allow an
unmarried individual to continue to use the married filing jointly status
227for two years after the taxable year in which his spouse passes away.
An LPR schedule could be available for a similarly circumscribed time
to counter any disincentive to naturalization. The ready time period that
volunteers itself is five years, as many LPRs are ineligible for naturaliza-
tion without five years continuous residence.228 Though an imperfect
metric, the law would effectively use an LPR's failure to apply for citi-
zenship as a signal that permanence of status is of lower value to her than
to an individual who applies as soon as is possible. To the extent an LPR
does not value permanence of status, the benefits gulf between she and a
citizen lessens.
A third objection to a different rate may come from immigrants'
rights advocates. Immigrant advocacy groups frequently highlight the
fact that immigrants routinely comply with tax laws, countering rhetoric
that negatively casts immigrants as burdens to the fisc. 229 Studies support
these statements, showing that immigrants contribute significantly to
state and federal economies.230 The tax-immigration nexus highlights the
role tax compliance plays in making citizens. If LPRs or other immi-
grants were to pay less in taxes, the lower burden could subject an al-
ready vulnerable population to the allegation that by paying less in taxes,
its members have less purchase on the right to citizenship. The inequity
of taxing LPRs and U.S. citizens the same could, in other words, become
buried in the rhetoric of desert. Thus, while tax policy analysis of fair-
ness might justify a lower tax burdens for LPRs, immigration policy
might intervene to stop such a reform.
As this discussion illustrates, a preferential rate schedule for LPRs
is subject to objections. By providing comprehensive tax relief, as op-
posed to the one-off relief of a naturalization credit, however, a rate re-
form better respects the fact that LPRs face insecurity and disproportion-
227. I.R.C. § 2(a) (2012) (providing the definition of a surviving spouse).
228. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012). For a helpful list of the naturalization requirements LPRs face,
see U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 22, at 18-21.
229. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 26 ("'So many people say we are here burdening the
country, but we are paying their retirements,' he told me. For now, he doesn't mind supporting the
social security system, he says, but hopes one day he can reap the benefits too."); Do Immigrants
Take American Jobs, Use Our Services Without Paying Taxes, and Cost American Taxpayers Mon-
ey?, AM. FOR IMMIGRANT JUST.,
http://www.aijustice.org/doimmigrants take americanjobs use our services withoutpaying tax
esandcostamericans taxpayers money (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
230. For a sampling of helpful studies, see HEATHER GIBNEY & PETER S. FISHER, IOWA
POLICY PROJECT, IMMIGRANTS IN IOWA: WHAT NEW IOWANS CONTRIBUTE TO THE STATE
ECONOMY (2014); INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS' STATE
AND LOCAL TAX CONTRIBUTIONS (2013); NAT'L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG'G, & MED., THE ECONOMIC
AND FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (Francine D. Blau & Christopher Mackie eds., 2016).
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ate punishments for tax offenses every year that they are LPRs, and that
these factors are relevant to tax on horizontal equity grounds. At the
same time, the fact that LPRs would remain part of the taxable communi-
ty means the disciplinary or constructive role tax plays in requiring
would-be citizens to act as such is not lost, nor is the basic benefit/burden
bargain. Current law, by taxing LPRs on the same terms as citizens, sup-
ports the project of training citizens but fails to account for the differ-
ences between tax and formal citizens. Arguably, however, remedying
one perceived inequity may give rise to another in the eyes of formal
citizens to whom LPRs bear significant resemblance. The goal of this
Article is not to unequivocally state that a given proposed reform is right.
Rather, it is, in part, to add a new thread to the conversation on citizen-
ship-based taxation by introducing the concept of the tax-immigration
nexus and suggesting that current tax law, in light of the nexus, is too
heavily weighted against LPRs.
C A Note on Salience and the Tax-Immigration Nexus
As discussed above, tweaking the tax-immigration nexus may posi-
tively impact tax compliance by enhancing the perceived fairness of the
system and, thereby, its legitimacy. In this effort, the salience23 1 of tax
law to noncitizens should be further explored. New arrivals to the United
States and immigrants seeking more permanent status are, or should be,
very aware of the importance of tax compliance on the pathway to legal
status or citizenship. Accordingly, the tax-immigration nexus creates an
opportunity for tax law and policy to use this salience to support compli-
ance among citizen and noncitizen populations. Under current law, the
tax-immigration nexus casts tax in a coercive and punitive light. As we
have seen, noncompliance, whether intentional or inadvertent, with tax
232law may result not only in penalties but grave collateral consequences.
Any of the three proposed reforms could increase immigrants' percep-
tions of the tax code as fundamentally fair. 233 By granting LPRs lower
rates, a tax credit to assist with naturalization costs, or modifying report-
ing requirements the tax system appears to strike a balance between sup-
porting the idea that paying taxes is an obligation of citizenship while
recognizing that LPRs are not yet citizens and, as such, perhaps should
not bear the full brunt of what is one of the key responsibilities of citi-
zenship.234 Such a shift could lend support to the idea that tax compliance
231. For a recent, excellent piece on tax salience, see Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Sali-
ence Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 254-55 (2011).
232. See supra Part Ill; see also LEvI, supra note 74, at 49-52 (discussing coercion and ideo-
logical compliance).
233. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 171, at 769-73; John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear,
and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. Sci. 490, 490-91
(1995) (suggesting that a sense of duty to the collective plays a role in taxpayer compliance).
234. See Andrea Louise Campbell, What Americans Think of Taxes, in THE NEW FISCAL
SOCIOLOGY, supra note 48, at 48, for the proposition that "taxation constitutes one of the main
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is a positive expression of fiscal citizenship rather than simply a potential
roadblock on the path to naturalization.235 Empirical research could ex-
pand on this idea and further develop its relevance to both tax compli-
ance and immigration policy.
CONCLUSION
Tax and immigration law are, at first glance, two areas of law with
policy goals and responsibilities that do not seem to overlap. Tax law
focuses on revenue collection, albeit with extensive forays into social
and economic policy. Immigration law concerns regulating who can
come and go from the country and who is entitled to restricted or full
membership in the national community. The Supreme Court's decision in
Kawashima v. Holder provided a tip-off to a connection between immi-
gration and tax. Looking further reveals the extensive tax-immigration
nexus.
Citizenship is the common thread that runs through and unites these
seemingly disparate subjects. Social theory teaches us that citizenship is
more than formal legal status, but a practice performed by individuals to
varying degrees. Utilizing this broader concept of citizenship, the num-
ber of connections between tax and immigration increases. Tracing those
points of connection reveals a robust tax-immigration nexus in which
immigration law relies upon tax to construct and police the requirements
of formal citizenship, and tax law utilizes both a formal, immigration
law-based and performative concept of citizenship to define the taxable
community. Thus, these two bodies of law that appear to be relatively
isolated from one another are, in fact, intimately entwined. Moreover, the
depth and breadth of the tax-immigration nexus pushes us to reconsider
whether the current taxation of LPRs is equitable in light of the key ways
in which LPRs differ from formal U.S. citizens.
linkages between citizens and government." Additionally, see LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO
LOVE FORM 1040: Two CHEERS FOR THE RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 4 (2013).
235. ZELENAK, supra note 234, at 4. See generally Ajay K. Mehrotra, Reviving Fiscal Citizen-
ship, 113 MICH. L. REV. 943 (2015) (discussing fiscal citizenship); Jill Lepore, Tax Time: Why We
Pay, NEW YORKER (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/11/26/tax-time
("What's surprising, given how much money and passion have been spent to defeat a broad-based,
progressive income tax over the past century, and how poorly it has been defended, is that it has
endured-testimony, perhaps, to Americans' abiding sense of fairness. Taxes are a pact. That pact
needs renewing."). Even reforms short of a credit or rate change could engender this view. The
Service could increase outreach to immigrant populations with compliance and public education
programs similar to those for the Earned Income Tax Credit. Doing so would respect the role that tax
law currently plays in the social project of constructing citizens.
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ABSTRACT
A profound transformation has been worked in the law of the
dormant Commerce Clause. Much contemporary scholarship and many
modem decisions of the Supreme Court present the essential structure
and content of the doctrine in the form that it held through the middle
decades of the 20th century (hereafter the "Traditional Framework"). But
in truth the Court has dramatically eroded the dormant Commerce Clause
since the mid-1980s, leaving it today a slender remnant of the traditional
model. This Article tracks three dimensions of the doctrine's precipitous
decline. First, the Court has profoundly eroded the rule against discrimi-
natory regulation, focusing almost exclusively on "intentional" protec-
tionism. Second, the Court has virtually retired the practice of burden
review, in which the balance between the commercial burden of a state
measure and its social benefits is judicially scrutinized for reasonable-
ness. Third, the Court has created and expanded exceptions to the reach
of the doctrine with remarkable speed. The first and second of these di-
mensions accord closely with prescriptions offered by Donald Regan in a
seminal 1986 article, but the third dimension marks a decisive step be-
yond even Regan's prophetic vision. Today, the path ahead remains un-
clear. Justice Scalia was a powerful and influential critic of the dormant
Commerce Clause, and much may turn on whether his successor contin-
ues his project of opposition to the doctrine. But whatever happens next,
the Traditional Framework is now hopelessly out of date, and the
dormant Commerce Clause is in remarkable decline.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he construction of [the Commerce Clause] has been so fully dis-
cussed at the bar, and in the opinions delivered by the court in former
cases, that scarcely any thing can be suggested at this day calculated
to throw much additional light upon the subject, or any argument of-
fered which has not heretofore been considered, and commented on,
and which may not be found in the reports of the decisions of this
court.'
1. Thurlow v. Massachusetts (The License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573 (1847).
256 [Vol. 94:2
2017] THE DECLINE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 257
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney
A profound transformation has been worked in the law of the
dormant Commerce Clause. While courts and scholars still invoke a
basic doctrinal model settled in the middle of the last century-a model
that I will call the "Traditional Framework"-this model is now hope-
lessly out of date. Since the mid-1980s, it has crumbled under a barrage
of criticism from the academy and the judiciary: criticism of its claim to
the status of constitutional law, of its practicability, of its democratic
legitimacy, and of its focus on economic effects. But despite the long
tradition of distinguished and thoughtful commentary associated with the
doctrine,2 scholarly and judicial writing has yet to fully confront the
change. This Article charts the remarkable decline of the dormant Com-
merce Clause, from the Traditional Framework to the modem reality.
In the following pages, we will see that since the mid-1980s the
Court has: (1) significantly narrowed the prohibition on discriminatory
state action to focus on "intentional" protectionism; (2) effectively re-
tired the practice of "burden review" (in which a state measures adverse
impact on trade is weighed against its political or social benefit); and
(3) overseen the creation and expansion, with unprecedented speed, of a
series of exceptions to the reach of the doctrine. There are powerful rea-
sons to suspect that his transformation is regrettable, but the primary
concern of this Article will be to reveal, rather than criticize, what the
Court has wrought in this area: to expose the astonishing decline4 of the
Traditional Framework.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part II summa-
rizes the Traditional Framework. Part III charts that model's decline un-
der the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Part IV concludes.
2. For a very small cross-section of the more influential contributions in recent years, see
generally Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J.
965 (1998); Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 417 (2008); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91
YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, I10 YALE L.J. 785 (2001); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 217 (1995); Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation, The American Common Market and
Public Choice, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569
(1987); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125 (1979); Norman R. Williams, The Foundations of the
American Common Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 409 (2008); Amy M. Petragnani, Comment,
The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1215 (1994).
3. See Daniel Francis, The Phantom Case Against the Dormant Commerce Clause (un-
published manuscript in preparation) (on file with author).
4. During the preparation of this article for publication I had the pleasure of coming across
Charles Budd's thoughtful piece in Volume 4 of The State and Local Tax Lawyer, with a title in-
spired, like mine, by Edward Gibbon. Charles Budd, The Decline of the Dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause Halted?: Deer Park v. Harris County Appraisal District, 4 ST. & LOc. TAX LAW. 171
(1999). 1 have not thought it necessary to change my title as a result, but I gladly acknowledge Judge
Budd's work and his fine taste in article titles.
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II. THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. Overview and Fundamentals
The phrase "dormant Commerce Clause" refers to the inference that
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution ("The Congress
shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce . .. among the several
States") is not only a basis for affirmative federal lawmaking, but also
precludes states from acting in certain ways that threaten trade among the
states. Under the Traditional Framework, the dormant Commerce
Clause prohibits three types of conduct: discrimination against interstate
or out-of-state interests; the imposition of unreasonable burdens upon
interstate commerce; and (occasionally) extraterritorial regulation.6 The
7doctrine also applies in a distinctive fashion to taxation cases. We will
consider the Traditional Framework's treatment of each of these types of
state conduct in turn.
The dormant Commerce Clause can be invoked by any entity-
natural or legal-injured by, or facing injury from, a state measure that it
forbids.8 This includes, for example: a person directly addressed by the
state measure;9 another state that has suffered impairment of "specific tax
revenues,"'0 suffered other "direct injury,"" or whose citizens face "sub-
stantial economic injury"' 2 from the measure; a trade association,13 or a
state agency acting as a de facto trade association,14 representing interests
that are injured by the measure; or an entity otherwise suffering or facing
damage from the measure.5
The doctrine may be invoked to challenge the conduct of states,
their agents, and their subdivisions,'6 although probably not Native
American tribes.17 The Court has applied the dormant Commerce Clause
5. BORIS I. BITTKER & BRANNON P. DENNING, BITFKER ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.01-6.01[B] (2d rev. ed. 2012) (alteration in original).
6. See id. § 6.02[B].
7. See id. § 6.06[G].
8. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 468 (2005) (actual injury); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923) (impending injury).
9. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 572-75
(1997) (taxed entity); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 388 (1994) (regu-
lated entity); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1946) (criminal defendant).
10. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448-54 (1992).
11. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 562, 598
(1855).
12. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736-39 (1981); see also Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 262 U.S. (13 How.) at 591 (recognizing the right of a state to represent the interest of its
citizens).
13. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1977).
14. See id. at 344.
15. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 286 (1997); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 267 (1984).
16. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 653 (1994).
17. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); see also Otoc-
Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep't of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 117 n.9 (2d Cir. 2014)
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to a wide variety of measures, including civil statutes,' criminal stat-
19 221utes,1 municipal and local ordinances,2 0 tax laws and tax exemptions,
22 2administrative orders, mayoral executive orders,23 and even contracting
practices24 and policies adopted by state-owned businesses.25 As far as I
can tell, the Supreme Court has almost never entertained an effort to in-
voke the Commerce Clause against private entities (although there is one
unusual case that arguably constitutes an exception26), even private enti-
ties exercising de facto regulatory authority or closely entangled in the
regulatory process.
A person is not precluded from invoking the dormant Commerce
Clause against that person's own state of citizenship or residence.27 The
argument that in-staters have an adequate remedy at the polls, and that
they should accordingly be denied relief under the dormant Commerce
Clause and confined to "political" remedies, has been quite properly re-
jected by the Court,28 although in some other cases the Court has indicat-
ed a troubling willingness to entertain it.29 It has also featured in much
scholarly writing, where it is associated with the notion of "representa-
tion reinforce[ement]."30 But the notion that access to dormant Com-
merce Clause litigation should be denied to anyone fairly represented in
the political process has mostly been-and certainly deserves to be-
rejected, on at least two grounds: (1) the burden of anticompetitive state
regulation virtually always falls partly upon in-staters and partly upon
out-of-staters; and (2) the legality of state law cannot reasonably be made
(explaining that the Indian Commerce Clause does not contain a "dormant" dimension equivalent to
that found in the Interstate Commerce Clause).
18. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 323-24 (1979); Morgan v. Virginia, 328
U.S. 373, 374-77 (1946).
20. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 336-37 (2007) (plurality opinion); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,
386-87 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 331-32 (2008) (plurality opinion);
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1997).
22. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 188, 190 (1994); New Eng.
Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 335, 337 (1982).
23. See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1983).
24. See, e.g., S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84-86 (1984).
25. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 430, 432-33 (1980). But see discussion
infra Sections III.D.1-2 (arguing recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded the category of
state-owned enterprises that are excluded from the dormant Commerce Clause).
26. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 566-67, 572-73, 599-600 (1895).
27. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 326 (1890).
28. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994); see also Comptroller of
Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1797-98 (2015).
29. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 345 (2007) (plurality opinion); Wunnicke, 467 U.S: at 92; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981).
30. Eule, supra note 2, at 441-43; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 83-84 (1980).
DENVER LAW REVIEW
to depend upon a court's armchair assessment of the political economy
of regulation within a state.3 '
B. Discrimination
Perhaps above all else, the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits
discrimination by a state in favor of its own commercial actors, interests,
32or activities, to the detriment of interstate or out-of-state equivalents.
But a discriminatory measure is not automatically invalid. Rather, if the
Court concludes that a challenged measure is discriminatory in the rele-
vant sense, it will turn to the question of whether that discrimination is
justified. The Court's justification analysis will be discussed in detail
below, but, in summary, discrimination is typically unlawful unless it is
justified by a "legitimate" regulatory objective and there is no reasona-
ble, less discriminatory, alternative way to achieve that objective.33 The
party raising the dormant Commerce Clause challenge bears the burden
of showing a prima facie violation of the doctrine; once this burden has
been discharged, the burden then passes to the regulating state to estab-
lish a justification.34
In the language preferred by the Court, discrimination in the pro-
scribed sense is "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state [or
interstate] economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter"35 in such a way that affects a relationship of actual or potential
economic competition between the in-state and out-of-state interests.36
"Benefit" and "burden" are measured against a counterfactual world
without the measure: thus, a measure can discriminate by singling out
out-of-state or interstate interests for less favorable treatment,3 7 or by
31. See, e.g., I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1055 (3d ed. 2000)
("The concept of surrogate representation should be deployed with care, since its logic cannot easily
be contained."); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty, Residency, and Federalism: States' Duty ofImpar-
tiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 277, 313 n.101 (1999) ("1 tend to be skeptical that
the Court could ever really figure out whether the burdened state residents will suffice to represent
out-of-state interests. After all, is there ever a case in which burdened out-of-state interests like
nonresident prospective home buyers have no proxy-real estate brokers, home builders, lenders,
and so on-for their interests?"); see also W Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Analysis of interest group participation in the political process may serve many useful
purposes, but serving as a basis for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is not one of them.").
32. See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794; CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,
87 (1987).
33. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008) (plurality opinion).
34. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
35. United Haulers Ass'n, v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338
(2007) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (cita-
tions omitted).
36. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300, 303 (1997) (holding a competi-
tive relationship is a prerequisite to a finding of discrimination); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 271 (1984); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1961).
37. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568, 574-76
(1997).
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depriving them of a competitive advantage that they would otherwise
38have enjoyed.
Accordingly, the concept of "discrimination" is a broad one. What
we might call "partial" discrimination-discrimination in favor of a re-
gion of the regulating state, in favor of a few (or just one) in-stater(s), or
against only some other states-is treated just like "complete" discrimi-
nation and is unlawful.39 This makes perfect sense as an anti-evasion
norm: absent such a rule, states could simply avoid the prohibition by
favoring large in-state regions or large groups of in-state actors. Also
caught is discrimination against states that fail (or refuse) to satisfy a
requirement of reciprocity with the regulating state.40
In the Court's jurisprudence, discrimination comes in two catego-
ries: (1) facial discrimination and (2) effect-based discrimination.
1. Facial Discrimination
When a measure facially or formally discriminates-that is, distin-
guishes on its face-against interstate or out-of-state commerce, entities,
or activities, it is caught by the dormant Commerce Clause and must be
justified as described below. 4 1 There is no de minimis exception to the
42rule against facial discrimination.
The Court has applied this rule to a wide range of regulatory
measures, including: bans or prohibitions on interstate transactions;43
taxes and charges on interstate transactions or activities in excess of
those applied to comparable internal ones;'4 less favorable tax treatment
38. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1994); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350-51;
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
39. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (one in-
state actor favored); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353,
361 (1992) (preference for State subdivision impermissible); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982) (only certain States disfavored); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 350, 354 (1951) (requirement to process milk within five miles of center of Madison);
Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1891) (fee for inspection of meat of animals slaughtered
more than 100 miles from place of sale).
40. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472-473; New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
276 (1988); Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58; see also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366, 379 (1976). But see Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 371-72, 376 (analyzing reciprocity criterion using
Pike burden test).
41. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 575-76; see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S.
324, 344 n.* (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Denning, supra
note 2, at 495.
42. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455-56 (1992); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 269 (1984); see also Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 344 n.*.
43. See, e.g., Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473; Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986); S.-Cent.
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84-86 (1984); New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hamp-
shire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979); City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941).
44. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981); Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 332 (1977); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70
(1963).
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of products "because they are made in .. other States";45 application of
special and burdensome licensing (or similar) requirements to products
from out of state;46 regulation of third parties forcing them to deal, entire-
ly or partly, with an in-state entity;47 regulation of third parties making it
more expensive or burdensome for them to deal with out-of-state inter-
ests;48 limitations on the types of transactions in which out-of-state par-
ties can engage;49 and procedural rules disfavoring out-of-state parties in
-50litigation.
2. Effect-Based Discrimination
When a measure discriminates in its effect-that is, in its distribu-
tion of actual benefits and burdens-against interstate or out-of-state
interests, it must also be justified, just as if it were facially discriminato-
ry. ' But effect-based discrimination is an elusive and controversial con-
cept.
Every commentator makes his or her own effort to capture the
idea: here is mine. Effect-based discrimination occurs when-
considering those bearing the burden of the regulation plus their competi-
tors (whether or not the competitors are subject to the measure in ques-
tion)-the burden created by a state measure correlates to or varies with
out-of-stateness. The burden of a regulation can correlate to out-of-
stateness either in its incidence (i.e., interstate or out-of-state regulatees
are subject to the measure more often when undertaking an activity than
in-state regulatees undertaking the same activity or an equivalent52) or in
its burden when incident (i.e., interstate or out-of-state regulatees are
subject to a heavier burden than in-state regulatees engaging in the same,
45. Limbach, 486 U.S. at 274; see also W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193
(1994); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Enytl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353,
359 (1992); Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1952); Welton
v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 279 (1875).
47. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389-91 (1994);
Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 455; Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 376-77
(1964); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948).
48. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575-76
(1997) (tax exemption); Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (surcharge); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) (fee).
49. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 37-39 (1980) (finding discrimi-
nation where a Florida statute prohibited ownership of local investment or trust businesses by certain
types of out-of-state firms).
50. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 889 (1988)
("[T]he Ohio statute that suspends limitations protection f r out-of-state entities is a violation of the
Commerce Clause."); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 202 (1914).
51. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 457 (1940) ("The freedom of commerce ... is not
to be fettered by legislation, the actual effect of which is to discriminate in favor of interstate busi-
nesses, whatever may be the ostensible reach of the language." (footnote omitted)); Nippert v. City
of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 429-32 (1946).
52. See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) (tax favoring fruit wine
and okolehao brandy); Best & Co., 311 U.S. at 456-57 (tax on merchants using hotel rooms to
secure retail orders); Nippert, 327 U.S. at 417-18, 431 (tax on itinerant solicitors).
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or an equivalent, activity5 3). What matters here is the overall tendency of
the measure, not its impact in idiosyncratic individual cases.54 An effect-
based rule of this kind only makes practical sense if it incorporates a de
minimis exception: a trivial or momentary imbalance in competitive im-
pact hardly warrants full-blown justification analysis.55
Note that my formulation does not reach, and is not intended to
reach, all forms of unequal regulatory burden. In particular, a rule against
effect-based discrimination, contoured as I have described it here, does
not imply that a burden is discriminatory in the proscribed sense just
because it applies mainly or even solely to out-of-state or interstate regu-
latees. I think this is a minority view: if I read them correctly, Brannon
Denning, Norman Williams, and Michael Lawrence see such measures
as discriminatory in the relevant sense; I do not.5 6 Such a situation can
arise, for example, when a state regulates an industry in which the activi-
ties or actors happen to be predominantly (or even exclusively) interstate
in nature: in such a case the regulation may burden that industry, but
among the set of regulatees and competitors no relative advantage is con-
ferred on in-state interests. In such situations the Court tends-quite
rightly in my view-not to find discrimination. Consider, for example,
a state that did not produce milk, or a state with no mining or pharmaceu-
tical companies of its own. Could that state regulate milk, or mining, or
pharmaceuticals, without immediately tripping over the dormant Com-
merce Clause and being forced to justify its regulatory scheme? I think
the answer should be "of course." So the question is not whether, in the
set of burdened regulatees, there are more out-of-staters than in-staters;
the question is whether in-staters tend to enjoy a better deal by compari-
son with out-of-state competitors (either because th  in-staters face a
lighter burden or because they are less frequently burdened).
The Supreme Court has found effect-based discrimination, for ex-
ample, when regulatory measures: favor or require the performance of
some action in-state, or in or near to some specific region of the state (a
requirement that, practically speaking, favors in-state entities, particular-
53. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 335, 353 (1977)
(prohibition on displaying State apple quality markings which operated to the particular detriment of
Washington apples).
54. See, e.g., Nippert, 327 U.S. at 432.
55. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 2, at 136 ("Protectionist effect ... cannot be made virtually
per se illegal... . There are just too many possible laws that are within the states' power on any
reasonable standard and that have some protectionist effect.").
56. See Denning, supra note 2, at 514 (regarding such measures as discriminatory); Michael
A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Frame-
work, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 423-424 (1998); Williams, supra note 2, at 412, 412 n. 14.
57. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1981); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 125-26 (1978); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 177-79 (1923); Heisler v.
Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 258 (1922). But see Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 135 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority opinion for declining to find effect-
based discrimination in such a case).
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ly those already located in or near the relevant area);58 favor some kind
of product or service produced solely or primarily in-state, by compari-
son with out-of-state substitutes or competitors;59 or favor incumbents in
a state's internal market.6 0
3. Intentional Discrimination
Occasionally, one sees intentional or purposive discrimination listed
as a distinct third category of discrimination, along with facial and effect-
based discrimination.61 But in truth, and setting aside a recent wave of
innovations upon the Traditional Framework that will be discussed in
detail below,62 the Court's decisions generally do not focus on intention,
nor suggest that intention alone can render a measure troubling under the
dormant Commerce Clause.63
4. Justification of Discriminatory Regulation
The Court typically states that a discriminatory measure "will sur-
vive only if it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be ade-
quately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."" The
Court describes this test as one of the "strictest scrutiny,"65 and the regu-
lating state carries the burden of proof.66 The justification analysis appar-
ently includes a subjective component: in order to claim the benefit of a
justification, the Court seems to require that the state show that the justi-
58. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1994)
(citing cases); S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84 (1984) (timber processing
required to be performed in-state); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)
(Madison regulation that favored milk produced within five miles of Madison was unlawful discrim-
ination); Foster-Fountain Packaging Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 (1928); Minnesota v. Barber, 136
U.S. 313, 326 (1890) (meat examination required to be performed in-state); see also Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138, 146 (1970) (fruit packaging required to be performed in-state).
59. See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984).
60. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). But see Panhan-
dle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 333 (1951) (upholding requirement
to obtain license before competing with an incumbent).
61. See Regan, supra note 2, at 1092; see also Denning, supra note 2, at 502; Daniel K. Lee &
Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to
Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 306 (2013); Bradford C. Mank,
Are Public Facilities Different from Private Ones? Adopting a New Standard of Review for the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 SMU L. REv. 157, 163-64 (2007); Will Sears, Note, Full-Impact
Regulations and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 157, 163 (2014).
62. See infra Section III.B.2 (charting the increasing focus on intention in recent cases).
63. See infra Section III.B.1 (discussing traditional rejection of intention).
64. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (plurality opinion) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (citations omitted); see also United Haulers Ass'n. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338-39 (2007) (plurality opinion); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S.
460, 489 (2005); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 581-82
(1997); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); Or. Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1994); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S.
334, 342 (1992); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
65. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 581 (citation omitted); Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S.
at 101 (citation omitted).
66. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
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fication in question actually motivated the measure and is not an ex post
rationalization.67 The Supreme Court often stresses the toughness of the
justification test by asserting that discriminatory measures are "virtually
per se invalid." 68
As actually applied, however, the justification analysis for discrimi-
natory regulation is more permissive. It is split into two stages. In the
first stage, the state must identify a "legitimate purpose" for the discrimi-
nation, on a broad, permissive, and binary definition of "legitimate"
(much like rational basis scrutiny),69 and it must also show that the prob-
lem at which the regulation aims varies in some way with out-of-
stateness.70
In the second stage, the state is required to show that its regulatory
solution varies with out-of-stateness in approximately the same way that
the problem does-that the skew of the measure broadly resembles the
skew of the underlying policy problem. Thus, a problem that is simply
"common to the several States" will not justify discrimination.7' And it
must be the problem itself, not the solution, that varies with out-of-
stateness: the legislature cannot discriminate in order to address the in-
72state piece of an evenly distributed problem. Such evenly distributed
problems-the need for food safety,73 the harms and losses from compe-
74 7576
tition, the scarcity of natural resources, the noxiousness of pollution,
the burdens of caring for the indigent,77 the risk of consumer confusion,
and so on-therefore cannot be solved with discriminatory regulation.79
By contrast, if the relevant problem is asymmetrically distributed across
67. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 457 (1992) (rejecting a proffered justifi-
cation because, among other things, it "finds no support in the records made in this case"); Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 680 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (plurality
opinion) ("The burdens imposed on commerce must be balanced against the local benefits actually
sought to be achieved by the State's lawmakers, and not against those suggested after the fact by
counsel.").
68. See, e.g., Davis, 553 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted).
69. See, e.g., Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
70. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353,
367 (1992); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 345-46 (1992).
71. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 339-40, 348; see also City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
72. For example, States have often discriminated against out-of-state interests simply because
they want to support and protect local businesses, consumers, charities, and resources. But, the Court
has recognized that to allow such "justifications" would be to trample the dormant Commerce
Clause into the mud. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994); Bacchus
Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1984).
73. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-55 (1951).
74. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 204-05; H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 531-33 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
75. See, e.g., New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337-38 (1979).
76. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
77. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1941).
78. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977).
79. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 538-39; Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,
278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928); West v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 260 (1911).
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states, a differentiated approach may be justified. By requiring the regu-
latory solution to fit the policy problem, the Court essentially invites the
state to show that it is not in fact "discriminating" in the sense of treating
similar things dissimilarly, but instead responding even-handedly to an
asymmetric problem.80
C. Burden Review
Discrimination, while of central importance, does not exhaust the
concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause under the Traditional
Framework. The doctrine has also long been understood to have an as-
pect that is concerned purely with burden upon commercial activity. This
practice of burden review is currently known as the "Pike" doctrine after
a case in which its current formulation was prominently articulated.8'
Under this approach, a measure is unlawful if its burdens are "clearly
excessive in relation to the [measure's] putative local benefits."82 Note
the term "local" here: on at least two occasions the Court has indicated
that only benefits accruing to the regulating state's own citizens count as
83"benefits" in the relevant sense. (There is accordingly something of a
tension in dormant Commerce Clause law between the doctrine's antag-
onism to state discrimination against out-of-staters, on the one hand, and
its lack of receptivity to the notion that states might legitimately justify
regulatory decisions, at least in part, by reference to the interests of out-
of-staters, on the other.)
The Court approaches burden review with considerable deference,
and generally confines its applications of this rule to clear cases.m For
example, the Court invalidated non-discriminatory rules in Kassel v.
80. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) ("[The justification
analysis] is perhaps just another way of saying that what may appear to be a 'discriminatory' provi-
sion in the constitutionally prohibited sense-that is, a protectionist enactment-may on closer analysis
not be so."); City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27 ("[W]hatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose,
it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the
State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.").
81. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Note that burden review
emerged long before Pike. See infra Section III.C. 1.
82. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S.
328, 338-39 (2008) (plurality opinion); United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (plurality opinion); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493,
525-26 (1989); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643
(1982) (plurality opinion); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981);
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
83. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987); Edgar, 457 U.S. at
644.
84. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951) ("When there is a rea-
sonable basis for legislation to protect the social, as distinguished from the economic, welfare of a
community, it is not for this Court because of the Commerce Clause to deny the exercise locally of
the sovereign power of Louisiana."), abrogated by Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189-91
(1938) (emphasizing the importance of judicial deference in the absence of discrimination); see also
Denning, supra note 2, at 422 & n.8 (noting that Pike calls for a "deferential balancing test").
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Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, when Iowa was unable
to muster any serious evidence that its exclusion of trucks beyond a cer-
tain length from its highways promoted safety;8 6 in Raymond Motor
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice,87 when the "appellants produced a massive
array of evidence to disprove the State's assertion that the regulations
make some contribution to highway safety," while the State had "virtual-
ly defaulted in its defense of the regulations as a safety measure";88 and
in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,89 when Illinois's requirement of the
use of curved mudguards on its highways, rather than the straight guards
required in most other states, created a burden on interstate commerce
that was "rather massive" while it was "conclusively shown" that the
curved guard conferred no advantages over the straight guard, and given
significant evidence that it actually introduced new dangers.90 Each of
these was a clear case, leaving little room for a serious defense of the
reasonableness of the measure in question.
D. Extraterritorial Regulation
A short but distinct line of cases applying the Traditional Frame-
work prohibits states from directly regulating "commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of [the] State."91 The key idea here, in a
hangover from an earlier version of dormant Commerce Clause doc-
92trine, is directness: "The Commerce Clause .. . permits only incidental
regulation of interstate commerce by the States; direct regulation is pro-
hibited."93 Thus, a state measure purporting to affect activities wholly
outside the state-regulating, incentivizing, or penalizing them-may be
struck down.94 Likewise, "a State may not adopt legislation that has the
practical effect of establishing a 'scale of prices for use in other
states," 95 and a state may not force an out-of-state merchant "to seek
regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in an-
other."96 This is so even if the relevant out-of-state activity itself has ef-
85. 450 U.S. 662, 671-74 (1981) (plurality opinion).
86. Id.
87. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
88. Id. at 444.
89. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
90. Id. at 525, 528.
91. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("The Commerce Clause . .. precludes the application of a
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the
commerce has effects within the State."); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)
("New York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in
that state for milk acquired there.").
92. See infra Section III.A.2 (describing the direct/indirect burden test).
93. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 640; see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
94. See Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 337-38; Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521; Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry.
Co., 125 U.S. 465, 498 (1888).
95. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336 (quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 528); see also id. at 337; Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986); Baldwin, 294 U.S. at
521; Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Cb. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 575-77 (1886).
96. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582.
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fects within the regulating state-as it often will. 97 The Court has never
clearly explained whether such regulation is automatically invalid or
whether it may be justified.98
It must be said that the extraterritoriality doctrine-presented here
as part of the Traditional Framework, before the decision in Pharmaceu-
tical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh"-is a bit of an
oddball component of dormant Commerce Clause law. In many ways it
may be better thought of as a creature of the Due Process Clause, with
which it has often been entangled.00 It may be right, as Goldsmith and
Sykes seem to suggest, that the "extraterritoriality" cases may be best
assimilated to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, if at all, under the
rubric of burden review.0 1
E. Tax Cases
For many years, the Court has approached taxation cases under a
specific doctrinal framework, rather different from that which applies to
"regulation" cases. The modem approach is adequately summarized by
the Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady02 test requiring that a tax "[(1)]
is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,
[(2)] is fairly apportioned, [(3)] does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and [(4)] is fairly related to the services provided by the
State."0 3
1. Substantial Nexus
Both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses require a connection
between a taxing state and-for an entity not domiciled in that state0 -
any interstate activity that it seeks to tax.ios This is a minimal require-
ment, and it is established if the taxed entity "avails itself of the substan-
tial privilege of carrying on business within the State,"'0 although the
Court has held that an entity lacking a physical presence within a state
97. See, e.g., Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642-43.
98. See Sears, supra note 61, at 172.
99. 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
100. See Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doc-
trinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 980-83 (2013); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays. (I) CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial
State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1884-85 (1987); Williams, supra note 2, at 411-12
("[T]he Court ... has never made clear the connection between the dormant Commerce Clause and
that limitation on state action.").
101. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 2, at 804.
102. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
103. Id. at 279; accord D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30 (1988); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981).
104. An appropriate share of all the activities of an entity domiciled in a State is automatically
within the State's reach. See Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 464 (2000).
105. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1983); see also
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995).
106. Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 (1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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but mailing goods into it from outside is not connected to the state by
such a nexus.10 7 A use tax may be levied on such shipped-in goods, but it
"must be collected from . . . the [in-state] customer, not the out-of-state
seller."'08 Justice Kennedy has recently called for this rule to be revisited
in an age of online retail.'0 9
The most interesting manifestation of the nexus doctrine-perhaps
not the very highest praise-concerns the ability of a state to reach the
out-of-state activities of an entity that undertakes some, but not all, of its
activities in-state. The basic rule is that a state can tax (an apportioned
share of" 0) out-of-state activity if the entity is domiciled in the state or,
for a nondomiciled entity, if the out-of-state activity is part of a "unitary
business" with the activity in the taxing state.'' Discrete business activi-
ties that are not part of a unitary business with the in-state operations of a
nondomiciliary entity may not be taxed."12
2. Fair Apportionment
A state that has a substantial nexus to an activity may only tax a
"fairly apportioned" share of the value of that activity." 3 This rule ap-
plies even, it seems, if the taxing state is the state of residence, although
the Court's precedents are not consistent on this point.1 4 This require-
ment has two components: internal consistency and external consisten-
107. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992); Nat'l Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967), overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); see also Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 124, 1127
(2015); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441, 450-51 (1903) ("[T]he fact that the price was
to be collected in North Carolina is too slender a thread upon which to hang an exemption of the
transaction from a rule which would otherwise declare the tax [unlawful].").
108. Direct Mktg. Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 1135 ("There is a powerful case to be made that a retailer doing extensive business
within a State has a sufficiently 'substantial nexus' to justify imposing some minor tax-collection
duty, even if that business is done through mail or the Internet.... The legal system should find an
appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess."); see also Robbins v. Taxing
Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 495 (1887) ("It may be suggested that the merchant or manufacturer has the
post-office at his command, and may solicit orders through the mails. We do not suppose, however,
that any one would seriously contend that this is the only way in which his business can be transact-
ed without being amenable to exactions on the part of the state. Besides, why could not the state to
which his letters might be sent, tax him for soliciting orders in this way, as well as in any other
way?"), abrogated by United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
110. See infra Section II.E.2 (describing the fair apportionment requirement).
111. MeadWestvaco Corp. ex rel. Mead Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 26 (2008);
Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 460-61 (2000); Allied-Signal, Inc. ex rel.
Bendix Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778 (1992).
112. Hunt- Wesson, 528 U.S. at 464.
113. See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795 (2015); Gwin, White
& Prince Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1939); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S.
307, 308-11, 314 (1938).
114. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1798-99; JD. Adams Mfg. Co., 304 U.S. at 311-12, 314. But see W.
Publ'g Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946) (per curiam), affg 166 P.2d 861, 864 (Cal. 1946);
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 299-300 (1944).
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cy. 15 A formula is internally consistent if, supposing that i were adopted
by every state in the Union, it would not result in interstate commerce
being taxed more heavily than its intrastate equivalent.'16 A formula is
externally consistent if the factors used in the formula "actually reflect a
reasonable sense of how income is generated."1 17 This test asks "whether
a State's tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly attributa-
ble to economic activity within the taxing State."" If the tax satisfies the
criteria of internal and external consistency, it is fairly apportioned-
even if, in fact, there is a risk or reality of "double taxation.""9
3. Non-Discrimination
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits tax discrimination against
interstate or out-of-state actors or activities. 120 This includes, for exam-
ple, the application of higher taxation rates for out-of-state or interstate
activities,121 tax breaks and exemptions that favor in-state businesses or
interests,122 and rules that allow in-state businesses to reduce their tax
liability in ways that are denied to out-of-staters.123 The internal con-
sistency rule, described above in connection with apportionment, can
also be understood to reflect a concern to avoid discriminatory taxa-
tion.124 All the comments above regarding effect-based discrimination
are fully applicable in this context: indeed, many of those cases are taxa-
125tion cases.
115. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) ("[W]e have as-
sessed any threat of malapportionment by asking whether the tax is internally consistent and, if so,
whether it is externally consistent as well." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
116. Id.; see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 437
(2005); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989), abrogated by Comptroller of Treasury v.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169
(1983).
117. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169.
118. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185; see also Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262 ("The external con-
sistency test asks whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate
activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed.").
119. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795, 1804; Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 191-92; Armco Inc. v.
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 645-46 (1984); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-79 (1978);
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946), overruled by Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines,
Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); see also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 58 (1920) (stating that double or
other "unequal" taxation is not per se prohibited by the federal Constitution), abrogated by Comp-
troller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
120. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997); Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 197;
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963).
121. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) (noting that a
taxing rule is discriminatory if it "'tax[es] a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses
state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State' (quoting Armco, 467 U.S. at 642)).
122. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 587-88
(1997); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988); I.M. Darnell & Son Co. v.
City of Memphis, 208 U.S. 113, 125 (1908).
123. See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169 (1999).
124. See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795, 1804; Armco, 467 U.S. at 644.
125. See supra Section II.B.2 (explaining effect-based discrimination).
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This rule against discrimination is subject to an important caveat.
The "compensatory tax" doctrine provides that a tax, even if facially
discriminatory, may be sustained if its effect is to eliminate a distortion
that would otherwise result from the uneven incidence of another tax
enacted by the same state.126 The effect must be "simply to make inter-
state commerce bear a burden already borne by intrastate commerce";127
that is, by "impos[ing] a tax on a substantially equivalent event," it "as-
sure[s] uniform treatment of goods and materials to be consumed in the
State." 2 8 A tax may survive on this ground if it: (1) is a compensation
for a tax separately imposed on intrastate activity; (2) approximates, but
does not exceed, the burden of that separate tax; and (3) taxes a "substan-
tially equivalent" event that is sufficiently similar in substance, and mu-
tually exclusive of, the event burdened by that separate tax.129 A com-
pensatory tax may not go beyond compensation and result in discrimina-
tion that favors in-state interests. The compensatory tax doctrine is a
form of justification: as such, the state bears the burden of proving ap-
plicability.'31
4. Fair Relation to Services Provided
Finally, "the Commerce Clause demands a fair relation between a
tax and the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by the State."'32 This is
a minimal threshold, asking only that "the measure of the tax must be
reasonably related to the extent of the contact" with the state.33 The rule
resembles, and should probably be understood as, a manifestation of the
general framework for burden review described above.134
126. Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647 (1994); accord Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937). For an early parallel, see Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 148, 152-53 (1868).
127. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1996); accord Bos. Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977) (noting that the "common theme" is "[e]qual treatment of
interstate commerce").
128. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981); see also Henneford, 300 U.S. at 584
("The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum is the same
when the reckoning is closed.").
129. Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 332-33 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 104 (1994) ("[R]espondents' compensatory tax
argument fails because the in-state and out-of-state levies are not imposed on substantially equiva-
lent events."); Armco, 467 U.S. at 643 (holding that "manufacturing and wholesaling are not 'sub-
stantially equivalent events' for the purposes of this analysis).
130. See, e.g., Lohman, 511 U.S. at 648-50.
131. Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 344.
132. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 199 (1995).
133. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981) (emphasis omitted);
see also Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 200 ("[The] fourth criterion asks only that the measure of the
tax be reasonably related to the taxpayer's presence or activities in the State."); Great N. Ry. Co. v.
Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 160-61, 168 (1937); Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389, 395-97
(1919); Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 162 (1918); D.E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S.
494, 506 (1914).
134. See supra Section II.C (explaining burden review).
DENVER LAW REVIEW
F. Congressional Override
Completing the picture is the proposition that the dormant Com-
merce Clause offers a rare example of judicial review without judicial
supremacy: Congress may authorize what the Court has forbidden or
would forbid, 35 by expressing such an intention "unambiguousl1y]."l3 6
Justice Scalia called this feature of the doctrine "utterly illogical," and
asked: "How could congressional consent lift a constitutional prohibi-
tion?"137 Amy Petragnani has raised the same criticism.' But this diffi-
culty recedes if the provision for congressional override is understood as
an element of the constitutional command, not an exception to it in the
strict sense.139 Of course, whether it can fairly be understood this way is
a separate question.
III. THE STRANGE DEATH OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE"
My central claim in this Article is that, since the mid-1980s, the Su-
preme Court has continued to pay lip service to the Traditional Frame-
work while, in fact, dramatically eroding it. This argument has three
components, each corresponding to a dimension of doctrinal change.
First, while the Court's rhetoric on discrimination broadly conforms to
the Traditional Framework outlined above, in practice the Court's will-
ingness to respond to discrimination has dwindled dramatically, and to-
day discriminatory regulation will only raise serious dormant Commerce
Clause issues when it amounts to intentional protectionism. Second, the
Court has effectively retired the practice of burden review. Third, excep-
tions to the doctrine-zones of complete immunity from the reach of the
dormant Commerce Clause-are being created and expanded at an un-
precedented rate.
This Part might well have been entitled "Regan's Victory" to honor
the fact that the first and second of these three dimensions of change
closely resemble the doctrinal model that Donald Regan promoted in his
135. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1986); S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1984); Grp. Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
218 n.18 (1979); Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex
rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(13 How.) 421,431 (1855).
136. E.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992); Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138-40; see
also Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 91; Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982);
New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982).
137. Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also Benjamin, 328 U.S. at 426 (questioning the effectiveness of congressional consent); Cooley
v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 321 (1851) (doubting the effectiveness of congressional
consent), abrogated by Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
138. Petragnani, supra note 2, at 1245-46.
139. But see Denning, supra note 2, at 496 (describing congressional override as an exclusion
or exception from the doctrine).
140. I allude here to GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE STRANGE DEATH OF LtBERAL ENGLAND
(1935).
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1986 article Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause.141 That
article made the descriptive claim that the Supreme Court had already
adopted this doctrinal model: a claim that was surely premature at the
time, although the law has aligned with Regan's prescription in the inter-
vening years. But even Regan could not foresee the third dimension of
the decline: the astonishing proliferation of exemptions and exceptions to
the doctrine. My argument also falls in line with the prescient work of
Amy Petragnani, who spotted the emerging trend in 1994 and argued
then that "the Court has . . . begun to realize the fallacy of the dormant
Commerce Clause," leaving the doctrine on its "last leg." 4 2
Many lower courts continue to articulate the Traditional Framework
in its customary form: a rule against discrimination and a rule against
unreasonable burden.143 But this Part, picking up where Regan and Pet-
ragnani left off, will demonstrate just how significantly the Supreme
Court has undermined and weakened that model in its own adjudicative
practice.
A. Background: Four Models ofDormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
It may be helpful to briefly recap, at least in very broad strokes, the
evolution of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine since it first raised
its head in the famous trilogy of Gibbons v. Ogden,'" Brown v. Mary-
landl45 and Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.'" The doctrine's
roots are long, deep, and tangled: even a basic history of its evolution
could occupy dozens of pages. Rather than undertake that exercise, this
section will offer thumbnail sketches of the four basic doctrinal models
that have-in very approximate sequence and with plenty of messy over-
lap between them in practice-dominated adjudication of the Commerce
Clause's preclusive shadow. Doctrinal detail will be set aside in this sec-
tion, as well as the wealth of social and political context that framed the
doctrine's evolutionary progress, along with the entire question of origi-
nal understanding.147 In the interests of clarity of exposition the models
141. See Regan, supra note 2, at 1093.
142. Petragnani, supra note 2, at 1216.
143. See, e.g., Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 826 F.3d
1030, 1042 (8th Cir. 2016) (describing the Traditional Framework); Int'l Franchise Ass'n v, City of
Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 399 (9th Cir. 2015); Amerijet Int'l, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 627 F. App'x
744, 752 (1 Ith Cir. 2015).
144. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
145. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
146. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
147. The relevant literature on the history of the Commerce Clause in general and its dormant
dimension in particular is voluminous, and it defies any attempt at curation. See, e.g., FELIX
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE 1 (1937); CURTIS
P. NErELS, THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL ECONOMY: 1775-1815, at 98-101 (1962); Albert S.
Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25
MINN. L. REV. 432, 432 (1941); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2010);
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1387-88
(1987); Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The Constitutional Legitimacy of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877, 1880-84 (2011); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J.
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will be organized by reference to the approximate period of their ascend-
ancy and prominence. In practice, of course, different models overlap
with and shade into one another, and the language and logic of adjudica-
tion change gradually and messily. The following should be understood
as nothing more than a gross simplification for heuristic purposes.
1. First Model: Interstate Commerce as Organizing Principle (c.
1820s-1890s)
From the 1820s onward, the Court grappled with the question of
whether-and if so to what extent-the Commerce Clause cast an exclu-
sionary shadow upon the regulatory powers of the states. Beginning with
some initial, tentative ventures into the problem,148 the Court arrived at
the principle that states may not regulate or tax interstate commerce at
all, but remained free to exercise their "police power" to regulate things
other than "commerce," and to regulate commerce that was not "inter-
state" in nature.149 These two terms, of course, had not yet acquired their
modem breadth.1 5 0
This approach placed a great deal of analytical strain on the notion
that regulations of interstate commerce, on the one hand, and exercises of
the local police power, on the other, could consistently be distinguished
from one another. As we now recognize, "[1]ocal concern and infringe-
ment of national interest are not mutually exclusive categories."5 1 With
the increasing modernization of the nation's economy, the notion that
states could not regulate or tax interstate commerce at all-and the rules
created to define the boundary, such as the bizarre "original package"
rule 52--became unsustainable. A crucial moment arrived with the
Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause. Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Com-
mercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1, 7-13 (1999).
148. See, e.g., Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 214-19, 221-22
(1849); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 522-24 (1847), overruled in part by Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), superseded by statute, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890), as recognized in
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 157-
59 (1837); Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 251-52; Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 447-49; Gibbons, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 161-71.
149. See, e.g., Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887) ("Interstate commerce cannot
be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce, or that
which is carried on solely within the state."), abrogated by United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
517 U.S. 843 (1996); Reading R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania (In re State Freight Tax), 82 U.S. 232, 279
(1872) ("[I]f such a tax is in effect a regulation of interstate commerce, the conclusion seems to be
inevitable that it is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States."), abrogated by Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449,
505 (1841) (McLean, J., concurring) ("[T]he commercial power, as it regards . . . commerce among
the several states, has been decided . . . to be exclusively vested in congress.").
150. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 147, at 481; Epstein, supra note 147, at 1393-95; Robert G.
Natelson, The Legal Meaning of "Commerce" in the Commerce Clause, 80 SAINT JOHN'S L. REV.
789, 805-06 (2006). But see Balkin, supra note 147, at 15-21 (defending a broad view of "com-
merce" as originally understood).
151. Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1940).
152. See, e.g., Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 441-42 (applying the Import-Export Clause and
holding that "when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become incorpo-
rated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive
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Court's statement in the 1851 Cooley v. Board of Wardens1 53 decision
that the power to regulate interstate commerce was exclusively in the
hands of Congress with respect to some matters, but shared with the
states with respect to other matters.'5 The federal monopoly on the regu-
lation of interstate commerce was broken, and a new analytical approach
would be required.
2. Second Model: Directness and Discrimination as Organizing
Principles (c. 1870s-1930s)
The analytical framework that emerged after Cooley proved influen-
tial and enduring. As the Court appreciated that the old test was a hope-
less fit with an integrated economy,'55 the Court articulated one better
suited to the Gilded Age. The new model turned not on whether inter-
state commerce was affected, but on the nature of the state measure.
States could not-even through the police power-"directly" regulate,
burden, or tax interstate commerce,156 and could not discriminate against
interstate commerce.'57 Conversely, state regulations that merely "indi-
rectly" or "incidentally" burdened interstate commerce were lawful, as
long as the indirect burden was not unreasonable.'58 This language en-
dured long into the twentieth century, although the Court continued to
apply a definition of "commerce" that fell far short of its modem
breadth.5 9
3. Third Model: Discrimination and Reasonableness as Organizing
Principles (c. 1930s-1980s)
All formalisms are born to die, and eventually the Court recognized
that there was no workable way to distinguish between direct and indi-
character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining
the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was im-
ported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution");
see also Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 138-40 (1868) (overruling the original package
rule as inapplicable to imports from another state).
153. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1851).
154. Id
155. Compare Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876) (acknowledging that local police-
power regulation "might indirectly affect the commerce of the country," but that it need not be
automatically unlawful on that account), with Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S.
557, 575 (1886) (emphasizing the converse proposition that even a regulation confined to the limits
of a State may violate the Commerce Clause when it burdens "transportation which constitutes a part
of commerce among the states").
156. See, e.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Taylor, 216 U. S. 262, 276 (1910); Atl. Coast
Line R.R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 334 (1907); Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488 (1877).
157. See, e.g., Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439 (1879); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275,
282 (1875); Woodruff, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 140.
158. See, e.g., Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1937); Buck v. Kuykendall,
267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925); Barrett v. City of New York, 232 U.S. 14, 31 (1914); Savage v. Jones,
225 U.S. 501, 525 (1912); West v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911).
159. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) (holding that "the incidents
leading up to and culminating in the mining of coal" are not "commerce"); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (differentiating "commerce" from "manufacture").
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rect (or incidental) regulation of commerce.'1 Eventually it was replaced
with what I have called the Traditional Framework, rooted in a turn to-
ward an effects-based, fact-sensitive analysis of the regulation's practical
161consequences.
This third model emerged with the New Deal in the late 1930s and
1940s, while a broadly similar transformation was famously occurring in
affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.1 62 In dormant Commerce
Clause law, it was most clearly inaugurated in by Justice Stone in two
cases. The first was South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barn-
well Bros.1 6 3 in 1938, in which Justice Stone emphasized that the Com-
merce Clause "prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce,
whatever its form or method," heavily hinting that discrimination implied
at least presumptive illegality, regardless of whether it was "direct."'6
The second was Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan 65in
1945, returning to the proposition (owing much to the practical logic of
Cooley'6) that "there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws
governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure
affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it," indicat-
ing that even state regulation of interstate commerce that was arguably
"direct" could be lawful.167 Completing the picture, the Court went on to
explain that even for non-discriminatory rules, the analytical key was
"the nature and extent of the burden which the state regula-
tion ... imposes on interstate commerce" and "the relative weights of the
state and national interests involved."1 6 8 The Traditional Framework-a
rule against discrimination and a rule against unreasonable burden-was
born.
160. E.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 635 n.19 (1951) ("'Incidental' as a test
has not continued as a useful manner for determining the validity of local regulation of matters
affecting interstate commerce."), abrogated by Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
444 U.S. 620 (1980).
161. E.g., W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 259 (1938) ("Practical rather
than logical distinctions must be sought.").
162. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 119-22 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937). Note
that the traditional "switch in time" narrative of the New Deal Supreme Court has been refined in
recent years. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and
Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 636 (2007) ("[H]istorians have
largely set to rest the 'switch-in-time-that-saved-nine' mythos .... " (footnote omitted)).
163. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
164. Id. at 185-86.
165. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
166. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851), abrogated by Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
167. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767.
168. Id at 770-71 (emphasis added).
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4. Fourth Model: Intentional Discrimination as Organizing Princi-
ple (c. 1980s-Present)
In the fourth model, which I claim has emerged from the jurispru-
dence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts as a consequence of the col-
lapse of the Traditional Framework, the zone of presumptive illegality
has been narrowed to a rule against intentional protectionism, and burden
review has decayed into minimal rational basis review at best. The mi-
gration from the third to the fourth phase will be the subject of the rest of
Part III.
To summarize my account, this development begins in and around
the 1980s. In what might be read as a reaction against the "age of balanc-
ing" that emerged in the years before, as well as a cousin of the "New
Federalism" drive to revive state regulatory autonomy,169 a remarkable
outpouring of influential critical attacks on the Traditional Framework
erupted at the end of the 1970s and through the 1980s.170 Then came the
changes of judicial personnel: 1986 saw both the accession to the Court
of Justice Scalia (soon to be established as a prominent critic of the
dormant Commerce Clause) and the elevation of Justice Rehnquist (an
outspoken defender of state autonomy) to the position of Chief Justice.
With the arrival in 1991of Justice Thomas-today the leading critic of
the doctrine-the stage was set for the doctrine's remarkable decline.
We will consider in turn the three dimensions of the long fall of the
dormant Commerce Clause: the retreat from the rule against discrimina-
tion; the retreat from burden review; and the proliferation of exceptions
and immunities.
B. The Decline of the Rule Against Discrimination
1. The Traditional Irrelevance of Intention
Throughout the life of the dormant Commerce Clause-up to and
throughout the period in which the Traditional Framework emerged-the
Court has overwhelmingly rejected subjective intention as a criterion of
legality for a state law challenged under the Commerce Clause, and-fo-
cused instead on the effect of the measure.171 To be sure, there are several
169. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 963-71 (1987) (charting the development and proliferation of balancing frameworks).
170. See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (noting academic criticism of the Tradi-
tional Framework in the late 1970s and early 1980s).
171. See Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 653 (1994); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-
53 (1977); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-54
(1951); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,
273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927), overruled on other grounds by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 114-
15 (1941); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 (1922); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S.
313, 320 (1890); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 268 (1875); In re State Freight
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examples of dicta and occasional holdings to the contrary,172 but subjec-
tive purpose, in the sense of what the state legislature or regulator actual-
ly thought or intended, has been rejected in the overwhelming majority
of dormant Commerce Clause cases. I do not propose to say much more
about this proposition, which I think generally uncontroversial. Even
Donald Regan, who analyzes the Court's modern cases through the lens
of subjective intentional protectionism, makes no claim that a concern
with intentional protectionism motivated the Court's case law before
1935.173 However, as this Section will show, the Court has abandoned
this long-held position, and has come to embrace the kind of intent-based
analysis that Regan himself proposed.
2. The Retreat from the Rule Against Discrimination
The first element of the retreat from the Traditional Framework was
a profound softening and blunting of the rule that discriminatory
measures-whatever their subjective purpose-presumptively violate the
dormant Commerce Clause. Over a long arc of recent cases, the Court
has repeatedly ignored effect-based discrimination-and even, in some
cases, facial discrimination-in cases lacking evidence of some kind of
undesirably "protectionist" frame of mind on the part of the relevant state
actor.
The Court's 1977 decision in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad-
vertising Commissionl74 exemplifies the treatment of discrimination un-
der the Traditional Framework.'7 5 Washington's apples are-or were-
so good that Washington had its very own system of quality grading.17 6
But the North Carolina Board of Agriculture neutralized this advantage
(at least in North Carolina) when it prohibited the use of any quality
grade markings other than the USDA's: thenceforth, apples in North
Carolina would have to bear the USDA's markings alone or none at
all. 17 7 This rule, though not facially discriminatory, had the effect of de-
priving the Washington apples of the advantage of their own superior
Tax, 82 U.S. 232, 276 (1872), abrogated by Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S.
175 (1995); Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 140 (1868); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504, 583 (1847) (Taney, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court), overruled in part by
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), superseded by statute, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890), as recognized
in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); see also United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 366-67 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (plurality opinion)
(emphasizing that the doctrine is not focused on the legitimacy of a measure's goals).
172. See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1719-20 (2013); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949);
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 425-27 (1936); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 522 (1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237
U.S. 52, 60 (1915); Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128, 139 (1911); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 713, 727 (1865).
173. Regan, supra note 2, at 1094.
174. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 336.
177. Id. at 337.
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quality (or, at least, their superior quality markings). Recognizing that
this was effect-based discrimination, the Court condemned the meas-
U .178ure.17
The Court in Hunt was assisted by more than a whiff of intentional
protectionism-there was clear evidence that the measure was enacted, at
least in significant part, in order to serve the commercial interests of the
North Carolina apple industry. Consistent with the Traditional Frame-
work, the Court denied that the finding of intention had independent le-
gal significance, but was sure to point it out anyway:
Despite the statute's facial neutrality, the Commission suggests that
its discriminatory impact on interstate commerce was not an unin-
tended byproduct and there are some indications in the record to that
effect. The most glaring is the response of the North Carolina Agri-
culture Commissioner to the Commission's request for an exemption
following the statute's passage in which he indicated that before he
could support such an exemption, he would 'want to have the senti-
ment from our apple producers since they were mainly responsible
for this legislation being passed['].... However, we need not ascribe
an economic protection motive to the North Carolina Legislature to
resolve this case; we conclude that the challenged statute cannot
stand ... even if enacted for the declared purpose of protecting con-
sumers from deception and fraud in the marketplace.179
But a thin crack in the Traditional Framework could be discerned
the following year when the Court decided City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey so in 1978. In that case, the Court confronted an example of facial
discrimination-a New Jersey statute that prohibited the import of waste
from out-of-statel81-and condemned it as such under the dormant
Commerce Clause.1 82 The significant move here was not the Court's
holding, but its language. Recall that the Traditional Framework involves
two prohibitions (setting aside the rule against extraterritoriality): a rule
against discrimination, which prohibits both facial and effect-based dis-
crimination, and a rule against unreasonable burden. But in City of Phil-
adelphia the Court commented that "where other legislative objectives
are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against inter-
state trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach, the
general contours of which were outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc."183
Notice the implicit move: no longer is burden review contrasted with a
rule against discrimination; it is contrasted with a rule against some nar-
rower category of "patent" discrimination.
178. Id. at 350-51.
179. Id. at 352-53.
180. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
181. Id. at 618.
182. Id. at 629.
183. Id. at 624 (citation omitted).
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Doctrine was to follow where rhetoric led, and the next step came in
1981 with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.'" Minnesota had
banned the sale of milk at retail in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable
containers, but allowed the sale of milk at retail in non-plastic nonreturn-
able, nonrefillable containers, such as those made out of paperboard,
relying on a series of studies of the ecological and environmental impact
of plastic containers.'85
In principle, such a measure seems unobjectionable. But in practice
the measure's effects were massively discriminatory in favor of in-state
business. The prohibited plastic containers were produced entirely out-
of-state, while the pulpwood used for making the paperboard substitutes
was a "major Minnesota product."1 86 Yet the legislation was, apparently,
"genuinely proposed for environmental reasons."'87 So the Court here
was confronted with discriminatory effects but (supposedly) good inten-
tions. Did it call out the effect-based discrimination, as it had in Hunt?
Not at all. The Court emphasized repeatedly that the measure was non-
discriminatory-that is, not that it was a justified example of discrimina-
tion, but actually non-discriminatory-and so applied deferential burden
review instead.'88 The measure survived.
Clover Leaf thus suggested that the rule against discrimination
might contain a penumbral region in which state conduct, while discrim-
inatory, was not the kind of "patent" discrimination with which the
dormant Commerce Clause was primarily concerned. Discriminatory
conduct in this penumbra would be treated more leniently than the "pa-
tent" variety. But it remained unclear whether this approach was a pass-
ing aberration, or-if not-how the boundary between the core and the
penumbra would be defined. Did "patent discrimination" mean facial
discrimination, intentional discrimination, or something else?
A further hint came in 1984's Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,189 in
which the Court demonstrated that it would strike down discrimination
even if it was not facial so long as protectionist animus was obviously
present. In that case, a Hawaii regulation that, while facially neutral, dis-
criminated in favor of okolehao brandy and fruit wine (whether in-state
or out-of-state). and against competing liquors (whether in-state or out-of-
state)-a kind of facial neutrality that was fooling no-one about its true
purpose. The Court reaffirmed the orthodoxy that "discrimination" in
the proscribed sense was present whenever the purpose or effect of the
184. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
185. Id. at 458-60.
186. Id. at 473.
187. Id. at 463 n.7.
188. Id. at 471-74.
189. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
190. Id. at 265.
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relevant measure was discriminatory.191 But the Court's opinion never-
theless laid great emphasis on the purpose of the measure, rebutting at
length the state's arguments that "there was no discriminatory intent"
behind it. 192
Meanwhile, momentum had been building for a change in the
dormant Commerce Clause's doctrinal framework. The ground had been
prepared for such a change by a series of vigorous academic attacks on
what was perceived as the indeterminacy and illegitimacy of the Tradi-
tional Framework. Influential examples included Mark Tushnet's advo-
cacy in 1979 of an approach that would have required the Court to inter-
vene only when economic and political analysis indicated some dysfunc-
tion in the state legislative process;193 Edmund Kitch's attack on the doc-
trine in 1981 as an idea of "absolutely no merit"; 19 4 and Julian Eule's
narrow account of the doctrine that built on Ely's "representation rein-
forcement" model.1 95 In addition, the groundswell of New Federalism
was rising, with increasing support for state regulatory autonomy.196 Af-
ter some changes to the Court's organization-the elevation of Justices
Scalia and Thomas to the Court (in 1986 and 1991 respectively), and
Justice Rehnquist's ascension to the Chief Justiceship (in 1986)-it
would soon arrive in a string of well-known decisions that would inaugu-
rate a new era in federalism jurisprudence.197 The dormant Commerce
Clause, likewise, seemed ripe for re-evaluation.
It was in this climate that Donald Regan published Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause in 1986.19 In this remarkably influential
(and lengthy) article, Regan argued that the Supreme Court had in fact
been concerned only with what he called purposeful economic protec-
tionism in its previous decisions, and that it should in principle be doing
just that. In his words, "[In] movement-of-goods cases . .. the Court has
been concerned exclusively with preventing states from engaging in pur-
poseful economic protectionism,"99 and that is "what the Court should
do and is doing." 200 Regan argued that a "court should strike down a state
law if and only if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that protec-
tionist purpose on the part of the legislators contributed substantially to
191. Id. at 270.
192. Id. at 272-73.
193. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 125.
194. Kitch, supra note 2, at 123.
195. Eule, supra note 2, at 427-28.
196. The history of "New Federalism" is widely chronicled. See generally Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
429, 429-31 (2002); Paul D. Moreno, "So Long as Our System Shall Exist": Myth, History, and the
New Federalism, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 711 (2005); Ryan, supra note 162, at 539-67.
197. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
198. Regan, supra note 2, at 1092-93.
199. Id. at 1092 (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Id at 1099.
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the adoption of the law or any feature of the law."201 And "protection-
ism" was an "improvement (caused by the statute) in the competitive
position of some class of local economic actors vis-it-vis their foreign
* ,,202
competitors. In later work, he would double down on this subjectivist
approach: "[W]hat we should be concerned with is 'subjective' in-
tent. ... It is a matter of what happens in the legislative halls in the gen-
eration of the law, not a matter of the consequences."203 Regan's rule
condemned measures motivated by protectionist purpose unless they
were not "analogous in form to the traditional instruments of protection-
ism-the tariff, the quota, or the outright embargo," a murky proviso
which helped to accommodate deviations from his rule.204
Was Regan's diagnosis premature? I think so. In 1986, although the
Court was certainly giving signals that it was starting to move in this
direction, the descriptive component of his claim was a real stretch. The
Court had explicitly disclaimed any reliance on intention as recently as
Hunt,205 and even in Bacchus Imports-in which intention was promi-
nent-the Court had stated that either "discriminatory purpose or dis-
criminatory effect" would be enough to classify a measure as discrimina-
206tory, indicating that discriminatory purpose was not necessary. More
pointedly, the footnoted admission in Clover Leaf that legislators had
won votes for the measure by emphasizing its "beneficial side effects on
state industry"207 (indicating protectionist purpose as the Court had de-
fined it in Bacchus Imports208) would put it on the wrong side of the line
that Regan himself seemed to be drawing: it certainly sounded like pro-
tectionist purposes had at least "contributed substantially to the adoption
of the [discriminatory law in Clover Leaf].
Two decisions that shortly preceded Regan's article gave further
grounds to doubt his descriptive claim. In 1984's Edgar v. AHTE
Corp.,2 10 the Court had condemned a non-discriminatory anti-takeover
201. Id. at 1148.
202. Id. at 1095.
203. Donald H. Regan, Judicial Review ofMember-State Regulation of Trade Within a Federal
or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and Balancing, Do Capo, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1853, 1885
(2001).
204. Regan identifies the key features of such laws as their protectionist effect (their relative
competitive promotion of local industry), their explicitness, and their protectionist purpose. Regan,
supra note 2, at 1095, 1201-02 (identifying a wide range of rules as "obviously sufficiently analo-
gous in form to tariffs, embargoes, or quotas" without explanation).
205. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1977).
206. Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (citation omitted).
207. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981).
208. See Bacchus Imps., 468 U.S. at 273 ("[I]t is irrelevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry
that the motivation of the legislature was the desire to aid the makers of the locally produced bever-
age rather than to harm out-of-state producers.").
209. Compare Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 463 n.7, with Regan, supra note 2, at
1148 ("The question is whether legislators shared the protectionist purpose.").
210. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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statute that was marked by no indication of protectionist purpose.2 11
Likewise, in 1982's decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,2 12
the Court had analyzed a water-conservation measure that was facially
discriminatory, and condemned it without any suggestion that the meas-
ure was motivated by improper protectionist purpose-or indeed by any-
thing at all other than the "unquestionably legitimate and highly im-
portant" one of conserving resources for reasons unrelated to competitive
preference.213
So in light of this background, and in light of the Court's long histo-
ry of rejecting intention as a guide to legality under the dormant Com-
merce Clause,214 Regan's descriptive claim was less than fully convinc-
ing. But his retrospective reclassification of earlier cases into an inten-
tional-protectionism framework provided an intellectual model of enor-
mous appeal to a Court that was ready to take the path he indicated. Re-
gan's use of epicyclical devices, like the "analogous in form" proviso,
and his exclusion of taxing and transportation cases, helped to explain
deviations from the "true" path of intentional protectionism.
Regan's intervention found a receptive audience. Almost immedi-
ately, in 1987's CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 215 the Court
cited his work for the proposition that "[t]he principal objects of dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against inter-
state commerce."216 Justice Scalia, newly arrived on the Court, made a
point of specifically endorsing his views in a concurring opinion.217 Re-
gan's work had made an immediate contribution to the fulfillment of its
own prophecy.
And sure enough, after CTS Corp., the Court moved more decidedly
toward a subjective purpose standard. The next crucial development
came the very next year, with 1988's New Energy Co. of Indiana v.
Limbach,218 in which the Court condemned a facially discriminatory
tax-a tax exemption that applied only to ethanol produced in Ohio-in
an opinion written by Justice Scalia which saw Regan's view clearly
expressed in doctrinal form.219 Justice Scalia was later to emerge as an
aggressive critic of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 220 but in his
211. See id. at 630-31. Regan himself acknowledged that Edgar did not fit his theory, and
declined to take it at face value. Regan, supra note 2, at 1279.
212. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
213. Id. at 954-55, 960.
214. See supra note 171 (collecting cases).
215. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
216. Id. at 87.
217. Id. at 95-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
218. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
219. Id. at 271.
220. See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1807 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing the dormant Commerce Clause as "a judge-invented rule under which judges
may set aside state laws that they think impose too much of a burden upon interstate commerce");
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Scalia, J., con-
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Limbach opinion-invalidating a statute that was facially and intention-
ally discriminatory, an easy target for invalidation-he weakened the
doctrine even while applying it. 221 In a crucial switch, he expressly iden-
tified the core function of the dormant Commerce Clause as prohibiting
intentional protectionism, emphasizing that it "prohibits economic pro-
tectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state eco-
nomic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors."2 22 Here was a
crisp articulation of the core of the "new" dormant Commerce Clause, in
terms that closely echoed Making Sense. The Limbach formulation im-
mediately stuck, and is frequently quoted.223 Intention now occupied
center stage.
Subsequent cases confirmed Limbach's location of the doctrine's
new center. In 1994's C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,224
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "[t]he central rationale for the
rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose
object is local economic protectionism."225 The same year, in West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy226 -a case that might have been analytically
close, involving a subsidy to local dairy farmers (almost certainly lawful
under the Supreme Court's subsidy jurisprudence22 7) funded by a tax on
all milk dealers (also almost certainly lawful because non-
discriminatory)-the Court condemned the measure, emphasizing that
protectionism was the "avowed purpose" of the law, and the "motive
behind" it.228
Rhetorical seeds eventually bear decisional fruit, and it would not
be long before the focus on intention began very clearly to dictate out-
comes. The implications of the new approach became clear in 1997 when
the Court examined a case of facial discrimination in General Motors
Corp. v. Tracy.229 In that case, Ohio had created a tax exemption for any
entity that qualified as a "natural gas company"-but only local distribu-
curring) (criticizing the Court's "wardrobe of ever-changing negative Commerce Clause fashions");
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674-75 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[A]s I have explained elsewhere, the negative Commerce Clause, having no foundation in the text
of the Constitution and not lending itself to judicial application except in the invalidation of facially
discriminatory action, should not be extended beyond such action and nondiscriminatory action of
the precise sort hitherto invalidated."); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scal-
ia, J., concurring) ("[T]he so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial interven-
tion not to be expanded beyond its existing domain.").
221. Limbach, 486 U.S. at 273.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-38 (2008) (plurality opinion); W.
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarks-
town, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
224. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
225. Id at 390 (emphasis added).
226. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
227. See infra Section III.D.3.
228. W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194, 196.
229. 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
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tors could qualify.2 30 The Court noted that these local distributors com-
peted with out-of-state companies for the business of one group of cus-
tomers (the "noncaptive" market), but that they did not significantly
compete with out-of-state suppliers for the business of another group of
customers (the "captive" market).23' So the tax exemption facially fa-
vored local distributors over out-of-state competitors.
But-stunningly-the Court refused to acknowledge the discrimi-
nation. Instead, the Court ascribed "controlling significance" to the exist-
ence of the "noncaptive market," in which in-state and out-of-state pro-
viders did not compete, and on that basis concluded that the prohibition
was non-discriminatory.232 In language foreshadowing the Court's sub-
sequent approach to burden review, the Court also indicated reluctance to
condemn the measure because "as a Court we lack the expertness and the
institutional resources necessary to predict the effects of judicial inter-
vention invalidating Ohio's tax scheme on the utilities' capacity to serve
this captive market."233 Indeed, the Court went on, "[T]he Court is insti-
tutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions
can be made, and professionally untrained to make them."234
The Tracy decision was remarkable. Disclaiming any ability to
make economic and social judgments, the Court chose to innovate on its
traditional doctrinal approach because of special characteristics of the
market at issue-characteristics that were distinguished and identified
presumably by reference to the very same political and economic factors
the Court disclaimed any competence to identify.235 The move was par-
ticularly perplexing given that the special characteristics in Tracy ap-
peared to be (1) the fact that heating gas was important and (2) the fact
that the state regulated the sector.236 These factors are, of course, ubiqui-
tous, and it is certainly not obvious that they necessitated tax discrimina-
tion as a solution.237
Tracy demonstrates just how far the rule against discrimination had
receded in cases where the legislature was pursuing something other than
230. Id. at 285. The limitation to local distributors arose from a decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court interpreting the statute in question.
231. Id. at 302.
232. Id. at 303-04.
233. Id. at 304.
234. Id. at 308 (citation omitted).
235. Id. at 303-05.
236. Id.
237. The complexity of a system of regulation and taxation might, of course, suggest a need for
caution and deference in the framing of a remedy. But for precisely these reasons, the Court has
always allowed the State to take the lead in framing a remedy in taxing cases without any suggestion
that the complexity of the tax code should make discrimination more acceptable in the tax code than
elsewhere. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 176 (1990) ("When we have held
state taxes unconstitutional in the past it has been our practice to abstain from deciding the remedial
effects of such a holding. While the relief provided by the State must be in accord with federal
constitutional requirements . . . we have entrusted state courts with the initial duty of determining
appropriate relief." (citations omitted)).
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a special competitive advantage for its own business. The Court was evi-
dently worried that local companies might not survive interstate competi-
tion, and that the security of gas supply might be endangered by judicial
238intervention.28 But three objections present themselves. First, there is no
suggestion in the opinion that the record before the Court supported the
proposition that a discriminatory tax was actually necessary, either for
the protection of the Ohio local gas companies, or for security of gas
supply to Ohio customers. Second, that very same argument-the need to
preserve local industry from the risks of ruinous interstate competition-
had been rejected countless times by the Court as a defense to dormant
Commerce Clause liability, on the ground that it is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the core of the doctrine.23 9 Third, the Court's concerns, based
on its own inability to investigate economic effects or interfere with deli-
cate regulatory balances, seem misplaced in this case, for at least three
reasons: (i) the Court had never previously required an investigation of
economic effects when discrimination was facial, as it was here; (ii) if
the Court felt unable to make reliable judgments about economic or po-
litical matters, the creation of ad hoc exceptions to settled doctrine-
based on the Court's case-by-case assessment of those very same eco-
nomic or political issues-seems to reproduce, rather than address, that
difficulty; and (iii) there was no suggestion that the difficulties or com-
plexities in Tracy were significantly greater than those presented by other
cases in which the Court had applied its doctrinal framework. For these
reasons, Tracy can be seen as a watershed dormant Commerce Clause
decision.
If Tracy exemplified the Rehnquist Court's work to weaken the
dormant Commerce Clause, worse was to come under the Roberts Court.
In 2007's United Haulers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority,240 the Court considered a local ordinance that
reserved waste disposal business to a single, publicly owned, local enter-
241
prise. (The case is primarily of note for announcing a "public enter-
prise" or "public entity" exception-discussed below242-but we focus
here on the discrimination analysis.) The Court stated the basic rule, as
238. See Tracy, 519 U.S. at 308-10.
239. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994) ("If we were to
accept these arguments, we would make a virtue of the vice that the rule against discrimination
condemns. Preservation of local industry by protecting it from the rigors of interstate competition is
the hallmark of the economic protectionism that the Commerce Clause prohibits."); Bacchus Imps.,
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1984) ("If we were to accept [the promotion of local industry as
a] justification, we would have little occasion ever to find a statute unconstitutionally discriminato-
ry."); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) ("Let such an exception be admitted, and all that a state will have to
do in times of stress and strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be pro-
tected against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists or perish altogether.
To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity.").
240. 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
241. Id. at 336-37.
242. See infra Section III.D.2.
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was by then usual, in terms of discriminatory purpose.243 But what fol-
lowed was a remarkable sleight of hand.
A careful reader of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence up to 2007 would probably hold the view that state regulations
motivated by protectionist purpose raise constitutional concerns because
protectionist distortions of the internal free market are the problem at
which the Commerce Clause is aimed. In other words, the purpose to
distort competition is objectionable precisely because the effect-
distortion of competition-is constitutionally proscribed. But the United
Haulers Court turned this basic proposition around, stating that "when a
law favors in-state business over out-of-state competition, rigorous scru-
tiny is appropriate because the law is often the product of simple eco-
nomic protectionism."24 In other words, the Court reasoned, protection-
ist effect triggers constitutional scrutiny because it suggests a protection-
ist purpose. The tail of purpose was now cheerfully wagging the dog of
effects. And this idea carried the implicit corollary that if a protectionist
purpose was not present, then even a clear protectionist effect would be
no cause for alarm.
Sure enough, the next stage of the analysis followed straight from
this topsy-turvy premise. The category of laws that the Court believed
were at issue in United Haulers-"[1]aws favoring local government"-
were untroubling because, "by contrast [with most protectionist regula-
tion, they] may be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unre-
lated to protectionism."245 Thus, even if laws do have a protectionist ef-
fect, there is no dormant Commerce Clause concern when they might not
have a protectionist purpose. Having deftly set the cart before the horse
in this way, the Court did not miss a further opportunity to harvest the
fruit of Tracy by locating yet another category of extra-special deference
to state regulation in order to bolster its conclusion. Just as natural gas
was special in Tracy, so too waste disposal would get special deference
in United Haulers because it "is both typically and traditionally a local
government function."24 The Court completed its analysis by pointing
out that the harm from any lost competition fell on the politically em-
powered voters of the regulating state: an argument that applies to virtu-
ally every dormant Commerce Clause case.247 Yet again the Court dis-
243. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338 ("Discriminatory laws motivated by 'simple economic
protectionism' are subject to a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity . . . .' (emphasis added) (quoting
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978))). The City of Philadelphia decision
itself actually said "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually
per se rule of invalidity has been erected," which is hardly the same thing. City ofPhiladelphia, 437
U.S. at 624 (emphasis added).
244. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. Id at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
247. Id. at 343-45. Needless to say, every dormant Commerce Clause case-indeed, every
constitutional challenge to a State measure-involves an attempt to secure a victory the challenger
could not obtain through the political process. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also W.
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claimed economic and political expertise while relying on its own eco-
nomic and political analysis to justify special treatment in an individual
case.
The United Haulers Court wrapped up, and drove home its empha-
sis on subjective purpose, with a truly remarkable account of burden re-
view (i.e., the deferential scrutiny applicable to all measures, including
non-discriminatory ones). The Court described this highly deferential
standard of review as the appropriate metric-not just for measures that
were non-discriminatory-but for laws that were "directed to legitimate
local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only inci-
dental."248 The strong rule against discrimination now seemed to be re-
served only for those forms of discrimination that were not subjectively
"directed to legitimate local concerns."249 A fine dissent written by Jus-
tice Alito, and joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, vigorously at-
tacked the opinion, to no avail.250
United Haulers was no aberration. The Court went out of its way to
reaffirm it in the very next landmark dormant Commerce Clause deci-
sion: Department of Revenue v. Davis251 in 2008. In that case, the Court
considered Kentucky's decision to immunize income from its own bonds
from taxation while denying such an exemption to bonds of other
states.252 A case of clear facial discrimination in favor of in-state inter-
ests, one would think. But the Court hammered home the now-familiar
language of Justice Scalia's Limbach formulation-"the dormant Com-
merce Clause is driven by concern about . .. regulatory measures de-
signed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors253 -and made a point of repeating the cart-before-horse
move from United Haulers.254 The Court concluded that the dormant
Commerce Clause had not been offended, relying on yet another "spe-
cial" exemption that we will discuss below.255 Just as in United Haulers,
and in Tracy before that, a clear example of facial discrimination was not
even put to a test of justification.
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 215 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Analysis of
interest group participation in the political process may serve many useful purposes, but serving as a
basis for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is not one of them.").
248. UnitedHaulers, 550 U.S. at 343, 346 (emphasis added) (quoting City ofPhiladelphia, 437
U.S. at 624).
249. Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624). Note that this holding at last assigned
meaning to the comment in City of Philadelphia that burden review was the appropriate standard
outside a core zone of"patent" discrimination. See City ofPhiladelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
250. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 357-66 (Alito, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's
application based on the distinction between public and private entities).
251. 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (plurality opinion).
252. Id. at 333-34.
253. Id. at 337-38 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. Id. at 341.
255. See infra Section III.D.L
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But the historic low in the discrimination jurisprudence of the Court
was yet to come. It arrived in 2013 with the decision in McBurney v.
Young,256 which is at the time of writing the Court's most recent substan-
tive statement on the doctrine in a non-tax case.2 57 Virginia's FOIA stat-
ute provided access to public documents and records, materials that con-
stitute a crucial competitive input for companies engaged in the business
of obtaining such records and providing them to consumers.258 But the
statute limited access to such materials to Virginia citizens only.259 The
out-of-state proprietor of one such records company was denied access
on the basis that he was not a Virginia citizen, and along with others, he
challenged the limitation under the dormant Commerce Clause.260
This was not merely discrimination: it was facial discrimination
placing out-of-staters at a significant competitive disadvantage. But there
was obviously no "protectionist purpose" at work-of course, the Virgin-
ia FOIA statute was not drafted with the intention of imposing a competi-
tive disadvantage on out-of-state suppliers in the public-records business.
So by now the outcome should have been clear. The Court began by em-
phasizing that intentional discrimination was the root of Commerce
Clause evil.2 6 1 But rather than decide the case on that basis, the Court
was to outdo itself: holding, remarkably, that Virginia's FOIA law was
not suitable for review under the dormant Commerce Clause at all.262 The
law in question
neither "regulates" nor "burdens" interstate commerce; rather, it
merely provides a service to local citizens that would not otherwise
be available at all. . . . This case is thus most properly brought under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause: It quite literally poses the
question whether Virginia can deny out-of-state citizens a benefit that
it has conferred on its own citizens.263
This is a staggering conclusion for two reasons. First, it is well es-
tablished that an "overlap" between the dormant Commerce Clause claim
and a potential Privileges and Immunities Clause claim is not remotely
harmful to either claim. The Court has on more than one occasion ap-
plied both provisions to state regulation, using quite separate analytical
frameworks, reflecting the fact that the two Clauses are fundamentally
concerned with different things and subject to radically different limita-
256. 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013).
257. The "non-tax" caveat refers to Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015),
which is not clearly a discrimination case but is discussed in the next subsection.
258. McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1713.
259. See id. at 1714.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1719-20.
262. See id. at 1720.
263. Id.
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tions of scope.264 The dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with dis-
tortions of economic competition; the Privileges and Immunities Clause
is concerned with denial of equal treatment to natural persons with re-
spect to a set of "fundamental rights." It is beyond dispute that a measure
can come out one way under the dormant Commerce Clause and another
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,265 the Equal Protection
Clause,266 or for that matter, the Due Process Clause.267 Second, it is ab-
surdly inconsistent on the facts of the case. The Court held in the very
same opinion that the right to public records fell outside the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.2 8 The fact that it would be possible to frame a
claim unsuccessfully under one provision of the Constitution hardly
weakens, let alone invalidates, an otherwise meritorious constitutional
claim under another provision.
The Court finally commented that, even if the dormant Commerce
Clause were applied to the Virginia FOIA law, a special exception-the
market participant doctrine-would apply: a conclusion discussed be-
low. 269 The Court's determination to save this "innocent" statute could
hardly have been clearer.
Finally, the Court's most recent dormant Commerce Clause deci-
sion-Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne 270-iS worth brief comment.
264. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221-22
(1984) ("Camden may, without fear of violating the Commerce Clause, pressure private employers
engaged in public works projects funded in whole or in part by the city to hire city residents. But that
same exercise of power . . . may be called to account under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.");
id. at 220 ("The two Clauses have different aims and set different standards for state conduct."); see
also White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 213-15 (1983) (reaching oppo-
site result under the dormant Commerce Clause).
265. See, e.g., United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 219-21 (declining to immunize under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause a measure virtually identical to one authorized the previous year under the
dormant Commerce Clause, on the ground that "[t]he two Clauses have different aims and set differ-
ent standards for state conduct").
266. See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1996) ("While we continue to
measure the equal protection of economic legislation by a rational basis test [under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause], we now understand the dormant Commerce Clause to require justifications for discrim-
inatory restrictions on commerce [to] pass the strictest scrutiny. Hence, while cases like Kidd and
Darnell [which uphold State taxing rules] may still be authorities under the Equal Protection Clause,
they are no longer good law under the Commerce Clause." (internal quotation marks omitted) (cita-
tions omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 (1985) (holding measure unlawful under
the Equal Protection Clause even though it was immunized from dormant Commerce Clause analy-
sis and stating: "[T]he State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal
protection analysis and the consequent different purposes those two constitutional provisions
serve."); cf W. & S. Life Ins. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1981) (applying
Equal Protection Clause to a measure that was immune from Commerce Clause challenge).
267. See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1798 (2015) ("[W]hile a
State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer,
imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause." (quoting Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992))); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1898) (invalidating a statute under the Commerce Clause although the same statute had
previously been held lawful under the Fourteenth Amendment).
268. McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1717-18.
269. See infra Section III.D.l.
270. 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
2017] THE DECLINE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 291
Under Maryland's taxing rules, residents paid both a state income tax
and a county income tax on all their income, while nonresidents paid the
state income tax on income derived in Maryland plus a "special nonresi-
dent tax" as a substitute for the county tax.27 For residents, taxable in-
come included income that had been earned in other states, but, to the
extent that such out-of-state income was also taxed by the other state in
question, the taxpayer was allowed to deduct the tax paid to that other
state from their liability to pay Maryland's state income tax.272 This
avoided "double taxation" of income earned outside the state. But the
problem was that the county income tax included no such offset.273 So a
resident's liability to pay the county tax on any income earned in another
state would be additional to all the tax, if any, charged on that income by
the other state.274
The taxing rule in Wynne obviously failed the test of internal con-
sistency: that is, the rule that a state tax must be such that, if the tax were
universalized among the states, interstate commerce would not be more
heavily taxed than intrastate commerce.2 75 The Court's analysis rested
firmly on this ground,276 though the majority did not admit that the
Court's precedents were murky on the issue of whether a state of resi-
dency or domicile was required to apportion income at all.277 But there
was no suggestion of protectionist purpose. To some extent, then, this
decision looks at odds with the general narrative I am offering here.
Perhaps Wynne is a wobble on the course that I have described here,
but, if it is, it is a small and likely irrelevant one. Wynne turned on a me-
chanical application of the internal consistency rule-a specific rule ap-
plied in taxation cases with no direct equivalent in non-tax cases. Tax
cases are, doctrinally speaking, a little different, and much more specif-
ic: the analysis relies on peculiar heuristics like "fair apportionment" and
"substantial nexus," rather than the more porous tests ("legitimate,"
271. Id. at 1792 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272. Id. at 1798.
273. Id at 1792.
274. Id
275. To see why, consider the following. If every State taxed income earned by its residents in
another State at rate X, without granting an offset for income tax paid to that other State, and also
taxed in-State income from nonresidents at rate Y, income derived in-state by State residents would
be subject to burden X, income derived in-state by nonresidents would be subject to burden X+Y,
and income derived out-of-state by State residents would be subject to burden X+Y. The result
would be that interstate commerce bore a heavier burden: the internal consistency test would be
violated. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995); see also Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 437 (2005); Goldberg v. Sweet,
488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989), abrogated by Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015);
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
276. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1803-05.
277. See id. at 1798-99; J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311-14 (1938). But see
W. Publ'g Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823, 823 (1946) (per curiam) (affirming the lower court's
judgment allowing apportionment of income tax by a state of domicile and another state in which
income is earned), affg 166 P.2d 861, 864 (Cal. 1946); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S.
292, 299-300 (1944).
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11 278"clearly excessive," and so on) that characterize the non-tax cases.
And the hypothetical universalization analysis applied by the Court un-
der the internal consistency test is not a true discrimination test: in dis-
crimination cases the Court asks whether this law before the Court-not
some hypothetical set of universalized rules-actually differentiates in
form or effect. So I see Wynne as telling us little about the Court's gen-
eral attitude to discrimination: it is chiefly significant to the extent that it
suggests that the "decline" may be confined to non-tax cases.
For these reasons, Wynne can be bracketed, at least for now. Step-
ping back a little to review the four horsemen of the dormant Commerce
Clause apocalypse-McBurney, Davis, United Haulers, and Tracy-the
disintegration of the rule against discrimination is clear. Under the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, in cases without evidence of a subjective
intention to distort competition, the rule against discrimination has col-
lapsed.
C. The Decline ofBurden Review
In recent jurisprudence, the practice of "burden review" of even
non-discriminatory regulation-commonly known since 1970 as the
"Pike test," and turning on whether the regulatory burden on interstate
commerce is "unreasonable"-has dwindled dramatically. I want to start
by showing how deeply and broadly the roots of burden review reach in
the history of the dormant Commerce Clause, and then show how far the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have gone in pulling them up.279
1. The Tradition of Burden Review
Burden review dates from the early years of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. Non-discriminatory rules were at issue in a number of
the key early cases, including Willson, Cooley, and others, with no indi-
cation from the Court that discrimination was the limit of the preclusive
reach of the dormant Commerce Clause.280 Indeed, Willson itself set the
theme for much of what was to follow, with its gnomic indication that
the legality of a state measure was to be analyzed in light of "all the cir-
278. Indeed, Regan himself left taxing cases outside the scope of his article and his claims.
Regan, supra note 2, at 1099.
279. Arguably included in this category, but not discussed here, is what Brannon Denning has
identified as the death of the rule against extraterritorial State regulation. Denning, supra note 100, at
1006 ("[Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine] extraterritoriality is, for all intents and purposes,
dead.").
280. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851), abrogated by Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829). But see Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 140 (1868)
("There is no attempt to discriminate injuriously against the products of other States or the rights of
their citizens, and the case is not, therefore, an attempt to fetter commerce among the States . . .
(emphasis added)).
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cumstances of the case."281 And the Court actually struck down a non-
discriminatory measure under the Commerce Clause at least as early as
1867: a five dollar port charge that applied to in-state and out-of-state
entities and commerce alike in Southern Steamship Co. of New Orleans
v. Portwardens.282 It is also worth noting that the second "dormant
Commerce Clause case" ver decided by the Court, Brown, concerned a
discriminatory regulation that was treated by the Court as a non-
discriminatory one, and in that case Chief Justice Marshall intimated that
state laws could be constitutionally troubling if they "affect[ed] material-
ly the purpose for which [the commerce] power was given" to the federal
Congress.283 He went on to emphasize that "[w]e cannot admit, that
[State taxing power] may be used so as to obstruct or defeat the power to
regulate commerce."284 That is the language of burden review, right at
the birth of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Moreover, it is far
from an anomaly.
It is impossible not to read much of the Court's analysis in a great
many of its earlier cases as amounting to or motivated by burden review:
that is, a concern with the overall reasonableness of the burden on com-
merce in light of the measure's benefits. To be clear, I do not claim that
the Court has a long history of aggressively or casually invalidating state
laws based on a de novo review of their wisdom. Nor do I claim that the
Court has been consistent or clear in its adjudicative practice, in this any
more than in any other aspect of its dormant Commerce Clause (or in-
deed its constitutional) jurisprudence. My purpose is just to point out that
burden review-or reasonableness review, if you prefer-has for a very
long time been part of the dormant Commerce Clause toolkit, contrary to
the views of those like Donald Regan and Louis Henkin who perceive
balancing analysis as a recent development in dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.285
I think there are two good ways to develop this point. The first is to
show that a rule against unreasonable burden is consistent with the lan-
guage of the Court's decisions; the second is to show that the logic of
burden review helps to explain what would otherwise be puzzling out-
comes in the Court's adjudicative practice. In service of the first ap-
proach, I offer evidence of considerable support for burden review in the
281. Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 252. Indeed, at least one judge familiar with the views of Chief
Justice Marshall later understood the decision in Willson to have turned on the extent of the burden
imposed by the State in that case. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 398 (1849)
(McLean, J.) ("The chief justice [in Willson] was speaking of a creek which falls into the Delaware,
and admitted in the pleadings to be navigable, but ofso limited an extent that it might well be doubt-
ed whether the general regulation of commerce could apply to it." (emphasis added)).
282. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 32 (1867).
283. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827).
284. Id. at 448.
285. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1022, 1038 (1978) (arguing that the pre-1937 cases did not require balancing); Regan, supra
note 2, at 1109.
294 DENVER LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 94:2
Court's jurisprudence before Pike in the following footnote.28 Again, I
make no claim that this practice of burden review was con-
286. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 448 (1960)
(measure not "unduly burdensome"); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30
(1959) (non-discriminatory measures may create an "unconstitutional burden"); Buck v. California,
343 U.S. 99, 103 (1952) (permit and fee requirement not an "unreasonable burden"); Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) ("A State is... precluded from taking any [non-discriminatory]
action which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between
States."), overruled by Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (court must "balance ... the exercise of the local police power
and the need for national uniformity"); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 425 (1946)
(States may not impose "undue or discriminatory" burdens); California v. Thonipson, 313 U.S. 109,
113-14 (1941) (State measure lawful if it "neither discriminates against nor substantially obstructs"
commerce); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 352 (1939) (court must
"weigh[] the nature of the respondent's activities, and the propriety of local regulation"); Bourjois,
Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1937) (standard is "actual undue burden"); Mintz v. Bald-
win, 289 U.S. 346, 349-50 (1933) (measure does not "so unnecessarily burden[] interstate transpor-
tation as to contravene the commerce clause"); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925) (State
measures lawful where the "indirect burden imposed on interstate commerce is not unreasonable");
Mich. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577 (1925) (State measures may not "pass beyond
the bounds of what is reasonable and suitable"); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 435
(1919) (measure lawful when "reasonable and nondiscriminatory"); Port Richmond & Bergen Point
Ferry Co. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 234 U.S. 317, 331 (1914) (distinguishing "burdensome
exactions" from "reasonable charges"); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 291
(1914) (State measures "must not be arbitrary, or pass beyond the limits of a fair judgment as to
what the exigency demands"); Barrett v. City of New York, 232 U.S. 14, 31 (1914) (measure lawful
absent "unreasonable demands" on business or applicable federal law); id at 33 ("[W]hen the
movement of interstate traffic is involved, [regulations] should be entirely reasonable and should not
arbitrarily restrict the facilities upon which it must depend."); Simpson v. Shepard (The Minnesota
Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352, 408, 410 (1913) ("[State legislation] may extend incidentally to the
operations of the carrier in the conduct of interstate business, provided it does not subject that busi-
ness to unreasonable demands, and is not opposed to Federal legislation."); Standard Stock Food Co.
v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 549 (1912) (measure was "not an unreasonable one"); Savage v. Jones, 225
U.S. 501, 525 (1912) (measure lawful when, among other things, it "has real relation to the suitable
protection of the people of the state, and is reasonable in its requirements"); West v. Kan. Nat. Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911) (no State may "unreasonably burden" interstate commerce); Engel v.
O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128, 138 (1911) (noting that the threshold of legality "is a question of more or
less.. . . The question is whether the state law creates a direct burden upon what it is for Congress to
control, and the facts of the specific case must be weighed"); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larabee Flour
Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 622-24 (1909) ("In none of these cases [in which State regulations were
upheld] was it thought that the regulations were unreasonable, or operated in any just sense as a
restriction upon interstate commerce."); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 152 (1902) (State measure
did not "unduly burden[]" interstate commerce where "it does not appear otherwise than that the
statute can be obeyed without serious embarrassment or unreasonable cost"); Smith v. St. Louis &
Sw. Ry. Co., 181 U.S. 248, 255 (1901) (test of legality is "whether the police power of the state has
been exerted beyond its province .. . and to an extent beyond what is necessary" (emphasis omit-
ted)); id. at 258 ("It is the character of the circumstances which gives or takes from a law or regula-
tion of quarantine a legal quality."); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1898)
(measure unlawful where overbroad); N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S.
628, 631 (1897) (States retained authority "to establish such reasonable regulations as were appro-
priate for the protection of the health, the lives, and the safety of their people"); id at 632-33 ("[A]
state [may] make such reasonable regulations for the safety of passengers on interstate trains as in its
judgment, all things considered, is appropriate and effective."); Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427,
431 (1897) (State measure lawful where burden involved a "few minutes" and a "trifling expense,"
as it was a "reasonable exercise of the police power of the state"); W. Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162
U.S. 650, 662 (1896) (measure lawful where "we cannot say that it is so unreasonable as to be out-
side of and beyond the jurisdiction of the state to enact"); Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156
U.S. 590, 598 (1895) ("[The challenged regulations] may in some cases in a slight degree affect
commerce, but not in such an extent or sense as to be properly designated as regulations of com-
merce."); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1891) (State measure was not automatically
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sistent: everyone knows that the Court's Commerce Clause cases are
anything but that. And, of course, some cases clearly reject the language
and the logic of burden review.287 But it is impossible to read through the
Court's innumerable dormant Commerce Clause adjudications without
being struck by the length and clarity of burden review's lineage. I in-
clude the outrageous footnote in order to demolish the notion that burden
review of non-discriminatory regulations is an innovation in the jurispru-
dence of the dormant Commerce Clause, or a creature of any particular
Court, or any particular era.
Separately, I also claim that there are ample grounds on which to
conclude that the logic of burden review explains knots of contradiction
in the Court's application of the formalistic tests that characterized its
earlier jurisprudence. (This resonates with the view of Justice Stone, ar-
chitect of the Traditional Framework.288) One such knot of cases deals
with local-service requirements for railroads: that is, state regulations
providing that railroad companies engaged in interstate transportation
must provide a certain level of service to towns and cities within the
state's own territory. If read at face value, these cases are all over the
map. If the distinction between legality and illegality is "directness" of
burden, how could a law requiring that "a railroad company whose road
is operated within the state shall cause three each way of its regular trains
carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop
at any station, city, or village of 3,000 inhabitants for a time sufficient to
receive and let off passengers" be lawful in 1899,289 and a law that
lawful "simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the states, including
the people of the state enacting such statute"); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 14 U.S. 196,
217 (1885) ("Reasonable charges for the use of property, either on water or land, are not an interence
[sic] with the freedom of transportation between the states, secured under the commercial power of
congress."); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1877) ("[A State] may not interfere with transpor-
tation into or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It may
not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or
inter-state commerce."); id. at 473 ("[Illinois] courts have refused to inquire whether the prohibition
did not extend beyond the danger to be apprehended, and whether, therefore, the statutes were not
something more than exertions of police power. That inquiry, they have said, was for the legislature
and not for the courts. With this we cannot concur."); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418,
428-29 (1870) (States may enact "reasonable regulations" for tax collection); Hinson v. Lott, 75-
U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 151 (1868) ("[A] tax which so seriously affects the interchange of commodities
between the States as to essentially impede or seriously interfere with it, is a regulation of com-
merce."); Conway v. Taylor's Ex'r, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 603, 634 (1861) ("[States] may pass laws so
infringing the commercial power of the nation that it would be the duty of this court to annul or
control them. The function is one of extreme delicacy, and only to be performed where the infraction
is clear." (citation omitted)).
287. See, e.g., S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938); Shafer
v. Farmers' Grain Co. of Embden, 268 U.S. 189, 202 (1925); In re State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232,
276 (1872), abrogated by Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Veazie
v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 404
(1849).
288. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting that
earlier cases turned on "consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the
regulation, its function, the character of the business involved and the actual effect on the flow of
commerce"), overruled on other grounds by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1941).
289. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U.S. 285, 301 (1899).
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"[e]very railroad corporation shall cause its passenger trains to stop up-
on ... arrival at each station advertised .. . as a place of receiving and
discharging passengers upon and from such trains, a sufficient length of
time to receive and let off such passengers with safety" be unlawful in
1900?290
But the picture becomes clearer with the insight that burden analy-
sis, reasonableness analysis, was doing much of the work in these cases.
In Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Law-
rence,291 the Court was perfectly clear about it: "the reasonableness or
unreasonableness ofa state enactment is always an element in the gen-
eral inquiry by the court whether such legislation encroaches upon na-
tional authority, or is to be deemed a legitimate exertion of the power of
the state. ... The Court concluded that the law, "so far from being
unreasonable, will greatly subserve the public convenience."293 Likewise,
in Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Illinois ex
rel. Jett,294 the Court observed that "[s]everal acts in pari materia with
the one under consideration have been before this court, and have been
approved or disapproved as they have seemed reasonable or unreasona-
ble, or bore more or less heavily upon the power of railways to regulate
their trains in the respective and sometimes conflicting interests of local
and through traffic."2 95 And that same principle was to drive the conclu-
sion: "The demurrer to the answer admits that the railway company [al-
ready] furnishes a sufficient number of regular passenger trains (four
each way a day), to accommodate all the local and through business
along the line of the road, and that all of such trains stop at Hillsbo-
ro .. . and if compelled to stop at county seats the company will be com-
pelled to abandon the train, to the great damage of the traveling public
and to the railway company."296 And the very same approach was taken
in Houston & Texas Central Railroad Co. v. Mayes, 297 in which the
Court observed that "[t]he exact limit of lawful legislation upon this sub-
ject cannot, in the nature of things, be defined. It can only be illustrated
from decided cases, by applying the principles therein enunciated, de-
termining from these whether, in the particular case, the rule be reason-
able or otherwise."298
290. Cleveland, Cinncinati, Chi., & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Illinoit ex rel. Jett, 177 U.S. 514, 515
(1900).
291. 173 U.S. 285 (1899).
292. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
293. Id.
294. 177 U.S. 514 (1900).
295. Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
297. 201 U.S. 321 (1906).
298. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
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I could, but will not, go on.29 9 These cases strongly suggest that the
logic of burden review motivated the outcome of these decisions. And a
similar approach seems to unlock-at least to a significant extent-other
knots of case law that make little sense on their formalist face. Let us
take just two further examples, rather more briefly, to make the point.
First, consider the "arrival requirements" cases: the apparently contradic-
tory cases reviewing state regulations applicable to arriving vessels and
their passengers. Why, for example, was New York forbidden to impose
a $1.50 capitation tax upon boat passengers in Henderson v. Mayor of
New York,300 and California forbidden to demand a bond for passengers'
good behavior in Chy Lung v. Freeman,301 while New York was permit-
ted to impose a $75 penalty per passenger for failure to produce a mani-
fest in Mayor of New York v. Miln?302 Can it really have been that the
imposition of a burden on each arriving passenger was a regulation of
interstate commerce, "direct" or otherwise, in Henderson and Chy Lung
but not in Miln? Of course not. The inconsistency recedes when we set
the formalistic language of the opinions aside and recognize that a re-
quirement to provide a list is simply a lighter and more reasonable meas-
ure in light of its minimal burden on the business in question and the
available grounds of public interest; an automatic per-capita charge or an
onerous bond requirement for carrying passengers is less so.30 3
Second, consider the long line of cases dealing with vehicle regula-
tion: requirements and specifications pertaining to equipment, crews,
dimensions, and so on. At first glance these cases seem hopelessly jum-
304bled. A state may require trains to use a certain kind of headlight, may
require cabooses on trains,305 and may forbid them from using a particu-
lar kind of furnace,306 but may not require trucks to use a certain kind of
mudguard.3 07 A state may require that trains travel with a minimum com-
plement of staff,30 8 but it may not require that passengers be seated in
segregated or unsegregated arrangements. 3  It may prohibit cars from
299. See, e.g., Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 334-35 (1907); Miss. R.R.
Comm'n v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1906).
300. 92 U.S. 259, 263 (1875); see also The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 572 (1849)
(capitation tax unlawful).
301. 92 U.S. 275, 281 (1875).
302. 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 102, 104-105, 107 (1837).
303. 1 lay no emphasis here on the language of these opinions, which are often highly formalis-
tic. I am concerned solely with outcomes.
304. Vandalia R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 242 U.S. 255, 259-60 (1916); Atl. Coast Line
R.R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1914).
305. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1943).
306. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 631 (1897).
307. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959).
308. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 393
U.S. 129, 144 (1968); Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 256 (1931); St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1916); Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R.
Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 466 (1911).
309. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946); Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 490 (1877).
But see Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1900); Plessy v. Ferguson,
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being carried over transporter cabs,31 0 but may not prohibit trucks or
trains beyond a certain length.311 Were the permitted rules really "indi-
rect" regulations, but the proscribed ones "direct" regulations, in any
meaningful sense?
Again, I think not. I see no sensible way to organize the outcomes in
these cases that is not sensitive to burden, and specifically to the relation-
ship between burden and benefit. In the mudguard case, for example, a
serious burden was threatened:
[I]f a trailer is to be operated in both States, mudguards would have
to be interchanged, causing a significant delay in an operation where
prompt movement may be of the essence. It was found that from two
to four hours of labor are required to install or remove a contour
mudguard.312
Likewise, approving the headlamp law in Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road Co. v. Georgia,313 it emphasized that "[t]he requirements of a
state . . . must not ... pass beyond the limits of a fair judgment as to
what the exigency demands. ... Likewise, in Morgan v. Virginia,
reviewing a segregation law, the Court emphasized "the degree of state
legislation's interference with . . . commerce,"316 and that the analysis
was "a matter of balance between the exercise of the local police power
and the need for national uniformity." 317
This approach, in one form or another, pervades the Court's juris-
prudence. Analysis of whether a subject "requires" a uniform national
standard-a test inaugurated in Cooley and frequently invoked thereaf-
ter--often seems to be a euphemism for burden review, rooted in a prac-
tical economic assessment of the consequences of unilateral state regula-
tion.1 8 Language of "requirement" and "necessity" simply obscure what
is going on: review for unreasonable burden.
163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (sustaining segregation requirement for intrastate railroad travel), over-
ruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co. v.
Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 591-92 (1890).
310. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 617 (1940).
311. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 677-79 (1981) (plurality
opinion); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447-48 (1978); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizo-
na ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945).
312. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 527.
313. 234 U.S. 280 (1914).
314. Id. at 291.
315. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
316. Id. at 380.
317. Id. at 386.
318. See Denning, supra note 2, at 459 ("[E]vidence that burdens on interstate commerce
clearly outweighed local benefits suggested that it was a national problem to be regulated by Con-
gress, if at all."). But see Aleinikoff, supra note 169, at 952 ("[S]ome might say that Lochner and
many constitutional decisions of the nineteenth century were based on implicit, undisclosed balanc-
es. While this claim cannot be disproved, I think it is quite unlikely to be correct.").
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2. The Retreat from Burden Review
Having established the long history of burden review in the Court's
body of precedent and practice, we now turn to its erosion under the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. To be sure, burden review remains part of
the Court's rhetorical toolkit, linked these days to the 1970 Pike deci-
sion,319 and commentators often express the view that this test remains
good law.320 But the reality is different.
Burden review was still alive and well as recently as 1982, when it
played a key role in Edgar.3 2 1 The case concerned the Illinois Business
Take-Over Act, which applied to any takeover tender offer for the shares
of
[A] corporation or other issuer of securities of which shareholders lo-
cated in Illinois own 10% of the class of equity securities subject to
the offer, or for which any two of the following three conditions are
met: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is
organized under the laws of Illinois, or has at least 10% of its stated
capital and paid-in surplus represented within the State.322
Upon such tender offers the Act imposed a twenty-day waiting pe-
riod, during which the Illinois Secretary of State was empowered to
block the offer if the offer was "inequitable or would work or tend to
work a fraud or deceit upon the offerees."323 This amounted to a veto on
interstate takeovers: undertaking burden review, the Court held that it
was unreasonable and invalidated it. The Court reaffirmed that "even
when a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the burden
imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in relation to the local
interests served by the statute."324 Rejecting the state's public-purpose
defense, and noting that the Act purported to give Illinois the power to
block "nationwide" tender offers, the Court responded that Illinois could
assert no interest in protecting citizens of other states from undesirable
tender offers; moreover, the measure added little benefit in light of exist-
ing law.325 As such, the balance between benefits and burdens was unrea-
sonable and the law was invalidated.326
319. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008) (plurality opinion);
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007)
(plurality opinion); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433
(2005).
320. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory ofArticle 1, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REv. 115, 167 (2010) ("The dormant Commerce Clause
almost always prohibits states from . . . placing an undue burden on the interstate movement of
goods and services.").
321. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (plurality opinion).
322. Id. at 627.
323. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
324. Id. at 643 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
325. Id. at 644-46.
326. Id. at 646.
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A similar, but more narrowly tailored, measure came before the
Court just five years later: Indiana's anti-takeover statute, challenged in
CTS Corp.327 The Indiana statute was similar to Illinois's, but it applied
only to corporations with a stronger link to the regulating state than Illi-
nois had required in Edgar.32 8 The Court emphasized-citing Donald
Regan, whose Making Sense article had just been published-that the
"principal objects" of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine were dis-
criminatory state regulations, unlike the non-discriminatory Indiana stat-
ute.329 Then the Court turned to the central question of whether the Act's
capacity to hinder tender offers-surely the essence of its burden on in-
terstate commerce-raised a constitutional difficulty. The Court con-
cluded that it did not. The Act made a significant contribution to protect-
ing shareholders of Indiana corporations, and its limitation to corpora-
tions with a strong Indiana link meant that its commercial burdens were
less than those imposed by the law at issue in Edgar.331 The Act sur-
vived.
The CTS Corp. Court also intimated that judicial abstention was
particularly appropriate because "[tihe very commodity that is traded in
the securities market is one whose characteristics are defined by state
law" 332; the state has a long-settled role as an "overseer of corporate gov-
ernance"333; and "state regulation of corporate governance is regulation
of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state
law." 3 34 We recognize here the kind of deferential special pleading that
was to re-appear in Tracy in 1997, as discussed above.335 Concurring,
Justice Scalia made a point of commending the work of Donald Regan.33 6
He wrote:
One commentator [Regan] has suggested that, at least much of the
time, we do not in fact mean what we say when we declare that stat-
utes which neither discriminate against commerce nor present a
threat of multiple and inconsistent burdens might nonetheless be un-
327. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1987).
328. Compare id at 73 (noting that the act applies only to businesses incorporated in Indiana),
with Edgar, 457 U.S. at 626-27 (noting that the act applies to any takeover offer for shares of a
target company, which includes any corporation where any two of the three conditions are met: the
principal executive office is in Illinois, it is incorporated in Illinois, or has at least 10% of its capital
and paid-in surplus represented within Illinois).
329. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 87.
330. Id. at 91.
331. Id. at 93-94.
332. Id. at 94.
333. Id. at 91.
334. Id. at 89.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 230-39 (discussing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519
U.S. 278 (1997)).
336. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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constitutional under a "balancing" test. If he is not correct, he ought
to be.337
CTS Corp. marked a sea change. In the almost thirty years since this
decision, the Court has not struck down a single statute under the
dormant Commerce Clause on grounds of burden.
But while burden review was to show no further teeth after Edgar,
no serious effort was made to actually kill it until the advent of the Rob-
erts Court. The occasion for the first decisive step was United Haulers, a
case in which-as noted above-an ordinance enacted by two counties
had completely reserved the local waste processing business to a compa-
ny that was publicly owned: all other businesses were excluded from
competition.338 The counties effectively monopolized the market by or-
dinance and denied it to all competitors, foreign and domestic. The Court
held, applying mysterious logic discussed below,339 that the measure
should be analyzed as a non-discriminatory regulation.
But our concern here is with the fact that the United Haulers Court
made short work of burden review. The Court (somewhat uncritically)
accepted the state's view that the measure promoted revenue generation
(because, as a publicly-owned monopolist, the public entity generated
money for the state); it also "create[d] enhanced incentives for recycling
and proper disposal of. . . waste" and "markedly increased [the coun-
ties'] ability to enforce recycling laws," by reducing the number of sites
at which recycling enforcement would be necessary.340 The Court's inter-
rogation of this argument was, at best, cursory, amounting to rational
basis review, and requiring the relationship between ends and means,
rather than the substantive tradeoff, to be reasonable. And this minimal
scrutiny assuredly reflected a careful and deliberate choice to eschew the
traditional burden analysis. Consider its disdainful description of burden
review:
[The haulers] maintain that the Counties' laws cannot survive the
more permissive Pike test, because of asserted burdens on commerce.
There is a common thread to these arguments: They are invitations to
rigorously scrutinize economic legislation passed under the auspices
of the police power. There was a time when this Court presumed to
make such binding judgments for society, under the guise of inter-
preting the Due Process Clause. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 . . . (1905). We should not seek to reclaim that ground for judicial
supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause.341
337. Id, (citation omitted).
338. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334-
37 (2007) (plurality opinion).
339. See infra III.D.2 (discussing the public entity exception coined in United Haulers).
340. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346-47.
341. Id at 347 (citation omitted).
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If this brutal language inflicted a mortal wound on burden review,
the Court finished it off the next year in Davis. In that case (described
above342), the Court declined to even go through the motions of applying
the test, on the ground that "the Judicial Branch is not institutionally
suited to draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary
for the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case."343 In par
ticular, the Court explained that "weighing and quantifying [the alleged
harms] for a cost-benefit analysis would be a very subtle exercise."344
The Court went on to disclaim any meaningful institutional capacity "for
making whatever predictions and reaching whatever answers are possible
at all," and quoted from previous judgments emphasizing that the Court
is poorly placed to "gather the facts upon which economic predictions
can be made," "professionally untrained to make [economic predic-
tions]," and "poorly equipped to evaluate with precision the relative bur-
dens of various methods of taxation."345
This line of argument should be deeply familiar. Just like the rea-
sons given in CTS Corp., Tracy, and United Haulers, none of the reasons
given for "specially" weakening the scrutiny of the dormant Commerce
Clause are specific to the facts of Davis. They are fundamental attacks on
the propriety of burden review for reasonableness as such. Only Justice
Scalia, in his partial concurrence, squarely acknowledged that fact.34 6
Such is the state of burden review today. Dan Coenen argues that
Davis might "pave the way" for the repudiation of burden review.347 I
think that Davis and its companion United Haulers are the repudiation of
burden review. I say this because what is truly significant is not just the
outcome in these cases, but the reasoning and the derisive tone in which
burden review is treated. Courts govern not just by what they do, but by
how they say that they are doing it. And the steady and sustained lower-
ing of burden review into the rhetorical mire, culminating in the refer-
ence to Lochner v. New York348 in United Haulers (not in an angry and
polemical dissent from a known opponent of the dormant Commerce
Clause but, rather, in an opinion of the Court written by the Chief Jus-
tice), and the flat-out refusal to apply it in Davis, are profoundly instruc-
tive. The most recent case to mention the doctrine of burden review-
342. See supra text accompanying note 251 (discussing Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S.
328, 333-34 (2008)).
343. Davis, 553 U.S. at 354-56.
344. Id. at 354.
345. Id. at 355-56 (quoting Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 342 (1996)).
346. Id. at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
347. Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the State-Self-
Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541, 627 (2010); see
also Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REV. 1283, 1293
(1997) ("[T]he [Pike] balancing test in practice has become increasingly lax.... If [it] continues to
be applied in this fashion, U.S. law may be evolving toward a purely discrimination-based test in
domestic trade cases.").
348. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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McBurney349 -refused to even acknowledge a burden at all, on the
ground that the case was somehow inappropriate for Commerce Clause
adjudication.350
D. A Proliferation ofExceptions
The third aspect of the modem erosion of the dormant Commerce
Clause-marking a leap far beyond even what Donald Regan advocated
in 1986-is the proliferation of special exceptions to the reach of the
Clause. I will discuss four of them here: (1) the market participant excep-
tion; (2) the "public enterprise" or "public entity" exception; (3) the sub-
sidy exception; and (4) the "traditional government function" exception.
1. Market Participant
The market participant doctrine was introduced in two cases-
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 35' in 1976 and Reeves, Inc. v. Stake352
in 1980-to reflect the proposition that the dormant Commerce Clause
does not limit a state's power to buy and sell goods and services.353 The
doctrine is often explained in terms of a dichotomous split between a
state's action "in its proprietary capacity as a purchaser or seller,"354 re-
garding which the dormant Commerce Clause has nothing to say, and its
action in a regulatory capacity, which falls within the ambit of the doc-
trine. This distinction can be justified clearly enough on textual
grounds: the existence of a partly exclusive federal power to regulate
commerce does not, at least intuitively, furnish grounds to preclude a
state from engaging in it.3 5 5
But the complications start very early. Oddly, Alexandria Scrap it-
self was not at all a clear case of buying or selling: at issue in that case
was a statutory scheme that made bounty payments available to scrap
processors for each car hulk that they processed.356 But a true "core case"
of market participation was presented by Reeves, which concerned the
discriminatory sales policy of a state-owned cement factory. The Court
held that the dormant Commerce Clause did not constrain such a poli-
349. McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1719-20 (2013).
350. See supra text accompanying notes 257-68 (discussing the conclusion in McBurney); see
also discussion infra Section Ill.D.1 (discussing the application of the market participation doctrine
in McBurney).
351. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
352. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
353. Id. at 435-39; Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 808-10.
354. E.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 592-93
(1997).
355. The Court has tended not to make this textual point, relying instead on originalist logic.
See, e.g., Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 ("There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability
of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market." (citation omitted)); see also Alexandria
Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810 (focusing on "the purposes animating the Commerce Clause").
356. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 798-800.
357. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 430-33.
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cy.358 Reeves followed a fortiori from Alexandria Scrap: if creating a
statutory subsidy-hardly classic "private" activity-was enough to con-
stitute market participation, selling cement on the open market from a
factory certainly was enough.
Subsequent cases have generally affirmed the basic distinction be-
tween trading and regulating. For example, when Ohio argued in
Limbach that a tax exemption for in-state ethanol should be thought of as
a "purchase" of the ethanol and therefore market participation-a claim
that, in fairness, is not a million miles from the logic of Alexandria
Scrap-the Court knocked the argument back.359 Likewise, the Court
rejected an attempt to repackage a tax exemption as "purchasing" in
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison.360 A little oddly,
the doctrine immunizes competitive distortions only in the market in
which the state actor directly participates.
So much for the basic doctrine. Symptoms of "decline" are found
here not in the creation of the doctrine, which is unobjectionable enough
and perfectly compatible with the Traditional Framework, but in the sub-
sequent expansion of the "market participant exception." The key cases
are already familiar to us: Davis and McBurney.
Davis is a peculiar and fragmented decision, but the three-Justice
plurality in that case sowed a remarkable seed in market participation
jurisprudence. Recall that Davis concerned a tax exemption granted by
Kentucky for income from its own bonds, denied to income from the
bonds of other states.362 The state rather speculatively raised a market
participation defense, even though tax rules-as "primeval government
activity"-had been repeatedly contrasted with market participation in
countless earlier decisions. That a state should throw in a cheeky argu-
358. Id. at 440-41.
359. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1988).
360. 520 U.S. 564, 593-94 (1997).
361. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984). Wunnicke is not only
odd on its face (because it has nothing to do with the regulation/participation distinction underlying
the doctrine), but is also decidedly in tension with a case that was decided only the previous year. In
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., the mayor of Boston issued an
executive order equiring that city construction projects be carried out by a workforce of which at
least 50% was composed of residents of Boston. 460 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1983). The Court concluded
in that case that "[i]nsofar as the city expended only its own funds in entering into construction
contracts for public projects, it was a market participant and entitled to be treated as such . . . ." Id. at
214-15. But the city was not hiring laborers, it was hiring construction firms that hired laborers. Id.
at 217. So Wunnicke's same-market limitation seems flatly at odds with White, and simply overrules
it on that point. A "same market" rule of this kind is, of course, a strange and formalistic limita-
tion: buying and selling invariably has competitive consequences in upstream and downstream
markets, and if the market participant doctrine rests on the fact that the conduct does not involve the
exercise of the State's distinctive regulatory powers with which the Commerce Clause is concerned,
and given the usual indifference of Commerce Clause doctrine to any disparity between the point in
the supply chain at which a measure is formally applied and the point at which it has allegedly
anticompetitive effects, the Wunnicke conclusion is hard to justify. But see Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at
98-99 (attempting-rather unconvincingly-to justify the rule).
362. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 333 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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ment in a kitchen-sink effort to defend a facially discriminatory tax ex-
emption is not surprising. But what is surprising is that three Justices of
the Supreme Court accepted it:
[T]here is no ignoring the fact that imposing the differential tax
scheme makes sense only because Kentucky is also a bond issuer.
The Commonwealth has entered the market for debt securities, just as
Maryland entered the market for automobile hulks, and South Dakota
entered the cement market. It simply blinks this reality to disaggre-
gate the Commonwealth's two roles and pretend that in exempting
the income from its securities, Kentucky is independently regulating
or regulating in the garden variety way that has made a State vulner-
able to the dormant Commerce Clause... . [W]hen Kentucky ex-
empts its bond interest, it is competing in the market for limited in-
vestment dollars, alongside private bond issuers and its sister States,
and its tax structure is one of the tools of competition.363
For the plurality, as a result, the market participant doctrine should
have applied in Davis.3 '4 In vain did Justice Kennedy cry out in dissent
that "[t]his expansion of the market-participant exception, if it were un-
leashed by a majority of the Court, would be an open invitation to enact
these kinds of discriminatory laws-laws that, until today, the Court has
not upheld in even a single instance," and that the Court had repeatedly
held that "[t]axation is a quintessential act of regulation, not market par-
ticipation." 365 Justice Kennedy was quite right: the plurality was flatly at
odds with strong language in Camps Newfound/Owatonna,366
Limbach,367 and C & A Carbone.368
The crack in the market participation doctrine was to be opened fur-
ther in McBurney a few years later. In McBurney itself, recall that the
Court considered a case of discriminatory regulation-access to Virginia
public records under the state FOIA law-and failed to analyze it as
such.369 But what is interesting for our purposes now is what the Court
went on to say. The Court stated that even if dormant Commerce Clause
analysis were applied, it would fail because the public documents in
question were created by Virginia. That fact was significant because "a
363. Id. at 344-45 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted).
364. Id. at 348.
365. Id at 375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
366. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997) ("A tax
exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in the market that falls within the market-
participation doctrine.").
367. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1988) (emphasizing that the
"assessment and computation of taxes" was "a primeval governmental activity," not market partici-
pation).
368. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994) ("[H]aving elected
to use the open market to earn revenues for its project, the town may not employ discriminatory
regulation to give that project an advantage over rival businesses from out of State.").
369. See supra text accompanying notes 256-69 (discussing analysis of discrimination in
McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013)).
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State does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause when, having cre-
ated a market through a state program, it 'limits benefits generated by
[that] state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the
State was created to serve,"' citing to-of all things-Reeves, the ce-
ment-factory case.370
This aspect of McBurney is on any view a pretty shocking misappli-
cation of the market participation doctrine: Virginia was not buying nor
selling anything. The statutory provision of a right of access to public
records falls about as far from market participation as one could imagine.
The "created by the State" doctrine in McBurney-a kind of mutated
super-version of the market participant exception-is troubling in princi-
ple and as applied. In principle, it threatens to apply broadly: to anything
that the state alone does or provides. Infrastructure, regulatory approvals,
corporate charters, licenses to trade or carry on a profession, police and
fire protection, and all the rest of it: these are things "which would not
otherwise exist" without state action. But the doctrine is even worse as
applied in McBurney itself, for it completely misses the point that the
market in which the Court was distorting competition-the market for
real estate information providers, perhaps-was by no means a market
that had been created by the state.371 Rather, the company was competing
in an existing market against existing in-state companies, and in that
market it was subject to facial discrimination that created a competitive
disadvantage. To all this the Court averted its eyes.
The market participant doctrine thus stands extended in two direc-
tions. The plurality opinion in Davis lies about like the proverbial "load-
ed weapon,"372 ready to be picked up by a later majority and used as sup-
port for the notion that "market participation" includes any exercise of
the state's regulatory powers in connection with something in which the
state has an economic or quasi-competitive interest. And, more trou-
blingly still, the "created by the State" version offered by a majority of
the Court in McBurney threatens application of the doctrine to a great
swathe of state conduct. This exemption seems ready to burst its banks
entirely.
370. McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1720 (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980)).
371. Compare Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809 n.18 (1976) ("[T]he
commerce affected by the 1974 amendment appears to have been created, in whole or in substantial
part, by the Maryland bounty scheme. We would hesitate to hold that the Commerce Clause forbids
state action reducing or eliminating a flow of commerce dependent for its existence upon state sub-
sidy instead of private market forces. Because the record contains no details of the hulk market prior
to the bounty scheme, however, this issue is not clearly presented."), with id. at 815 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 446 n.18 (suggesting that the Alexandria Scrap Court
could hardly have meant hat the scrap processing market was created by the State).
372. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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2. Public Enterprise / Public Entity
The Roberts Court has also created an entirely new exception,
which was inaugurated in United Haulers, and confirmed and expanded
in Davis. Under this exception, immunity attaches to: (1) a state's crea-
tion of state-owned enterprises that operate in the market; and also (2) to
the conferral, through regulation, of competitive advantages-up to and
including full regulatory monopoly-on such enterprises. I will call this
a "public enterprise" or "public entity" exception.373
In United Haulers, the Court effectively held that the decision by a
state, or a subdivision thereof, to "nationalize" an area of industrial activ-
ity, including by precluding or limiting private competition or by dis-
criminating in favor of a public enterprise, is beyond the purview of the
Clause: "The dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for fed-
eral courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local
government to undertake, and what activities must be the province of
private market competition."374 Thus, laws that "benefit a clearly public
facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same.. . . do not
discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant
Commerce Clause."
Notwithstanding the protestations of the United Haulers majority,376
this holding is a clear retreat from the earlier decision in C & A Carbone,
a case in which the Court held unlawful an attempt to discriminate in
favor of what was at the very least a public-private partnership (more
accurately a public entity under short-term private administration for
funding purposes).377 In C & A Carbone itself, the Court stated that "hav-
ing elected to use the open market to earn revenues for its project [(a
waste processing facility)], the town may not employ discriminatory reg-
ulation to give that project an advantage over rival businesses from out of
State."378 In other words, the thrust of the holding in C & A Carbone was
that a state, having decided to create a competitor, may not tip the table
in favor of its own creation by exercising regulatory powers-the tradi-
tional province of the dormant Commerce Clause, unlike the essentially
private conduct that the market participation exemption i dulges 379-in a
discriminatory fashion. Earlier cases supported this outcome.380
373. Others have their own labels. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 347, at 544 ("state-self-
promotion" exception); Williams, supra note 2, at 455 ("sovereign protectionism").
374. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343
(2007) (plurality opinion); see also id at 344 ("It is not the office of the Commerce Clause to control
the decision of the voters on whether government or the private sector should provide waste man-
agement services.").
375. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
376. Id. at 341 ("Carbone cannot be regarded as having decided the public-private question.").
377. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387, 393-94 (1994).
378. Id at 394.
379. See supra Section III.D. I (discussing the logic of the market participant exception).
380. See UnitedHaulers, 550 U.S. at 361-63 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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But United Haulers (unconvincingly) distinguished C & A Carbone
and reversed the rule for which it stood."' It is true that the Court held in
United Haulers that such rules were still subject to Pike burden review,
but it is hard to credit this as more than a token gesture, given the thor-
ough beating that burden review has now taken,382 and given the wither-
ing disdain for burden review shown in United Haulers itself.383 And the
United Haulers approach was affirmed recently by Davis, the Kentucky
bond-income case, in which the state tax rule clearly "operated as a de
facto protective tariff." 3 85 But "[t]here is no forbidden discrimination,"
the Court concluded in Davis-not, on this point, a plurality, but a ma-
jority of the Court-"because Kentucky, as a public entity, does not have
to treat itself as being substantially similar to the other bond issuers in
the market."386
So the rule is now clear: the state can use its regulatory and taxing
powers to favor the competitive position of a public enterprise or other
387public entity without fear of the dormant Commerce Clause. What is
still prohibited by the doctrine, at least in principle, is conferral of a di-
rect regulatory competitive advantage on private in-state actors.388 Need-
less to say, this suggests an inability to "appreciate the extent to which
government and private operations are and can be comingled,"389 or that
"there is just as much reason to believe that state or local governments
are likely to act upon protectionist considerations when the benefited
operation is owned by the government as when the benefited operation is
privately held."390
Moreover, read together, the public entity and market participant
exceptions open the door to considerable discrimination in favor of pri-
vate entities. For example, it is elementary that Arizona could not enact a
statute (say, the Arizona Plumbing Preference Act) that provided that
"only Arizona companies may supply plumbing services in Arizo-
na": that would constitute intentional, facial discrimination, and the
dormant Commerce Clause prohibits that if it prohibits anything. But
there would seem to be nothing to stop Arizona from creating the Arizo-
na State Plumbing Corporation (immune under United Haulers's public
381. Id. at 342 (majority opinion).
382. See supra Section III.C.2 (discussing the retreat from burden review).
383. See supra text accompanying note 341.
384. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 332-34 (2008) (plurality opinion).
385. Coenen, supra note 347, at 561; see also Williams, supra note 2, at 466 ("Kentucky's tax
on the interest on out-of-state municipal bonds [was] nothing more than a tariff .... ).
386. Davis, 553 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
387. Id. at 341-43; United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 342-43 (2007) (plurality opinion).
388. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343-44; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 394 (1994).
389. Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The "New Protectionism" and the American
Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 282 (2009).
390. Williams, supra note 2, at 459.
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entity exception), legislating to prohibit other private businesses from
engaging in plumbing in Arizona (also immune under United Haulers's
public entity exception), and then having the Arizona State Plumbing
Corp. grant franchises only to Arizona businesses (immune under the
market participant exception391). Compare it with the Arizona Plumbing
Preference Act. The same outcome has been reached-all Arizona busi-
nesses are free to compete, and no out-of-state ones are-but the means
are perfectly lawful.392
Accordingly, I do not share Chief Justice Roberts's view that there
is a meaningful line to be drawn between the outcome in United Haulers
and the creation of a state-owned hamburger stand combined with an
ordinance requiring that all residents buy their hamburgers from the
stand.393 If there is a real difference between this and United Haulers, I
simply do not see it, and the Chief Justice does not tell us what it is. I
make no claim here about the desirability of this outcome, but if burden
review-last seen alive not much more recently than Jimmy Hoffa and
Lord Lucan-is the best hope for striking down a measure as obviously
discriminatory and protectionist as my Arizona plumbing example, we
can say at the very least that the dormant Commerce Clause is not quite
what it used to be. Norman Williams and Brannon Denning describe this
outcome as "public protectionism, "394 to which I would add that the pro-
tectionism that it so obviously validates need not in practice be public, as
my Arizona example shows.
In sum, state-owned enterprises now enjoy a remarkable quadruple
exemption from the fundamental rules of American economic organiza-
tion. The public entity doctrine exempts such enterprises from dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny with respect to their creation; the market par-
ticipant exemption immunizes their trading conduct in the market; the
public entity doctrine (again) immunizes any state regulation that skews
the terms of competition in their favor; and the state action doctrine ex-
empts them from antitrust control. Noli me tangere, says the state-owned
enterprise, for Caesar's I am.
391. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983) (applying
market participation to awards of contracts to provide public works). Note that the Wunnicke same-
market exception would not apply because our notional ASPC would be active in the same market as
its franchisees. See supra note 361 (discussing the Wunnicke limitation and its interaction with
White).
392. Dan Coenen argues that a scheme of this kind would be unlawful because it fails to re-
spect United Haulers's mandate to "treat[] all private businesses the same." Coenen, supra note 347,
611 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the same is true of all market participant cases, including
Alexandria Scrap and Reeves: the unequal treatment is the very thing that the market participant
exemption immunizes.
393. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345 n.7.
394. Williams & Denning, supra note 389, at 310.
395. Wyatt's full couplet makes the point unimprovably: "Noli me tangere for Cesars I ame, /
And wylde for to hold though I seme tame." Thomas Wyatt, Whoso List to Hounte, in THE OXFORD
BooK OF ENGLISH VERSE 28 (Christopher Ricks ed., 1999).
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3. Subsidies
If there were ever a single example of the Court's unwillingness to
let economic theory dictate doctrine, it is the proposition-heavily indi-
cated by the Court's jurisprudence but never quite held outright39 6-that
the provision of subsidies is immune from dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny. Thus, to tax in-state A one dollar and out-of-state B two dollars
is an unlawful discriminatory tax; to tax them both two dollars and give
A a one dollar rebate or tax exemption is an unlawful discriminatory tax
exemption; but to tax them equally and give A a one dollar subsidy from
the state's general treasury is a completely lawful subsidy. Make of that
what you will. 397
I will state the doctrinal case for the legality of subsidies very brief-
ly, as it is essentially a mosaic of dicta. Like the other elements of the
"decline" that we have charted here, the notion becomes prominent in the
Court's case law from the mid-1980s onward.
* In Limbach (1988), the Court stated that "[d]irect subsidization of
domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant Com-
merce Clause]."3 8
* In C & A Carbone (1994), the Court actively invited subsidiza-
tion: "Clarkstown maintains that special financing is necessary to ensure
the long-term survival of the designated facility. If so, the town may sub-
sidize the facility through general taxes or municipal bonds." "
* In West Lynn Creamery (1994), the Court held that "[a] pure sub-
sidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on in-
terstate commerce, but merely assists local business."400
* In Camps Newfound/Owatonna (1997), the Court held: "Although
tax exemptions and subsidies serve similar ends, they differ in important
and relevant respects, and our cases have recognized these distinc-
tions."401 The Court acknowledged that "[w]e have never squarely con-
fronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not address these
questions today,"402 but noted that the distinction between tax exemp-
tions and subsidies "is supported by scholarly commentary as well as
precedent, and we see no reason to depart from it."403 And it went
on: "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the Town is correct that a direct subsidy
396. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 2, at 968-69 (noting that the Court "still has not ruled" on
the legality of subsidies).
397. Cf Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) ("The determination of consti-
tutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened party.").
398. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
399. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994).
400. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994).
401. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 589 (1997).
402. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
403. Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
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benefiting only those nonprofits serving principally Maine residents
would be permissible, our cases do not sanction a tax exemption serving
similar ends."40
Similar support is found in a series of concurring and dissenting
opinions.40 5 To date, the case most thoroughly testing the limits of the
Court's position on subsidies remains West Lynn Creamery, a case in-
volving a challenge to a subsidy paid to in-state upstream dairy farmers
which was funded directly by a non-discriminatory tax on all down-
stream milk dealers.406 Holding the measure unlawful, the Court drew a
distinction between a so-called "pure" subsidy funded out of general
revenue, which "ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce,
but merely assists local business,"4 07 and one funded directly from a tax
levied specifically upon the same industry. The closest the Court came to
explaining the significance of this distinction for dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine involved the suspicious notion of "representation rein-
forcement."408
West Lynn Creamery is odd because, as Brannon Denning accurate-
ly points out, the tax in that case did not discriminate between in-state
and out-of-state competitors.409 But I think it is best understood as a case
in which the discriminatory subsidy for in-state dairy farmers was the
troubling element, to which the Court was unwilling to accord the usual
subsidy exemption given its entanglement with a taxing measure.
In any event, the Court has since doubled down on its doctrinal dis-
tinction between a tax exemption and a subsidy. When Maine gave fa-
vorable tax treatment to businesses serving in-state customers in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, it argued that it was simply subsidizing the provi-
sion of services to in-staters. Not so, the Court replied: "[a]lthough tax
exemptions and subsidies serve similar ends, they differ in important and
relevant respects, and our cases have recognized these distinctions."4 10
Maine's protest that "in economic reality," given their economic equiva-
lence, "since a discriminatory subsidy may be permissible, a discrimina-
tory exemption must be, too," was unavailing.411 The Court noted that it
had treated tax exemptions and subsidies differently under the First
404. Id. at 589 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 589 n.22 (describing this more candidly as
"[t]he distinction we have drawn for dormant Commerce Clause purposes").
405. See id. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting); W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 211 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 351
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 895 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 816 (1976) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
406. W Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 188.
407. Id at 199.
408. Id at 200-01; see also supra text accompanying note 30 (discussing representation rein-
forcement).
409. Denning, supra note 2, at 468.
410. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 589.
411. Id.
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Amendment,4 12 as well as in its previous Commerce Clause cases, and
declined to reconsider the distinction.4 13
I do not propose to say much more about his exception. The peculi-
ar distinction between discriminatory subsidies and discriminatory bur-
dens has some defenders,4 14 but many critics. 415
4. Traditional Government Function
The final topic that we will consider here falls just short of being a
clear-cut exemption. It is more like an animating concern: in the area of
"traditional governmental functions," the Court betrays particular reluc-
tance to deploy the dormant Commerce Clause.
a. Background: The Short Life of Usery
As a general matter, the notion that states enjoy a special zone of
constitutional protection in areas of "traditional" governmental functions
had its time in the sun during the nine-year life of National League of
Cities v. Usery.416 The story is very well known but will bear a quick
retelling. It presented the question of Congress's power under the affirm-
ative Commerce Clause to apply a statute regulating minimum wages,
overtime pay, and the like to state government employees.4 17 The federal
law was challenged as an invasion of core areas of state sovereignty that
were constitutionally protected from Congressional egislation.4 18
The Supreme Court sided with the states. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court, held that the Constitution-including but not limited to the
Tenth Amendmen4 19-extended a shield of constitutional protection
over at least some quantum of state sovereignty.420 The Court held that
"insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions," they fell outside the scope of the Commerce
412. Id. at 590 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)).
413. Id. at 589-91.
414. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 2, at 983; Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Consti-
tutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 102 (1988); Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate
Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 M[NN. L. REV. 447, 495 (1997); Lawrence, supra note
56, at 454.
415. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 263; Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the
Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Dis-
criminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 34-35 (2002); see also Coenen, supra note 2, at
969, 1031-54 (proposing the invalidation of subsidies that "share[] the essential constitutional de-
fects of a discriminatory tax break").
416. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985), superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150,
99 Stat. 787, 787 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012)).
417. Id at 836.
418. Id at 837.
419. Id at 842-43.
420. Id at 845.
312 [Vol. 94:2
2017] THE DECLINE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 313
Clause and were void.421 Four members of the Court dissented, with Jus-
tice Brennan, in particular, criticizing the majority opinion as "a cata-
strophic judicial body blow at Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause."422
The Usery holding survived for just under ten years, during which
time federal and state courts struggled with the attempt to determine
what was, and what was not, a "traditional governmental function."423
But in 1985, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,42 4
the Supreme Court finally gave up the fight. Garcia turned on whether
San Antonio's mass transit system was engaged in a "traditional gov-
ernmental function." 425 The Court conceded that even "this Court itself
has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental func-
tions deemed protected under [Usery]."426 Neither part of the "traditional
governmental" diptych had turned out to be very robust: on the "tradi-
tional" side, the Court rejected the notion that actual historical tradition
could be the Court's guide to the immunity of state conduct from federal
427interference. On the "governmental" side, there was barely any such
thing as a uniquely or necessarily governmental function.42 So Usery
was overruled as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.A29
In its place was set a straightforward admission that "with rare excep-
tions ... the Constitution does not carve out express elements of state
sovereignty that Congress may not employ its delegated powers to dis-
place."430 It was the political process, framed by the Constitution, that
would henceforth protect that sovereignty.3 1
b. Traditional Government Functions and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause
Back to the dormant Commerce Clause. As a matter of principle,
does a "traditional government function" exemption, or zone of special
421. Id. at 852.
422. Id. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
423. Compare Molina-Estrada v. P.R. Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845 (1st Cir. 1982) (find-
ing operating a highway authority to be a traditional government function), and United States v.
Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding licensing automobile drivers to be a tradition-
al government function), with Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding
regulation of traffic on public roads not to be a traditional government function).
424. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 2, 99 Stat. 787, 787 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012)).
425. Id. at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted).
426. Id. at 539.
427. Id. at 543-44.
428. Id. at 545.
429. Id. at 546.
430. Id. at 550.
431. Id. at 550-55. Of course, since Garcia the Court has demonstrated a willingness to inter-
vene on other "federalism" grounds. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,
70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311, 1335 (1997) ("Whether the Court will explicitly overrule Garcia is almost
a moot question, because the Court already has decided to ignore its requirements and to exert full
judicial review over questions involving state sovereignty and federalism.").
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deference, make any more sense under the dormant aspect of the Com-
merce Clause than on the affirmative side considered in Usery and Gar-
cia?
One might see at least four reasons to say no. First, the Usery expe-
rience strongly suggests that there is no way to make such a category
workable. No one knows what "traditional governmental activity"
means, or what it should mean. Second, recall the logic of the market
participant exemption. The premise of that exception is that the dormant
Commerce Clause is with distinctively governmental action (regulation),
not distinctively private action (trading). The point is obvious: it is bi-
zarre to suggest that the doctrine is really concerned with distinctively
governmental action but also should be particularly deferential to tradi-
tional governmental action. Third, there is a basic problem of constitu-
tional interpretation here. "Traditional governmental actions" includes, at
the very least, whatever state governments were getting up to in the late
eighteenth century when the Commerce Clause was being drafted. So the
very types of activity that the dormant Commerce Clause must have been
intended to preclude-assuming that it was intended to target and pre-
clude some types of state action-are precisely the same types of activity
that a "traditional governmental function" exemption would tend to pro-
tect. Fourth, as a matter of precedent, the Court has repeatedly denied
that there is any special constitutional preference for laws enacted in the
exercise of "police power." The modern state police power is simply
what is left over after the federal Constitution and any validly enacted
federal laws have been applied, not a source of special immunity from
federal law or federal action.432 So the case for special deference for
"traditional" governmental actions-above and beyond the deference
normally applicable to democratically enacted legislation-is very weak
indeed.
And yet the reemergence of the traditional governmental function
exception in dormant Commerce Clause case law is clear. We have al-
ready seen that seeds of "special" deference were sown in CTS Corp.
(particular deference to state regulation of corporationS433) and in Tracy
432. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1946); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 779-81 (1945); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935);
Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75, 79 (1914); Barrett v. City of New
York, 232 U.S. 14, 31 (1914); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389, 399 (1913); Savage v. Jones,
225 U.S. 501, 524-25 (1912); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 151 (1902); Crutcher v. Kentucky,
141 U.S. 47, 61-62 (1891); Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 490-92 (1888); Walling
v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 460 (1886); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271-72
(1875); see also FRANKFURTER, supra note 147, at 47 (describing the proposition that "the existence
of the states operated as an impalpable limitation upon national powers" as the "most insidious
application" of "the general principle of strict construction").
433. See supra text accompanying notes 332-42 (discussing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987)).
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(particular deference to state regulations of gas supply434). We have seen
that the theme came back strongly in United Haulers, in which the Court
deployed the notion as a ground for "hesitation," explaining that special
deference was appropriate because "waste disposal"-waste disposal!-
was "both typically and traditionally a local government function."A35
Justice Alito, in dissent, protested that "this Court has previously recog-
nized that any standard 'that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a
particular governmental function is "integral" or "traditional"' is 'un-
sound in principle and unworkable in practice."' 36 And we find that this
aspect of United Haulers was reloaded with a vengeance in Davis, with
the language moving to "quintessentially public," and its function mov-
ing from supportive dicta in United Haulers to the central basis for the
holding in Davis:
It follows afortiori from United Haulers that Kentucky must prevail
[in Davis]. In United Haulers, we explained that a government func-
tion is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scruti-
ny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate objectives distinct
from the simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors. [The]
logic [of immunizing measures that are "likely motivated by legiti-
mate objectives"] applies with even greater force to laws favoring a
State's municipal bonds, given that the issuance of debt securities to
pay for public projects is a quintessentially public function, with the
venerable history we have already sketched.... [T]he apprehension
in United Haulers about "unprecedented . .. interference" with a tra-
ditional government function is just as warranted here ... .437
It was left to Justice Kennedy to point out the concept that was real-
ly doing the work:
The Court defends the Kentucky law by explaining that it serves a
traditional government function and concerns the "cardinal civic re-
sponsibilities" of protecting health, safety, and welfare. This is but a
reformulation of the phrase "police power," long abandoned as a
mere tautology. It is difficult to identify any state law that has come
before us that would not meet the Court's description.438
Quite so.
Note the full circle here formed by the interaction of "traditional
governmental function" with the other market participant and public enti-
ty exceptions. Any activity that is not totally novel since the Founding
434. See supra text accompanying notes 229-39 (discussing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519
U.S. 278 (1997)).
435. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344-
45 (2007) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
436. Id. at 368-69 (Alito, J., dissenting).
437. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 341-42 (2008) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added) (footnotes and citations omitted).
438. Id. at 365-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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was "traditionally" performed by someone: it was either traditionally
private or traditionally public. If it was traditionally private but now per-
formed by the state, it is likely to be covered by the market participation
or public entity defenses. If it was traditionally public, it is likely to be a
traditional governmental activity. Heads I win, tails you lose. We behold
clearly, at last, the remarkable decline of the dormant Commerce Clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
My primary purpose in this contribution has been to expose, not to
criticize, the doctrinal transformation wrought by the Court. Rather than
recapitulate the preceding pages, I want to conclude by drawing out four
central attacks that have been leveled repeatedly, from the bench and
from the academy, at the Traditional Framework, and which I think have
influenced and motivated the decline that I have chronicled above. I re-
serve for another occasion the task of developing and answering these
four challenges to the Traditional Framework.4 39
The first is the elephant that awkwardly shares the room with a
great deal of dormant Commerce Clause discussion: deep unease about
the legitimacy of the doctrine's claim to the status of constitutional law,
given the absence of clear grounding in the text or early history of the
Constitution. From the bench, Justice Scalia has called the doctrine "a
judicial fraud,"""' and Justice Thomas claims it has "no basis in the Con-
stitution.""' From the academy, Redish and Nugent have called it "little
more than a figment of the Supreme Court's imagination,"442 and Kitch
has called it "an idea of absolutely no merit."M3
The second is the claim that burden review is analytically form-
less: a cipher for a naked policy choice. This is exemplified by Justice
Scalia's quip that burden review of state regulation is like asking
"whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."4 "
Brannon Denning makes a related point, noting that burden review re-
439. See Francis, supra note 3, to which this Conclusion is heavily indebted and from which it
borrows extensively.
440. Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The negative Commerce Clause applied today has little in common with the negative Commerce
Clause of the 19th century, except perhaps for incoherence."); see also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of
Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674-75 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A]s I have explained else-
where, the negative Commerce Clause, having no foundation in the text of the Constitution and not
lending itself to judicial application except in the invalidation of facially discriminatory action,
should not be extended beyond such action and nondiscriminatory action of the precise sort hitherto
invalidated."); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he
so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial intervention not to be expanded
beyond its existing domain.").
441. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring).
442. Redish & Nugent, supra note 2, at 617.
443. Kitch, supra note 2, at 123.
444. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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quires weighing "things that are not readily reducible to a common met-
ric."
The third is the claim that burden review, as a species of "judicial
balancing," is inherently illegitimate and undemocratic, that it is a rem-
nant of discredited Lochner-ism that deserves to be forcibly retired.46
Writing in this tradition, Lisa Heinzerling argues that
The Court's concept of discrimination embodies a preference for
markets over regulation, and its view of what counts as "regulation"
rests on undefended assumptions--reminiscent of the Lochner period,
when forced departures from the free market as shaped by common-
law entitlements were constitutionally suspect but the common-law
entitlements were not--about what counts as government action and
what counts as inaction.447
From this perspective, burden review presents a particularly unpal-
atable form of the proverbial counter-majoritarian difficulty.448
The fourth is the claim that courts should concern themselves, whol-
ly or in part, with the subjective intention or purpose of state regulators
rather than economic effects. The high priest of this tradition is Donald
Regan, who argued (as we have noted above) that "the court should
strike down a state law if and only if it finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that protectionist purpose on the part of the legislators contrib-
uted substantially to the adoption of the law or any feature of the law.""49
But the church of subjectivism is a broad one with many members. Nor-
man Williams, for example, has proposed that legality under the dormant
commerce clause should turn on "deliberative equality,"450 by which he
means that state regulation of interstate commerce should be valid only if
the state government in question "gives equal regard to similarly situated
445. Denning, supra note 2, at 494.
446. See, e.g., id at 459 ("At its worst, [antidiscrimination law] is a tool for the promotion of
an economic ideology that smacks of Lochnerian economic substantive due process."); Richard C.
Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091,
1111 (2008) ("The right to pursue a common calling on equal terms as others was an aspect of
personal liberty that the Lochner-era courts revived as substantive due process, but which continues
as a function of the dormant commerce clause."); Williams, supra note 2, at 431 ("To suggest that
the Constitution protects economic efficiency--much less that the courts should enforce such protec-
tion--seems at first glance to urge a reprisal of the Lochner era, when the federal courts aggressively
policed state regulations in the name of a laissez faire capitalist ideology.").
447. Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 222; see also id. at 268-69 ("Rather than promoting econom-
ic efficiency, representation reinforcement, and national unity, the Court's concepts of discrimination
and regulation suggest a return to Lochner-style assumptions about the natural and proper role of
government. Thus, the nondiscrimination principle is doomed not only by its failure to achieve its
stated objectives, but by its promotion of an unstated, outdated view about government's appropriate
boundaries.").
448. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1986).
449. Regan, supra note 2, at 1148.
450. Williams, supra note 2, at 414-16.
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in-state and out-of-state interests.'"45 Other notable subjectivists, or those
with subjectivist inclinations, include Mark Tushnet (who has described
the invalidation of measures motivated by an impermissible purpose as
"the most easily justifiable form of dormant commerce clause review"452)
and Catherine O'Grady, who writes that "judicial motive review is par-
ticularly appropriate and unobjectionable in a dormant Commerce Clause
analysis.'A53
Under this four-fold barrage of criticism, the dormant Commerce
Clause has fallen an awfully long way since the 1970s. Today, the Tradi-
tional Framework receives only formal dues-and, increasingly, not even
that-from the Court. But, in closing, I want to point out that the very
fact that the Court continues to make rhetorical genuflections to the tradi-
tional model (as do the lower courts) is, itself, of great significance. It
preserves the possibility that renewed life could be breathed into the doc-
trine, even into the Traditional Framework itself, before the profound
decline charted above becomes irreversible. Much will depend upon the
changing membership of the Court. The arrival of Justice Scalia in 1986,
as an outspoken and tireless critic of the doctrine, marked the beginning
in earnest of what I have described here as the decline of the dormant
Commerce Clause. His passing, and the arrival of his successor, may turn
out to mark a point of inflection in the story of this most protean of the
creatures of the Constitution. Time will tell.
451. Id. at 414.
452. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 130.
453. Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead ofInterstate Discrimina-
tion Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 571, 596 (1997); see also J.
Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 953, 953-55 (1978); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-23 (1970); John Hart Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Moti-
vation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1155, 1156-61 (1978).
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ABSTRACT
Unconventional oil and gas development is surging in the United
States despite the inconsistent market for oil and gas. By most estimates,
if unconventional gas exploration and extraction continues at current
rates, the United States could become a net exporter of natural gas by
2020. Although federal and tribal lands make up a relatively small per-
centage of the total oil and gas producing lands in the United States, that
percentage becomes significant when analyzed against the other values
Congress has designated for these lands. One of these values is the cul-
tural resources of indigenous Americans. These resources are virtually
everywhere; they do not observe political or jurisdictional boundaries,
and they are continually threatened by unconventional oil and gas opera-
tions.
The recent controversy over the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL)
and the threat it poses to the cultural resources of the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe illustrates this tension all too well. For cultural resources in
the path of the unconventional oil and gas trajectory, like those of the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, these trends will result in permanent cultural
losses. This Article will focus on four prominent areas where unconven-
tional oil and gas development threatens cultural resources: the Sacred
Stone camp and burial sites along the proposed DAPL near the Standing
Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota, the greater Chaco Canyon
region in northwestern New Mexico and southern Utah, the Bears Ears
region of southeastern Utah, and the Blackfeet Reservation in western
Montana.
This Article discusses the laws that ostensibly protect ribal cultural
resources on federal or tribal lands as well as the multitude of federal and
tribal laws governing unconventional oil and gas development on both
types of land. It highlights three examples of cultural resources on feder-
al and tribal lands in the United States facing threats from existing or
proposed unconventional oil and gas development and explains the rele-
vant laws governing oil and gas exploration on federal public and tribal
t Hillary M. Hoffmann is a Professor of Law at Vermont Law School. The author thanks
Letson Douglass for her help researching and editing this Article and Professor N. Bruce Duthu for
the inspiration to write it.
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lands. Finally, it concludes with some recommendations for reconciling
the statutory disconnect in a manner that will actually protect the re-
sources at stake.
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Unconventional oil and gas development and the infrastructure it
requires is surging in the United States, despite the inconsistent market
for oil and gas.' By most estimates, if unconventional gas exploration
and extraction continues at current rates, the United States could become
1. Evan J. House, Fractured Fairytales: The Failed Social License for Unconventional Oil
and Gas Development, 13 Wyo. L. REV. 5, 8-9 (2013); Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The
Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115,115 (2009).
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a net exporter of natural gas by 2020.2 One reason for this projection is
the relative strength of the United States's unconventional oil and gas
reserves, which are enormous. This nation is home to the second largest
"tight oil" reserves in the world3 and the fourth largest shale gas reserves,
both of which are tapped for extensive development. Although federal
and tribal lands make up a relatively small percentage of the total oil and
gas producing lands, that percentage becomes significant when analyzed
against the other values Congress has designated for these lands.
The impacts of unconventional oil and gas operations are vast and
multifaceted, but this form of energy development has been particularly
devastating to the cultural resources of indigenous Americans. Tribal
cultural resources6 are virtually everywhere; they do not observe political
or jurisdictional boundaries, and they are continually threatened by un-
conventional oil and gas operations. The recent controversy over the
Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) and the threat it poses to the cultural
resources of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe illustrates this tension all too
well.7 And that is but one example. More broadly, the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), which is the agency that manages the largest per-
centage of federal lands, has committed over ninety percent of the lands
it manages to oil and gas production.8 Even in Indian Country, tribes are
opening their lands to oil and gas production.9 For cultural resources in
2. Jude Clemente, World Benefits from U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Exports, FORBES (Jan.
10, 2016, 5:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/01/10/world-benefits-from-u-s-
liquefied-natural-gas-exports/#6ecdc3502b7 1.
3. Jamie Webster, Senior Dir. of Glob. Oil Mkts., IHS, Presentation at the 2014 EIA Energy
Conference: Going Global: Tight Oil Production (July 2014),
http://www.eia.gov/conference/2014/pdf/presentations/webster.pdf.
4. Analysis & Projections: World Shale Resource Assessments, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/ (last updated Sept. 24, 2015). The growing push
for "cleaner" energy sources has only increased the desirability of unconventional natural gas devel-
opment in the United States, resulting in all-time peak production outputs during the last decade. See
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK (STEO) 1
(2016), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/archives/Febl6.pdf ("Natural gas working inventories
were 2,934 billion cubic feet (Bcf) on January 29, 20% higher than during the same week last year
and 18% higher than the previous five-year average (2011-15) for that week."); see also Natural
Gas: U.S. Natural Gas Marketed Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050us2a.htm.
5. See generally U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SALES OF FOSSIL
FUELS PRODUCED FROM FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS, FY 2003 THROUGH FY 2014 (2015),
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/federallands/pdf/eia-federallandsales.pdf.
6. This Article uses the term cultural resources to refer to items or places of cultural value to
various tribes. It does not include intangible values such as intellectual property rights however.
7. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2016 WL
4734356, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016); Joe Heim & Mark Berman, Federal Government Moves to
Halt Oil Pipeline Construction near Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Land, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/09/09/federal-judge-denies-standing-
rock-sioux-tribes-request-to-stop-work-on-four-state-oil-pipeline/?utmterm=, 1616a3a02a04.
8. THE WILDERNESS SOC'Y, No EXIT: FIXING THE BLM'S INDISCRIMINATE ENERGY
LEASING 2 (n.d.),
http://wilderness.org/sites/default/files/TWS%20No%2OExit%20Report/`20WebO.pdf.
9. See generally U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 5.
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the path of the unconventional oil and gas trajectory, these trends will
result in permanent cultural losses.
This Article will focus on four prominent areas where unconven-
tional oil and gas development threatens cultural resources: the Sacred
Stone camp and burial sites along the proposed DAPL near the Standing
Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota; the greater Chaco Canyon
region in northwestern New Mexico and southern Utah; the Bears Ears
region of southeastern Utah; and the Blackfeet Reservation in western
Montana. All four areas are located above large oil and gas reserves pro-
posed for hydraulic fracturing or tar sands development or along the
transport route to move crude oil to a refining location.0 Despite tribal
objections to the siting of the unconventional oil and gas developments
in areas of great cultural value, federal law does little to protect tribal
values. The reason for this is a combination of international and domestic
demand for the oil and gas reserves as well as highly discretionary feder-
al and tribal mineral leasing and cultural protection laws.1
This Article will discuss the laws that ostensibly protect tribal cul-
tural resources on federal or tribal lands as well as the multitude of fed-
eral and tribal laws governing unconventional oil and gas development
on both types of land. For instance, on federal land, there are general
environmental statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which gives an agency discretion to protect cultural resources
from the hazards of oil and gas operations.12 The multiple-use statutes,
such as the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA), also provide discretion to
protect cultural resources but do not require it.1 3 Similarly and surprising-
10. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CANYONS OF THE
ANCIENT NATIONAL MONUMENT: TRAIL CANYON ACQUISITION MAP I OF 2 (n.d.),
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/co/nn/canm/CANMDocuments.Par.71946.File.dat/TCacq
uisitionmapl.pdf (showing Bureau of Land Management lands along the northwestern border of
Mesa Verde National Park); BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MAP 2 FLUID
MINERAL LEASING: CANYONS OF THE ANCIENTS NATIONAL MONUMENT (2010),
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialiblblm/co/nm/canm/CANMDocuments.Par.65309.File.dat/CANM
FinalPlanMap2_FluidMineralLeasing.pdf (showing dozens of active wells in and near Canyons of
the Ancients National Monument in Colorado); see also Din6 Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v.
Jewell, No. CIV 15-0209 JB/SCY, 2015 WL 4997207, at *12 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015); Heim &
Berman, supra note 7.
11. See generally Archeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm
(2012); 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (2012); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(2012); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2012). On
tribal lands there are several statutes that govern oil and gas operations, and some tribes have laws
protecting cultural and other resources on their lands, but many tribal cultural resources are not
located on federal lands due to the forced relocation policies of the federal government during the
nineteenth century, rendering many tribes powerless to protect cultural resources not located within
their territorial borders.
12. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4370m-12
(2012); see also Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing NEPA protec-
tions against potentially harmful effects of industrialization).
13. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §429 (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1711; GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS &
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 15.1 (2d ed. 2016); Walter E. Stem
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ly, the statutes with a stated purpose of protecting cultural resources,
such as the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) and the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, are largely
procedural and impose only temporary barriers to the development of
unconventional oil and gas in the vicinity of cultural resources.14
To date, the scholarship on this issue has addressed the general lack
of importance placed on preserving items of historic or prehistoric signif-
icance in the United States, the effects of cultural resource statutes on
federal land management decisions," and discrete but unrelated subtop-
ics related to cultural resource protection, such as theft of archaeological
resources.16 Environmental and natural resources scholarship has ad-
dressed oil and gas development in general, and some recent publications
have addressed unconventional mineral development specifically.17
However, the current legal scholarship surrounding oil and gas develop-
ment has failed to address the enormous tension between these two val-
ues in a comprehensive manner. That conflict is precisely what this Arti-
cle sets out to examine.
Part I will define unconventional oil and gas development and ex-
plaining the various extraction techniques and processes. Part II will
highlight three examples of cultural resources on federal and tribal lands
in the United States facing threats from existing or proposed unconven-
tional oil and gas development. Following this discussion, Part III will
explain relevant laws governing oil and gas exploration on federal public
and tribal lands, including the newly promulgated BLM fracking rule.
Then, Part IV will examine the various laws related to cultural resource
protection in the United States, with a focus on the intersection between
unconventional mineral development and protection of cultural resources
in particular. Finally, Part V will conclude with some recommendations
for reconciling the statutory disconnect in a manner that will actually
protect the resources at stake.
& Lynn H. Slade, Effects of Historic and Cultural Resources and Indian Religious Freedom on
Public Lands Development: A Practical Primer, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 133, 139 (1995).
14. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm; National American Graves Protection Repatriation Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2012).
15. Karan L. Dunnigan & Holly C. Meyer, Access to Federal Oil and Gas on Public Lands 3
(2008) (paper presented at the 2008 Special Institute on Surface Use for Mineral Development in the
New West: Finding Good Ground) (on file with the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation).
16. Stem & Slade, supra note 13, at 134; Glenna J. Sheveland, Note, Evaluation of the Effec-
tiveness of Cultural Resource Laws in Criminal Prosecution for Theft ofArcheological and Cultural
Resources from Federal Lands, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 27, 28 (2002).
17. House, supra note 1, at 8; David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Politi-
cal Economy ofEnergy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 488 (2013).
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I. UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT: DEFINITIONS AND
TRENDS
A. Unconventional Oil and Gas Terminology
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, "unconventional" oil
and gas development is a term that has yet to be defined.8 As a starting
point though, it can perhaps best be defined by what it is not, which is
any conventional form of liquid oil or gas obtained through traditional
vertical drilling methods. That is to say, one quality that makes uncon-
ventional oil and gas unconventional is the drilling or extraction method
used. Another is the nature of the subsurface formations from which the
minerals can be extracted. Finally, the form that these substances take
upon reaching the surface is often unconventional as well, particularly
with respect to oil, which can be heavier and thicker when it is located
beyond the reach of conventional drills deep beneath the surface.19
Unconventional oil and gas is often extracted from geological for-
mations previously deemed inaccessible, such as shale plays, "tight gas"
formations, coalbed seams, and oil sands.20 Thus, "[u]nconventional oils
[in particular] tend to be heavy, complex, carbon laden, and locked up
deep in the earth, tightly trapped between or bound to sand, tar, and
rock." 2 1 They "include tight oils . . . [or] oil trapped in shale that can be
accessed by hydraulic fracturing or fracking, a procedure by which rock
formations are fractured by injecting fluids to force them open, allowing
oil (and gas) to flow out." 22 They also include "[u]ltra-deep oils that are
buried as remotely as 10 miles below the water's surface . .. .[and] coal-
like oils[,] . . . such as bitumen in tar and oil sands, kerogen in oil shale,
and liquid oils derived from coal itself." 23 As for unconventional gas, it
most often takes the form of "shale gas, tight gas, coal bed methane, coal
seam gas, and deep-ocean gas hydrates."24
Regarding the method of extraction, this varies wildly depending on
the subsurface formation but includes fracking and oil sands extraction.2 5
In essence, "[a]s conventional oils become less accessible, new, more
18. DEBORAH GORDON, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, UNDERSTANDING
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL 5 (2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/unconventional-oil.pdf.
19. Id. at 5-6.
20. Unconventional Oil & Gas, OIL & GAS FIN. J., http://www.ogfj.com/unconventional.html
(last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
21. GORDON, supra note 18, at 1. Some scholars break oil and gas production into three
categories: conventional, transitional (including tight shale oil and gas), and unconventional (includ-
ing oil sands and oil shale). For the purposes of this Article, transitional and unconventional methods
will both be defined as "unconventional." See id
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 7.
25. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the Energy
Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Frac-
turing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1526 (2014).
324 [Vol. 94:2
FRA CKING THE SACRED
technical, energy-intensive methods are being developed for their recov-
ery, from ultra-deep wells drilled miles below the sea to fracturing shale
rock in order to tap oil trapped in low-permeability siltstones, sandstones,
and carbonates deep in the earth."26 The same is true of unconventional
natural gas.27 Although the characteristics of unconventional oil and gas
are somewhat general, they provide a basis for discussion of the relevant
trends in the industry and its regulation.
B. Unconventional Oil and Gas Trends
As unconventional oil and gas extraction techniques have improved,
an American oil and gas "phenomenon" has emerged in which the Unit-
ed States has been able to access domestic oil and gas reserves at an un-
precedented rate. This phenomenon is freeing the nation from some of its
dependence on foreign markets, while at the same time, spurring industry
efforts in the unconventional drilling sector.28 In 2014 alone, "approxi-
mately 560,000 barrels of oil per day and 7.5 billion cubic feet of natural
gas per day were produced on onshore [federal] lands, including tribal
lands."2 9 This production has been deemed a "domestic energy revolu-
tion."30
Two primary unconventional gas resources have been driving this
revolution: shale gas and tight gas.31 They formed a small percentage of
U.S. domestic production in the early 2000s but have been increasing as
a percentage since the mid-2000s, which is expected to continue until at
least 2020.32 Total natural gas production in the United States "increased
by 35% from 2005 to 2013 ... largely from the development of shale gas
resources in the Lower 48 states (including natural gas from tight oil
formations)."33 By conservative estimates, the shale gas and tight gas
production rate in the Lower Forty-Eight will increase by seventy-three
percent by 2040.34
North American tight shale oil reserves are focused
in the northern Bakken (spanning North Dakota, Montana, Saskatch-
ewan, and Manitoba); in Eagle Ford, Barnett, and the Permian basin
in Texas and New Mexico; in the Cardium play in Alberta; in the
Miocene Monterey and Antelope deposits in California; in Mowry-
Niobrara in Wyoming and Colorado; in Oklahoma's Penn Shale; in
26. GORDON, supra note 18, at 7.
27. House, supra note 1, at 12.
28. Id. at 8, 12.
29. Din6 Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Jewell, No. CIV 15-0209 JB/SCY, 2015 WL
4997207, at *12 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015).
30. House, supra note 1, at 8.
31. Id
32. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015
WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at 19 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf.




Montana's Exshaw Shale; and in Utica Shale in Colorado, Wyoming,
and New Mexico.3 5
Locations with tight shale reserves include "New York, Maine,
Mississippi, Utah, and Alaska's North Slope and Cook Inlet."36 Oil sands
resources are located in "at least a dozen states, including (in relative
order) Alaska, Utah, Alabama, California, Texas, Wyoming, Colorado,
and Oklahoma."37 The oil sands resources "may also be less easily re-
covered due to different physical and chemical compositions."38 As for
oil shale, the "richest and thickest" deposits are "in the Green River
Formation, which covers portions of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming[][,]
Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, and additional basins in Colorado (Piceance), Utah
and Colorado (Uinta), and Wyoming (Washakie)."39
Globally, conventional oil production has plateaued, and while
many had expected that renewables such as biofuels, solar electricity,
and light gas would offset the decline in conventional oil production,
what has happened instead is that the "heavier" oil found in deep, tight
formations has begun to replace it. 0 In other words, while conventional
oil production fell from a peak of almost eighty million barrels per day in
1990 to less than seventy million barrels per day in 2015, global demand
for oil increased, and biofuels have only played a small role in offsetting
the 2015 demand for approximately 85 million barrels a day.41 The bulk
of the roughly fifteen million-barrel deficit has been accounted for by an
increase in natural gas and unconventional oil production.42
The political geography of oil development is changing as well.43
While the Middle East, Africa, and Russia used to be the leading sources
of oil, North America has taken over as "home to the world's largest
stores of unconventional oils."" Tight oil alone has gone from a negligi-
ble source of U.S. oil production in 2005 to more than three million bar-
rels per day in 2015 and will increase to over 4,000 barrels per day in
2020.45 If this projection holds, tight oil will become the largest source of
U.S. oil production by 2020.
35. GORDON, supra note 18, at 11.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3-4.
41. Id. at 3 (depicting conventional oil production decrease).
42. Id.; cf U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 5, at 2. Although the U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration notes that total production of oil and gas on federal lands actually decreased
from 2003-2014, the expressions of interest in oil and gas on federal lands has increased during that
same time. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 5, at 2.
43. GORDON, supra note 18, at 10.
44. Id.
45. Andrew Slaughter, Vice President, Energy Insight, IHS, Presentation at the EIA Energy




As global demand for liquid oils continues to increase, several types
of unconventional oil production are expected to satisfy it, including "oil
sands, tight oil, new heavy oils, deepwater oil, and eventually oil
shale."46 The unproved onshore oil reserves in the United States far out-
number the proved oil reserves, measured in billions of barrels per day
(bbd), with the proved Lower Forty-Eight onshore oil reserves coming in
at 24.5 bbd and the unproved coming in at 144.8 bbd.47 In Alaska, the
onshore and offshore proved reserves are 3.4 bbd and the unproved re-
serves are estimated at 34 bbd.48 The Colorado River Basin alone "con-
tains the largest untapped deposits of oil shale in the world."4 9 Roughly
speaking, this means that only slightly more than thirteen percent of the
onshore U.S. oil reserves have been developed, leaving roughly eighty-
seven percent left to tap.
With respect to natural gas, the proved onshore gas reserves in the
Lower Forty-Eight total 287.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf), while the un-
proved, onshore gas reserves measure 1,392 tcf.50 This is a smaller per-
centage discrepancy than with oil but shows a striking amount of un-
proved reserves in the Lower Forty-Eight.5 Of this total, only fifteen
percent of the tight gas reserves, nineteen percent of the shale gas and
tight oil reserves, and ten percent of the coalbed methane reserves have
been developed.52 In Alaska, the potential for development of natural gas
resources is huge-only .03% of the total onshore and offshore gas re-
serves have been developed.
Natural gas has also become one of the "largest domestically pro-
duced energy resource[s]."54 It is the preferred fuel source for large pow-
er plants due to its relatively low cost and cleaner emissions, which allow
these facilities to continue operating in compliance with ever-stricter
environmental regulations under the Clean Air Act.55 National health
organizations such as the American Lung Association have endorsed
fracking as a means of increasing the use of natural gas, which they ar-
46. GORDON, supra note 18, at 4.
47. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ASSUMPTIONS TO THE ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016, at 129-30 (2017),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/assumptions/pdf/oilgas.pdf (noting that only areas where oil and
gas development is allowed were factored into the numerical values in the report).
48. Id.
49. Melissa Sevigny, Scientists Call for Moratorium on Oil Shale, Tar Sands Development,
91.5 KJZZ (June 19, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://kjzz.org/content/154815/scientists-call-moratorium-
oil-shale-tar-sands-development.
50. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 47, at 130.
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gue improves air quality and consequently, public health.6 All of these
factors indicate that the tension among unconventional oil and gas opera-
tors, the BLM, tribes, and other groups seeking to protect cultural re-
sources on federal and tribal lands will only grow in the coming years.
C. Unconventional Oil and Gas Development Methods
As noted above, the unconventional forms of natural gas are "tight
gas sands, coalbed methane, and shale gas."57 Unconventional oil typi-
cally includes oil sands, tight oil, new heavy oils, and oil shale.58 Frack-
ing is the most common and effective method to extract all forms of nat-
ural gas, as well as tight oil, heavy oil, and oil shale.59 The process of
hydraulic fracturing is fairly simple. It involves using water and chemical
mixtures to fracture tight subsurface rock spaces, which frees trapped oil
and gas pocketsi0 After a well is drilled, either vertically, horizontally,
some combination of the two, or using a spiral pattern, millions of gal-
lons of water and chemical additives are pumped into the well.61 The
water and chemical mixture is injected at a "very high rate of speed" to
crack open the rock. 62 When the rock breaks apart or fractures, the em-
bedded oil or gas is released and flows back to the surface through the
same well that was used to inject the fracking fluids.63
The injected water and chemical mixture that flows back to the sur-
face is referred to as flowback or flowback fluids. 4 After fracking is
complete, the flowback must be disposed of and is often reinjected back
into a nonproducing well or injected into a new disposal well.65 Although
industry publications often describe flowback as "water"66 or even fail to
67mention this part of the operation at all, the fluids produced by hydrau-
56. Id.
57. House, supra note 1, at 18 (footnotes omitted).
58. See generally Slaughter, supra note 45.
59. House, supra note 1, at 18; see also The United States Now Produces Nearly All of the
Natural Gas That it Uses, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energy in-brief/article/shale-intheunited-states.cfm (last updated Jan. 10,
2017).
60. House, supra note 1, at 27-28; Michael Dillon, Comment, Water Scarcity and Hydraulic
Fracturing in Pennsylvania: Examining Pennsylvania Water Law and Water Shortage Issues Pre-
sented by Natural Gas Operations in the Marcellus Shale, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 206 (2011).
61. Philip P. Cristaldi I, Have We Been Looking at This All Wrong? Fracking and the
BLM's Proposed Regulations: A Different Idea to Promote Safe Operations, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 21,
25-27 (2014).
62. Id. at 25.
63. House, supra note 1, at 26-27.
64. Cristaldi, supra note 61, at 26.
65. Heather Whitney-Williams & Hillary M. Hoffmann, Fracking in Indian Country: The
Federal Trust Relationship, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Beneficial Use ofProduced Water, 32 YALE
J. ON REG. 451, 466 (2015).
66. See Technology Helps Recycle Texas Fracking Flowback, Produced Water,
WATERWORLD (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.waterworld.com/articles/2013/11 /produced-flowback-
recycled-water-increased-at-eagle-ford-shale-texas.html.
67. Ken Cohen, Facts on the Hydraulic Fracturing Process, ExxONMOBIL (June 17, 2011),
http://www.exxonmobilperspectives.com/2011/06/17/facts-hydraulic-fracturing-
328 [Vol. 94:2
FRA CKING THE SACRED
lic fracturing operations are voluminous and may resemble water de-
pending on the needs of the drilling operator, the subsurface formation,
and the depth of the reserve.6 8 Because of the potential toxicity of the
flowback fluids, they must be disposed of in a manner that protects
drinking water supplies, either in situ or offsite.69
Fracking is appealing to the industry in that it can extract more oil
and gas from conventional wells, which may have already reached the
end of their conventional producing lives.70 With increasing horizontal
drilling and spiral drilling technology, oil and gas operators are able to
target subsurface formations where tight oil and gas are located in a rela-
tively inexpensive manner and without requiring surface access rights
immediately above the oil or gas pocket.71 They can also drill multiple
wells from a single surface pad, allowing greater potential for extraction
with a smaller surface footprint, which requires a less complicated sur-
face leasing arrangement.7 2
The extraction process for tar sands or oil sands is somewhat differ-
ent. Tar sands are naturally-occurring petroleum deposits composed of a
"mixture of sand, clay or other minerals, water and bitumen."73 Because
the oil is so tightly bound to the other materials found with it, the process
for extracting it "involves considerably more processing and refining
than conventional crude oil." 74 Two methods of extraction are used to
mine oil from tar sands deposits, depending on whether the minerals are
located near or on the surface or below ground. For surface deposits,
the method "is much like a strip mining operation, requiring heavy
earthmoving equipment to clear away the dirt and rocks (and natural
ecosystems) covering the thick, asphalt-like deposits."76 The size and
scale of a large tar sands operation is massive, especially compared to the
relatively compact surface area involved in a single fracking pad.77
process/?gclid=Cj0KEQjwk7msBRCJj67khY2zNIBEiQAPTFjv2D3dwl3h-
j89ZlCUITV9ORwsfTUeXjo8-zJyT TzwaAi_18P8HAQ&gclsrc=aw.ds.
68. See 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2017).
69. See id; see also Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed.
Reg. 16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2017)) (discussing the goals of the rule
as including "protecting water supplies [and] to make certain that the fluids that flow back to sur-
face ... are managed in an environmentally responsible way").
70. Cristaldi, supra note 61, at 27.
71. Id.
72. House, supra note 1, at 25.
73. Steven Watmore, Note, Tar Sands Oil and Pipeline Safety: Examining Regulatory Short-
comings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 176 (2013).
74, Id.
75. Id. at 177.
76. Id at 177-78.
77. The largest North American tar sands deposit is located in Alberta, Canada, and occupies
an area roughly the size of the state of Florida. James Murphy, Tar Sands Development: A Test for
Our Energy Future, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 2012, at 54, 54.
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Removing the tar-laden material from the ground in a surface opera-
tion is only the first step in extracting the petroleum, however. After
this occurs, "it must be processed to separate the bitumen from the sand,
clay, and other minerals that are also trapped in the tar sand."79 The mix-
ture is then "treated with hot water and then agitated, making the bitu-
men rise to the top of the slurry mixture, where it can be skimmed off." 80
The remaining slurry material, containing water, suspended solids, and
processing chemicals, is deposited into slurry ponds, usually near the
mining operation.8 1
Subsurface tar sand deposits are mined in place, using various tech-
niques to separate the oil and bitumen mixture from any gravel or rock
substrate, before pumping it to the surface.82 These methods involve in-
jecting hot water, or water and a chemical mixture, into the tar sand de-
posit at a high rate of speed, which causes the oil and bitumen to soften,
separate, and pool into an extraction well, typically located below the tar
sand deposit.83 The oil and bitumen mixture can then be pumped from
the extraction pool to the surface and retrieved for refining.4 Once at the
surface, the oil must be separated from the bitumen, which requires on-
site refining infrastructure.8 ' During the refining process, the bitumen is
mixed "with other lighter petroleum products, typically natural gas con-
densate, to produce a more fluid substance that can be transported
through pipelines for further refining and upgrading."86
Although the extent of the surface impact depends on the method of
extraction, which is to some degree dependent on the resource being tar-
geted, unconventional oil and gas extraction processes tend to leave a
heavy surface footprint.87 Fracking also uses vast quantities of water,
which must be stored onsite after being used in production and then
trucked offsite for disposal or reinjection.8 8 Subsurface oil and tar sands
operations leave a heavy surface footprint due to the refining that must
take place after these semi-liquid minerals are brought to the surface.89
Finally, ancillary impacts of oil and tar sands operations are similar to
strip-mining, requiring extensive excavating, dredging, removing of any
vegetation, and leaving a giant, shallow hole in their wake.




82. Id at 178-79.
83. Id at 179.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 179-80.
86. Id. at 180.
87. See Michael Burger, The (Re)Federalization of Fracking Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1483, 1495 (2013).
88. Id. at 1492.
89. Lilly Fang, Note, Environmental Review Problems of Cross-Border Projects Under
NEPA: Lessons from the Tar Sands Pipelines, 31 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 285, 290 (2012).
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After the oil and gas is extracted, it must be transported to a refining
location, typically located in a distant state. Currently, the methods of
transport include railways, trucks, pipelines, and ships, or a combination
of the above.90 By percentage, the largest amount of crude is moved in
the United States using pipelines, followed by ships, then trucks and last-
ly, railways.9' There are five main refining locations: on the West Coast,
in the northern Rocky Mountains, along the Gulf Coast, in the upper
Midwest, and on the East Coast.92 All of the transport options involve
risks, but none involves more infrastructure than a pipeline. Sometimes
crossing over a thousand miles, multiple states and jurisdictions, pipe-
lines have an immense impact on the areas they transect. In addition,
refineries can only process certain types of crude, so new pipelines must
be constructed when the crude produced by a formation changes (be-
cause of the depth or location of the oil) and can no longer be transported
and processed by the same refinery.93
II. UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL
RESOURCES ON FEDERAL AND TRIBAL LANDS
A. Cultural Resources on Federal Lands
Like unconventional oil and gas resources, cultural resources are
somewhat hard to define. Cultural resources could theoretically include
anything of cultural value to any population in the United States, includ-
ing objects of antiquity, locations of historical significance, or religious
sites. A discussion of the impacts of unconventional oil and gas extrac-
tion on everything that might qualify as a cultural resource is beyond the
scope of this Article, which focuses only on areas of cultural significance
to Native American tribes. This Article further limits its discussion to
those resources located on federal and tribal lands.94
Although exact numbers are impossible to determine, throughout
the United States, the estimates of the total number of archaeological
sites on federal lands range from two million to seven million.95 In the
Southwest alone, the catalogued sites are voluminous. In a 2003 report
on cultural and fossil resources on public lands, the BLM stated that
90. James Conca, Pick Your Poison for Crude -- Pipeline, Rail, Truck or Boat, FORBES (Apr.





94. Cultural resources, for obvious reasons, do not respect jurisdictional boundaries, and there
are many located on state and private lands throughout the country.
95. Veletta Canouts & Francis P. McManamon, Protecting the Past for the Future. Federal
Archaeology in the United States, in TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
WORLD'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 97 (Neil Brodie et al. eds., 2001); Roberto Iraola, The




there were "hundreds of thousands" of documented archaeological sites
on the 261 million acres of BLM-managed land.96
This Article focuses on four examples of federal and tribal lands
containing cultural resources under threat from unconventional mineral
development. These examples were chosen because they illustrate so
well the tension between these resources. The first three, Standing Rock
Sioux sacred sites, Chaco Canyon, and the Bears Ears region in south-
eastern Utah,97 are similar in that they are considered sacred to various
tribes indigenous to the region, but they differ with respect to the type of
resource and the method of oil and gas development. The Standing Rock
Sioux sacred sites are not on federal or tribal land, but they do fall under
federal jurisdiction by virtue of the permitting required. The Greater
Chaco Region's significance is somewhat more tangible given the large
concentration of archaeological sites, all located on federal lands, while
the Bears Ears region is considered sacred primarily because of its intan-
gible cultural and religious value.98 Finally, the Blackfeet Reservation
contains numerous examples of planned fracking operations that threaten
sacred sites on tribal lands.
B. Standing Rock Sioux Sacred Lands, the Bakken Shale, and the Dakota
Access Pipeline Proposal
Perhaps no current controversy embodies the tensions between oil
and gas development and cultural resources than the DAPL proposal.9
The DAPL is designed to transport "over a half-billion gallons of crude
oil across four states daily."'lo It would carry crude extracted from the
massive Bakken shale formation, underlying parts of North Dakota and
Montana, and produced using primarily unconventional drilling tech-
niques, to refining facilities in Patoka, Illinois.ot Because the DAPL is
sited primarily on private land outside the Standing Rock Sioux Reserva-
tion, the federal permitting requirements are minimal despite the "nearly
1,200 mile[]' length of the project.102 However, the DAPL did require
96. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, AMERICA'S PRICELESS
HERITAGE: CULTURAL AND FOSSIL RESOURCES ON PUBLIC LANDS iii, 1 (2003).
97. Char Miller, Is Nothing Sacred? Fracking and Chaco Culture National Historic Park,
KCET (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.kcet.org/redefine/is-nothing-sacred-fracking-and-chaco-culture-
national-historic-park; Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition, Proposal to President Barack Obama for the
Creation of Bears Ears National Monument 34 (Oct. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Bears Ears Proposal],
http://www.bearsearscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Bears-Ears-Inter-Tribal-Coalition-
Proposal-10-1 5-15.pdf.
98. Bears Ears Proposal, supra note 99, at 18.
99. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2016 WL
4734356, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016); Heim & Berman, supra note 7.
100. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 2016 WL 4734356, at *1.
101. See Where Does the Dakota Access Pipeline Run?, DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE FACTS,
https://daplpipelinefacts.com/dt-articles/where-does-the-dakota-access-pipeline-run/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2017).
102. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 2016 WL 4734356, at *1.
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federal permits for the hundreds of locations where it would traverse
federal waters.'03
This permitting process gave the tribe a foothold under NEPA and
the National Historic Preservation Act (NIIPA) because the DAPL's
construction would traverse the tribe's ancestral lands and sacred waters
and, as discussed further below, the Army Corps was required to review
the permit application under both federal statutes.'0 According to the
tribe, "[t]he pipeline crosses areas of great historical and cultural signifi-
cance to the Tribe, the potential damage or destruction of which greatly
injures the Tribe and its members. The pipeline also crosses waters of
utmost cultural, spiritual, ecological, and economic significance to the
Tribe and its members."05 In its federal complaint, the tribe alleged that,
in violation of the NHPA, the Army Corps of Engineers granted the
DAPL permit, which would authorize construction in these sacred loca-
tions without consulting the tribe about potential impacts beforehand.'0
Construction of the DAPL will eventually require "clearing and grading
a 100-150 foot access pathway nearly 1200 miles long, digging a trench
as deep as 10 feet, and building and burying the pipeline [itself]." 0 7
The locations in the path of the DAPL are vital pieces of the tribe's
"historic and cultural connection to the [entire] Great Plains" region.1os
Originally part of the Great Sioux Nation, the Standing Rock Sioux once
inhabited much of what are now the states of North Dakota and South
Dakota.' After the war between the Great Sioux Nation and the United
States over the Black Hills, all of the Sioux were relegated to a series of
small reservations that constituted a fraction of the nation's traditional
boundaries.110 Yet, the tribes maintained their spiritual connections to
their former homelands, and some even retained treaty rights to hunt in
the seized territory."
These artifacts can be found along many nearby tributaries of the
Missouri River, reflecting "water's sacred role in [the tribe's] deeply held
spiritual beliefs.""12 They serve today as a visual spiritual connection to
103. Heim & Berman, supra note 7.
104. Id.
105. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 19, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 2016 WL
4734356 (No. 1:16-cv-01534), 2016 WL 4033936 [hereinafter Standing Rock Complaint].
106. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 2016 WL 4734356, at * 1. Although it is outside the scope of
this Article, the DAPL proposal also required a permit under the Clean Water Act and a finding that
when tribal cultural resources are present, construction will not violate the agency's General Condi-
tions governing tribal resources before the permit is approved. Id. at *4.
107. Standing Rock Complaint, supra note 107, 1 51.
108. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 2016 WL 4734356, at *6.




112. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 2016 WL 4734356, at *6.
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tribal ancestors.113 One particularly sacred place "lies at the traditional
confluence of the Missouri and Cannonball Rivers. The ancestors to the
Standing Rock Sioux gathered [at this confluence] to peacefully trade
with other tribes."1 14 However, this site is currently under a lake created
by the Army Corps of Engineers on the Missouri River, which flooded
the region and subsumed the stone markers designating the sacred gath-
ering location.'15
The DAPL's proposed course was revealed to the tribe in the sum-
mer of 2014, at which point the tribe discovered that it would undercut
Lake Oahe in the immediate vicinity of the sacred stones marking the
tribe's traditional gathering and trading site.'16 The company proposing
the pipeline, Dakota Access, conducted numerous historic and cultural
resource surveys prior to selecting the final route of the pipeline, and
because one of these private assessments revealed cultural resources sa-
cred to the Standing Rock Sioux, the company requested input from the
tribe about the proposed route. 17
However, the extent to which the permitting agency, the Army
Corps of Engineers, engaged in meaningful discussions with the tribe
about the location of the pipeline in the areas around Lake Oahe was
heavily disputed in the district court."'8 The Army Corps alleged that it
contacted the tribe's historic preservation officer multiple times in 2014
and either did not receive a response or received a response only to set up
meetings that never occurred. 19 In addition, the Army Corps claimed,
and the trial court found, that the tribal officer informed the Army Corps
that the tribe preferred to work directly with Dakota Access on rerouting
the pipeline, rather than discussing its concerns with the Army Corps
tribal liaison.12 0 The Tribe disputed this version of events, stating in its
complaint that it participated extensively in the public hearings and pub-
lic comment periods held by the Army Corps and sought formal consul-
tation with the Army Corps, but the Army Corps failed to engage it be-
fore approving all of the construction activities near the reservation.121
According to the tribe, the Army Corps only offered post-approval joint
monitoring of construction activities for potential threats to the tribe's
cultural resources.122
Despite the tribe's objections, the district court denied its motion for
a preliminary injunction on the NHPA issue, holding that the tribe could
113. Id.
114. Id. (citations omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id. at *6-7.
117. Id. at *7.
118. Id. at *8.
119. Id at *8-9.
120. Id at *9.
121. Standing Rock Complaint, supra note 107, $$ 60-62.
122. Id. ¶ 62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
334 [Vol. 94:2
FRA CKING THE SA CRED
not demonstrate that "additional harm" would befall its cultural resources
given that construction of the pipeline had begun already and, by impli-
cation, any sacred sites in its path had already been damaged or de-
stroyed beyond recovery.123 According to the district court, the tribe was
required to demonstrate that the sites around and under Lake Oahe would
result in "additional harm" to the tribe and the tribe had failed to meet
that burden.124 On the NHPA consultation issue, the court found that the
Army Corps had made "dozens of attempts to engage" the tribe in con-
sultation, but the tribe had "refused to engage."1 25 In fact, the court found
that the Army Corps had "exceeded its NHPA obligations" with respect
to the DAPL permitting process.126
The tribe filed an emergency motion for a stay pending an appeal to
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which the court summarily granted on
September 16, 2016.127 The court did not discuss the merits of the case in
its order and stated only that granting the emergency motion would give
the court sufficient time to consider the merits of the appeal.128 The court
later lifted the stay and ultimately denied the tribe's motion in March
2017.129 According to Dakota Access, the pipeline would begin trans-
porting oil in late March 2017.130 Although the court's approval of the
final construction phase of the pipeline likely destroyed several sites sa-
cred to the Standing Rock Sioux, the litigation regarding the Army Corps
of Engineers' and other agencies' consultation duties under the federal
statutes authorizing these projects is ongoing.'31 If the courts were to rule
in favor of the tribe on the consultation claims, such a ruling might indi-
cate to agencies that hey need to bolster their consultation efforts in the
future.
123. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 2016 WL 4734356, at *24.
124. Id
125. Id. at *22.
126. Id,
127. See generally Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe, 2016 WL 4734356 (No. 1:16-cv-1534-JEB), 2016 WL 4598845; Amended Order,
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB) (D.C. Cir. Sept. 16,
2016) ("ORDERED that Dakota Access LLC be enjoined pending further order of the court from
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline for 20 miles on both sides of the Missouri River at Lake
Oahe. The purpose of this administrative injunction is to give the court sufficient opportunity to
consider the emergency motion for injunction pending appeal and should not be construed in any
way as a ruling on the merits of that motion,"). The Amended Order is available in full through the
Public Access to Court Electronic Records portal. See generally PACER, www.pacer.gov (last
visited Mar. 4, 2017).
128. See Amended Order, supra note 129.
129. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2017 WL
908538 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2017) (order denying motion for preliminary injunction), appeal docketed,
No. 17-5043 (D.C.C. Mar. 15, 2017).
130. David Blackmon, A New Controversy Rises as Oil Begins to Flow Through Dakota Ac-
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C. The Chaco Canyon Region and the Mancos Shale Play
Chaco Canyon National Historic Park and the region surrounding it,
known as the Greater Chaco Canyon region,contain the greatest concen-
tration of tenth and eleventh century ancient Pueblo architecture in the
world.132 Because of the relative high quality of these ancient structures,
the Greater Chaco Canyon region was named a United Nations World
Heritage Site in 1987.133 Yet, for a decade prior to this designation, and
some would argue continuing to the present date, the region has also
been deemed a "national energy sacrifice zone" because of the extensive
energy development and associated activities that take place within it.1 34
For the past five years, the region has faced an influx of hydraulic frac-
turing operations, primarily due to the BLM allowing oil and gas compa-
nies to push deeper into the region.135
The Greater Chaco Canyon region once contained a network of
civilizations that arose in the tenth century throughout the modem states
of Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona.' 36 At that time, previously
disparate populations settled in more urban patterns, and the cities,
towns, and isolated outcroppings that emerged formed a vast population
network from the seventh century until the middle of the twelfth centu-
ry.1 37 Remnants of the outer edges of this civilization are visible today in
Mesa Verde National Park in Colorado,138 Hovenweep National Monu-
ment on the Utah/Colorado border,'39 Canyons of the Ancients National
Monument in Colorado,'4 Canyon de Chelly National Park, and Navajo
National Monument in Arizona.141 The sites these preserves have been
created to protect make up what is often referred to as the "American
Cradle of Civilization." 14 2
132. See John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The Rise and Fall of the Chacoan State, 64 UMKC L. REV.
485, 487 (1996).
133. Chaco World Heritage Designation, NAT'L PARK SERV.,
www.nps.gov/chcu/learn/historyculture/worldheritage.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
134. Julie Dermansky, Will New Mexico Double Down on Dirty Energy?, DESMOG (Mar. 7,
2015, 10:58 AM), http://www.desmogblog.com/2015/03/07/will-new-mexico-double-down-dirty-
energy.
135. Ellen M. Gilmer, Courtroom Slugfest Nears as Drilling Creeps Toward Ancient Chaco
World, E&ENEWS (July 13, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060021627.
136. See Ragsdale, supra note 134, at 487.
137. Id at 521, 544; see also NAT'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MESA VERDE:
ANCESTRAL PUEBLOANS AND THEIR WORLD (n.d.),
https://www.nps.gov/mevelearn/education/upload/ancestralpuebloans.pdf
138. Mesa Verde, NAT'L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/meve/index.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2016).
139. Hovenweep, NAT'L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/hove/index.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2016).
140. Canyons of the Ancients National Monument, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
http://www.blm.gov/co/st/en/nm/canm.html (last updated Aug. 16, 2016).
141. Canyon de Chelly, NAT'L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/cach/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2016).
142. Pete Dronkers, Fracking Threatens the Chaco Canyon World Heritage Site,
EARTHWORKS (June 11, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted),
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It is difficult to produce an exact number or percentage of related
archaeological sites on federal public lands in the greater Chaco region
because the agencies responsible for managing the lands where most are
located-the Forest Service and the BLM-have not completely invento-
ried them.143 Also, the Anasazi sites are particularly difficult to catalog
because of the Anasazi obsession with building in seemingly inaccessible
caves, sometimes located hundreds of feet from the rim or floor of a
sheer vertical cliff and often deep within canyons with limited accessibil-
ity. Another difficulty of surveying these archaeological sites is that
some of them are now underground and not detectable through surface
viewing alone.'"
Despite these challenges, the Anasazi's skilled and prolific building
has resulted in many of their larger villages and communities being pro-
tected as national monuments and national parks, such as Chaco Canyon,
Mesa Verde, and the others mentioned above.145 The number and size of
these Anasazi communities and individual structures is impressive even
by today's standards. A typical Anasazi or Chacoan community was fo-
cused around the "unit house," which was "basically a household module
with six to fifteen adjacent rooms employed for storage, living space and
ceremonial use." 4 6 The community consisted of several of these houses
loosely clustered near one another and always oriented in rows from east
to west, facing a plaza.147 Some of the communities also contained larger
buildings, such as "great houses," kivas, and other structures for storage
or ceremonial purposes.148 Great houses, as the name indicates, were
much larger than unit houses, reaching four or five stories in height and
containing hundreds of rooms.149 In its day, Chaco was a large city even
by today's measure, occupying over 100 square kilometers.15 0
The architectural feats of the ancient civilizations in the American
Southwest have been described as "spectacular" and "unrivaled" in
North America.i' The care with which many of these structures were
built is extraordinary; estimates of the numbers of stones that went into
the construction of the Chacoan great houses is in the millions.152 The
great houses also contained rooms with eight-foot, timber-beamed ceil-
htps://www.earthworksaction.org/earthblog/detail/fracking threatens the chaco_canyonworld her
itagesite#.WAvyLqNFSRs.
143. See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton, 326 F. Supp. 2d 102, 109-10 (D.D.C. 2004).
144. See id
145. See Ragsdale, supra note 134, at 489.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 495, 498-99.
149. Id. at 495 (noting that Pueblo Bonito, one of the largest great houses at Chaco, has been
called the "largest apartment building in the world" before the construction of a New York City
tenement in 1882).
150. Id at 486.




ings requiring the transport of "[h]undreds of thousands" of trees without
the benefit of livestock or even the wheel.153 Construction of a complex,
large great house alone could take several decades.'5
Perhaps the most delicate and signature feature of these communi-
ties are the kivas, which are circular ceremonial rooms built into the
ground with a covered roof.15' Kivas began as dwelling structures in the
early Anasazi period and evolved into purely ceremonial use by the
mid-i 100s.156 They ranged in size rom thirty feet in diameter to more
than eighty.15 7 Kivas typically contained a "roof . .. made of large sup-
port beams, generally ponderosa, which were covered, in a layered fash-
ion, with successively smaller logs, with branches and bark, and with
earth."158 The roof was "flat but possibly domed, and was between elev-
en and sixteen feet above the floor. .. . [and] supported by four columns-
massive, unsquared logs or rock-which were themselves set on footings
of huge, shaped stone discs."1 59 Their interior walls contained large and
small recessed spaces, which were finished with stucco-style coatings
and decorated with ornamental beads and stones.16 Kivas appeared to
serve as religious centers, oriented along cardinal directions and in dis-
cernible spatial relationships with planetary features.6 1
Smaller remnants of Anasazi civilization can be found far from the
community areas, and they range from earthen and masonry dams of a
few feet in height to storage structures for grains and other crops.162
There are also massive irrigation systems using masonry canals con-
trolled by headgates.163 The greater Chaco area contains thousands of
smaller villages, remote settlements, and agricultural lands that were
connected to the nerve center at Chaco by a myriad of roads.'" Archeol-
ogists believe that these satellites of the main urban center at Chaco may
have been part of a planned civilization network due to the repetitive
features found in each of the outlier sites.1 65 Although the exact nature of
the relationship between the main urban centers and the outlier commu-
nities is unclear, archaeologists agree that the settlement and road pat-
terns indicate a planned, rather than spontaneous, effort.166 These settle-
153. Id. at 496-97.
154. Id. at 497.
155. Id. at 499-500.
156. Id. at 500-01.
157. Id. at 501.
158. Id.
159. Id. (footnote omitted).
160. Id at 501-02.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 506.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 508-09.
165. Id at 509; see also DAVID E. STUART, THE ANCIENT SOUTHWEST: CHACO CANYON,
BANDELIER, AND MESA VERDE 77 (2009).
166. Ragsdale, supra note 134, at 510-11.
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ments fostered a political and economic network that archaeologists to-
day refer to as the "Chaco Phenomenon.",1
67
Underneath the greater Chaco region lies the Mancos Shale play,
which potentially contains "up to 60 billion barrels of oil."l 68 Until 2003,
it was considered to have reached the end of its useful production life by
conventional means, although the BLM recognized in its planning docu-
ments that significant oil reserves remained even after conventional drill-
ing methods ceased being capable of accessing them.169 In 2010, the
BLM starting receiving significant amounts of drilling applications for
hydraulic fracturing operations in the Mancos and fracking began to pro-
liferate there in 2011.170
In 2014, the BLM began the process of revising its resource man-
agement plan for the Farmington Area, which is located near Chaco
Canyon, because of the increased interest in oil and gas in the Mancos.'7'
Prior to this, the BLM had considered oil and gas reserves in this area to
be "fully developed." 72 However, the advances in hydraulic fracturing
techniques and the increase in applications to frack in the Mancos re-
quired the agency to revise the Resource Management Plan (RMP) to
account for a variety of new, fracking-related impacts to air quality, wa-
ter quality, riparian protection, paleontological resources, and cultural
resources.173 In particular, the new RMP was required to address impacts
to previously unknown archaeological sites in the Mancos-Gallup ba-
1 174sin.
167. STUART, supra note 167, at 77. The road network that connected Chaco Canyon to the
greater region is so vast that only a small fraction of it has been thoroughly inventoried or docu-
mented. Ragsdale, supra note 134, at 514. In the 1980s, the BLM initiated the most comprehensive
survey of these roads to date, cataloguing approximately 1500 roads radiating outward from the San
Juan Basin. Id. The longest road segments measure up to fifty kilometers and appear to connect
outlier great houses with urban great houses. Id Main roads were approximately twenty-seven feet
wide and smaller, spur roads were roughly ten feet wide. Id. at 515.
168. See Alex Ritchie, On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in New Mexico, 54
NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 277 n.127 (2014).
169. Dind Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Jewell, No. CIV 15-0209 JB/SCY, 2015 WL
4997207, at *4 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015).
170. Id. at *6.




107 (last updated Jan. 26, 2017).
172. Id.
173. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANCOS-GALLUP RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: ASSESSMENT OF
THE MANAGEMENT SITUATION 1-5 (2015) [hereinafter MANCOS-GALLUP RMPA],
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/nm/fieldoffices/farmington/farmingtonplanning/ffoplann
ingdocs/rmpa-mancos.Par.39210.File.dat/FMGFinalAMS_20150317_508_reduced.pdf; Dind
Citizens, 2015 WL 4997207, at *7 (noting that BLM approved 250 applications for permission to
commence hydraulic fracturing operations between January 2014 and March 2015).
174. MANCOS-GALLUP RMPA, supra note 175, at 1-5.
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The need for a new RMP was born out by the fracking numbers-
from the date the previous plan was adopted until the BLM began revis-
ing it in 2015, the BLM approved 185 new wells in the Mancos Shale.175
The BLM estimates that the play might yield in the neighborhood of 1.5
billion barrels of oil, recoverable only through unconventional means.176
So far, the agency has approved drilling permit applications without a
thorough inventory of archaeological or cultural resource sites in place,
resulting in litigation which, to date, has not been successful in halting
the development efforts.1 77 Because the archaeological sites have not
been surveyed and because those that have are protected from disclosure
in litigation, it is not possible to even describe the resources that may be
lost as a result of this increase in drilling in the Mancos Shale. What is
certain is that cultural resources will be lost, and it may not be possible to
ever determine what was once there.
D. The Bears Ears Region and Tar Sands Potential
The Bears Ears region is sacred to several tribes indigenous to the
Four Corners area, where Colorado, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico
intersect.178 In December 2016, President Obama declared it a National
Monument.179 The Monument encompasses the general region southwest
of Moab, Utah; west of Monticello, Utah; east of the Glen Canyon Na-
tional Recreation Area; and north of the Navajo Nation.1so It consists of
roughly 1.35 million acres of federal public land and is currently man-
aged in part by the United States Forest Service, the United States Park
Service, and the BLM. 81 This region is sacred to the Hopi, Navajo, Zuni,
Ute Mountain Ute, Uintah and Ouray Ute tribes, and contains ancestral
burial grounds, remnants of ancestral communities and places of wor-
ship, petroglyphys and pictographs, and several physical features of cul-
tural value to one or more of the tribes.182 Indeed, according to the tribal
proposal to create the Bears Ears Monument (Monument Proposal),
"large numbers of contemporary Indian people visit Bears Ears regularly
to gather medicines, herbs, and vegetative materials."'83
Most of the areas within the Monument are high-desert plateaus or
dramatic canyon country. Within the canyons, such as those on Comb
175. Dind Citizens, 2015 WL 4997207, at *7.
176. Id at *8. The revisions to the RMP are not yet complete, but the BLM can permit fracking
and vertical drilling in the interim under the existing plan.
177. See id at *50.
178. BEARS EARS INTER-TRIBAL COALITION, PROPOSED BEARS EARS NATIONAL MONUMENT,
http://www.bearsearscoalition.org/wp
content/uploads/2015/12/map Bears EarsProposal_lixl4.pdf.
179. Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument, Proclamation 9558 of Dec. 28,
2016, 82 Fed. Reg. 1,139 (Jan. 5, 2017).
180. BEARS EARS INTER-TRIBAL COALITION, supra note 180.
181. Establishment of Bears Ears National Monument, 82 Fed. Reg. at 1,143.
182. Bears Ears Proposal, supra note 99, at 8.
183. Id. at 2.
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Ridge or in Grand Gulch, there are many Ancient Pueblo or Anasazi
archeological sites from the period when these civilizations occupied
structures in seemingly inaccessible caves located high up steep canyon
walls.'m These are similar to the famous sites at Mesa Verde National
Park, although greater in number and smaller in size. The Bears Ears
Buttes are located in the center of the proposed monument boundary on
Cedar Mesa, and from a distance they somewhat resemble the ursine
features for which they are named.185
The Bears Ears region holds great significance for the various tribal
signatories to the Monument Proposal. One commonality for all tribal
proponents is that the region is part of the creation myth of all five
tribes.186 For the Hopi and Zuni, the Bears Ears region also represents
part of the tribes' ancestral homelands.'8 7 The Ute used the area more
seasonally, with "hunting expeditions ma[king] their way to the Bears
Ears region and [establishing] many trails, including one that led
to . .. the Henry Mountains" in south-central Utah.188 The Navajo hunted
in the region and also occupied it seasonally, building "hogans and other
structures" until the federal government forcibly removed the Navajo and
marched them to a reservation to the south, in what is now Arizona.189
The region also contains vast archaeological resources; the Monument
Proposal lists over 100,000 documented sites.'
Part of the reason the tribes petitioned President Obama to create
the Monument is that various portions of the Bears Ears region were be-
ing threatened by oil and gas development generally, and in critical are-
as, by unconventional forms.1 91 The conventional oil and gas potential
was limited to the far northern boundary of the proposed Monument,
near Hatch Point, Harts Point, and in the Lockhart Basin by Canyonlands
National Park.192 However, there are "significant deposits of tar sands"
located in White Canyon, which is basically right in the center of the
Monument, close to the Bears Ears formation.193 The White Canyon de-
posit was included within every alternative considered by the BLM for
tar sands development in the State of Utah.194
184. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. BLM, 140 IBLA 85, 88 (1997).
185. Bears Ears Proposal, supra note 99, at 7-8.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 8-9 ("Hopi and Zuni people moved from foraging to farming some 3,500 years ago
and constructed their stone villages, many of which remain in place today.").
188. Id. at 9.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Threats, BEARS EARS INTER-TRIBAL COALITION,
http://www.bearsearscoalition.org/threats/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., TAR SANDS - ALTERNATIVES: UTAH (n.d.),
http://ostseis.anl.gov/documents/docs/draftmtgs/1 I tar sands utah.pdf (showing alternative areas
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Although almost half a million acres of the proposed Monument
were excluded from the final Proclamation, the tribes are satisfied that it
will protect the most sacred sites and culturally important locations.195 it
seems clear from state efforts to lobby the BLM to continue to allow
mineral extraction in the Hatch Point, Harts Point, Lockhart Basin, and
White Canyon locations that, even after the Monument designation,
those locations still face development threats.196 The Bears Ears Monu-
ment has been seen as a highly effective means of protecting tribal cul-
tural resources within the Monument boundaries, although many have
called for President Trump to decommission the Monument despite the
benefits it has bestowed upon the tribes of this region.1 97
E. Blackfeet Sacred Land: Red Blanket Butte, Chief Mountain, and the
Bakken Shale Play
On tribal lands, cultural resources also face threats from unconven-
tional oil and gas operations. The Blackfeet Reservation in western Mon-
tana recently experienced this firsthand when the tribe authorized uncon-
ventional gas development throughout large portions of the reservation,
but individual tribal members mounted a campaign to prevent the devel-
opment in areas of great cultural and religious significance.'98 Bordering
Glacier National Park to the east, the Blackfeet Reservation is a long,
narrow band constituting a small portion of the original homelands of the
tribe.
In 2006, the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council approved unconven-
tional oil and gas development throughout the reservation by tribal reso-
lution.19 When the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the tribe began
the environmental review process in 2012 for a 640 acre lease unit near a
formation called Red Blanket Butte several tribal members submitted
comments opposing the potential drilling because of concerns related to
family members' grave sites on and near the Butte, damage to places of
spiritual retreat, and erosion to other cultural values.200 After receiving
the comments in opposition to drilling, the operator, Anschutz Corpora-
for potential mineral extraction as part of the 2012 Oil Shale and Tar Sands Programmatic Environ-
mental Impact Statement conducted by the Bureau of Land Management).
195. Lauren Markoe, Bears Ears National Monument, Sacred to Native Tribes, Faces Chal-
lenge to Its Status, NAT'L CATH. REP. (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/eco-
catholic/bears-ears-national-monument-sacred-native-tribes-faces-challenge-its-status.
196. Id.; H.R. 5780, 114th Cong. (2016).
197. Michael Blumm & Hillary Hoffmann, Opinion, Obama's National Monument Designa-
tions Were Lawful, Not Land Grabs, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017, 4:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-blumm-hoffmann-validity-of-national-monument-
designations-20170120-story.html.
198. Jack Healy, Tapping into the Land, and Dividing Its People, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/us/montana-tribe-divided-on-tapping-oil-rich-land.html?_r-0.
199. Tristan Scott, Oil Exploration Plans Suspended at Blackfeet Sacred Site, MISSOULAN
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tion, suspended its pursuit of the Red Blanket lease to determine a more
viable location for extraction.201
In another location on the reservation, Chief Mountain, the tribal
council also approved drilling in 2006. Then, in early 2013, the tribe
entered into a lease agreement with an oil company, Nations Energy,
LLC, to frack from pads occupying nearly 4,000 acres surrounding the
202base of the mountain. When tribal members became aware of the 2013
lease signing they started a petition to protect Chief Mountain, which is a
site of spiritual retreat for the entire Blackfeet nation.203 Upon receiving
the petition, the tribal council cancelled the lease, although the area re-
204mains "open" for future oil development2. On the Blackfeet Reserva-
tion, the tribe has been able to protect some of the most valuable cultural
resources, such as these two sacred places, more quickly and effectively
than has occurred on federal lands in the areas listed above. The reasons
for this are discussed further below in Section III.B.
III. UNCONVENTIONAL MINERAL LEASING ON FEDERAL AND TRIBAL
LANDS
A. Unconventional Mineral Leasing on Federal Lands
There are several statutes governing oil and gas exploration and ex-
traction on federal public lands, including the Mineral Leasing Act and
the Federal Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands.205 There are also
general multiple-use statutes that apply to all activities on federal lands,
such as the FLPMA, the NFMA, and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act (MUSYA).20 Together, these statutes provide a legal framework
governing mineral resource development and the impacts of that devel-
opment on other public resources.
Passed in 1920, the Mineral Leasing Act's primary purpose and ef-
fect was to "remove[] coal, oil, gas, oil shale, and four chemical minerals
from the location system" of the General Mining Law and make these
minerals readily available on public-domain lands to those who entered
207into a lease agreement with the federal government. The Mineral Leas-
ing Act for Acquired Lands contained similar provisions but applied to
201. Id.
202. Associated Press, Blackfeet Cancel Oil, Gas Leases near Sacred Chief Mountain,




205. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 223-229, 233(a), 241-242 (2012).
206. See 16 U.S.C §§ 528, 1604 (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012).
207. Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Hardrock Minerals, Energy Minerals
and Other Resources on the Public Lands: The Evolution of Federal Natural Resources Law, 33
TULSA L.J. 765, 782 (1998); Timothy M. Miller et al., Oil and Gas Operations on Public Lands in
the Marcellus Shale Region, 32 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 517, 539 (2011).
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208non-public domain lands acquired from private parties or the states. In
theory, these two statutes created a temporary interest in valuable miner-
als located on public lands (rather than a fee simple estate) and gave the
Secretary of Interior "broad discretion" over private entities' acquisition
of public lands for mineral development.209 More recently, Congress
passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which encouraged rapid develop-
ment of oil shale and tar sands specifically "to reduce the growing de-
pendence of the United States on politically and economically unstable
sources of foreign oil imports."2 10
In general, the BLM is authorized to issue mineral leases on BLM
land and in national forests,2 11 and the leasing process includes four
212phases. First, the BLM determines which lands will be made available
for oil and gas extraction and incorporates that designation into its re-
source management plan under FLPMA.213 In national forests, the de-
termination occurs within the process of developing a land and resource
management plan under NFMA. 214 Additionally, although the BLM has
primary authority over mineral leasing on BLM land and in national for-
ests, the Forest Service has the authority to approve surface activities
related to mineral leasing in national forests.215
The determination of which lands will be made available for oil and
gas exploration also includes some initial criteria the agency will impose
on any future leases to accommodate other overlapping uses or to miti-
gate environmental harm.216 In general, the planning processes under
FLPMA and NFMA are subject to the requirements of the NEPA, which
requires the agency to consider various alternatives to the proposed oil
217and gas leasing use.
In phase two, the BLM authorizes specific exploration or drilling
activities through a bidding process on lands previously determined to be
218suitable for oil and gas extraction. After the passage of the Onshore
Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act in 1987, bidding must be competitive-
at least initially. 219 Also, either the agency or private parties can nomi-
208. Miller et al., supra note 209, 539-540.
209. Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 209, at 782.
210. See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 369, 42 U.S.C. § 15927 (2012).
211. Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 209, at 796.
212. JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 1156 (2d ed. 2009).
213. 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2017).
214. Charles L. Kaiser & Scott W. Hardt, Fitting Oil and Gas Development into the Multiple-
Use Framework: A New Role for the Forest?, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 827, 839 (1991); Miller et al.,
supra note 209, 539-541.
215. Kaiser & Hardt, supra note 216, at 840.
216. Miller et al., supra note 209, 539-541.
217. Id. The specifics of NEPA as it relates to cultural resources will be discussed in more
detail below.
218. Id.
219. See generally 30 U.S.C § 226 (2012).
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220nate lands for bidding. If there is only one interested bidder, the agen-
cy can issue a noncompetitive lease. However, if the bidding is competi-
tive, the agency is required to accept the highest bid, and the winner of
the auction process obtains an exclusive leasehold right to extract oil and
gas from within the opened tract.221
The third phase of oil and gas leasing is entry into the lease agree-
ment with the federal government. Leases generally last either five or ten
years, depending on whether they were competitively obtained (five
years) or the result of an exclusive bid (ten years), although all leases
"continue in effect . .. so long after their primary term as oil and gas is
produced in paying quantities."222 The BLM is required to hold quarterly
auctions for mineral leases in each state with lands that have been desig-
nated as "open" for oil and gas extraction but are not currently in produc-
223tion. The lease agreement sets the fee structure for renting the physical
space involved in the exploration and drilling activities, such as the
"pad" required for fracking operations and the royalty rate for any min-
erals actually extracted.224
The final phase is the filing of the application to drill and a drilling
225plan with the BLM. Prior to drilling, the BLM must review the drilling
plan and determine whether there will be any adverse environmental
consequences associated with the drilling. 22 6 This phase is also subject to
NEPA, which requires the agency to produce an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) prior to approval of any drilling.227 The EIS reflects the
agency's site-specific assessment of the location for any proposed drill-
ing and any "concerns and other issues identified earlier in the process,
or during site examinations, may result in conditions of approval (COA)
on the operator's drilling permit."228 These conditions may "require, for-
bid, or control specified activities or disturbances."229 However, none of
these requirements relate to cultural resources specifically.
1. Specific Requirements for Hydraulic Fracturing
BLM promulgated its long-awaited Final Fracking Rule in 2015,
outlining new requirements to regulate fracking on federal and tribal
220. Miller et al., supra note 209, 540-41.
221. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 214, at 1156. The size of the tracts "opened up" for bidding
start at 2560 acres in all states but Alaska for liquid minerals other than tar sands. 30 U.S.C.
§ 226(b)(1)(A). Tracts containing tar sands are leased in parcels of 5760 acres. Id. § 226(b)(2)(A)(i).
This is also the minimum size of a non tar sand-bearing tract in Alaska. Id. § 226(b)(1)(A).
222. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 214, at 1156 (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A).
224. Miller et al., supra note 209, 539-41, 545.
225. Id. at 539-41.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128,




lands.230 According to the new rule, more than thirty-six million acres of
federal lands "are under lease for potential oil and gas development. . ."
across thirty-three states.231 The Department of Interior catalogued
95,000 active oil and gas wells on federal land, including conventional
and unconventional wells.232 Moreover, roughly "90 percent" of current-
233
ly drilled wells are fracked. Given that wells are often fractured at the
end of their useful life for conventional drilling, the number of fracked
wells could increase at a greater rate than the rate of conventional wells.
234Although the new rule has generated a significant controversy, it
does not differ greatly from the old rules in terms of leasing and operator
requirements.235 As far as the application for a permit to drill, the new
rule requires similar information as the old rule-plans that outline the
depth of the well, the materials that will be used to enclose the well shaft,
the depth and location of existing faults, and other information related to
the subsurface geomorphology.236 The new rule does differ from the old
in that it focuses more on impacts to drinking water sources in the drill-
ing phase and disposal of vast quantities of flowback after operations
have ceased.237 Because of the heavy reliance on water, the new fracking
rule adds a requirement to list the depths and location of "all usable wa-
ter" and the estimated volume of water that will be used to frack the
well.238 Lastly, the new rule adds a requirement that fracking fluids must
be disposed of in surface tanks or impoundments after operations are
completed, with "a limited exception."239
With respect to cultural resources specifically, there are no addi-
tional requirements in the new rule and the agency's approach to protect-
ing cultural resources from the impacts of fracking remains the same as
under prior regulations.2 40 This approach can be summarized as follows:
the authorizing statutes give the BLM authority to accommodate cultural
230. Id. A district invalidated the rule shortly after it was finalized, holding that BLM lacked
the authority to promulgate the rule and an appeal is currently pending before the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1326-28 (D. Wyo.
2015), vacated by Wyoming v. Sierra Club, No. 15-8126, 2016 WL 3853806, at *1 (10th Cir. July
13, 2016); Timothy Cama, Court Delays Appeal over Obama's Fracking Rule, HILL (Jan. 4, 2017,
11:13 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/312644-court-delays-appeal-case-over-
obamas-fracking-rule.
231. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,129.
232. Id
233. Press Release, Jessica Kershaw, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Office of the Sec'y of the Interi-
or, Interior Department Releases Final Rule to Support Safe, Responsible Hydraulic Fracturing
Activities on Public and Tribal Lands (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/newsroom/2015/march/nr_03_202015.html.
234. Wyoming, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1326-28.
235. Whitney-Williams & Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 482-83.
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resources in the mineral leasing process but do not require the agency to
do so. This discretion will be discussed more fully below.
2. Specific Requirements for Oil Shale and Tar Sands Extraction
The federal government "owns 72 per cent of all oil shale acreage
and 79 per cent of the shale oil in place in the United States,"2 4' and there
are special requirements governing the exploration and extraction of the-
se public oil shale and tar sands reserves.242 Although originally subject
to lease agreements under the Mineral Leasing Act, in 2005, Congress
formulated a specific system for leasing federal lands for oil shale.243
That year, in the Oil Shale, Tar Sands, and Other Strategic Unconven-
tional Fuels Act of 2005 (Unconventional Fuels Act), Congress provided
that "oil shale, tar sands, and other unconventional fuels are strategically
important domestic resources that should be developed to reduce the
growing dependence of the United States on politically and economically
unstable sources of foreign oil imports."24
To accomplish this purpose, the Unconventional Fuels Act focused
on streamlining development of the largest known oil shale deposit in the
world, the Piceance Basin, located under the states of Wyoming, Utah,
and Colorado.245 The Unconventional Fuels Act imposed three require-
ments under which the previously withdrawn shale source could be ac-
cessed, which can be summarized as follows:
First, rather than setting royalty rates and rental fees at a level meant
to encourage the growth of the oil shale industry, the EPAct requires
the Interior Secretary to ensure a "fair" rate of return to the United
States for every lease. Second, regulations implemented for the issu-
ance of oil shale leases now must contain work requirements and
milestones "to ensure the diligent development of the lease." Finally,
the EPAct includes a consultation requirement: before a commercial
oil shale lease can be issued in a state, the BLM must consult the
governor, representatives of the affected local government, "interest-
ed Indian tribes," and "other interested persons in that state."24
Moreover, the Unconventional Fuels Act directed the Secretary of
Interior to develop implementing regulations, which she did in the late
2000s.247 In brief, the leasing process contained in the regulations starts
with an initial bidding process similar to that used in conventional oil and
241. Robert P. Baker & Robert D. Mulford, Problems and Policies of Oil Shale Development,
19 STAN. L. REV. 190, 194 (1966).
242. Id. at 194-95; see also 42 U.S.C. § 15927(c) (2012).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 15927(c), (e).
244. Id.
245. Id. § 15927(d)(1); Alexander Hood, Note, The Same NEPA Proposal or Connected NEPA
Actions?: Why the Bureau of Land Management's New Oil Shale Rules and Regulations Should Be
Set Aside, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 191, 199 (2010).
246. Hood, supra note 247, at 200 (footnotes omitted).
247. 42 U.S.C. § 15927(c)(2); e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 3900.2 (2017).
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gas leasing.248 Each leased parcel cannot exceed 5,760 acres, and the
Secretary of Interior has absolute discretion to determine the lease
terms.249 Due to the volume of mining waste from a shale mining opera-
tion, the lessee is entitled to an additional disposal site lease of up to 320
acres.250 Unlike the leasing decision, which is not subject to NEPA re-
view, the decision to issue the disposal site lease is subject to NEPA. 2 5 1
With respect to cultural resources threatened by shale mining opera-
tions, the Unconventional Fuels Act is silent. The agency therefore has
not imposed regulations requiring it to survey or assess development
sites for the presence of cultural resources before drilling begins. This
essentially leaves NEPA and the cultural resource protection statutes as
the only legal barriers to oil shale development. NEPA and the scope of
its authority in this area will be addressed further below.
B. Unconventional Mineral Leasing on Tribal Lands
Native American tribes are "the third-largest owners of mineral re-
sources in the country, behind only the federal government and the rail-
roads."2 52 Tribal lands "contain approximately 3-4% of known oil and
gas reserves" in the nation and "more than 10% of federal on-shore ener-
gy production occurs on tribal lands, representing more than 5% of do-
mestic oil production [and] 8% of gas production."25 3 The Department of
Interior administers between 2,500 and 500 producing mineral leases on
tribal lands, resulting in revenue that is projected to reach $1 billion in
the near future.254
Tribes have different options for developing oil and gas reserves on
tribal lands.255 Because tribes hold rights to develop subsurface mineral
resources underlying tribal lands,256 they can develop mineral resources
directly by forming tribal energy corporations to explore and extract oil
257and gas. They can also use the "638 Program" under the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1974 to "enter into con-




252. JUDITH V. ROYSTER, MICHAEL C. BLUMM & ELIZABETH ANN KRONK, NATIVE
AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 277 (3d ed. 2013).
253. Id.
254. Id; BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OL AND GAS OUTLOOK
IN INDIAN COUNTRY (n.d.), http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xieed/documents/document/idcl-
024535.pdf.
255. ROYSTER, BLUMM & KRONK, supra note 254, at 277.
256. Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal
Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 545 (1994). In some cases land that might be
characterized as "tribal land," such as an individual allotments or fee land within a reservation, is
held by an individual tribal member who may hold the mineral rights individually. Id. at 550. For the
sake of this survey discussion, however, the general rule that tribes hold mineral rights underlying
their reservations (collectively) is followed. Id.
257. ROYSTER, BLUMM & KRONK, supra note 254, at 277.
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tracts and self-governance compacts to assume administration of federal
Indian programs" using funds from the Program.258 The third and final
option for tribes is to "enter into leases or other types of arrangements"
with private oil and gas companies.259 Under this model, which is by far
the most common arrangement, he federal government plays only a lim-
ited oversight role.26
This federal oversight role is authorized by several statutes: the In-
dian Mineral Leasing Act,261 the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act,262 the
Indian Mineral Development Act,26 3 and the Indian Tribal Energy Devel-
opment and Self-Determination Act.264 The Indian Mineral Leasing Act,
passed in 1938, established mineral leasing requirements and procedures
such as tribal consent and lease approval by the Secretary of the Interi-
or.265 Similar to the terms of the Mineral Leasing Act, the Indian Mineral
Leasing Act (IMLA) established a lease term of ten years, allowing leas-
es to be renewed "as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying
,,266quantities. IMLA also established "a system of bonuses, rents, and
royalties" and removed states' abilities to tax tribal royalty payments.267
The Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, passed in 1955, added another ele-
ment of federal control to the surface component of mineral leasing on
tribal lands and similarly required tribal consent and the approval of the
Secretary of Interior.268
In 1982, Congress passed the Indian Mineral Development Act
(IMDA), which authorized tribes "to enter into mineral agreements of
any kind, including 'any joint venture, operating, production sharing,
service, managerial, lease or other agreement."'269 In theory, the IMDA
gave tribes more control over the leasing structure, terms, and corre-
sponding level of risk they would undertake in the various types of min-
eral development leases.270 If tribes decide to authorize oil and gas de-
velopment, the federal government exercises some oversight of the de-
tails. 27 1 Critically though, if tribes do not want oil and gas development
258. Id.; Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458e (2012)).
259. ROYSTER, BLUMM & KRONK, supra note 254, at 278.
260. Id.
261. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (2012).
262. 25 U.S.C, § 415 (2012).
263. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (2012).
264. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506 (2012).
265. Id; 25 U.S.C. § 396a.
266. 25 U.S.C. § 396a.
267. ROYSTER, BLUMM & KRONK, supra note 254, at 312-13.
268. 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2012).
269. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2012); ROYSTER, BLUMM & KRONK, supra note 254, at 333.
270. ROYSTER, BLUMM & KRONK, supra note 254, at 333.
271. The only exceptions to this general rule are for tribes that do not reside in Indian Country,
such as those in Alaska, unrecognized tribes, and recognized tribes in Indian Country that have
received Congressional exemptions from the three statutes mentioned in the text. See ROYSTER,
BLUMM & KRONK, supra note 254, at 333.
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on their lands, they have the sovereign authority to prohibit it, and some
tribes have done just that.272
The 2005 Energy Policy Act contained within it the Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act (ITEDSA). 273 The
ITEDSA authorizes tribes to enter into Tribal Energy Resource Agree-
ments (TERAs) with the Department of the Interior.274 Under this
framework, if tribes can demonstrate that they have the necessary infra-
structure and resources to regulate the development of mineral resources
on tribal lands, the Department of Interior will approve a TERA.275 Once
a tribe has a TERA in place, it can freely enter into oil and gas leases and
business arrangements related to those activities without obtaining the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior for each agreement.276 Mineral
leases under ITEDSA have varying terms and "may be made for the
standard term of ten years and as long thereafter as the oil or gas is pro-
duced in paying quantities . . . [while] business agreements, and rights of
way may be made for terms not to exceed thirty years."277
Like the other mineral leasing statutes, the ITEDSA is silent as to
278cultural resources. However, tribes possess sovereign authority to reg-
ulate activities of both members and nonmembers on tribal lands as a
matter of federal law. 279 This authority, combined with the mineral leas-
ing structure Congress has imposed in Indian Country, means that tribes
have the authority to protect cultural resources located on tribal lands
from the threats associated with unconventional mineral development.
They can do so by refusing all forms of mineral development, by refus-
ing certain forms or certain proposals in particular that might be harmful
to cultural resources, or by approving mineral development but siting
individual leased tracts in a manner so as to avoid any impact to cultural
resources. In this way, tribes have much greater authority to protect their
cultural resources when they are located on tribal lands as opposed to
federal public lands.
IV. CULTURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION STATUTES
A. The Antiquities Act
Congress's first attempt to stop the looting and destruction of cul-
tural resources was the Antiquities Act of 1906. The Antiquities Act al-
272. See, e.g., Turtle Mountain Band Moved Fast to Ban Fracking on Reservation,
INDIANZ.COM (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.indianz.com/News/2016/020131.asp (discussing how the
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians banned fracking on their lands).
273. ROYSTER, BLUMM & KRONK, supra note 254, at 333-34.
274. Id.
275. Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (2012).
276. ROYSTER, BLUMM & KRONK, supra note 254, at 334.
277. Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065, 1081 (2008).
278. See 25 U.S.C. § 3504.
279. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).
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lows the President to protect any "historic or prehistoric ruin or monu-
ment, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or controlled by
the government of the United States."280 Although today the Antiquities
Act is used often for the purposes of land conservation and environmen-
tal protection, its original purpose was "to protect aboriginal objects and
artifacts" or other items of cultural significance.2 8' As it relates to miner-
al leasing, the Antiquities Act does not automatically withdraw all land
from mineral development.282 Rather, it prevents future opening of broad
tracts to mineral leasing while protecting existing leases.283 Therefore, it
can be used to prevent future unconventional mineral development that
threatens cultural resources if the President includes language to that
effect in the Presidential Proclamation establishing the monument.284
This is precisely the situation facing the Bears Ears cultural re-
source region. There are several locations within the proposed monu-
ment's boundaries that have been targeted for unconventional oil and gas
development and contain resources of significance to the tribal monu-
ment proponents. The Proclamation establishing the Monument lists
those resources in great detail, from archaeological sites to sacred gather-
ing locations to "Nahodishgish," the Navajo term for "places to be left
alone."285 The ancient human imprint on the Bears Ears region was over
5,000 years in the making, spanning the earliest prehistoric societies to
the five modern tribes who use the region today. As demonstrated by this
significant designation, the Antiquities Act is therefore a moderately
useful statute for protecting cultural resources from mineral develop-
ment-at least with respect to those located in areas not subject to exist-
ing leases.
B. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act
Congress passed ARPA in 1979286 in part because the problems of
large scale looting of archaeological sites for their pottery, human re-
mains, and other artifacts were still rampant even after Congress passed
287
the Antiquities Act. Despite the seemingly broad protections implied
by ARPA's title, the statute contains mostly inventory and planning
288
mandates. In ARPA, Congress directed all federal agencies to "devel-
280. 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2012).
281. Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REV.
473, 477 (2003).
282. Id. at 506 -07.
283. Id. at 506.
284. Id. at 507.
285. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Establishment of the Bears
Ears National Monument (Dec. 28, 2016),
https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/documents/files/2016bearsears.prc_.rel_.pdf.
286. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2012)); Iraola, supra note 95, at 222.
287. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(a)(3).
288. Stem & Slade, supra note 13, at 174-75.
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op plans" to survey the lands under their management authority "to de-
termine the nature and extent of archaeological resources on those
lands."2 89 Congress further directed these agencies to "prepare a schedule
for surveying lands that are likely to contain the most scientifically valu-
able archaeological resources."29
Although ARPA does have a permitting requirement, courts have
limited it to projects aimed at intentionally removing or altering archaeo-
logical resources rather than projects with incidental impacts.291 Moreo-
ver, ARPA expressly exempts mineral development activities from the
29permitting requirement.292 Therefore, despite its title, ARPA is not an
effective method of protecting cultural resources on federal or tribal
lands from unconventional mineral development.
C. National Historic Preservation Act
Congress passed the NHPA in 1966 to require all federal agencies
to assess impacts of their activities and the activities they authorize on
"historic" properties or resources. 293 There are two primary mechanisms
for enforcing the NHPA on federal lands, § 106 and § 110.294 Sec-
tion 106 provides that
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction
over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State
and the head of any Federal department or independent agency hav-
ing authority to license any undertaking, prior to the approval of the
expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the
issuance of any license, shall take into account the effect of the un-
dertaking on any historic property. The head of such Federal agency
shall afford the Council a reasonable opportunity to comment with
regard to the undertaking.295
The statute defines undertaking is defined as "any project, activity,
or program that can result in changes in the character or use of historic
properties, if any such historic properties are located in the area of poten-
tial effects."2 96 If a project or activity meets this definition, a consultation
requirement is triggered, requiring the head of the acting agency to con-
sult with the Advisory Council before proceeding with the activity.297
289. 16 U.S.C. § 470mm.
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. See 16 U.S.C. § 470kk.
293. Stern & Slade, supra note 13, at 136.
294. 54 U.S.C. §§ 306108, 306101(a)-306114 (2012)).
295. Id. § 306108.
296. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(o) (2017).
297. Din6 Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Jewell, No. CIV 15-0209 JB/SCY, 2015 WL
4997207, at *23 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015).
352 [Vol. 94:2
FRA CKING THE SACRED
Section 110 provides that "[T]he heads of all Federal agencies shall
assume responsibility for the preservation of historic properties which
are owned or controlled by such agency."2 98 Further, "[e]ach Federal
agency shall undertake, consistent with the preservation of such proper-
ties and the mission of the agency, any preservation, as may be necessary
to carry out this section."29 9 Also, the "agency shall establish a program
to locate, inventory, and nominate to the Secretary [of the Interior] all
properties under the agency's ownership or control. . . , that appear to
qualify for inclusion on the National Register." 3  Finally,
Consistent with the agency's missions and mandates, all Federal
agencies shall carry out agency programs and projects (including
those under which any Federal assistance is provided or any Federal
license, permit, or other approval is required) in accordance with the
purposes of [the Act].301
However, like the NEPA, the NHPA imposes largely procedural ra-
ther than substantive requirements.302 Courts have described it as a "stop,
look, and listen" statute but not one that demands particular substantive
outcomes.303
When unconventional oil and gas development is proposed for an
area that contains archaeological sites or other tribal cultural resources,
the NHPA applies, but it does not automatically prohibit the mineral de-
velopment activities.30 It merely requires the agency to consider mitiga-
tion options for potential damage to any historic resources threatened by
the development before proceeding with oil and gas development.305 if
tribal cultural resources may be impacted, the agency is required to con-
sult with the tribe before authorizing the undertaking.30 This consulta-
tion must provide "a reasonable opportunity to identify [the tribe's] con-
cerns about historic properties, advise on the identification and evalua-
tion of historic properties, including those of traditional religious and
cultural importance, articulate [tribal] views on the undertaking's effects
on such properties, and participate in the resolution of adverse effects."307
Although some courts have noted that tribal consultation should be con-
ducted prior to a NEPA analysis,308 other courts have refused to invali-




302. Dine Citizens, 2015 WL 4997297, at *23.
303. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick Sewer Auth., 334 F.3d 161, 166 (1st Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d
800, 805 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).
304. Stem & Slade, supra note 13, at 141-42.
305. Dind Citizens, 2015 WL 4997297, at *23.
306. Id. at *24.
307. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A) (2017).
308. See Dine Citizens, 2015 WL 4997207, at *27.
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date a NEPA analysis or bar an activity for a violation of the NHPA's
procedural consultation requirement when the tribal consultation did not
occur until well after the NEPA analysis was concluded.30 Moreover,
there is a limited window for tribes to engage in consultation-thirty
days under the NHPA regulations.310 Courts have interpreted this provi-
sion strictly, denying tribal claims under the NHPA consultation re-
quirement because the tribe's response or consultation attempt came too
late.311
This statute provides a more meaningful role for tribes seeking to
protect cultural resources on federal and tribal lands, but it does not de-
fine "consultation" in a way that requires an agency to heed the tribes'
wishes before making a decision on a leasing proposal. The opportunity
to "identify" objects or areas of concern, for example, could mean little
more than a phone call between the tribal cultural resource liaison a d
the federal land management official stating that there are cultural re-
sources that lie in the path of the proposed leasing arrangement. Howev-
er, the federal land management agency would not subsequently be re-
quired to deny the development application or proposal based on those
identified concerns or even to mention them in any final decision-making
document such as a Record of Decision under NEPA. Therefore, the
NHPA imposes mostly procedural obstacles to oil and gas development
projects that threaten tribal cultural resources. There is no substantive
element of this statute that requires protection of the cultural resources at
all costs.
D. National Environmental Policy Act
While a complete explanation of NEPA is outside the scope of this
Article, this discussion attempts to catalog the ways in which NEPA ap-
plies to cultural resources threatened by unconventional mineral devel-
opment. Generally, "NEPA imposes a procedural requirement '(1) to
ensure [that an] agency will have detailed information on significant en-
vironmental impacts when it makes its decisions; and (2) to guarantee
that this information will be available to a larger audience."'312 Thus, the
statute requires that "public officials make decisions that are based on
understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that pro-
tect, restore, and enhance the environment."313
309. See Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 609 (9th
Cir. 2010); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam).
310. 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(c)(4) (2017).
311. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick Sewer Auth., 334 F.3d 161, 167 (1st Cir. 2003).
312. Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone, 608 F.3d at 599 (quoting Inland Empire Pub. Lands
Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1996)).
313. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2017).
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The purpose of these requirements, as reflected in the statute itself,
is to "restore[] and maintain[]" the overall quality of the environment for
the welfare of the American citizenry.3 14 NEPA's language is broad
enough to include "important historical [and] cultural . .. aspects of our
national heritage."" Therefore, NEPA directs the federal government
"to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considera-
tions of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, func-
tions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may" preserve
these resources.316
In the context of mineral leasing projects on federal and tribal lands,
NEPA review is required during the initial planning process undertaken
by the respective land management agency responsible for the surface
estate in collaboration with the BLM, which has jurisdiction over the
mineral estate.317 There is a dispute among federal courts as to whether
NEPA review is also required at the individual leasing stage3 18 and then
again when the agency reviews an application for a permit to drill.319 At
each stage, the agency contemplating mineral leasing must conduct an
environmental assessment to determine if the activity is significant.320 if
so, an EIS will be necessary.321
In the EIS, NEPA regulations direct the federal agency to "include
discussions of . .. historic and cultural resources," as well as other crite-
ria, such as "[t]he environmental impacts of the alternatives including the
proposed action"; "adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented[J;] the relationship between
short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and en-
hancement of long-term productivity[;] and any irreversible or irretrieva-
ble commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposal
should it be implemented."322 However, nothing in NEPA or its regula-
tions requires an agency to deny or restructure a proposal because of
negative impacts to cultural resources alone, with the exception perhaps
314. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012).
315. Id. § 4331(b).
316. Id.
317. Miller et al., supra note 209, 539-41.
318. See Park Cty. Res. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 622 (10th Cir.
1987) (no environmental assessment was required prior to individual leasing decision), overruled by
Vill. of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992); Sierra Club v. Peter-
son, 717 F.2d 1409, 1411 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (environmental assessment required prior to entering into
individual lease agreements); Din6 Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Jewell, No. CIV 15-0209
JB/SCY, 2015 WL 4997207, at *22. (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015) (no environmental assessment was
required prior to individual leasing decision).
319. Park Cty. Res. Council, 817 F.2d at 622.
320. Id.
321. CRAIG P. HALL, OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS ON ONSHORE FEDERAL LANDS § 18.06[3][a]-
[c] (Energy & Mineral Law Found. 1991),
http://www.emlf.org/index.php?src=directory&view~whitepaper&srctype=detail&back-whitepaper
&refno=3794.
322. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (2017).
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of the regulatory requirement that the agency analyze the cumulative
impacts of a project rather than the individual impact of each application
for a permit to drill (APD). 323
Likewise, the agency must analyze the impacts of actions that are
"[c]onnected" and "[s]imilar." 324 However, even when an agency is con-
sidering hundreds of proposed wells within the same shale play and in
the same area as documented archaeological resources, courts may still
decline to find a NEPA violation if the agency has undertaken a partial
NEPA analysis-even if it was conducted over a decade prior to the de-
cision to approve the APDs.325 In short, as long as the agency has satis-
fied the procedural mandate of considering alternatives when cultural
resources are present and has "discuss[ed]" the cultural resources in the
environmental impact statement, NEPA is satisfied.326 This is true even
when the "discussion" involved is outdated and the inventory of cultural
resources is incomplete.
NEPA's role in protecting cultural resources from unconventional
mineral leasing is therefore somewhat limited. This is especially true in
those states falling within the Tenth Circuit, because an initial NEPA
review conducted concurrently with the drafting or revision of a land
management plan may be deemed "enough" of a NEPA analysis even
when the planning was conducted before unconventional drilling poten-
tial was understood or uncovered.327 This is precisely what happened in
the greater Chaco region, discussed above. In a lawsuit challenging the
BLM's issuance of hundreds of APDs, a number of Navajo Nation envi-
ronmental groups argued that the BLM's 2003 RMP and EIS were not
adequate to satisfy NEPA because the agency had only considered drill-
ing techniques available in 2003. The more advanced techniques used in
2013 were barely even contemplated in 2003, let alone given the "hard
look" that NEPA requires.32 8 Although vertical and horizontal drilling
had been used in the area for nearly half a century, the specific direction-
al drilling technique that the applicants sought to use in the APDs were
unknown to the BLM at the time it conducted its initial NEPA review.329
Moreover, the plaintiffs argued the impacts of directional drilling
are greater on both the surface and subsurface than those associated with
323. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.25(c), 1508.7 (2017).
324. Id. § 1508.25(a)(1)-(3).
325. Din6 Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Jewell, No. CIV 15-0209 JB/SCY, 2015 WL
4997207, at *43 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015).
326. See N. Idaho Cmty. Action Network v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 545 F.3d 1147, 1156-57
(9th Cir. 2008).
327. Dine Citizens, 2015 WL 4997207, at *15.
328. Id. at *15, *19.
329. Id. Directional drilling allows operators to access much more of the subsurface than
horizontal or vertical drilling. The materials used are flexible to the point that drilling can proceed in
spiral or multiple curving patterns beneath the surface as opposed to the straight-line of vertical
drilling or the L shape of vertical drilling combined with horizontal drilling.
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traditional vertical or horizontal drilling primarily because one drill
"pad" can be used as an access point for multiple directionally-drilled
wells.330 In this situation, the disposal needs are greater as well because a
much higher volume of water is needed to fracture the various wells, and
that water must be disposed of on the surface or injected back under-
ground pursuant to the BLM's new final fracking rule. However, despite
these arguments, the district court in the Dind Citizens Against Ruining
Our Environment v. Jewell case held that no NEPA violation occurred
because the BLM had relied on its initial EIS and RMP as a basis for
later, tiered environmental assessments, and when the agency found that
no significant impacts to cultural resources would occur, its duty was
satisfied.331 Therefore, barring a successful appeal, or perhaps a sudden
downturn in the shale gas market, the cultural resources in the vicinity of
the thousands of new wells in the Mancos Shale will likely be lost.
In the Ninth Circuit, courts apply a stricter NEPA analysis to miner-
al leases that threaten cultural resources, although again, even a finding
of a NEPA violation does not ensure that the threatened cultural re-
sources will be protected.332 In Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone v.
United States Department of the Interior, a group of plaintiffs, including
the Western Shoshone Tribe and several environmental groups, filed suit
alleging a NEPA violation because the BLM failed to supplement its EIS
approving a mineral exploration project expansion from an initial drill
site approval to roughly five times the original size.333 The project was
proposed for the Mount Tenabo area, which "is considered a traditional
locus of power and source of life for the Western Shoshone, and figures
in creation stories and world renewal."334
Upon consulting with the tribe, as required by NEPA and NHPA,
"about sites of cultural and religious significance" to the tribe, the BLM
designated "two sites within the project area as 'properties of cultural
and religious importance' or 'PCRIs' that are eligible for inclusion on the
National Register of Historic Places."335 Despite the designations and
despite the fact that the operator had not provided the exact location of
the proposed exploration in the drilling plan accompanying the expan-
sion proposal, the BLM made a finding that the expansion would have no
330. Id at*ll.
331. Id at *43. Part of the court's decision was based on the common law standards of review
applied to agency decisions and the "extreme degree of deference" that courts give to agencies when
reviewing scientific matters within their expertise. Id. at *40. Although outside the scope of this
Article, it is worth noting that statutes such as the ones discussed above, lacking in citizen suit provi-
sions, can only be enforced by private citizens or groups using the Administrative Procedures Act,
which as noted provides significant deference to the agency making the initial determination. Id. at
*24-28.
332. Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 603, 606-07
(9th Cir. 2010).
333. Id. at 596.




significant impact on the designated sites and declined to draft a full
EIS.33 6 In other words, despite not knowing which sites might be impact-
ed or to what extent, the BLM determined that there was no need for a
supplemental EIS.3 37 The agency simply included a provision in the ap-
proval, noting that once the exact locations were determined, the operator
would have to give notice of them to the BLM to allow the agency to
determine whether the designated sites would be disturbed and if so, to
create "exclusion zones" around those sites.338 However, often, an opera-
tor may not know where it can drill until after conducting exploratory
drilling and seismic analysis, and those activities can cause just as much
damage to cultural resources as the final drilling and extraction them-
selves. Thus, the extent to which NEPA can protect cultural resources
depends on the diligence of the agency officials conducting the environ-
mental and cultural resource analysis and, to some extent, the jurisdiction
in which the resources fall.
E. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
One statute that does have the potential to protect cultural resource
from unconventional oil and gas development is the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).339 Congress enacted
NAGPRA in 1990 "to reallocate the custody of Native American human
remains and other cultural items housed in the collections of federal
agencies and federally funded museums, or discovered on federal or trib-
al lands after the Act took effect."340 Essentially, Congress sought to re-
turn the remains and associated funerary objects taken from Native
American burial grounds to the tribe of origin, whether these items had
found their way to a museum or were discovered later on federal or tribal
lands.341 The purpose behind the statute was the immense theft of re-
mains and associated objects from their original resting places-
estimates ranged from in the hundreds of thousands to the multiple mil-
lions, with 18,000 skeletal remains of individual Native Americans held
by the Smithsonian Museum alone.342
NAGPRA requires that Native American remains and associated
funerary objects "excavated or discovered" on federal lands be left where
found until the federal agency with jurisdiction can identify and contact
the "lineal descendants" of the remains.343 When identifiable lineal de-
336. Id. at 598.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 601.
339. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2012).
340. Robert W. Lannan, Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, and the Unresolved Issues of Prehistoric Human Remains, 22
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 369, 392-93 (1998).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 392-95.
343. Id. at 397-98, 400.
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scendants of remains cannot be found, NAGPRA delineates a process by
which the federal agency can attempt to identify one or more potentially
affiliated tribes.344 As a last resort, when the remains are unclaimed by
any lineal descendants or any tribe, they may be excavated and sent for
scientific study or reinternment if a permit is procured under ARPA.345
Inadvertent discovery, as might occur in the course of exploratory
drilling for unconventional fuel resources, is addressed in a specific sec-
tion of the statute.346 This section requires "any person who . . . has dis-
covered Native American cultural items on Federal or tribal lands" to
notify the tribe or agency with jurisdiction over such lands in writing.347
If the discovery occurs in connection with certain activities including
mining, "the person shall cease the activity in the area of the discovery,
[and] make a reasonable effort to protect the items discovered" while
awaiting direction from the agency or tribe.348 If a permit is sought, the
remains can be excavated and either returned to the tribe or sent for sci-
entific study as provided in the statute, after which, mining activity can
resume.349 If no permit is sought, no tribe claims the remains, and no
scientific inquiry into the remains is sought, the agency may reinter the
remains pursuant to NAGPRA regulations, and if this occurs, mineral
development activity would have to cease unless it could proceed with-
out affecting the reinterment.350
NAGPRA applies to remains and associated objects discovered on
"Federal lands" and "tribal land[s].""' NAGPRA defines tribal land as
"all lands within the exterior boundaries of any Indian reservation," "all
dependent Indian communities," and "any lands administered for the
benefit of Native Hawaiians."352 If remains or funerary objects are found
on tribal lands after an oil and gas leasing program has been developed
or after a tribe has entered into individual lease agreements with an oper-
ator, the tribe or operator must cease development in the area until the
remains are identified and repatriated. The tribe may also terminate the
lease under its general civil regulatory authority, as occurred on the
344. Id. at 398.
345. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2012); Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 209 F.
Supp. 2d 1008, 1016 (D.S.D. 2002).




350. 43 C.F.R. § 10.7 (2017).
351. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
352. Id. § 3001(15). Although Native Hawaiian lands are included within NAGPRA's defini-
tion of "tribal land," Native Hawaiians do not have the same authority over those lands under the
mineral leasing statutes because those statutes only apply to federally recognized tribes, and Native
Hawaiians are not "federally recognized" as an indigenous community. Therefore, the same types of
conflicts between oil and gas development and cultural resource preservation would not occur in the
same manner as on the Blackfeet Reservation or other lands that are home to or occupied by mem-
bers of federally recognized tribes. However, NAGPRA would still have the same effect on oil and
gas development on state and federal land in Hawaii.
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Blackfeet Reservation in the area of Chief Mountain and Red Blanket
Butte.3 53 Thus, NAGPRA imposes significant barriers to oil and gas de-
velopment in areas where human remains and associated funerary objects
are discovered, although the barrier may only be temporary if the re-
mains are claimed, disinterred, and returned to the tribe.
V. MOVING FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROVIDE GREATER
PROTECTION FOR TRIBAL CULTURAL RESOURCES
The future of tribal, cultural resources located above the Mancos,
Bakken, and Piceance Shale Plays, as well as elsewhere on federal and
tribal land throughout the United States, looks somewhat grim in light of
the strong statutory support for extensive unconventional oil and gas
development and the weak protections for cultural resources in the vari-
ous statutes that govern them. There are exceptions to this general rule
for human remains and associated objects, which are protected absolutely
under NAGPRA, although that statute protects the remains and objects
themselves without regard to the location in which they are found. For
instance, if an ancient, tribal burial ground is located on federal public
land, once the remains are discovered and in the likely event that the
tribe claiming them has since been removed to a distant reservation, the
remains will be disinterred and sent to the tribe for reburial in the tribe's
present location. The traditional burial ground might be recognized as a
sacred place or a cultural resource in the language of federal law, but it
would not be protected by NAGPRA once the remains are removed.
Likewise, as in the case of the DAPL, the NHPA can halt construction
activity that threatens cultural resources but only under the most specific
circumstances and potentially, only temporarily. Therefore, the existing
cultural resource protection statutes do not reliably or consistently pre-
vent unconventional oil and gas development.
For cultural resources located on unprotected federal lands, it is
clear that the mineral resource statutes, the general planning statutes, and
the cultural resource statutes lack provisions that ensure that tribal cul-
tural resources are not lost forever in the short-term pursuit of energy and
fuel reserves. Simple amendments to a statute like ARPA could go a long
way to protect these resources and would align with the greater purpose
and intent behind the statute. These might include a deadline for the pub-
lic land-management agencies to complete the required inventory of ar-
chaeological resources on lands under their jurisdiction and the elimina-
tion of the mineral development exclusion. If the latter were too contro-
versial to adopt, a more balanced approach could be amendments that
require mineral development to proceed in a manner that avoids the de-
struction or permanent loss of archaeological resources.
353. Associated Press, supra note 204.
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The NHPA could be similarly amended to protect sacred places that
might not contain archaeological resources within the definition of the
ARPA, but which tribes seek to protect nonetheless, such as the Bears
Ears region, the ancient remnants of the greater Chaco region, and the
Standing Rock Sioux sacred sites near and under Lake Oahe. In addition,
the consultation requirements of NEPA and NHPA could be amended to
enable tribes to assist in the inventory of cultural resources on federal
lands, which would be relatively easy for the tribes to do and which
would alleviate the resource burden on the agency required to conduct
the survey. That would also engender a level and depth of communica-
tion between the tribes and the agencies that could foster closer, mutually
beneficial relationships when it comes to cultural resource inventory and
protection.
The Antiquities Act functions well to protect cultural resources, as
the Bears Ears Monument demonstrates, although it faces constant
threats from Congressional representatives who find that Presidents in-
voke it too often and too broadly. Their argument is that the Antiquities
Act should only be used to protect archaeological or scientific sites but
not the surrounding land.3 4 To ensure that this statute continues to be a
viable option for tribal interests seeking to protect cultural resources of
all types, whether tangible or intangible, Congress should decline to
adopt any of the proposed measures that would limit the Executive's
authority under it.
An additional recommendation that would ensure protection for cul-
tural resources on lands facing unconventional oil and gas development
is to amend the multiple use statutes FLPMA, MUSYA, and NFMA to
require that agencies completely survey lands under their jurisdiction for
the presence of tribal cultural resources prior to the amendment of any
land use plan. To ensure that this happened, provisions allowing for judi-
cial review of agency failure to comply would be necessary. These small
amendments would ensure that agencies at least possess the relevant in-
formation that would allow them to plan for unconventional mineral de-
velopment in a manner that avoids unnecessary destruction of cultural
resources.355 In addition, Congress could amend these statutes to require
that unconventional mineral development be sited in a manner that
354. Recent proposals to either eliminate or amend the Antiquities Act to restrict its use by
executives include the following: H.R. 4132, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 3946, 114th Cong. (2015); S.
2004, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 3389, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1879, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1416,
114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2258, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 900, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 437, 114th
Cong. (2015); H.R. 488, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 232, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 228, 114th Cong.
(2015); H.R. 330, 114th Cong. (2015), and perhaps others.
355. For example, with a shale play the size of the Bakken, and the advanced drilling technolo-
gy that exists today, there are various surface locations where the BLM could allow fracking pads to
be sited, from which horizontal or spiral drilling methods could reach the shale play. Having an
accurate survey of cultural resources located on the surface would allow the agency to limit opera-
tors to certain surface locations where cultural resources are not present, avoiding unnecessary harm
or destruction to the cultural resources while allowing the fracking operation to proceed.
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avoids destruction or harm to these resources. This might prove easier to
accomplish with an unconventional method like fracking, which allows
extraction of the oil or gas from a variety of surface locations, than with
tar sands, which is location-specific, but at the very least it would pro-
vide more protections for some cultural resources than under the current
system.
On tribal lands, the decision of whether and how to allow uncon-
ventional oil and gas development is of course one for the tribe. Current
federal law respects tribal sovereignty over this aspect of natural resource
development, relegating decisions to the tribe as far as whether and how
much unconventional mineral development to allow. Tribal law is there-
fore the appropriate mechanism to protect cultural resources located on
tribal lands. Tribal laws banning or strictly regulating unconventional oil
and gas development would ensure the complete protection of cultural
resources on tribal lands.
Given the recent trends toward extensive and rapid development of
unconventional oil and gas on federal and tribal lands, it is clear that
many conflicting resource values may be sacrificed at the dual altars of
national security and energy independence. With respect to environmen-
tal values, there are many statutes in place that require federal agencies
and tribes to at least consider impacts to those values before proceeding
with development, if not requiring them to cease development altogether.
In the realm of cultural resources, relatively few such tools exist despite
an extensive body of positive laws purporting to protect them. Yet, with
just a few simple amendments to these existing statutes, Congress and
the relevant tribes could ensure that tribal cultural resources are pre-
served for future generations of tribal members and the general citizenry
alike.
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In May of 2016, the Denver Law Review published a series of invit-
ed articles on the timely topic of the James Holmes murder trial. The
Law Review solicited articles from the Defense, the Prosecution, and the
Judge who participated in the Holmes case.' The defense lawyers and the
judge both wrote articles relating to the Holmes litigation.2 By contrast,
the prosecutors, George Brauchler and Rich Orman, used the opportunity
to write an attack on prior empirical studies of Colorado's death penalty
that we conducted.3 The Law Review has now offered us an opportunity
to respond to the Brauchler and Orman attack on our work and our credi-
bility.
I. Tyson L. Welch, Foreword, 93 DENv. L. REV. i, i (2016).
2. See Kristen Nelson, Tamara Brady & Daniel King, The "Evil" Defendant and the "Hold-
out" Juror: Unpacking the Myths of the Aurora Theater Shooting Case as We Ponder the Future of
Capital Punishment in Colorado, 93 DENV. L. REV. 595, 595 (2016); Carlos A. Samour, Jr., Effectu-
ating Colorado 's Capital Sentencing Scheme in the Aurora Theater Shooting Trial, 93 DENV. L.
REV. 577, 577 (2016).
3. See George Brauchler & Rich Orman, Lies, Damn Lies, and Anti-Death Penalty Research,
93 DENV. L. REv. 635, 635 (2016).
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At the outset, we want to be clear that as scholars we welcome chal-
lenges to our work that allow us to revise our thinking, improve our
methods, or better understand a legal problem. The scholarly enterprise is
at its best when it is informed by vigorous debate and when ideas are
tested through discourse and intellectual exchange. Indeed, we have al-
ready engaged in one very productive debate with a critic of our re-
search.4 Unfortunately, Brauchler and Orman's article lacks any of the
attributes of constructive scholarly criticism. The article does not cite any
of the scholarly literature in this field (much less provide a basis for re-
jecting it); it does not meaningfully engage with the conclusions of our
research. Instead, it resorts to name calling and ad hominem attack by
repeatedly referring to us as disingenuous, biased, inexperienced, unethi-
cal, and uninformed. We were obviously disappointed to see such overtly
political and ad hominem attacks in a law review article and we will use
this Article to briefly respond to the merits of the Brauchler and Orman
critique.
In Part I, we reiterate what we actually did-setting forth our meth-
odology for studying Colorado's death penalty and responding to Brau-
chler and Orman's mischaracterization of our study design. In Part H, we
discuss why we did what we did-elaborating on the well-established
principles of Colorado and federal constitutional law that informed our
study design. This Part serves as a rebuttal of the claims that our work is
somehow divorced from the legal realities of state and federal law. Final-
ly, in Part III, we reiterate our empirical findings and explain how they
compel the conclusion that Colorado's death penalty is unconstitutional.
The Eighth Amendment requires an objective, statutory standard for
identifying the few who can be put to death from among the many who
kill; neither the purported good faith of prosecutors, the availability of
appellate review, nor opportunities for a jury to grant mercy can substi-
tute for this requirement. Because Colorado's homicide statute does not
provide an objective basis for meaningfully narrowing the class of death-
eligible defendants, our state's death penalty scheme violates the Eighth
Amendment.
I. THE STUDY: PURPOSE & METHODOLOGY
The central premise of the Brauchler and Orman article is that our
study design is deeply "flawed"'5 (using this term more than a dozen
times), rests on "cherry-picked"6 data, and was conducted by "experts"
4. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Remember Not to Forget Furman: A Response to Profes-
sor Smith, 100 IOWA L. REv. BULL. 117, 117-18 (2015); Robert J. Smith, Forgetting Furman, 100
IOWA L. REV. 1149,1149 (2015).




(us) who are both unqualified7 to do an empirical study of capital pun-
ishment and hopelessly biased against the death penalty.8 In this Part, we
will summarize our methodology and respond to the baseless claims that
our research was flawed or biased.
A. Purpose of the Study-The Research Question and Our Biases
The opening paragraph of our study announces our purpose: to as-
sess "whether Colorado's statutory aggravating factors meaningfully
narrow the class of death-eligible offenders."9 As we will lay out in more
detail below, the Eighth Amendment requires the states to make mean-
ingful distinctions between who lives and who dies through comprehen-
sible legislative definitions. With this standard in mind, we examined the
Colorado first-degree murder statute and the aggravating factors that set
out death eligibility to determine whether-in practice-they effectively
reduced the pool of murderers to a much smaller group eligible for death.
We familiarized ourselves with the governing law and the best prac-
tices used by researchers in this field to study this question. As academ-
ics, we genuinely wanted to know how successful our state was in sort-
ing out the worst of the worst killers. To answer this question, we built a
database of every murder prosecution in the state commenced between
January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2010, and studied the facts of each
case to determine whether each defendant could have been convicted of a
capital crime. What we found was that Colorado's first-degree murder
statute is one of the most capacious in the country-nearly 90% of all
murderers could have been convicted of first-degree murder under the
statute, and over 90% of those first-degree murderers were made statuto-
rily eligible for a death sentence by the presence of an aggravating factor
in their case. Based on these numbers, we determined that less than 1%
of all eligible killers were being sentenced to death in Colorado. We thus
concluded that the Colorado murder statute was failing in its task of iden-
tifying the worst of the worst killers and that as a result the exercise of
capital punishment in this state violates the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution.
In Brauchler and Orman's opinion, however, the entire study is a
facade for the promulgation of anti-death penalty rhetoric.'0 Our study,
7. See id. at 652-54. Brauchler and Orman repeatedly contend that we are simply too "inex-
perienced" to undertake this study. See, e.g., id. at 653-54 (citing our "apparent inexperience in the
area of criminal law" as a reason for discounting the study).
8. E.g., id at 640.
9. Justin Marceau, Sam Kamin & Wanda Foglia, Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are
Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (2013).
10. E.g., Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 682 ("To achieve their goal of lowering the bar
of punishment for aggravated murderers, the Authors-at the request of a murderer attempting to
avoid the death penalty for his second murder-have applied their questionable expertise and nearly
complete misunderstanding of Colorado's death penalty laws to a biased and flawed set of data
compiled by the murderer's defense team to support a theory they had from the outset: the Colorado
law is defective and unconstitutional.").
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they assert, suffers from "outcome-oriented methodology"" because the
"[a]uthors are anti-death penalty attorneys."l2 An entire section of their
article claims that the "[p]urpose of the [s]tudy at the [o]utset [w]as to
[d]efeat the [d]eath [p]enalty in Colorado." 3 While our study was com-
missioned by counsel for a capital defendant in Colorado, the research
and findings are based on our own independent judgment and work,
which we welcome anyone to replicate. The full methodology that we
used in our study is now a matter of public record, having been submitted
in litigation in a number of capital cases in Colorado.
As a general matter, Brauchler and Orman's claim that no academic
work, even an empirical study such as ours, can be viewed "in any way,
as disinterested [or] unbiased" is nothing less than a frontal assault on
academic scholarship and empirical research.14 To suggest that academ-
ics who hold any personal views on the issue they study are fundamental-
ly incapable of conducting neutral research is an astonishingly sweeping
and cynical perspective. Like Brauchler and Orman, we have personal
views on the merits of the death penalty. Unlike them, however, we set
out to study empirically the realities of the death penalty in Colorado in
order to test our hypothesis. This is the very essence of scientific inquiry;
if research must be discarded because its authors have personal views on
the subject matter, then scientific inquiry is impossible.
Moreover, the suggestion that we have intentionally skewed our re-
sults to conform to our personal views treads dangerously close to libel. 5
Our approach was not result-oriented, but was instead based on the best
practices for empirical legal research in the capital punishment field.'6 As
we have averred under oath, our personal views on the death penalty did
not impact the study methodology. 17 We take the veracity and integrity
11. Id at 652.
12. Id
13. Id at 654.
14. Id at 640.
15. It is defamation per se in many jurisdictions, including Colorado, to imply that one lacks
integrity. See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (holding that Colora-
do's anti-libel statute could be applied "constitutionally to private defamers who knowingly publish
or disseminate . . . any statement or object tending . . . to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or
reputation of a private individual" (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted)); Tronfeld v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 636 S.E.2d 447, 449-50 (Va. 2006) (describing common law defamation
claims including claims where a person's integrity is attacked). Brauchler and Orman repeatedly say
that our work was biased and cannot be viewed "as disinterested" because our only goal is to see the
death penalty abolished. E.g., Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 640. They claim that our ideolo-
gy "influenced [our] outcome-based research and analysis." Id.
16. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 40-62 (1990) (detailing the methodology used in two death penalty
studies); Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1091-93 (providing a literature review of death
penalty research).
17. Under Brauchler and Orman's view, anyone with reservations about the death penalty,
which is most scholars who have reflected on the issue, is unqualified to study the death penalty. See
Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 640 ("The Authors of Many Are Called and Disquieting Dis-
cretion are anti-death penalty. There is, of course, nothing wrong with that. However, they should
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of our academic work seriously and would not compromise our reputa-
tions for this or any study. Our study is based on concrete, verifiable data
and widely-accepted methodological approaches.'8
But don't take our word for it. The accuracy and robustness of our
conclusions have been verified by a separate study conducted by the
prosecution itself'9 Although Brauchler and Orman are now quick to
dismiss our conclusions as the product of bias and wanton "subjectivi-
ty,"20 when their own team of experts and researchers reviewed our data,
they found "death eligibility rates almost identical to ours (88.4% com-
pared to our 90.4%).",21 The reason for this similarity is easy to explain-
the application of the Colorado murder statute and aggravating factors in
individual cases is not rocket science. We firmly believe that anyone who
uses our dataset o replicate our research will answer our research ques-
tion-do Colorado's aggravating factors effectively narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants-the same way we did. The fact that a team of
prosecutors came to empirical conclusions essentially indistinguishable
from our own is perhaps the clearest refutation of the argument that our
conclusions were driven by our own views on the death penalty.
If further refutation of the claim of subjective bias was necessary-
and we argue that it is not-such evidence is easy to find. For example,
one could engage in the most conservative measure of death eligibility
imaginable by measuring only those aggravating factors in the Colorado
statute that are objectively verifiable (thus not subject to any discretion-
ary judgment calls by researchers).22 Even under this greatly simplified
view of when the death penalty is available in Colorado, the data shows
that the death eligibility rate is still far too high to pass constitutional
muster. As we have previously explained:
We could separate out the following class of indisputably objective
aggravating factors under the Colorado statute: (1) prior violent felo-
ny; (2) already serving a felony sentence at the time of the killing; (3)
pregnant victim; (4) victim was a child; (5) possession of the murder
weapon was a felony; (6) the defendant killed two or more people in
one or more incidents; (7) felony murder; and (8) killing for pecuni-
ary gain. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2014). Based on the-
se aggravating factors alone, over a ten-year period of study, 368
not be perceived, in any way, as disinterested, unbiased academics examining a problem and reach-
ing a conclusion.").
18. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 16, at 40-62.
19. See Prosecution Murder Stud y, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Douglas Cty. Mar. 29, 2013).
20. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 651.
21. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 4, at 121.
22. Of course this is not the approach adopted by the Colorado death penalty scheme which
permits a death sentence when, among other things, any of seventeen aggravating factors are present.
If Colorado's death penalty were limited to objectively identifiable aggravating factors, it would be a
very different and narrower statute. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2016).
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cases (out of the 596 first-degree murders within the study period)
would have objective, indisputable aggravating factors.23
In other words, if we limit our analysis solely to completely non-
subjective aggravating factors, Colorado still has an aggravating factor
rate of over 60%. This would be such a broad murder statute that it
would fail constitutional muster even if all factors requiring judgment
calls were excluded.24 Just these eight factors would permit nearly two-
thirds of all murderers to be put to death. And, of course, the Colorado
statute includes many more than these eight aggravating factors.
The claims that our results are the product of subjectivity, bias, or
result-oriented research are thus demonstrably false. Our dataset une-
quivocally shows a strikingly high aggravating factor rate (and a corre-
spondingly low death-sentencing rate). Brauchler and Orman may not
like this finding, but to call it biased in the face of concrete numbers is
simply disingenuous.
B. The Dataset
Our study is perhaps the most thorough of its kind. One principle
reason for this conclusion is that we did not sample murder cases within
a jurisdiction, but instead studied every single murder case statewide
during the relevant time period of our study. No other similar study has
examined such a broad swath of cases across an entire state. Without
mentioning this fact, Brauchler and Orman also take aim at our dataset,
claiming that "defense [lawyers] limited the data [we] were [able] to
consider."25 Once again, public filings make clear that this claim is false.
Our dataset was created by the State Judicial Branch State Court Admin-
istrator's Office (SCAO) rather than by the defense team and was subject
to a complete review and revision by prosecutors in the course of litiga-
tion. Brauchler and Orman have, in their possession, an affidavit from
the SCAO attesting under oath that they provided to the defense (who
then provided us) a list of every murder during the relevant time period.26
While it is true that defense counsel provided us with the cases that
we analyzed, it is important to remember that they obtained the case list
23. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 4, at 121 n.25 (citing Appendix to Mr. Montour's Brief in
Reply to the Prosecution's Motion to Vacate and to Its Submission of the Prosecution Montour
Murder Study (PMMS) app. J, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Douglas Cty.
Mar. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Montour Appendix]).
24. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not itself ever suggested that a death sen-
tencing scheme is unconstitutional based on the death eligibility rate alone. Instead the focus has
been on the death sentencing rate-a low death sentencing rate suggests arbitrariness in the applica-
tion of the ultimate penalty. But high death eligibility rates cause low death sentencing rates, and
even with a death eligibility rate of only 60%, the Colorado death sentencing rate would still be well
below the 15% constitutional floor suggested in Furman. Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The
Calfornia Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1288 (1997).
25. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 655.
26. See Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1098 n.148.
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from the SCAO and filed that list with the court in litigation. Defense
attorneys were operating at our direction (rather than the other way
around) regarding which cases to include in the study and which cases to
exclude from the study. Mr. Brauchler's office had the full opportunity
to, and did, thoroughly check the list for completeness and accuracy;
prosecutors had full access to the SCAO and its research capabilities as
well. All of the attorneys who participated in this process-including
Brauchler's team-have an absolute duty of candor to courts.27 In light
of these factors, it was reasonable for us to rely on the good faith of the
lawyers who collected the data used in our study.
Beyond accusations of bias, Brauchler and Orman suggest that we
should have consulted with District Attorneys in the creation of the data
set and given them an opportunity to note any missing murder cases from
the relevant time period. As they put it, "A fair attempt to review all
homicide cases over a limited period would have included seeking sup-
plementation or amendment of the defense-provided list by seeking input
from [prosecutors]."28 In fact, our published study does exactly this. Our
data was turned over to and reviewed extensively by the prosecution and
its own team of experts. The State identified seven cases that qualified
for the study but had not been initially included because their court files
had been sealed in the district court.29 The prosecution provided infor-
mation from their own files and we included all seven cases (all of which
we found to have the presence of at least one aggravating factor). In
court filings, Brauchler's own office conceded that there were no addi-
tional cases that they were aware of that satisfied the study criteria for
the relevant time period.
In short, Brauchler and Orman protest that our dataset was created
by a (dishonest) defense t am without any opportunity for input from the
prosecution. In reality, the dataset was generated by the SCAO and was
subject to screening and revision by the prosecution in the course of liti-
gation.
27. A number of declarations and supporting documents filed in the Montour case by those
responsible for providing, receiving, and reconciling the list, including the SCAO, the Office of
Alternative Defense Counsel (OADC), and others, were filed with the Court. These materials, espe-
cially given the prosecution's ability to verify all of the information, clearly establish that our study
included all known murder cases for the relevant time period. See Montour Appendix, supra note 23,
app. D, E, H.
28. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 655.
29. The Court Programs Analyst for the State Judicial Department signed a Declaration that
was filed with the Court, attesting to the very small number of murder cases tatewide-less than
five a year-that are subject to such sealing orders. See Montour Appendix, supra note 23, app. D;
see also Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1101-02.
30. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at I101--02.
31. Id. at I101-02, 1101 n.165.
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C. Case Selection and the Coding ofIndividual Cases for Aggravating
Factors
Our study of the effectiveness of Colorado's aggravating factors in
legislatively narrowing the class of death-eligible offenders required us
to examine the details of each individual murder case included in the
dataset. Specifically, we examined the available information about each
case to assess whether the case was a potential first-degree murder,32 and
if so, whether at least one aggravating factor was applicable to the
crime.3 3
Brauchler and Orman criticize this aspect of our research because,
in their view, our analysis was based on a "lack of reliable information"
about each case.34 In particular, they fault us for not having the police
report or affidavit in support of probable cause in many cases, and for
relying on media reports regarding the crimes in a non-trivial number of
the files.35 While this critique might appear reasonable, upon closer ex-
amination, it too fails to taint our research.
First, we note the information asymmetry under which we were op-
erating. The files that we received from the defense team contained all of
the information they were able to access from the SCAO. In the cases
where we did not have certain court-related documents, including the
probable cause documents, it is because the courts would not release
those documents to us-often because they were sealed. We are entirely
open to updating or amending our findings, and have done so as new
documents, such as appellate decisions in the studied cases, became pub-
licly available. If Brauchler and Orman think that we have misunder-
stood or misinterpreted cases, they should make available to us any in-
formation they possess that they think we are missing. In their article,
however, they point to no actual errors in our analysis and offer no sup-
plemental data to critique our methodology.
Relatedly, Brauchler and Orman identify as the "most concerning"
defect with our dataset the fact that we did not have any "information for
420 of the cases."3 6 They suggest that we "remarkably" coded approxi-
mately 31% of all of the cases in the study without examining a "single
piece of paper" relating to this case.37 This would, of course, be concern-
ing (if not disqualifying) if it were true, but it is not. While it is true that
a number of cases were removed from the study without our analyzing
them, this approach follows the best practices in the field. Those best
32. Our assessment was actually focused on determining whether each particular case was
either "factually" or "procedurally" first-degree murder. Id. at 1103 (defining and applying these
terms of art).
33. Id. at 1102.
34. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 656.
35. Id. at 656-57.




practices call for researchers to remove cases from their dataset when
those cases could never have been capital prosecutions, and that is exact-
ly what we did. We directed the interns and lawyers working for the
Data Collection Team to exclude a number of cases from our dataset for
ministerial reasons. Indeed, a careful reading of our study methodology
explains that we instructed the Data Collection Team "to remove cases
from the study based on three criteria: (1) the absence of a deceased vic-
tim ... (2) the defendant was a juvenile . .. or (3) the defendant was
convicted of [a particularly low level homicide, such as killings done in
the heat of passion, thus suggesting that it was not a factual first-degree
murder.]."39 Brauchler and Orman do not (and could not) contest any of
these rote determinations-they do not, for example, point to a single
defendant who was wrongly excluded from our study on this basis. This
criticism is nothing but a red herring.
Finally, while there is rhetorical force in chiding our study for rely-
ing in part on media accounts of crimes in analyzing our cases (when no
other information was available), some clarification is necessary on this
point as well. First, many of the narratives published in newspapers
about murders include quotes from prosecutors, which we treated as par-
ticularly relevant.40 For example, a quote from a prosecutor that the de-
fendant made good on a previous threat o kill the victim would be rele-
vant in determining that he defendant deliberated his killing. Likewise, a
news account that multiple people were killed or that the victim was an
infant would be highly relevant to assessing whether the crime had an
aggravating factor. Importantly, when we did not believe the file con-
tained sufficient information to determine whether a killing was a first-
degree murder for which an aggravating factor could be proved, we cod-
ed the case accordingly, and it was removed from the dataset.
To be sure, our claim is not that the dataset is perfect. Ours was a
sweeping project involving hundreds of cases from scores of jurisdic-
tions throughout the state; information was kept unevenly in different
counties but it was collected to the best abilities of those charged with
that task. We have done all that we could to confirm the accuracy and
38. Although Brauchler and Orman critique these methodological decisions to exclude cases
that are categorically ineligible for the death penalty, we are in fact making sure that our numbers do
not exaggerate Colorado's low death sentencing rate. Including such cases would skew the results
towards the appearance of unconstitutionality by "faulting" the State for a low death-prosecution
rate. Thus, removing those cases from consideration is a conservative measure that favors the State.
The largest removal category-almost two-thirds of the total-were cases in which there was no
deceased victim, such as attempted murders in which no one was killed. The State cannot constitu-
tionally prosecute a defendant for the death penalty unless someone has been killed, Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008), so we can imagine no principled objection to these exclusions.
39. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1100-01, 1101 n. 165.
40. See, e.g., John Ingold, James Holmes Trial: Prosecutors Seek Death Penalty in Aurora
Theater Shooting, DENV. POST (Apr. 1, 2013, 3:10 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/2013/04/01/james-holmes-trial-prosecutors-seek-death-penalty-in-




completeness of our data and continue to work to keep it up to date. Sig-
nificantly, Brauchler and Orman cannot identify a single specific error in
our findings associated with gaps in our data.
D. The Time Period Studied, 1999-2010
Brauchler and Orman also argue that the timeframe of our study
was unrepresentative and "seriously flawed."4' They claim that we ma-
nipulated the period under study in order to bolster a particular conclu-
sion.4 2 This critique is characteristic of their shoot-the-messenger style
and is woefully off-the-mark. Far from cherry-picking our data, we stud-
ied every murder case available to us at the time our study began.
Brauchler and Orman simultaneously complain that we did not
study recent enough cases like that of James Holmes (2015), and that we
did not go far enough back (pre-1999).4 3 As we have previously ex-
plained, the reason for limiting our study to these twelve years were
practical constraints on accessing data rather than decisions made by
anyone involved in the research. Once again, declarations from the Court
Programs Analyst of the Colorado Judicial Branch Division of Planning
and Analysis and the Office of the Alternate Defense Counsel attest to
the fact that the state judiciary provided us a list of every murder in the
state that could be identified through electronically searchable means.44
To put the matter plainly, 1999 was selected as the start of our study pe-
riod because, prior to 1999, there was simply no comprehensive way to
search for all murder cases in a given year. To have gone any further
back in time would have run the risk of producing exactly the kind of
incomplete and unrepresentative data that Brauchler and Orman wrongly
accuse us of using.
In addition, we have no reason to believe (and Brauchler and Orman
have offered no comprehensive data to suggest)45 that Colorado's death
41. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 657-60.
42. See id. at 657-59 (describing the time period used in the study as "seriously flawed and
unrepresentative of the death penalty in Colorado" and claiming that "[t]he Montour defense team
and the Authors chose the best possible dataset to get the results that hey were trying to reach in an
effort to spare Montour from a death sentence, and further, to attempt to declare Colorado's long-
standing death penalty unconstitutional").
43. Id at 659-60.
44. Apparently, the State Judicial Department underwent a computer conversion at the begin-
ning of 1999 that makes impossible reliable, electronic data searches prior to that time. Accordingly,
our study's dataset starts on January 1, 1999, and goes through the end of the last complete calendar
year before we commenced our study in mid-2011; that is, we looked at every murder case that
could be made available to us. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1098.
45. In a careless half-hearted attempt to characterize our dataset as "cherry-picked," Brauchler
and Orman provide information about six pre-1999 cases they identified. The conclusion seems to be
that if we had only looked back farther in time our conclusions would be fundamentally different.
Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 637, 658-60. Of course, Brauchler and Orman do not and
cannot explicitly make this point because they do not have anything approaching complete data
regarding all the murder cases in the years prior to 1999, as such data is unavailable. The examples
they give, like so much in their article, is a rhetorical sleight of hand. It is absurd to believe that their
analysis of six pre-1999 cases could possibly taint our 12-year, comprehensive study of over 1000
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penalty operated in a fundamentally different way in the years prior to
1999.4 And more importantly, we seriously doubt that such data from
more than seventeen years ago, even if it were available, would shed
considerable light on the current administration of Colorado's death pen-
alty. Our study is an examination of the current functioning of Colora-
do's capital sentencing scheme, not a historical project about how things
worked in the early 1990s.
Likewise, the claim that we deliberately omitted data from more re-
cent years is absurd on its face. Brauchler and Orman repeatedly fault us
for not including cases, like that of James Holmes, but the Holmes crime
had not even occurred when our study was under way and Holmes's trial
was not concluded until years after our study had been published. But
lest there be any lingering doubt about not including more recent cases,
we have continued analyzing cases arising after the end of our original
study, and we will continue to publish those findings as they become
available. Contrary to the claims of Brauchler and Orman, we are genu-
inely interested in what the data will show. Leading experts have con-
cluded that ours is perhaps the best study of death eligibility conducted in
the country to date,47 but as new or better data becomes available, we
strive to update our findings and improve our analysis.
E. Qualifications and Experience
Throughout their article, Brauchler and Orman refer to our research
in scare quotes (they call it a "study" and refer to us as "experts").48 It
seems that their pejorative tone towards our research is based on their
assumption that we are simultaneously too invested in death penalty re-
cases. Indeed, adding all of the cases they mention to our study (even though they are outside the
study period) would make no significant difference in the aggravating factor rate or the death sen-
tence rate, which is what we set out to study.
46. For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that some aggravating factors were added
in the years just before and after our study window. In 1998, Colorado added a hate-crime aggrava-
tor. H.B. 98-1160, 61st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 314, § 34 (codified
at COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(n) (1998), repealed by 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 318, § 3). In
2000, the possession of a murder weapon being a felony was added. H.B. 00-1234, 62nd Gen. As-
semb., 2d Reg. Sess., 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 110, § I (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(5)(o) (2000), repealed by 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 318, § 3). And in 2003, aggravators were
added to include pregnant victims and persons who kill two or more persons across more than one
incident. H.B. 03-1138, 64th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess., 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 340, § 5
(codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(q) (2003)); H.B. 03-1297, 64th Gen. Assemb., Ist
Reg. Sess., 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 202, § 1 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(p)
(2003)).
47. See, e.g., Montour Appendix, supra note 23, app. C (consisting of the Declaration of
Steven F. Schatz, the Philip and Muriel Barnett Professor at the University of San Francisco School
of Law and a leading researcher in the field); see also Steven F. Shatz, The Meaning of "Meaningful
Appellate Review" in Capital Cases: Lessons from California, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 82 n. 15
(2016) ("The most recent and thorough discussion of the narrowing requirement appears in Sam
Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981 (2015).").
48. E.g., Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 651-52. At one point they criticize us for
crediting our research with being original. Id. at 651 ("[T]he Authors rely on self-declared original
research."). We don't know what they mean by this attack. Our research is undisputedly original.
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search (having spent "the majority of [our] professional careers" on the
issue) and simply too inexperienced (referring to us as "nonpractitioner
academicians").4 9 We have already addressed the claim that our empiri-
cal analysis cannot be trusted because of our supposedly secret agenda to
undermine the death penalty.o In this Part, we will briefly respond to the
claim that we are unqualified to conduct a study such as ours.
First, we note that the argument1 that academics who are not cur-
rently practicing a particular kind of law in a particular jurisdiction are
unfit to analyze and critique that legal system is both deeply cynical and
52remarkably hostile to the academy as a whole. It undermines the entire
enterprise of legal scholarship to suggest that only practicing trial law-
yers are qualified to make empirical assessments of how a legal institu-
tion works in practice. Brauchler and Orman criticize us for not being
disinterested observers, but if anyone is disinterested here, it is those of
us outside the Colorado criminal justice system rather than those who
operate it on a daily basis.
As for our specific qualifications, one of us has a social science doc-
torate, whose background includes training in empirical study design and
implementation. Both of us are among the nation's most well-regarded
legal academics on the topic of the death penalty: we are co-authors of
the new edition of the leading textbook on this topic, we have individual-
ly and jointly been cited with regularity by state and federal courts, in-
cluding a recent dissent in a U.S. Supreme Court decision and the deci-
sion of the Delaware Supreme Court invalidating its state's death penalty
statute.53 We teach a course on capital punishment to law students and
one of us regularly teaches the course to sociology students, and we have
published numerous scholarly articles on the subject. Contrary to Brau-
chler and Orman's claim, our background and experience make us
uniquely qualified to engage in studies of this kind.M It is far more apt to
49. Id. at 651.
50. See supra Section I.A.
51. Under Brauchler and Orman's reasoning the greatest empirical researchers in history,
including David Baldus, would be categorically unfit to study the administration of the death penalty
in any state because they are not lawyers. See generally Adam Liptak, David C. Baldus, 75, Dies;
Studied Race and the Law, N.Y. TiMES (June 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/us/15baldus.html. This is patently absurd and anti-intellectual.
Such reasoning ought not to have appeared in the pages of a law review.
52. Brauchler and Orman go so far as to suggest hat only attorneys barred in a particular state
are fit to study or critique that state's statutes. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 653 (emphasiz-
ing that we are not "licensed to practice law in Colorado" as evidence of our inability to analyze the
Colorado system accurately).
53. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2761 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Rauf
v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
54. It is also simply inaccurate to say that we have never practiced law. One of us was an
assistant federal public defender handling almost exclusively death penalty cases for two years,
including a case that went to the U.S. Supreme Court. One of us has continued to practice law,
including criminal and death penalty law, as an academic, and both of us consult with criminal
lawyers, both on the defense and prosecution side. Sam Kamin, Professor, Vicente Sederberg Pro-
fessor of Marijuana Law & Policy, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll, of Law, Curriculum Vits (2016),
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wonder what qualifies Brauchler and Orman to critique the design of an
empirical study, something neither of them have ever done.
II. COLORADO AND FEDERAL LAW INFORMING OUR STUDY'S
METHODOLOGY
Contrary to claims made by Brauchler and Orman, we crafted our
study in accord with governing Colorado and federal law. In fact, these
laws drove our study.
A. Colorado Death Penalty Law
In addition to claims of bias and inexpertise, the central and defin-
ing substantive critique leveled against our study by Brauchler and Or-
man is that we fundamentally misunderstand Colorado law.55 Specifical-
ly, they assert that we fail to see the full picture by focusing on the pres-
ence or absence of aggravating factors rather than viewing the Colorado
capital statute more holistically.56 For example, Brauchler and Orman call
our failure to consider the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors
of the Colorado sentencing process in our assessment of legislative nar-
rowing the "most obvious demonstration of the impact of [our] inexperi-
ence and bias."57 However, this critique turns on a fundamental mischar-
acterization of Colorado law and is simply incorrect as a matter of Eighth
Amendment law.
To reiterate, our study was designed to assess whether Colorado's
statutory aggravating factors were effective in meaningfully narrowing
the class of death-eligible defendants. To make this determination, we
assessed whether a defendant could have been convicted of first-degree
murder and whether or not one or more aggravating factors was present
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/full-time/sam-kamin.pdf; Justin F. Marceau, Professor,
Animal Legal Def. Fund Professor of Law, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law, Curriculum Vita-
(2016), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/full-time/justin-marceau.pdf.
55. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 682 (stating that we "applied [our] questionable
expertise and nearly complete misunderstanding of Colorado's death penalty laws to a biased and
flawed set of data").
56. Id. at 653 n.108. Brauchler and Orman go out of their way to criticize the most trivial
mistakes and misstatements in our study in order to support their claim that we are unqualified to
study Colorado's death penalty. Many of the "mistakes" are matters of style or semantics that have
no relevance. More importantly, most of the instances where Brauchler and Orman attempt to "cor-
rect" us reveal their own ignorance of Colorado law. They repeatedly misstate and mischaracterize
Colorado law. For example, they seize upon a sentence in our study that says that a "defendant
convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, which is a class two felony, could be guilty
of first-degree murder as an accomplice," and claim definitively that this is a "misstatement of
Colorado law." Id. (quoting Justin Marceau, Sam Kamin & Wanda Foglia, Death Eligibility in
Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1100 n.162 (2013)). In
their view, "conspirators are not a subset of accomplices, nor vice-versa." Id. We don't disagree. We
were simply stating that one who has agreed with another to commit murder will often be guilty of
that murder under the separate theory of accomplice liability and that one who has aided another in
his commission of a murder (and is therefore liable for that killing as an accomplice) will often be
found to have entered a conspiracy with the killer. Nothing we wrote in our article was contrary.
Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at I100 n.162.
57. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 653.
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in a given case. Upon finding that nearly all killings during the study
period could have been prosecuted as first-degree murders and that more
than 90% of first-degree murders in Colorado had one or more aggravat-
ing factors, we concluded that the Colorado capital statute was not serv-
ing as an effective, legislatively imposed limit on the imposition of the
death penalty and that as a result, the statute fails constitutional muster.
Our inquiry follows directly from the Supreme Court's own language.
Brauchler and Orman reject this analysis, arguing that there is no
constitutional requirement of legislative narrowing because such a rule
originated in Furman v. Georgia, a seminal Supreme Court decision
that they maintain does not create any binding precedent.5 9 They identify
our focus on Furman as "symptomatic" of our inexperience because we
are "quoting not from the per curiam decision but to ... concurring opin-
ion[s] from the Furman decision."a They maintain, in other words, that
because Furman was a plurality decision, it created no binding precedent
beyond its holding. It is surprising that two capital litigators would so
fundamentally mischaracterize one of the Supreme Court's most im-
portant death penalty decisions; the Court has repeatedly held that Fur-
man is a critically important precedent.6 1 The words of Justice Scalia-
one of the Court's great death penalty defenders-echo with exacting
precision the reading of Furman we rely on in our study (and that Brau-
chler and Orman discount as deeply "flawed reasoning"): "The critical
opinions [in Furman] .. . focused on the infrequency and seeming ran-
58. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40, 313-14 (1972).
59. See Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 664-66.
60. Id. at 664 (footnote omitted).
61. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) ("This is because '[t]he stand-
ard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The
standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society
change."' (alteration in original) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)));
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006) (detailing the standard for state death penalty sys-
tems that Furman established); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 974-75 (1994) ("We have held,
under certain sentencing schemes, that a vague propositional factor used in the sentencing decision
creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the mark of the arbitrary and capricious sentencing
process prohibited by Furman . . . ." (citation omitted)); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 240 (1992)
(describing how the Court has applied Furman); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988)
("Since Furman, our cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discre-
tion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently mini-
mizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." (citations omitted)); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 301-03 (1987) (discussing Furman's impact on state death penalty schemes); Sumner
v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 70 (1987) ("In Furman, this Court, in effect, invalidated all such capital-
punishment statutes because of its conclusion that statutes permitting juries absolute discretion in
making the capital-sentencing determination resulted in the death penalty's being arbitrarily and
capriciously imposed, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."); Pulley v. Harris,
465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984) ("In Furman, the Court concluded that capital punishment, as then adminis-
tered under statutes vesting unguided sentencing discretion in juries and trial judges, had become
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment."); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983)
(describing the Court's opinion in Furman as a "central mandate"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 427-28 (1980) (describing Furman's holding); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977)
(describing Furman's holding); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (stating that Furman
established requirements that are necessary to render a death penalty statute constitutional).
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domness [of state death penalty systems]."62 Avoiding rarity and ran-
domness remains a mandate of Furman and the constitutional framework
governing capital punishment in this country. Brauchler and Orman's
repeated suggestion that Furman, much less the requirement of narrow-
ing, are not constitutional mandates i  indefensible; indeed, the Justices
have individually and as a Court repeatedly and without hesitation rec-
ognized Furman as creating this binding law on more than a dozen occa-
sions at this point.63
Furman and its progeny make clear that a capital statute must nar-
row the pool of all murderers to a small group eligible for death and that
this narrowing must occur through legislative definition rather than the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Explaining the holding of Furman,
in Zant v. Stephens, a case inexplicably missing from Brauchler and
Orman's analysis, the Court stated that the process of narrowing is a
"constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative defini-
tion."65 In other words, narrowing is a legislative function, not a matter
of moral judgment or prosecutorial discretion. The Court has recognized
that the Eighth Amendment requires that narrowing occur through jury
findings of a statutorily enacted "aggravating circumstance (or its
equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase."66
This straightforward rule has huge implications that vindicate our
research methods and are devastating to Brauchler and Orman's critique.
Brauchler and Orman live in a world where the requirement of legisla-
tively enacted narrowing is not constitutionally mandated. Indeed, they
blithely claim that "[o]f course, more than just the death penalty statute
needs to be considered,"67 rejecting the holding of Furman, Zant, and
their progeny that narrowing is a legislative act. They even go so far as to
claim that the most serious defect of our research is our failure to "in-
clude any analysis whatsoever concerning the jury's consideration of
mitigation and weighing mitigation against aggravation."68 We have re-
sponded at length to this misplaced attack elsewhere,69 so a short rebuttal
of this point will suffice.
Colorado's capital sentencing framework is comprised of four stag-
es (called "phases" or "steps"): (1) a jury finding of one or more aggra-
vating factors; (2) the assessing of mitigating factors; (3) weighing ag-
gravating factors against mitigating factors to determine whether the case
62. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-58 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled on
other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
63. See cases cited supra note 62.
64. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
65. Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
66. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 644.
68. Id at 663-64.
69. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 47, at 1038.
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in mitigation is sufficient to justify mercy; and (4) even if the weighing
does not favor life over death, a determination whether death is the ap-
propriate penalty.70 It is true that we included in our narrowing study
only the first stage-the finding of aggravating factors.7' But we did so
deliberately and with good reason. The assessing of mitigating factors
and the purely "moral assessment"72 of whether mitigating factors out-
weigh aggravating factors are not objective and determinate questions of
fact of the sort the Supreme Court has described when it speaks of nar-
rowing. While they are very relevant to who lives and who dies under
Colorado law, they cannot do the work of constitutional narrowing.
That is because the Supreme Court has made clear that the eligibil-
ity factors-those factors that make one eligible for the ultimate penal-
ty-must be sufficiently objective that they "require an answer to afac-
tual question."73 This is why our research question was whether the eli-
gibility factors in Colorado-those determinate, factual questions that
create the preconditions for a death sentence-are serving a meaningful
narrowing function. While there may be other prerequisites to the impo-
sition of a death sentence-the decision of a prosecutor to pursue the
death penalty, a jury's conviction of a capital crime, the decision that the
case in mitigation does not outweigh the aggravating factors, the ultimate
decision to spare or condemn the defendant-those are not the kind of
objective, narrowing factors that the Supreme Court has mandated.
Confirming this point, the Supreme Court, subsequent o the publi-
cation of the Brauchler and Orman article, has further weakened the ar-
gument that Colorado's third-stage (the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors) is an eligibility question of the sort we were measur-
70. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1088-89 (Colo. 2007) (en bane).
71. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1110.
72. In Colorado, the third phase weighing decision is indisputably a moral, not factual, eval-
uation. See People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 845 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (calling Colorado's weighing
decision a "moral evaluation"), superseded by statute COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-102(1) (1993), as
recognized by People v. Vance, 933 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1997) (en banc), disapproved by Griego v.
People, 19 P.3d I (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (regarding whether an order granting a new trial is final,
which is immediately appealable); id at 844 ("[T]he weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors
differs fundamentally from the functions of a jury in finding facts and applying the law as instructed
by the court."); id. (stating that the "essence of the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating
factors" is a "moral evaluation"). Brauchler should remember this from the James Holmes trial, at
which the trial judge instructed jurors that "each of you will be called upon to deliberate to make
decisions based on your individual reasoned moral judgment." See Jury Instructions-Phase 2 of
Sentencing Hearing, at Instruction No. 1, People v. Holmes, No. 12-CR-1522 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Arap-
ahoe Cty. July 30, 2015) [hereinafter Holmes Instructions],
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/CourtProbation/18thJudicialDistrict/1 8thCourts/ 12
CR1522/011/Jury/20lnstructions(l).pdf; id. at Instruction No. 2 (mitigation may bear on "the
defendant's moral culpability"); id. at Instruction No. 5 ("Each juror must use his or her own person-
al discretion, life experiences, and reasoned moral judgment in determining for himself or herself
what mitigating factors exist."); id. ("[T]he weighing process requires a critical evaluation of the
mitigating factors and the aggravating factors so that you can make a reasoned moral judgment as to
whether you are individually convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating factors do not
outweigh the aggravating factors.").
73. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 978 (1994) (emphasis added).
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ing in our study. In Kansas v. Carr,74 the Court explained that the pro-
cess of assessing mitigating evidence is not subject to clear standards of
proof because it is not truly a factual or evidentiary matter:
[W]e doubt whether it is even possible to apply a standard of proof
to the mitigating-factor determination (the so-called "selection phase" of
a capital-sentencing proceeding). It is possible to do so for the aggravat-
ing-factor determination (the so-called "eligibility phase"), because that
is a purely factual determination. The facts justifying death set forth in
the Kansas statute either did or did not exist-and one can require the
finding that they did exist to be made beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether mitigation exists, however, is largely a judgment call (or per-
haps a value call); what one juror might consider mitigating another
might not. And of course the ultimate question whether mitigating cir-
cumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances is mostly a question of
mercy-the quality of which, as we know, is not strained.75
Carr's reasoning reiterates the Court's view that death eligibility
turns on "purely factual" matters while issues of penalty selection turn on
moral "judgment call[s]."76 In Brauchler and Orman's view, determining
the ability of the Colorado death penalty system to meaningfully narrow
requires an examination of the weighing of aggravators and mitigators
(stage three of the Colorado system). But the Colorado Supreme Court
unequivocally disagrees with this reading of the capital statute-
"whether mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances
is mostly a question of mercy."7 7 The existence of an aggravating factor
alone does not guarantee a death sentence, to be sure, but proof of an
aggravating factor serves as the definitive, objective, factual limit on the
imposition of the death penalty, and it was there that our focus was right-
ly placed.78 Despite sweeping ad hominem suggesting that we should be
74. 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016).
75. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
76. Id
77. Id.; see People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965, 973, 987 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (stating that
mercy and sympathy for the defendant can be considered at steps two (mitigation) and three (weigh-
ing)); see also Holmes Instructions, supra note 73, at Instruction No. 2 ("[A] mitigating factor is a
fact or circumstance which, in fairness or mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the
degree of the defendant's moral culpability or as diminishing the appropriateness of a death sen-
tence."); id at Instruction No. 8 ("You may consider mercy for the defendant during Phase 2 of the
sentencing hearing.").
78. The statutory aggravating factor is the starting point for research in the field. See Kathe-
rine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in
Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 305, 321 (2009) ("The purpose of statutory aggravators is to
significantly narrow the immense discretion that prosecutors wield in making decisions to seek the
death penalty and juries wield in making decisions to impose the death penalty."); see also, e.g.,
JOHN J. DONOHUE III, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 1973-2007: A COMPREHENSIVE
EVALUATION FROM 4686 MURDERS TO ONE EXECUTION 175 (2011); David C. Baldus et al., Racial
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United States
Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1229 (2011); Raymond Pater-
noster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland,
1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 1, 20 (2004); Glenn L. Pierce & Mi-
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ashamed of our methodology, we proudly stand by our conclusion that
statutory narrowing occurs in Colorado only through the application of
aggravating factors.7 9
B. Prosecutorial Discretion Is Not Constitutional Narrowing
Brauchler and Orman also take great umbrage with our discussion
of one particular aggravating factor-that the defendant lay in wait for
his victim. In the background section of our study we commented that
"[fjor any murderer who kills 'after deliberation,' it will be the rare case
in which the perpetrator did not also surprise the victim, or at least wait
for an opportune moment to kill. Thus, the lying in wait aggravator has
application in an extremely large number of murder cases in Colorado."8 0
Brauchler and Orman respond to this sentence in the following manner:
Failing to cite to any source for their conclusion, the Authors claim
that this applies to almost any first degree murder after delibera-
tion ... . Here, the Study seems to suffer from what one can under-
statedly call a dearth of practical experience. By contending that the
absence of "lying in wait or ambush" aggravator is rare in a first de-
gree murder prosecution, the Study demonstrates a misunderstanding
of the nature of first degree murder prosecutions in Colorado and,
likely, any other state. Indeed, our practical experience, and that of
chael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39,
55-56 (2002); Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 24, at 1313, 1318-19.
79. Closely related, Brauchler and Orman repeatedly make the self-serving claim that our
study is "replete with oversimplifications." Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 662. The alleged
"over-simplification" that they press most fervently is our conclusion-borrowed from the Supreme
Court-that low death sentencing rates naturally flow from unreasonably high death eligibility rates.
Id. at 662-63. As Justice White explained in Gregg, when a death penalty system is sufficiently
narrowed through aggravating factors, as in Georgia, "it becomes reasonable to expect that ju-
ries ... will impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined." Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring). The counterintuitive nature of the Eighth
Amendment claim we articulate is exactly consistent with the Supreme Court's discussion of nar-
rowing: Since 1972 a showing that too few people being sentenced to death (out of the too many
eligible for death) will state an Eighth Amendment claim. Brauchler and Orman mock this claim, but
there is nothing comical or simplistic about a straightforward application of constitutional law. As
we acknowledge repeatedly in our own study, though it seems paradoxical to argue that a death
sentencing rate that is too low evinces a constitutional problem, this is what the Eighth Amendment
dictates. See Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1078 n.37; id at 1082 ("[I]t is this require-
ment of legislative narrowing that renders sensible the otherwise counterintuitive claim that a capital
sentencing scheme that produces too low of a death sentence rate is unconstitutional."). When death
eligibility is too high-that is, when the legislatively enacted narrowing devices do not sufficiently
limit the class of persons eligible for the death penalty-leading researchers and the Supreme Court
have predicted exactly what our study shows-unconstitutionally low death sentencing rates. Id. at
1078, 1092-93. Thus, Brauchler and Orman claim that we "want it both ways" because we claim
that too many defendants are death eligible while also citing the low death sentencing rate. Brauchler
& Orman, supra note 3, at 644. This criticism betrays a lack of understanding of the Eighth Amend-
ment doctrine at issue. High rates of death eligibility give rise to low death sentencing rates-
because so many are eligible for death, a small percentage of those elgible will be sentenced to
death. This point seems to be entirely lost on Brauchler and Orman.
80. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1089.
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other prosecutors with whom we have discussed this issue, shows
killing from ambush, or lying in wait, are the rare case. Very rare.si
While it is true that we did not cite a source for our assertion, one is
ready at hand. Over a strenuous defense objection, lawyers in Brauchler
and Orman's office argued that the lying in wait aggravator was support-
ed by the evidence in the case of Edward Montour.82 Montour was
charged, convicted, and subsequently sentenced to death for killing a
prison guard with an industrial-size soup ladle while working in the
kitchen. The prosecution argued that because the defendant surprised the
victim or waited for an opportune moment to kill, the lying in wait ag-
gravator applied to his case, and the trial court agreed:
The People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defend-
ant concealed his purpose and his intention to kill Sergeant Autobee.
Clearly the concealment of physical presence is sufficient to establish
a claim of lying in wait. The issue is whether concealment of purpose
or intent is also sufficient to establish a claim of lying in wait. There
is no specific Colorado case law on this issue. Other jurisdictions
have indicated that lying in wait covers, in addition to physical con-
cealment, concealment of purpose or intention. See People v. Mo-
rales, 770 P.2d 244 (Calif. 1989), and People v. Carpenter. 935 P.2d
708 (Calif. 1997). Given the facts outlined above in People's Exhibit
50 concerning the Defendant's waiting for the opportunity to strike
the victim and the concealment of the purpose of his actions from the
victim, this Court finds that this aggravator has been established be-
yond a reasonable doubt.83
In other words, at the urging of Brauchler and Orman's own col-
leagues, a Colorado court has concluded that the lying in wait aggravator
applies any time a defendant seeks to surprise the victim or any time the
defendant seeks an advantageous opportunity to kill and conceals his or
her purpose. This is the definition of lying in wait urged (successfully)
by Brauchler's own office-we simply applied it. 4
We mention this critique of our use of the lying in wait aggravator
because it is but one of many places in their article that Brauchler and
Orman appeal for deference to their years of trial court experience. Per-
haps what Brauchler and Orman mean to say is that they would not
charge "lying in wait" in the vast majority of deliberate killings. This
81. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 661-62.
82. Sentencing Order at 10-11, People v. Montour, No. 02-CR-782 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Douglas
Cty. Feb. 27, 2003).
83. Id at 11.
84. There were twenty-two formal death prosecutions during the study period. See Marceau,
Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1111. Of the twenty-one such prosecutions in which a notice of
aggravating factors was filed, the lying in wait aggravating factor was alleged in nine cases, which
belies the claim that Brauchler and Orman make about this factor being regarded as "very rare."
Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 662.
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might be true, but it has no bearing whatsoever on our conclusions or on
the constitutionality of the Colorado statute. Whether Brauchler and Or-
man may personally choose to apply a narrowing construction to this
aggravating factor has no relevance to the question of whether, at the
stage of legislative definition, the aggravating factors in the Colorado
capital statute narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. Just as pros-
ecutors cannot save Colorado's statute by promising, for example, that
they would never seek death unless two or more aggravators are clearly
present, they cannot by fiat redefine an aggravating factor so as to render
its application less capacious. Constitutional narrowing must occur
through legislative enactment of objective criteria, not through prosecu-
torial grace.
C. Colorado's First-Degree Murder Is Not Narrowly Circumscribed
Among Brauchler and Orman's many misstatements, one of the
most blatant is their assertion that Colorado's "definition of 'first-degree
murder"' is narrower than most all other states . They make this claim to
counter our findings (which their own office confirmed) that the aggra-
vating factors do not do any meaningful narrowing work under the cur-
rent statutory framework. And it is at least theoretically possible that for
a state's narrowing to be done not just by the aggravating factors, but by
a very specific first-degree murder statute. The problem, however, is that
their characterization of Colorado's first-degree murder provision is en-
tirely divorced from the textual reality and from the operation of the stat-
ute in practice.
Colorado law permits one to be convicted of first-degree murder
based on an unintentional killing-killing with extreme indifference is a
category of first-degree murder in our state.86 Very few, if any, other
states allow one to be guilty of the highest grade of murder for a single
unintentional, non-felony murder. Furthermore, all felony murder in
Colorado is first-degree murder; unlike most other states, Colorado's
murder statute lacks a second-degree felony murder provision. Brauchler
and Orman attempt to elide these damaging facts by arguing that the
"most utilized theory of first-degree murder" is a killing that occurs "af-
ter deliberation," which they explain is narrower than first-degree murder
in some other jurisdictions.87 This is yet another example of the prosecu-
tors attempting to use their own discretion to fix flaws in the capital stat-
ute. They argue that the relevant definition of first-degree murder is what
their office is likely to prosecute as first-degree murder, rather than what
the statute actually says. Of course, this is not how a legal system
works-a statute is judged on its words, not simply on the way a pair of
prosecutors choose to understand and apply those words. There is noth-
85. Id. at 644.
86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(d) (2016).
87. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 644-45.
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ing Brauchler and Orman can say that would change the plain reality of
the Colorado statute, which is that it allows nearly 90% of murders to be
prosecuted as first-degree murders. So instead, they ignore the actual
Colorado statute and analyze only the "after deliberation" form of first-
degree murder.
III. CONCLUSION: COLORADO'S DEATH PENALTY IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Brauchler and Orman article strains mightily to convince read-
ers that the death penalty in Colorado is simply a matter to be determined
by public opinion. Their article is replete with data about the popularity
of capital punishment in this state. From this data they conclude that
Colorado's death penalty is constitutional and that our research is irrele-
vant. Trust us, they seem to say, the death penalty is working fine.
This is one of the themes in their article; after the inflammatory lan-
guage is stripped away, one is left with little more than a demand by two
powerful prosecutors to be left alone. Pay no attention to those academ-
ics, they argue, the death penalty is working just fine, and the people of
the state are happy with how we and other prosecutors are using it. It is a
chilling and dark commentary on how these career prosecutors and poli-
ticians view academic scholarship. They attack the credibility and the
methods of the messengers, rather than taking accountability for what we
have shown are profound shortcomings in the current system.
What all of their invective cannot do, however, is change the facts
or law regarding the death penalty in Colorado; as our study shows, Col-
orado's death penalty statute fails to pass constitutional muster. We show
that nearly every murder in Colorado could be charged as first-degree
murder, and nearly every one of those is statutorily eligible for the death
penalty. Our numbers could not be more clear, and the conclusion from
them could not be more straightforward: Colorado's death penalty is
fatally, unconstitutionally defective. We would hope that Brauchler and
Orman would spend their time constructively trying to fix a broken sys-




THE JURY REQUIREMENT IN DEATH SENTENCING AFTER
HURST V. FLORIDA
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has long held that the death penalty is different
from all other punishments and requires more substantive and procedural
restrictions. Capital sentencing in particular requires more protections
than non-capital sentencing. The Supreme Court has previously declared
that death cannot be the mandatory penalty for committing a criminal
offense. Instead after the conviction stage of a capital trial, states utilize a
second, sentencing stage in which the sentencer decides whether the de-
fendant receives a life sentence or the death penalty. States have devel-
oped several different kinds of sentencing schemes, most leaving sen-
tencing exclusively to the jury, others exclusively to the judge, and still
others a hybrid system wherein the jury gives a recommendation, but the
judge independently determines and imposes the actual sentence.
While the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment controls most death penalty jurisprudence, the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial guarantee also limits the ways in which states may sentence a
defendant to death. The Supreme Court struck down judge-only sentenc-
ing systems in 2002, holding that these schemes violated criminal de-
fendants' jury trial right. Specifically, judge-only sentencing impermissi-
bly removed from the jury the duty of finding the aggravating factors
necessary to increase a criminal defendant's sentence from life impris-
onment to death. However, some of the states that allowed for the judi-
cial override of the jury's recommended sentence did not modify their
state death penalty statutes in the wake of this decision. Instead, they
argued that the jury's recommended sentence satisfied the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee, even though the judge determined the
actual sentence notwithstanding the jury's recommendation.
On January 12, 2016, the Supreme Court struck down Florida's hy-
brid sentencing statute. In Hurst v. Florida, the Court reiterated its previ-
ous sentencing jurisprudence, interpreting the Sixth Amendment as guar-
anteeing that a jury find all the facts necessary to elevate the possible
sentence from life imprisonment to death. Since this decision, the Dela-
ware and Alabama Supreme Courts have interpreted the Sixth Amend-
ment's requirements and have come to radically different conclusions
about their respective judicial-override systems. This Case Comment
analyzes the breadth and limitations of Hurst's Sixth Amendment ra-
tionale. The Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence limits the jury's
role in death sentencing to fact-finding. However, the evolving standards
of decency that lie at the heart of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment make it impermissible for a single state
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actor to determine and impose the death penalty. Going forward, the
Court should recognize that the Eighth Amendment requires the jury,
representing and voicing the conscience of the community, to decide
every sentence of death.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 2016, in Rauf v. State,' the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware ruled the state's death penalty statute unconstitutional.2 The
grounds for this ruling came from the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Hurst v. Florida,3 which held that "[t]he Sixth
Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to
impose a sentence of death."A Delaware's capital sentencing statute cre-
ated a hybrid system in which the jury recommended a sentence of life
imprisonment or death, but the judge independently determined and im-
posed the sentence (also known as "judicial override"). The Delaware
Supreme Court justices who joined the majority split in their reasons,
each interpreting Hurst's requirements in radically different ways.6
1. 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 433-35.
3. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). In Hurst, the Court applied the sentencing requirements revealed in
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), specifically to judicial-override capital sentencing. 136 S. Ct.
at 620-22.
4. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 619.
5. See Rauf 145 A.3d at 450.
6. See id. at 434-37, 454, 458-61, 464-66, 468-69, 475-77, 480 (Strine, C.J., concurring);
id. at 482-87 (Holland, J., concurring); id. at 487-90, 492-501 (Valihura, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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Less than two months after Rauf, Alabama's Supreme Court held
that Hurst did not invalidate Alabama's own hybrid capital sentencing
system. Unanimous in the result and relying on earlier Alabama case
law, the state supreme court held that Alabama's construction of capital
crimes implicitly satisfied the Sixth Amendment's fact-finding require-
ments described in Hurst.
These varied opinions illustrate the general confusion surrounding
the U.S. Supreme Court's recent capital sentencing jurisprudence. This
Case Comment analyzes the breadth and limitations of Hurst's reliance
on the Sixth Amendment to define the jury's role in capital sentencing. It
argues that Hurst compels the conclusion that a jury, not a judge, must
make all death eligibility findings, including the assessment of the rela-
tive weight of aggravating and mitigating factors. In addition to this
Sixth Amendment guarantee, the Court should recognize the Eighth
Amendment as requiring the jury to determine and impose every death
sentence.
The Court's capital jurisprudence arose in the 1970s.9 In 1972's
Furman v. Georgia,'o the Supreme Court declared that the present appli-
cation of the death penalty violated the Constitution in a short per curiam
opinion joined by five justices." However, many states desired to retain
the death penalty and struggled to parse the Court's confusing decrees
and redraft their capital statutes accordingly.12
In response to Furman, every death penalty state adopted a bifurcat-
ed capital trial system, which divided trials into a guilt-innocence stage
and a sentencing stage.'3 The sentencing stage took several forms; while
7. See Bohannon v. State (In re Bohannon), No. 1150640, 2016 WL 5817692, at *17-18
(Ala. Sept. 30, 2016).
8. Id. at*10-ll, *15-17, *26.
9. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE
OF ABOLITION 183-86 (2010) (discussing the American anti-death penalty movement that faltered in
the mid-1970s after the Supreme Court briefly ruled the death penalty unconstitutional); Sam Kamin
& Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury's Role in Capital Sentencing, 13
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 533-35 (2011); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ulti-
mate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091,
1091-93 (2003).
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
11. Id. at 239-40. Far from united in its reasoning, the five justices who voted down the death
penalty each issued his own concurrence. Id. at 240. Likewise, the four pro-death penalty justices
each authored his own dissent. Id.
12. See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury,
2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 124-25 (2004); Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited
Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62, 62 (1972). In
what is perhaps an ironic nod to Furman, the Delaware Supreme Court in Rauffollowed Furman's
lead by issuing a short per curiam decision followed by several concurrences, leading to an outcome,
but no concrete rule of law. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 430-31 (Del. 2016) (per curiam)
("[T]he importance of [capital sentencing] to our state and our fellow citizens .. . makes it useful for
all the Justices to bring our various perspectives to bear on these difficult questions.").
13. See William J. Bowers et al., The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of
the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 931, 932-33 (2006); cf Abramson, supra note 12, at 124-26.
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most states retained jury sentencing, some states instituted a system
wherein the judge alone determined sentencing factors, imposing a life
sentence or a death sentence based upon the judge's findings.14 Still oth-
ers employed hybrid systems (also known as judicial override) in which
the jury, having already convicted a criminal defendant of a capital of-
fense, recommended a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but the
judge independently determined and imposed the actual sentence.
The Supreme Court set a capital-sentencing trend in 1976 by up-
holding Florida's hybrid system.16 Over the 1980s and 1990s, the Court
routinely upheld hybrid and judge-only capital sentencing systems.,
However, in 1999 and 2000, the Court issued two non-capital sentencing
opinions that undermined these previously-constitutional capital sentenc-
18 20
ing systems. In Jones v. United States19 and Apprendi v. New Jersey,
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee requires
that any fact necessary to increase the maximum penalty for an offense is
an "element" of the offense and must be proved to a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.2 1 This requirement applied to any such fact, no matter
what the state called it, and could not be avoided by describing the fact
as merely a sentencing consideration.22 While both opinions distin-
guished the seemingly-conflicting holdings of the earlier capital cases,23
the Court soon held in Ring v. Arizona24 that judge-only capital sentenc-
ing was "irreconcilable" with the Apprendi rule.25
While Ring determined the fate of judge-only capital sentencing,
states were left to wonder about the constitutionality of hybrid schemes.
Some abandoned the practice,26 but other states kept their systems in
14. Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 933.
15. Id. States implemented judicial override systems in order to protect defendants, thinking
that this gave defendants "a second chance for life with the trial judge" should the jury vote in favor
of the death penalty. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 513 (1995) (quoting Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 296 (1977)).
16. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-50, 253 (1976). In Florida's scheme, a jury,
after the conviction stage and a sentencing hearing, recommended a sentence of life imprisonment or
death; however, notwithstanding the jury's recommendation, a judge independently determined and
passed the sentence. Id. at 248-50, 252.
17. See, e.g., Harris, 513 U.S. at 515 (upholding Alabama's hybrid sentencing system); Wal-
ton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 639 (1990) (upholding Arizona's judge-only sentencing system),
overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 638-41
(1989) (upholding Florida's hybrid system), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016);
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 449 (1984) (upholding Florida's hybrid system), overruled by
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
18. See cases cited infra notes 19-20.
19. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
20. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
21. See id at 476, 490; Jones, 526 U.S. at 243-44.
22. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 495-96.
23. See id. at 496-97; Jones, 526 U.S. at 250-51.
24. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
25. See id. at 609.
26. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 937 (noting that Indiana replaced the judicial override
with jury-sentencing).
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place, relying on the Supreme Court's pre-Apprendi decisions upholding
these sentencing schemes.27 However, in the recent decision of Hurst, the
Court extended Apprendi and Ring, holding that Florida's hybrid sen-
tencing system denied criminal defendants their Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial.2 8
Despite one Delaware Supreme Court justice's broad reading of
Hurst,29 this Case Comment will demonstrate that the Supreme Court's
recent extension of the Sixth Amendment is, at best, a modest step to-
ward guaranteeing that the death penalty be imposed without violating
constitutional safeguards. Part I explores the legal background leading up
to Hurst. Part II examines Hurst itself Part III discusses the implications
of Hurst. It first looks to the limits of Hurst by examining exactly what
kinds of facts fall under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee. It
then looks to the Delaware Supreme Court's application and varied in-
terpretations of Hurst's mandates. The Case Comment then turns to
Hurst's implications, arguing that Alabama's judicial override statute
will almost certainly be overturned. Finally, it argues that the Hurst ma-
jority should have supported its Sixth Amendment holding with the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.30
These twin constitutional bulwarks limit the government's ability to sen-
tence and apply the death penalty.3 1 Taken together, they guarantee that a
judge-as the state's agent-can neither find the facts necessary to make
a defendant death eligible nor can a judge impose the ultimate penalty.
Rather, an impartial jury, as representative of the community's con-
science and voice, should make any findings necessary to sentence a
defendant to death.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty systems in
Texas and Georgia were so arbitrary that they violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.32 The deci-
27. See, e.g., Waldrop v. State (In re Waldrop), 859 So. 2d 1181, 1184, 1191 (Ala. 2002)
(upholding Alabama's hybrid system), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003); Bottoson v. Moore, 833
So. 2d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 2002) (upholding Florida's hybrid system), abrogated by Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
28. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619-21, 624 (2016). The Court struck down Florida's
statute 7-1. See id
29. Raufv. State, 145 A.3d 430, 434-36 (Del. 2016) (Strine, C.J., concurring) (per curiam).
30. Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer provide the foundation for this argument. See Ring, 536
U.S. at 613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-16, 524-26 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467, 471-73, 477-90 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
31. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 532-33.
32. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam). The opinions of Jus-
tices Stewart, White, and Douglas-which were concerned with the states' formulation of the death
penalty and not the per se constitutionality of the death penalty-have had the largest influence on
death penalty jurisprudence going forward. While varied, the opinions criticized the lack of statutory
guidance for death sentencing and the randomness of death sentences. See Kamin & Marceau, supra
note 9, at 533-34.
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sion set the stage for modem death penalty jurisprudence as thirty-five
states scrambled to decipher the Court's requirements in Furman and
craft constitutionally permissible capital punishment statutes.33 While
this reworking took many forms, every death penalty state adopted a
bifurcated capital trial system, which split capital trials into two parts:
(1) the guilt-innocence stage (which must always be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt) and (2) the sentencing stage.34 In 1976, the
Supreme Court issued five death penalty decisions in which it declared
that some states had overcome Furman's critiques.35 Effectively, the
death penalty was reinstated.
Over the years since restoring capital punishment, the Court has
evolved and adopted a "death-is-different" jurisprudence, primarily
linked to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.36 This jurisprudence holds generally that because of its finality,
irrevocability, and severity, the death penalty requires "greater procedur-
al and substantive protections" than all other forms of punishment.37 For
example, in Woodson v. North Carolina,38 the Court held that, unlike
lesser punishments, the death penalty cannot be a mandatory punishment
for violation of a criminal statute.39
What makes a punishment cruel and unusual is not static but chang-
es as society progresses.40 Recognizing this principle, the Court derived
33. See Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1091 n.4. In the first stage, the Sixth Amendment required
that the defendant's guilt be proved to a jury by a reasonable doubt. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .").
34. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 932-33; cf Abramson, supra note 12, at 124-26.
35. The Court upheld death penalty statutes in three cases. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
268, (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87,
206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Court struck down statutes in two cases. See Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 327, 336 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 282, 305
(1976) (plurality opinion).
36. Abramson, supra note 12, at 118-19. Since 2002, the Court has generally expanded the
scope of the Eighth Amendment in terms of both capital punishment and life without the possibility
of parole (LWOP). See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (striking down man-
datory LWOP for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81-82 (2010) (striking down LWOP
for juveniles who commit non-homicide crimes); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412-13
(2008) (striking down capital punishment for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and
was not intended to result in death of the victim); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005)
(striking down capital punishment for juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)
(striking down capital punishment for intellectually disabled defendants).
37. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sen-
tencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1150, 1164-65, 1167, 1174
(2009); see also Abramson, supra note 12, at 118-19; Erwin Chemerinsky, Sydney M. Irmas Profes-
sor of Pub. Interest Law, Legal Ethics & Political Sci., Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch., Keynote Address at
the Honorable James J. Gilvary Symposium on Law, Religion & Social Justice: Evolving Standards
of Decency in 2003-Is the Death Penalty on Life Support?, in 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 201, 219
(2004) ("[D]eath, after all, is different than any other punishment because it's irrevocable. Any other
mistake could to some extent be corrected, but not when somebody is executed.").
38. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
39. Id. at 301.
40. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) ("[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are
not precise, and . . . their scope is not static.").
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"two essential touchstones for defining the evolving standards of decen-
cy . .. at the core of Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments: (1) 'objective ind[ices] of contemporary val-
ues"' seen in death penalty legislation and jury verdicts and (2) "whether
the death penalty 'comports with the basic concept of human dignity at
the core of the Amendment.'"4  Although the Court has mostly applied
the "evolving standards of decency" to limit substantive offenses (e.g.,
no capital punishment for non-homicide offenses and no capital punish-
ment for juveniles or those with intellectual disabilities),42 the Court has
indicated several times in the past that this standard applies to procedural
concerns as well (e.g., whether only a jury may pass the sentence of
death).4 3
Since 1976, states that did not leave capital sentencing determina-
tions exclusively to the jury adopted one of two systems. The first was a
judge-only sentencing scheme, in which a judge, sitting without a jury,
determined and imposed the sentence.4 The second was a hybrid
41. Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1139 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 180-81 (1976) (plurality opinion)); accord William W. Berry Ill, Eighth Amendment
Differentness, 78 Mo. L. REV. 1053, 1060-61 (2013). In short, the objective indices boil down to
how many states (and perhaps other countries as well) use the form of punishment in question,
whether states (or other countries) expanded or reduced the practice over time, and how often the
punishment was imposed in the states (or countries) which employ them. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 312 ("[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
enacted by the country's legislatures." (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,.492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abro-
gated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002))); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 596 (1977) (Eighth Amendment evaluated by jury determinations and legislation). The second
part, the independent judgment of the Court, is evaluated "by asking whether there is reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators" when the objective indicia
show a general consensus. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
42. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457-58 (2012) (striking down mandatory
LWOP for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (striking down LWOP for juveniles
who commit non-homicide crimes); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434-35 (2008) (striking
down capital punishment for non-homicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71
(2005) (striking down capital punishment for juveniles); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (striking down
capital punishment for mentally intellectually disabled defendants); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 801 (1982) (striking down capital punishment for felony murder when defendant did not kill,
attempt to kill, or intend to kill the victim); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01 (Warren, C.J.) (using
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" for the first time,
holding that the Eighth Amendment does not allow denationalization as a form of punishment).
43. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 520-22 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for not considering Alabama's judicial override under the evolving standards of decen-
cy set forth in Trop); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) (evaluating Florida's judicial
override statute in terms of "contemporary standards of [fairness and] decency"), overruled by Hurst
v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); id. at 490 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("History, tradition, and the basic structure and purpose of the jury system persuade me that jury
sentencing is essential if the administration of capital punishment is to be governed by the communi-
ty's evolving standards of decency."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (per curiam) (discussing the evolving standards of decency that govern the Eighth
Amendment and noting that "[it] would seem to be incontestable that he death penalty inflicted on
one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth,
social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such
prejudices").
44. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 932-33, 933 n.9 (noting that this system was adopted
by Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska).
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scheme, in which a jury recommended a sentence, but the judge inde-
pendently made an assessment and imposed the sentence.45 In this hybrid
system, after finding a criminal defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of a capital crime, a jury issued an advisory sentence by recom-
mending either a life sentence or the death penalty.46 However, the trial
judge, far from being bound by the jury's recommendation, could over-
ride the jury and impose the opposite sentence.47
In Proffitt v. Florida,4 8 the Court upheld hybrid sentencing on
Eighth Amendment grounds.49 With Eighth Amendment challenges no
longer available in the wake of Proffitt, criminal defendants turned to the
Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee to challenge non-jury death pen-
alty sentencing.so For the next quarter century, these challenges did not
move the Court. In both 1984 and 1989, the Court upheld Florida's
hybrid system, explaining that the Sixth Amendment did not require a
jury to impose a death sentence.52 In 1990, the Court also approved Ari-
zona's judge-only system.53 It held that during sentencing the Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantee was not violated when a judge found the
facts necessary to impose a death sentence because these were "sentenc-
ing considerations" and not elements that must be proved to a jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt.54 This long period of Supreme Court approval
seemed to indicate that non-jury capital sentencing was constitutionally
permissible for the foreseeable future.
However, in 1999 and 2000, the Supreme Court issued two non-
capital sentencing opinions that laid the groundwork for a reversal of the
Court's previous Sixth Amendment decisions. The first of these decision
45. Id. at 932-33, 933 n.10 (noting that the judicial override was adopted by Alabama, Dela-
ware, Florida, and Indiana). Although the judicial override system started as a protection against
capital juries imposing unjust death sentences, judges in most hybrid states more often increase the
jury's sentence of life to death. See Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1140-45 (discussing the breakdown
of statistics on judicial overrides in hybrid states).
46. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 932-33.
47. See id. at 933.
48. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
49. Id. at 247. The Court lauded a judge's decision-making capabilities over a jury's, stating
that a trial judge's greater sentencing experience would "lead, if anything, to even greater consisten-
cy" in capital sentencing, helping to alleviate the randomness of the death penalty identified in
Furman. See id. at 252.
50. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-48 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 638 (1989), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.
Ct. 616 (2016); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct.
616 (2016).
51. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995); Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-49; Hildwin,
490 U.S. at 640-41; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464-65. Justice Stevens dissented in both Harris and
Spaziano, arguing that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibited a
judge from imposing death by overriding a jury's life sentence. Harris, 513 U.S. at 526 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
Ring, Justice Breyer, who supported the majority in Harris, changed his mind, opining that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the judicial override. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
52. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 639-41; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464-65.
53. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.
54. Id.
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adopted the eponymous Apprendi rule: "[A]ny fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."55 Crucially,
it did not matter how the State labeled the fact in question.5 6 Apprendi's
mandate focused on the effect of the sentencing scheme rather than its
form.57 States could not circumvent the Sixth Amendment through clever
statutory drafting by labeling these facts as "sentencing factors" or "sen-
tencing considerations."
When applied to capital sentencing, the Apprendi rule would seem
to prohibit a system in which the judge, at sentencing, has to find an ag-
gravating circumstance before a defendant is eligible for death.59 Confus-
ingly, in both Jones and Apprendi the Court went to great lengths to dis-
tinguish and harmonize the Apprendi rule with its previous capital sen-
tencing decisions, such as Spaziano v. Florida,a Hildwin v. Florida,6 1
and Walton v. Arizona,62 that permitted a judge to decide whether aggra-
vating factors were present.63
Two years later, the Supreme Court reversed itself in Ring.4 The
Court held "that the Constitution requires that at least some aspects of the
capital sentencing determination be allocated to a jury rather than a
judge."65 Overruling its decision in Walton, the Court held that the Ap-
prendi rule applied to capital sentencing.66 Specifically, Arizona's
scheme violated the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee because it
required a judge to determine the existence of an aggravating circum-
67stance without which the death penalty could not be imposed. As in
Apprendi, the Court determined that the Sixth Amendment does not care
how the statute labeled this crucial determination: "If a State makes an
increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the find-
55. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Rule was originally set forth in
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-53 (1999). Apprendi concerned a New Jersey hate crime
statute in which a judge could find that a crime involved racial animus thus doubling the potential
maximum prison sentence. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 541-42.
56. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495-96.
57. See id
58. See id. at 485.
59. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 543.
60. 468 U.S. 447 (1984), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
61. 490 U.S. 638 (1989), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
62. 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
63. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 250-51 (1999).
Justice O'Connor described this attempted distinction as "baffling." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
65. Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1094.
66. Id. at 1109.
67. Id. at 1109-10.
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ing of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."6 8
However, the State of Arizona argued in Ring that judicial death
sentencing was an important mechanism for ensuring that juries did not
arbitrarily or cruelly sentence defendants to death.69 On the one hand, the
Ring Court questioned the "superiority of judicial factfimding," while on
the other hand it reasoned that the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee
"does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of poten-
tial factfiders."70 Instead, the Founders adopted the amendment because
they were not willing to allow the State to single-handedly carry out
criminal justice.7 '
A crucial development in Ring was that Justice Breyer changed his
mind about capital sentencing.72 Where in an earlier case, Harris v. Ala-
bama (Harris 1),73 he supported the majority's decision to uphold Ala-
bama's judicial override, in Ring he endorsed Justice Stevens's Harris I
74dissent. However, unlike the Ring majority, Justice Breyer did not ar-
gue for a limit based on the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee. Ra-
ther he argued for one based on the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment.75 The death penalty, he argued, had no
demonstrable deterrent or incapacitative effects above and beyond lesser
forms of punishment.76 Therefore, capital sentences found their primary
justification in retribution.7 7
Justice Breyer then highlighted the many controversies surrounding
the death penalty in general and with judicial imposition in particular:
(1) the political pressures on appointed and elected judges; (2) the large
divide in community opinion on whether the death penalty is ever justi-
fied; (3) the "potentially arbitrary application" of capital punishment;
(4) the fact that "the race of the victim and socio-economic factors seem
to matter"; (5) the potentially unconstitutional waits that death row pris-
oners endure before execution; (6) the poor legal representation that
many capital defendants receive; and (7) the United States' status as an
68. Ring, 536 U.S. at 602. Endorsing this point in his concurrence Justice Scalia quipped that
these facts were elements "whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors,
or Mary Jane." Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id at 607 (Ginsburg, J.).
70. Id.
71. Id. ("[The jury-trial guarantee] has never been efficient; but it has always been free."
(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
72. Id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not
to reject it merely because it comes late." (quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co.,
335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
73. 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
74. Ring, 536 U.S. at 614-15 (Breyer, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 612-14.
76. Id. at 614-15.
77. Id. at 614.
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outlier on the world stage, being the "only Western industrialized Nation
that authorizes the death penalty."78
All of these controversies led Justice Breyer to determine that if the
United States should impose the death penalty then "the Eighth Amend-
ment requires individual jurors to make, and to take responsibility for,"
individual death sentences.79 The jury, as a cross-section of the commu-
nity, has access to the community's conscience and may speak with the
community's voice above and beyond appointed or elected judges.
80
The majority opinion in Ring, on the other hand, focused exclusive-
ly on judge-only sentencing schemes, necessarily invalidating the stat-
utes in other judge-only sentencing states. 8 In Ring's wake, hybrid states
struggled to decide how to respond.82 Some hybrid states chose to proac-
tively comply with Ring by replacing their questionable systems with
jury sentencing.83 Others chose to follow Ring in only the narrowest pos-
sible sense.4 Alabama and Florida, on the other hand, left their statutes
unchanged and their respective state courts later affirmed that their hy-
brid schemes either did not violate Ring or that Ring did not apply to
hybrid systems. This refusal to address Ring led to the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Hurst.86
II. HURST V. FLORIDA
A. Facts
In May of 1998, Cynthia Harrison was stabbed to death and left in
the freezer of the restaurant in which she worked. The restaurant's safe
was missing a large amount of money.88 Timothy Lee Hurst was the only
other person scheduled to work that night.89 He insisted that he never
78. Id. at 615-18.
79. Id. at 615-16, 618-19. Note that Justice Breyer's Eighth Amendment argument requires
much more than the Ring majority's Sixth Amendment mandate; instead of a jury making the fact-
finding determinations necessary for the imposition of a death sentence (allowing the judge to de-
termine and impose the sentence itself), the Eighth Amendment requires the jury to pass the actual
sentence of death. See id. at 618-19; see also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-17, 519-20
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467, 469, 470-72, 476-77, 482-
84, 486-88, 490 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Hurst v.
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
80. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., concurring).
81. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 937.
82. See id at 937-38.
83. See id. (discussing how Indiana replaced the judicial override with a jury-sentencing
scheme).
84. See id. (discussing how Delaware changed its statute to require a jury to find at least one
aggravating circumstance but then left the finding of mitigating circumstances and the weighing of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as well as the imposition of the sentence to a judge).
85. Waldrop v. State (In re Waldrop), 859 So. 2d 1181, 1187-90 (Ala. 2002); Bottoson v.
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002), abrogated by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
86. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 620-21 (2016).





made it in, but called Harrison to report that his car had broken down.
During his phone call with Harrison, Hurst claimed that she seemed
scared and that he had heard someone else "whispering in the back-
ground.""
B. Procedural History
The State of Florida charged Timothy Lee Hurst, the only other res-
taurant employee scheduled to work that night, with murder.91 The State
put on "substantial forensic evidence" and numerous witnesses who testi-
92fied to Hurst's culpability. The jury found Hurst guilty of first degree
murder without explaining upon which theory-premeditated murder or
felony murder-it made its finding. 93
The trial court then held a sentencing hearing in which the jury rec-
ommended the death penalty.94 The judge agreed and sentenced Hurst to
death.95 However, the Florida Supreme Court vacated the sentence "for
reasons not relevant to this case."96
After a new sentencing hearing, the jury again recommended the
death penalty.9 7 Having given "great weight" to the jury's recommenda-
tion, the judge independently found that "both the heinous-murder and
robbery aggravators existed" and sentenced Hurst to death.98
Hurst challenged his sentence as a violation of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial in light of the Court's decision in Ring.99 Alt-
hough recognizing that Ring "held that capital defendants are entitled to
a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an
increase in the maximum punishment," Florida's highest court rejected
Hurst's argument in a four-to-three decision.'00 The Florida court stated
that Ring was "inapplicable" because the Supreme Court of the United
States had repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of Florida's sentencing
scheme over the past twenty-five years.0 1 The Supreme Court then




93. Id. at 619-20.
94. Id. Florida's death penalty statute bifurcates capital trials into a guilt-innocence stage and
a sentencing stage. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 937-39.
95. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 619-20.
96. Id. at 620.
97. Id. (noting that the jury voted 7-5 for death).
98. Id
99. Id
100. Id at 620-21 (quoting Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 445-46 (Fla. 2014), abrogated by
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)).
101. Id. at 620.
102. Id. at 621.
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C. Opinion of the Court
Justice Sotomayor delivered the majority opinion joined by six oth-
er justices.103 The Court held that Florida's sentencing scheme was un-
constitutional in light of Apprendi and Ring.' 0 It found that Florida's
capital sentencing system required a judge, independent of a jury, to find
aggravating factors before sentencing a defendant to death. os Because a
criminal defendant could not receive a death sentence absent this finding,
the Apprendi rule required this determination to be made by a jury be-
cause "[a] jury's mere recommendation is not enough."106
Justice Sotomayor then acknowledged and rejected three arguments
made by Florida in defense of the statute.107 First, the State argued that
the jury's recommendation of a death sentence "necessarily included a
finding of an aggravating circumstance"; the judge's finding at the sen-
tencing stage then was a redundant safeguard, not a necessary step before
a death sentence could be passed.08 The Court rejected this argument,
highli hting that the State fundamentally mischaracterized the judge's
role.'o Without a judge's independent finding of an aggravating circum-
stance at sentencing, Florida's law did not allow for a death sentence."0
Second, the State argued that Hurst admitted to an aggravating cir-
cumstance and that Ring "[did] not require jury findings on facts defend-
ants have admitted.""' The Court, however, determined that Florida had
misapplied precedent and that Hurst, in fact, had admitted no such
thing.112 Lastly, the State argued that the Court's decisions in Spaziano
and Hildwin settled the issue in Florida's favor, having twice ruled the
state's system constitutional.'13 The Court responded by overruling the
earlier cases, finding them "irreconcilable with Apprendi.""14 However,
rather than vacating Hurst's sentence, the Court remanded the case to
determine whether or not this error was harmless."5
103. See id. at 619, 624.
104. See id at 619 ("The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact nec-
essary to impose a sentence of death.").
105. Id. at 624.
106. Id. at 619.
107. Id. at 622-24.
108. Id at 622 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 44, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)
(No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 4607695, at *44).
109. Id. (noting that Florida's statute required "[tlhe trial court alone" to find the facts neces-
sary to impose the death penalty).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 622-23 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 41, Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616 (No. 14-7505),
2015 WL 4607695, at *41).
112. Id. (explaining that Florida relied on a case concerning guilty pleas not jury findings).
113. Id. at 623.
114. Id at 623-24 (finding support in Ring's earlier overruling of Walton).
115. Id. at 624 (avoiding the question of whether the error was harmless or not and stating that
this is a determination usually left to state courts). Florida judges have not overridden the jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment since 1999. See Michael L. Radelet, Overriding Jury Sentenc-
ing Recommendations in Florida Capital Cases: An Update and Possible Half-Requiem, 2011
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D. Justice Breyer's Opinion Concurring in the Judgment
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer reasoned that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment requires that
a jury, not a judge, impose a sentence of death.116 Justice Breyer used his
concurrence in Ring to explain his reasoning.1 17 As a retributive form of
punishment with minimal, if any, penal benefit over life imprisonment,
Justice Breyer would have held that the death penalty is only permissible
when a jury, acting as the conscience and voice of its community, deter-
mines and passes the sentence."8
E. Justice Alito's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito alone dissented.'19 He began by analyzing the Court's
approval of Florida's sentencing system over the past twenty-five
years.120 Further, he opined that rather than overruling Spaziano and
Hildwin, the Court should reexamine Ring.121
Justice Alito then wrote that even if Ring was correct, the Court
erred in extending it to Florida's sentencing system.122 He found crucial
differences between Arizona's judge-only sentencing scheme in Ring and
Florida's hybrid system in Hurst.123 Unlike Arizona's completely jury-
free system, Florida required a capital jury to be "the initial and primary
adjudicator of the factors bearing on the death penalty."1 24 Juries heard
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, weighed these
circumstances against each other, and recommended death only if the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt one or more aggravating circum-
stances.125 Justice Alito endorsed the State's argument that the judge then
merely duplicated the steps taken by the jury.12 6
Finally, in the alternative, Justice Alito asserted that the error in
Hurst's case was harmless.127 The State, he concluded, proved with
"overwhelming" evidence both the robbery-aggravator and the heinous-
MICH. ST. L. REV. 793, 809-10 (2011). "Between 1972 and early June 2011, a total of 166 death
sentences were imposed in Florida following a jury recommendation. . . . [O]nly about twenty-six
percent (43 + 166) of the override cases were affirmed on direct appeal. Of those forty-three, thirty-
four won relief (so far) after subsequent litigation. Five remain on death row, and four were execut-
ed." Id. at 809 (footnotes omitted).
116. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (Breyer, J., concurring).
117. Id.
118. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-17 (2002).
119. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624-27 (Alito, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 624-25.
121. Id. at 625 (referencing his dissent in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2172-73
(2013) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 625-26.
124. Id. at 625.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 625-26 (highlighting that a judge has not overridden the jury to impose death in
over fifteen years as support for judicial fact-finding functioning as a mere redundancy).
127. Id. at 626.
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ness-aggravator which made Hurst eligible for the death penalty.128 To
Justice Alito, "it defies belief to suggest that the jury would not have
found the existence of either aggravating factor if its finding was bind-
ing."l29
III. ANALYSIS
In Hurst, the Supreme Court made a straightforward application of
the Apprendi-Ring requirements to Florida's hybrid sentencing
scheme.130 By doing so, the Court has taken another modest step toward
securing Sixth Amendment protections for capital defendants. However,
the narrowness of the Ring and Hurst holdings might signal a moderation
of the sweeping sentencing reforms of Jones and Apprendi. While the
Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant
the right to have a jury find the facts necessary to make him or her eligi-
ble for death, the Court, aside from Justice Breyer, seems reluctant to
declare that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to have a jury pass the death sentence itself.
This Part first analyzes the breadth and limitations of the Hurst de-
cision: what kinds of facts at sentencing, in addition to aggravating fac-
tors, are "elements" for the purposes of complying with the Sixth
Amendment after Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst? It then examines the Del-
aware Supreme Court's application of Hurst in Rauf and the justices'
competing interpretations of what Hurst requires for capital sentencing.
This Part next examines the constitutionality of certain state death
penalty statutes in light of these decisions, determining that Alabama's
statute, at the very least, must be overturned. Finally, it looks to Justice
Breyer's and Justice Stevens's calls for an Eighth Amendment right to
have a jury determine, impose, and take responsibility for each particular
sentence of death. The death penalty requires the most stringent of pro-
tections because of its severity and irrevocability. The Court should rec-
ognize that the Sixth and Eighth Amendments bar judges, as state offi-
cials, from imposing the death penalty. Instead, a jury, representing and
expressing the community's conscience, when aided by proper statutory
guidelines, should determine and impose death sentences.
A. The Limits ofHurst: What Kinds ofFacts Are Elements?
The Ring and Hurst holdings limit the manner in which a state may
sentence criminal defendants to death.1' However, these rulings are
quite narrow. The Apprendi rule mandates that "any fact that increases
128. Id.
129. Id. However, the jury only recommended death by seven votes to five. Id. at 620 (So-
tomayor, J.).
130. Id at 620-24.
131. Id. at 624; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
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the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" has to
be found by a jury.1 32 These facts, according to the rule, are actually "el-
ements" of the crime regardless of whether the legislature classifies them
in statutory drafting as "sentencing factors" or "sentencing condi-
tions."l33 By relying exclusively on the Apprendi rule, the Court has held
that the Sixth Amendment guarantees only that the jury make all fact-
finding determinations necessary for death penalty eligibility rather than
guaranteeing a jury determine and impose a sentence of death itself.134
The effects of Ring and Hurst depend on what exactly a "fact" is with
regard to capital sentencing. In Ring and Hurst, the Court clarified that at
least one kind of fact is subject to Apprendi: the existence (or absence) of
an aggravating circumstance-an issue addressed during the sentencing
stage of a capital trial-is a fact for the purposes of the Sixth Amend-
ment because it is a necessary finding before a defendant can become
eligible for a death sentence. 135
However, death sentences are not imposed based on aggravating
circumstances alone.1 36 Instead, there are two other requirements: (1) the
consideration of mitigating circumstances and (2) the weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances against one another and the
determination that the aggravating outweigh the mitigating.137
These requirements are not just statutory mandates imposed by state
legislatures.13 8 Rather, the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment
requires that the sentencing body in a capital case-whether judge or
jury-considers mitigating factors before it passes a sentence and that a
state may not limit the kinds of mitigating factors that the sentencer may
132. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S 466, 490 (2000).
133. Id. at 494 ("[T]he relevant inquiry is not one of form, but of effect-does the required
finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty ver-
dict?").
134. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 529-30.
135. See Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 619; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002).
136. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(d)-(e) (1975) (describing how the trial court must "enter
specific written findings" for (1) aggravating circumstances, (2) mitigating circumstances, and then
(3) "determine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances it finds to exist").
137. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 548-50 ("[States] generally ask triers of fact to
consider any proffered mitigating evidence against he government's case in aggravation and to
determine whether, on balance, the evidence supports a punishment of life imprisonment or death.").
This is a necessary simplification of how states have structured their capital sentencing statutes. In
practice, states statutes often look different than the three-step process. For example, Texas has a
two-step process. In the first step, the jury must determine whether the defendant poses a future
danger (the aggravating factor). In the second-step, the jury must determine whether "taking into
consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's charac-
ter and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigat-
ing circumstance or circumstances to warrant" a life sentence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071, § 2(a)(1), (b)(1)-(2), (e)(1) (West 2013). Thus far, the Supreme Court has not recognized
any particular constitutional limitations for how the weighing process must occur. See Kansas v.
Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 175 (2006); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988); see also Kamin &
Marceau, supra note 9, at 550.
138. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1) (2013) (Delaware's death sentencing
statute), held unconstitutional by Raufv. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
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consider as grounds for leniency.139 Crucially, mere consideration of
mitigating factors is not enough; instead, the Constitution requires the
sentencing body to be able to act on these factors. 4 The Court went on
to declare that "[o]nly then can we be sure that the sentencer has treated
the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g]' and has made a
reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence."41
Some states have narrowly interpreted Ring and Hurst, arguing that
the jury need not make all three of these determinations to meet the Sixth
Amendment's requirements.142 According to this interpretation, when a
jury first finds an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the de-
fendant becomes death eligible; any mitigation at this point is not an el-
ement under Apprendi (anything necessary to increase the maximum
punishment) but, rather, an opportunity to lessen an already available
punishment.143 For instance, in Texas, a defendant cannot be given the
death penalty unless a jury finds the existence of a single kind of aggra-
vating circumstance (future dangerousness), but after this finding, the
judge determines the existence or absence of mitigating factors, weighs
the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors, and ultimately de-
cides to impose the death penalty or not.'
Ring and Hurst leave defendants and legislators unsure whether the-
se two types of findings function as "elements" of the crime by being
necessary facts that must be found before imposition of a death sentence
(like the finding of aggravating circumstances).145 The Supreme Court
could decide that these findings are not elements. Instead, it might hold,
as the highest criminal court in Texas has ruled,14 that the finding of an
aggravating circumstance alone lifts the possible sentence from life to
death. These secondary findings then function as true sentencing factors.
Under this interpretation, these findings are not necessary for a particular
139. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (invalidating an Ohio statute that limited
the kinds of mitigating factors the sentencer could consider as a basis for granting life over death);
see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) ("Just as the State may not by statute
preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to
consider, as a matter oflaw, any relevant mitigating evidence.").
140. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The jury's consideration of mitigating factors may be guided by state
statutes in capital cases but never removed. See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 171 ("So long as the sentencer is
not precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence, a capital sentencing statute cannot be
said to impermissibly, much less automatically, impose death.").
141. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
142. See, e.g., Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (arguing that
Texas's sentencing scheme did not run afoul of Ring).
143. Id.
144. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 568-69. Before Rauf Delaware had a similar
system in which a jury found "at least one statutory aggravating factor" before a judge weighed the
aggravating and the mitigating and decided the sentence. Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 937.
145. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 945-46 (discussing the confusion over whether Ring
demands that jurors find and weigh mitigating factors).
146. Perry, 158 S.W.3d at 447-49.
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defendant's eligibility for death and do not increase the sentence availa-
ble prior to their evaluation by the judge, but merely affect the sentenc-
ing outcome.14 7 The Eastern District Court of Missouri recently interpret-
ed Ring and Hurst in just this way. 148
Before 2013, there was some reason to believe that the Court would
adopt this reasoning and hold that these two findings are not subject to
the Apprendi rule.149 In Harris v. United States (Harris II),15o which fol-
lowed shortly on the heels of Ring, the Court limited Apprendi, holding
that the Sixth Amendment did not require a jury to make fact-finding
determinations which trigger a mandatory minimum sentence.is' In 2013,
however, the Court expressly rejected and overruled Harris II in Alleyne
v. United States.'52 In Alleyne the Court held that "any fact that increases
the mandatory minimum is an 'element' that must be submitted to the
jury."
1 53
Although the Alleyne ruling suggests that the Court might reject
such rigid formalisms, it is not dispositive. The Alleyne decision made
clear that Apprendi should not be read as cutting off the United States'
long history of judicial discretion in sentencing.154 The Court may well
decide that mitigating circumstances and the weighing of those circum-
stances against the aggravating are truly sentencing factors, not elements.
This interpretation would hold these are the kinds of facts that a judge or
jury can and should consider to decide between a sentence of life or
death once the finding of an aggravating factor by the jury has made the
defendant death eligible. In their analysis of the fact-driven requirements
of Ring, Professors Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau have argued that
states can circumvent such an interpretation of Ring "by dispensing with
any legalistic limits on the process of balancing, by making it look more
like a moral judgment and less like a legal one." 55
However, this position would undermine the last sixteen years of
sentencing jurisprudence, as it supports the kind of formalism that the
Court sought to remove from criminal sentencing with the Apprendi
147. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 945-46.
148. See McLaughlin v. Steele, No. 4:12CV1464 CDP, 2016 WL 1106884, at *29-30 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 22, 2016). In McLaughlin, the court decided that Ring and Hurst did not, of themselves,
make the finding of mitigating circumstances and the weighing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances fact findings necessary to impose the death penalty. However, it still vacated the
defendant's death sentence because it found that the Missouri statute of its own power made such
findings "facts." Id.
149. See Abramson, supra note 12, at 154 (discussing whether the Court will apply the logic of
Harris to mitigating factors).
150. 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
151. Id. at 555-57 (holding that it is constitutionally permissible for a judge to make this de-
termination because it imposed a minimum penalty permitted under the statute, rather than increas-
ing the ceiling of permitted punishment).
152. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2163.
155. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 572.
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rule.156 Under this interpretation, a state, like Missouri in McLaughlin v.
Steele,15 7 can sidestep the Sixth Amendment by merely characterizing
mitigating circumstances as "sentencing factors" notwithstanding Ap-
prendi's disapproval of such tactics. Under this interpretation, Texas's
hybrid system, in which a jury need only find an aggravating circum-
stance and the judge then determines the sentence, would withstand Sixth
Amendment scrutiny.
The determination of aggravating factors is an obvious example of
fact-finding. Aggravating factors can be enumerated in a statute and the
jury can simply decide that the evidence shows the defendant did or did
not do X (e.g., intentionally murder for pecuniary gain).159 On the other
hand, the consideration of mitigating factors and then weighing them
against the aggravating factors is not as obvious an example of fact-
finding.'6 Nonetheless, fact-finding determinations have never been
limited to such obvious examples. For instance, the Supreme Court has
long held that the finding of negligence in tort cases is a question of
fact.161 The legal system treats negligence as a factual determination in
large part because juries determine negligence by means of a balancing
test.162 Justice Scalia, in dicta mere days after Hurst was decided, reiter-
ated that the process of finding and weighing of mitigating circumstances
contained fact-finding determinations even though they were in large
part "question[s] of mercy." 63
156. See id at 569-71 ("The jury right cannot be evaded by simply redefining critical elements
as defenses or sentencing factors . . . .").
157. See McLaughlin v. Steele, No. 4:12CVl464 CDP, 2016 WL 1106884, *26-28 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 22, 2016).
158. See Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
159. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6) (2016) (enumerating a finite list of aggravating factors of
Florida's capital punishment statute), held unconstitutional by Perry v. State, No. SC 16-547, 2016
WL 6036982 (Fla. Oct. 14, 2016) (per curiam); cf id. § 921.141(7) (enumerating a list of mitigating
circumstances, but with "[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that
would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty"); see also Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633,
642 (2016) (in dicta) (discussing how the finding of aggravating circumstances "is a purely factual
determination").
160. Others have argued that the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence allows
states to exclude the jury from these crucial sentencing decisions "by making [them] open-ended
rather than fact-based, by making the decision to impose death a moral judgment rather than a legal
conclusion." Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 530.
161. Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873) ("[A]lthough the
facts [in this case] are undisputed it is for the jury and not for the judge to determine whether proper
care was given, or whether they establish negligence."); see also Ronald J. Allen & Michael S.
Pardo, The Myth ofthe Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1781 (2003) ("[I]t is a firmly
entrenched rule that juries shall decide both the underlying facts and whether those facts constitute
negligence.").
162. See Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307-08 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Posner, J.) (citing Judge Learned Hand's famous balancing test for negligence in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[T]he owner's duty... to provide against
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that [a ship] will break away
[from its mooring]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions.")).
163. See Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 642 (Although Justice Scalia drew a distinction between aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances, he explicitly stated that this argument did not "reference . .. our
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A better ruling would hold that the determination of mitigating fac-
tors and the process of weighing aggravating factors against mitigating
factors constitutes an element of the offense for the purposes of Appren-
di, Ring, and Hurst.1 6 While Ring and Hurst mandate that a jury find
aggravating factors necessary to make death eligible, the Supreme Court
has already held that it is unconstitutional to sentence someone to death
without considering mitigating evidence and without weighing that evi-
dence against the aggravating factors.1 65
The consideration and weighing of mitigating factors are elements
of a capital crime under the Apprendi rule because without such consid-
eration and without making a fact-finding determination in how much
weight to assign those factors, a sentencer cannot pass a sentence of
death. '6 Stated another way, the existence of an aggravating factor alone
does not make a defendant eligible for death. Without considering miti-
gating evidence and without weighing that evidence against the aggravat-
ing circumstances, a sentencer cannot impose the death penalty.'67 To
treat a defendant as death-eligible once the jury has found an aggravating
factor-a necessary premise of the narrow reading of Ring and Hurst-is
flatly inconsistent with the Court's insistence that the death penalty is
only constitutionally permissible once mitigating factors have been con-
sidered and weighed.168 Therefore, the narrow interpretation of Ring and
Hurst cannot be squared with the Court's existing death penalty prece-
dents.
This interpretation forms the basis of much of the Delaware Su-
preme Court's rationale in Rauf for striking down the State's capital pun-
capital-sentencing case law"); see also id. at 648 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the majori-
ty's fact-judgment contained in the weighing of mitigation).
164. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 474 (Del. 2016) (Strine, C.J., concurring) (per curiam)
("[I]t is not clear what constitutional line exists involving facts that aggravate toward greater pun-
ishment or those that mitigate toward leniency. These are both key factual components. . . . [A]
consideration of the mitigating factors is every bit as crucial-as necessary-to the determination of
life or death."). This comment makes no argument as to mitigating factors and the weighing of
aggravation against mitigation as part of the Eighth Amendment's narrowing principle. For a de-
tailed discussion of this principle, see Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981 (2015).
165. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (court may not preclude sentencing
body from considering mitigating evidence as a matter of law); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607-
08 (1978) (legislature may not limit relevant mitigation in statute); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271
(1976) (state may not limit mitigating evidence).
166. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271; see
also Rauf, 145 A.3d at 474 (Strine, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he fact finding necessary to sentence a
defendant to death cannot avoid a consideration of mitigating factors too."). In Jurek, the Supreme
Court explicitly stated that a system that did not allow the consideration of mitigating factors in
determining death sentences came perilously close to mandatory capital punishment statutes which
the Court held to be unconstitutional. 428 U.S. at 271 ("A jury must be allowed to consider on the
basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it
should not be imposed.").
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ishment statute in early August.169 It also strongly suggests that all three
sentencing considerations are elements of the offense, no matter what a
state legislature names them.170 Rather than withdrawing from Apprendi,
this interpretation embraces the spirit of the Apprendi rule: "When a
judge's finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence authoriz-
es an increase in the maximum punishment, it is appropriately character-
ized as 'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.""n7
B. Delaware's Unconstitutional Death Penalty Statute: Rauf v. State
Seven months after Hurst, the Supreme Court of Delaware struck
down the state's death penalty statute.172 The court issued a short per
curiam opinion joined by three justices, holding the statute unconstitu-
tional because it, among other things, allowed a judge to determine ag-
gravating factors and weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigat-
ing.1 73 Finding that the statute rendered the "respective roles of the judge
and jury . . . so complicated," the court held that they could not sever the
sentencing provisions from the statute as a whole and struck down the
entire death penalty statute.174 Rather than presenting unified reasons for
these holdings, the court's justices split, authoring three concurrences
with separate legal arguments.175
Chief Justice Strine's concurrence presents the most far-reaching in-
terpretation of Hurst.16 He recognizes that the Supreme Court has previ-
ously held that consideration of mitigation, along with balancing of miti-
gation against aggravating circumstances, is "necessary to sentence a
defendant to death." 77 However, his analysis does not end there. He fur-
ther argues that, "[r]ather than write more and more intricate judicial
decisions parsing different kinds of fact findings," Hurst restores the
historical role of the jury in death sentencing: "200 years of our nation's
customs and traditions" reveal that the jury has typically passed death
169. See discussion supra Section HI.A.
170. See Rauf, 145 A.3d at 474 (Strine, C.J., concurring).
171. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylva-
nia, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)); see also Woodward, 134 S. Ct. at 410-11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (describing the weighing of aggravating factors against mitigating factors
as a "factual finding [that] exposes the defendant to a greater punishment than he would otherwise
receive: death, as opposed to life without parole").
172. Rauf 145 A.3d at 432-33 (Strine, C.J., Holland, J. & Seitz, J.). Delaware's Attorney
General has decided not to pursue an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Attorney General
Will Not Appeal to U.S. Supreme Court on Death Penalty, DELAWARE.GOV (Aug. 15, 2016),
http://news.delaware.gov/2016/08/15/cp/.
173. Rauf 145 A.3d at 432-33 (Strine, C.J., Holland, J. & Seitz, J.). Delaware's statute, like
Florida's, had the jury give a recommendation after finding aggravators, mitigators, and weighing,
but the judge's determination decided the ultimate sentence. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)
(2013), held unconstitutional by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
174. Rauf 145 A.3d at 433 (Strine, C.J., Holland, J. & Seitz, J.).
175. See id (Strine, C.J., concurring); id at 482 (Holland, J., concurring); id. at 487 (Valihura,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. See id. at 434-36 (Strine, C.J., concurring).
177. Id. at 451.
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sentences. Ultimately, Chief Justice Strine concludes that the Sixth
Amendment requires a jury to be the final sentencing body in capital
cases, arguing "[i]f the right to a jury means anything, it means the right
to have a jury drawn from the community and acting as a proxy for its
diverse views and mores, rather than one judge, make the awful decision
whether the defendant should live or die."l7 9
Justice Holland, by contrast, restricts his argument to a straightfor-
ward extension of Hurst.'80 He argues that the language of Ring and
Hurst differ just enough for Hurst to do something new: require the jury,
not a judge, to weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating. 18 He
finds support for this reading in Justice Sotomayor's authorship of the
majority opinion in Hurst.1 82 Three years before Hurst, Justice So-
tomayor dissented from a denial of certiorari in Woodward v. Ala-
bama,183 arguing:
[A] defendant is eligible for the death penalty in Alabama only upon
a specific factual finding that any aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors he has presented. The statutorily required finding
that the aggravating factors of a defendant's crime outweigh the miti-
gating factors is therefore necessary to impose the death penalty. It is
clear, then, that this factual finding exposes the defendant to a greater
punishment than he would otherwise receive: death, as opposed to
life without parole. Under Apprendi and Ring, a finding that has such
an effect must be made by a jury.18
According to Justice Holland, Justice Sotomayor intentionally
placed new, broader language into the Hurst majority opinion. Specifi-
cally, by inserting the sentence, "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury,
not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,"
Justice Sotomayor expanded Ring to include the process of weighing
mitigation and aggravation because this too is a necessary fact-finding
before a sentencer can pass a death sentence.186
Justice Valihura, unlike Chief Justice Strine and Justice Holland,
argues that, while Hurst does require a jury to find aggravating circum-
stances, it does not similarly require a jury to consider and weigh miti-
gating circumstances against aggravating circumstances before the impo-
178. Id. at 477.
179. Id. at 436.
180. See id at 482-87 (Holland, J., concurring).
181. Id at 487 ("Although the United States Supreme Court's holding in Hurst only specifical-
ly invalidated a judicial determination of aggravating circumstances, it also stated unequivocally that
the jury trial right recognized in Ring now applies to all factual findings necessary to impose a death
sentence under a state statute.").
182. Id.
183. 134 S. Ct. 405 (2013).
184. Id at 410-11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citation omitted).
185. See Rauf 145 A.3d at 482 (Holland, J., concurring).
186. See id (quoting Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016) (emphasis added)).
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sition of death.87 Justice Valihura also makes use of Justice Sotomayor's
authorship of Hurst and the dissent in Woodward, but reaches a different
conclusion-namely that if Justice Sotomayor wished to extend Appren-
di-Ring to the process of weighing aggravating circumstances against
mitigating circumstances, then she would have explicitly done so, rather
than sneaking it in through the back door.'88 Instead, weighing is a "judi-
cial function" both constitutionally and under Delaware's own statute.89
C. State Implications ofHurst: What Happens Next?
Where the Supreme Court of Delaware held that Hurst invalidated
its capital sentencing statute, the Supreme Court of Alabama found no
such problem for its state's system. After Ring, the Alabama legisla-
ture refused to change its judicial override system, and the state's highest
court ruled that Ring was inapplicable because of the structure of the
state death penalty statute.191 After Hurst, the Alabama Supreme Court
relied on this interpretation, reasoning that Hurst was a mere application
of Ring rather than an extension.'92 The court held that, because Hurst
did not reveal any new constitutional requirements, Alabama's statute
remained constitutional.'93
Alabama's hybrid system largely mirrors the one that the Supreme
Court struck down in Hurst.194 However, there are two main differences
between Florida and Alabama's statutes: one in the sentencing scheme
itself and the other in the statutory division of capital offenses.
These sentencing differences make Alabama's system an even more
egregious violation of the Sixth Amendment than Florida's. The Court
struck down Florida's statute because "[a] jury's mere recommendation,"
even when the judge is required to give it "great weight," cannot satisfy
the Sixth Amendment.'95 Yet Alabama's statute does not even require the
judge to consider the jury's recommendation let alone give it great
weight. Rather, as Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Harris I, Ala-
187. Id. at 487-89, 495-97 (Valihura, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Id. at 495-96.
189. Id. (emphasis in original).
190. Bohannon v. State (In re Bohannon), No. 1150640, 2016 WL 5817692, at *17-18 (Ala.
Sept. 30, 2016).
191. See Waldrop v. State (In re Waldrop), 859 So. 2d 1181, 1194-95 (Ala. 2002). Similarly,
both Alabama and Florida's high courts held that the Supreme Court's rejection of judge-only death
sentencing in Ring was inapplicable to their own hybrid statutes. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d
693, 695 (Fla. 2002), abrogated by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 620-21 (2016). In Bottoson, the
Florida Supreme Court denied the defendant's Ring challenge to his judicially-determined and
imposed death sentence, holding that the Supreme Court of the United States-by denying the de-
fendant's petition for certiorari, lifting his stay of execution without explanation, and not expressly
overruling Hildwin in Ring-effectively affirmed the sentence. Id. For the Alabama Supreme
Court's reconciliation of its hybrid scheme after Ring, see In re Waldrop, 859 So. 2d at 1185-88.
192. In re Bohannon, 2016 WL 5817692, at *14-15, *17-18.
193. Id. at * 14-15.
194. See Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1093.
195. See Hurstv. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619-20 (2016).
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bama judges have "unbridled discretion to sentence the defendant to
death-even though a jury has determined that death is an inappropriate
penalty, and even though no basis exists for believing that any other rea-
sonable, properly instructed jury would impose a death sentence."'96
Hurst makes clear that such unbridled judicial discretion cannot meet the
Sixth Amendment's requirements to have a jury determine the facts
which make a defendant death eligible.'97
In addition, Alabama cannot successfully argue that stare decisis-
the Court's upholding of Alabama's death sentencing system in Harris
I-is dispositive. As the Court in Ring and Hurst rejected its previous
capital sentencing decisions in Walton, Spaziano, and Hildwin, here, the
Court would likely decide that Harris I is irreconcilable with the hold-
ings of Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst.198
The second difference involves Alabama's statutory division of cap-
ital crimes. On first glance, it appears that this difference provides some
ground upon which Alabama's law may rest, but this quickly disappears
after further examination. Writing before Hurst, then-Solicitor General of
Alabama Nathan Forrester argued that Alabama's law met the Court's
requirement in Ring that a jury must find an aggravating factor to make a
defendant eligible for death. 199 The state did so by dividing capital crimes
into eighteen separate offenses, most containing its own aggravating cir-
cumstance.200 In order for a jury to convict a defendant of a capital crime
in the trial's guilt-innocence stage, it must necessarily find the existence
of one of these aggravating factors.201 Therefore, before the judge moves
on to determine and impose the sentence, the jury has already found the
facts that make the defendant eligible, making the statute constitutionally
permissible.202 The Alabama Supreme Court used a similar rationale in
Waldrop v. State203 and Bohannon v. State204 when it twice upheld Ala-
bama's death sentencing system.205
196. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 514-16 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 619.
198. See id at 623; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
199. Nathan A. Forrester, Judge Versus Jury: The Continuing Validity of Alabama's Capital
Sentencing Regime After Ring v. Arizona, 54 ALA. L. REv. 1157, 1158-59 (2003).
200. Id. at 1180-81 (e.g., murder during a kidnapping, murder during a robbery, and murder
during a rape).
201. Id. at 1197-98.
202. See id. at 1197-99.
203. 859 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. 2002).
204. No. 1150640, 2016 Ala. LEXIS 114 (Ala. Sept. 30, 2016), cert. denied, Bohannon v.
Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017).
205. In re Bohannon, 2016 WL 5817692, at *15-16; In re Waldrop, 859 So. 2d at 1190-91.
This is not the first time in recent history that Alabama courts have defied federal court mandates on
the issues of Constitutional Law; elected Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court
has once been removed from his office for defying a federal court order to remove a religious statue
which he installed in the Judicial Building in Montgomery, Alabama, home to that state's highest
court. Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 891 So. 2d 848, 850-52, 858, 862 (Ala. 2004). Even now
C.J. Moore has been suspended over his order to Alabama probate judges to defy the U.S. Supreme
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However, this argument ignores one crucial safeguard adopted by
every death penalty state after Gregg v. Georgia206: the bifurcated trial
system.207 Forrester and the Alabama Supreme Court effectively argue
the bifurcated trial system into a mere formality, one which may be easi-
ly circumvented by narrowly defining capital offenses.208 At the sentenc-
ing stage, the judge need not make any fact-finding necessary to impose
death because the findings have already been made.2 09 In simpler terms, a
conviction of a capital crime in Alabama makes a defendant eligible for
death.2 10
This is exactly the kind of formalism that Jones and Apprendi struck
down in non-capital sentencing, and it is exactly the kind of formalism
that Ring and Hurst make improper in death sentencing.211 In addition,
the mere finding of an aggravating circumstance-whether at the convic-
tion stage or sentencing stage-cannot make a defendant eligible for
death because Supreme Court precedent insists that the death penalty
requires a consideration of mitigating factors and a subsequent weighing
of those factors against aggravating circumstances.212
For these reasons, Ring and Hurst make it clear that the Alabama
capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment because it al-
lows a judge to make an independent fact-finding necessary to make a
defendant eligible for the death penalty.213
In Bohannon, Alabama's highest court willfully ignored the United
States Supreme Court's signals in the months following Hurst that Ala-
bama's capital sentencing statute cannot stand; within a five-week peri-
od, the Court vacated three Alabama death sentences, remanding each
case to the state court for reevaluation in light of Hurst.214 By upholding
the Alabama statute in Bohannon and using reasoning that differs so
greatly from the Delaware court's holding in Rauf, Alabama's highest
Court's gay marriage ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges by denying marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. Kyle Whitmire, Roy Moore Suspended from Office: Alabama ChiefJustice Faces Removal
over Gay Marriage Stance, AL.COM,
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2016/05/alabamachiefjustice roymoor_10.html (last updated
May 8, 2016, 6:35 PM).
206. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
207. See Abramson, supra note 12, at 151-52.
208. Id
209. See id at 150-51.
210. Cf Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (describing how a death penalty system that
does not allow the sentencing body to consider mitigating circumstances would violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
211. See supra notes 57-59, 65-69 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
213. See Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1120.
214. Kirksey v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 2409, 2409 (2016) (mem.); Wimbley v. Alabama, 136 S.
Ct. 2387, 2387 (2016) (mem.); Johnson v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 1837, 1837 (2016) (mem.).
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court has essentially guaranteed that litigants will petition for Supreme
Court review.215
Crucially, the makeup of the Court is now in flux with the death of
Justice Antonin Scalia in February 2016.216 justice Scalia was a forceful
advocate for limiting Ring to fact-findings of aggravating factors.2 17
Without Justice Scalia's presence, Justice Sotomayor, who authored the
majority opinion of Hurst, has a greater opportunity to persuade a ma-
jority of justices to explicitly and clearly recognize that the Sixth
Amendment requires a jury to make all findings necessary to impose a
sentence of death, including the finding of mitigating circumstances and
the process of weighing mitigating circumstances against aggravating
218circumstances.
D. The Death Penalty Should Be Hard: Combining the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments
Death is different.2 19 State-sanctioned killing as punishment is final,
irreversible, and extraordinarily severe.220 The death penalty is not only
exceptional for defendants, but also has broader societal implications as
well because "the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its
citizens . . . differs dramatically from any other legitimate state ac-
tion." 2 21 Death requires more justification than other punishments: "It is
of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any deci-
sion to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion."222
Similarly, the punitive justifications for the death penalty differ
from those of lesser punishments.2 23 Death does not effectively deter
215. Three litigants have already petitioned for certiorari, but the Supreme Court declined to
hear these cases without explanation. Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Lets Alabama Judges Impose
Death Penalty, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:18 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/23/supreme-court-alabama-florida-death-
penalty-judge-jury/96947280/.
216. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
217. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 611-13 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
218. See Woodward v. Alabama, 143 S. Ct. 405, 410-11 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); see also supra notes 184-86 (discussing Delaware Supreme Court Justice
Holland's interpretation of Hurst wherein he reasons that Justice Sotomayor has already made this
requirement plain in Hurst).
219. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (per
curiam) ("[T]he finality of death precludes relief"); id at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[The death
penalty] is unique in its total irrevocability."). For a discussion of "death-is-different" philosophy
and jurisprudence, see Abramson, supra note 12, at 124-28.
220. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) ("[E]xecution is the most irreme-
diable and unfathomable of penalties ... . [D]eath is different."); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
637 (1980) ("[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this
country . . .." (alteration in original) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977))).
221. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357-58.
222. See id at 358.
223. See Abramson, supra note 12, at 119 ("[R]etribution provides the main justification for
capital punishment." (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring))).
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crime, does not significantly incapacitate criminals more than life with-
out parole, and, of course, cannot rehabilitate. Instead, the death penal-
ty's primary justification is retribution.224 Reinstating the death penalty in
Gregg after Furman's four-year moratorium, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the retributive nature of the death penalty: "[capital punishment] is
an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are them-
selves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response
may be the penalty of death."225
Retribution requires more than these other justifications. Justice
Breyer has argued that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment demands that such retributive punishment be decid-
ed and imposed by juries because juries "are more likely to 'express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death,'
and [are] better able to determine in the particular case the need for retri-
bution .... "226
In recent years, the Sixth Amendment has been an important tool
for reforming the death penalty. However, the limits placed on the
Amendment by the Court227 indicate that standing alone it may not be
sufficient to protect capital defendants from state overreach. It was under
the Eighth Amendment that he Court launched modem capital punish-
ment jurisprudence as states responded to Furman's critiques.228 It was in
the Eighth Amendment that the Court found and imposed many constitu-
tional limits for the death penalty: a death sentence must not be arbitrary
or random, and the punishment of death must not be grossly dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crime.229 Eighth Amendment capital juris-
prudence should similarly be brought to bear to protect a criminal de-
230
fendant from being sentenced to death by a judge's determination.
224. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 614-16; see also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517-18 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 477-81 (1984) (Stevens, Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616
(2016); cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The death penalty is
said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospec-
tive offenders.").
225. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184, 207.
226. Ring, 536 U.S. at 614-16 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968))
(further citation omitted).
227. See discussion supra Section III.A.
228. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 534-35.
229. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that he death penalty may
not be imposed on intellectually disabled criminal defendants); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
797-98 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits death for aiders and abettors of a
felony murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-600 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for rape); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion) (holding that the death penalty may not be the mandatory punishment for violating a
criminal statute).
230. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 1003; Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 586 ("The
Court should take up the call of Justices Breyer and Stevens and hold that the Eighth Amendment
requires that juries determine the ultimate sentence...."); Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1152 (dis-
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The Constitution uses broad language, cruel and unusual, to de-
scribe the Eighth Amendment's punitive prohibitions.23 1 The Supreme
Court has stated time and again that what constitutes "cruel and unusual"
232cannot be fixed or static. Rather, courts must look to "'the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' to
determine which punishments are .. . cruel and unusual."233 In turn, the
Court derived "two essential touchstones for defining the evolving stand-
ards of decency that are at the core of the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishments: (1) objective ind[ices] of
contemporary values" seen in death penalty legislation and jury verdicts
"and (2) ... whether the death penalty comports with the basic concept
of human dignity at the core of the Amendment."234
Although the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee almost surely
prohibits Alabama's judicial override,235 the Alabama statute also runs
afoul of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. The statute cannot withstand the two-part test that the Supreme
Court has set forth for evaluating the evolving standards of decency that
delineate constitutional punishments from cruel and unusual ones.236
On the national scale, American opposition to capital punishment is
at its highest point since Furman.237 After Ring and Hurst, Alabama now
stands alone as the only state with a complete judicial override.238 In oth-
er words, there is a national consensus against judicial override. The Su-
preme Court has regularly found a national consensus against forms of
the death penalty on much less objective indicia than this.239 For exam-
cussing how the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence already includes the right to a capital jury
in sentencing decisions and that this right should be preserved).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
232. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (2005).
233. See id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
234. Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1139 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 181-82 (1976) (plurality opinion)); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64; Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 311-12.
235. See discussion supra Section III.C.
236. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("[T]he 'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."' (quoting Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002))); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-97 (1977) (discussing jury determinations and legislation for evaluat-
ing death penalty as the punishment for the crime of rape under Eighth Amendment).
237. See Niraj Chokshi, Death Penalty Loses Majority Support for First Time in 45 Years,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/us/death-penalty-loses-majority-
support-for-first-time-in-45-years.html (discussing the findings of a Pew Research Center survey of
Americans between August and September 2016).
238. Alabama's sole companion, Delaware, recently overturned its own judicial override
statute. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433-35 (Del. 2016) (per curiam); see also discussion supra
Section III.B. Florida's legislature replaced the judicial override with jury sentencing in light of
Hurst. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2), (3) (2016) ("If the jury has recommended a sentence of:... Life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the court shall impose the recommended sentence."),
held unconstitutional by Perry v. State, No. SC16-547, 2016 WL 6036982 (Fla. Oct. 14, 2016) (per
curiam).
239. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15.
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ple, the Court found a national consensus against the death penalty for
240
juveniles when thirty states prohibited the execution of children.
Likewise only twenty-one states prohibited the death penalty for the in-
tellectually disabled when the Supreme Court found a national consensus
against that form of punishment.24'
Even before Alabama became the only state with a judicial override
statute, it stood out among its peers as the only state to regularly disre-
gard the entire purpose of the judicial override. 242 Instead of granting
judges the power to quell too-punitive juries-likely the result of strong
emotions among jury members-by overriding death sentences with life,
243
Alabama judges have routinely done the exact opposite. Between
1976's reinstatement of the death penalty and 2011, Alabama judges
overrode the jury 107 times.2 44 In 98 cases-almost 92% of the time-
the judge ignored the jury's mercy and imposed death.245 In startling con-
trast, the judge only granted a more merciful sentence than the jury in 9
of those cases-barely 8% of the time.
246
The second part of the Eighth Amendment test consists of the jus-
tice's own judgment.247 The Supreme Court has held that "in cases in-
volving a consensus [such as in the case of judicial overrides], our own
judgment is 'brought to bear,' by asking whether there is reason to disa-
gree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators."248 In
Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
barred death sentences for intellectually disabled defendants, the justices'
own judgment found no such disagreement, finding that "the execution
of [intellectually disabled] criminals will [not] measurably advance the
deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty."249
Bringing their own judgment to bear, judges should be troubled by
another aspect of judicial imposition of the death penalty: the effect of
political pressure on the judiciary in a tough-on-crime nation.250 While
better qualified to understand and apply the law, a judge is a single state
actor, and many judges are subject to political pressure which should
240. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
241. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15.
242. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE 9-
13 (2011) (discussing how Delaware and Florida only rarely used the judicial override and more
often than not the judge overrode the jury's decision of death to impose life instead).




247. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002).
248. Id. (citation omitted).
249. Id at 321.
250. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Alabama trial
judges face partisan election every six years. The danger that they will bend to political pressures
when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted by
judges beholden to King George Ill." (citation omitted)).
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have no place in determining individual capital sentences.251 Former
Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court represents the
danger of such political pressure to judges. 52 After overturning every
death penalty case she heard on the court, her political opponents ran a
successful campaign against her retention on the court based in large part
on these death penalty rulings.253 At the same time, the state's governor
threatened and ultimately opposed another two justices, whom he
254
thought did not uphold enough death penalty cases. After filling their
seats with new justices, California's highest court dramatically shifted to
upholding nearly 97% of death penalty cases thereafter.
2 55
These political pressures affect trial judges as well. A study of Ala-
bama's judicial override by the Equal Justice Initiative revealed that
"30% of death sentences were imposed by [judicial] override" in 2008,
compared to "just 7% in 1997."256 A key difference between these two
years is that 2008 was an election year and 1997 was not.257 The combi-
nation of tough-on-crime judges and a judicial override capital sentenc-
ing regime has led to disturbing results in Alabama, a practical reversal
of the merciful purpose of judicial override.258
Although she authored the majority opinion in Harris I,259 which
260upheld Alabama's judicial override in 1995, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has long led the push to end the election of judges, arguing
that "[i]n many states" they are merely "politicians in robes."261 justice
Stevens, in his Harris I dissent, gave a thorough and powerful argument
for why judges should not be the ultimate capital sentencing authority.26 2
He cited the United States' long history of requiring a jury to pass a sen-
tence of death, the fact that judges "are far more likely than juries to im-
pose the death penalty" due to political pressure, and that the judicial
251. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 989-91, for a discussion of the political pressures on
elected judges in hybrid states with regard to reviewing and passing capital sentences.
252. Maura Dolan, Ex-Chief Justice Rose Bird Dies of Cancer at 63, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5,
1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/dec/05/news/mn-40743; Todd S. Purdum, Rose Bird, Once
California's Chief Justice, Is Dead at 63, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1 999/12/06/us/rose-bird-once-califomia-s-chief-justice-is-dead-at-63.html.
253. See Dolan, supra note 252; Purdum, supra note 252.
254. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Be-
tween the Bill ofRights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1995).
255. Id.
256. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 242, at 8.
257. Id.
258. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text; see also Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S.
Ct. 405, 408 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Alabama judges, who are
elected in partisan proceedings, appear to have succumbed to electoral pressures.").
259. 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
260. Id. at 515.
261. Annemarie Mannion, Retired Justice Warns Against "Politicians in Robes," CHI. TRIB.
(May 30, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-30/news/chi-retired-justice-wams-
against-politicians-in-robes-201305301 o-connor-bias-judges.
262. Harris, 513 U.S. at 516-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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override in particular undermines the jury's role, responsibility, and le-
gitimacy.263
Improper political pressure is not the only problem with the judicial
override from life to death. In Alabama, judicial override "is character-
ized by arbitrariness and error.,264 Whether or not a defendant is subject
to judicial override seems largely dependent on the county in which the
defendant is convicted.265 Errors have led to reversal of sentences or con-
victions for a startling number (37%) of those sentenced by life-to-death
override.266
Given the Alabama legislature's history of refusing to comply with
federal court orders,267 the legislature-and perhaps even the judiciary-
will likely not overturn the law without a clear federal court mandate and
perhaps not even then. The Supreme Court should force hesitant states
such as Alabama to recognize constitutional requirements by declaring
that it is the role of a jury to serve as the community's representative and
268voice in the administration of criminal defense. Since the death penalty
is the ultimate punishment and has its own unique requirements, it should
263. Id. at 516-23; see also Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice
Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 308, 330 (1997) (discussing how Justice Stevens has stated that "[a] campaign
promise to 'be tough on crime,' or to 'enforce the death penalty,' is evidence of bias that should
disqualify a candidate from sitting in criminal cases" (alteration in original) (quoting Justice John
Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 3,
1996))). Political pressure on judges due to single, unpopular decisions has been in the news again
recently. In California, Judge Aaron Persky outraged many in the country when he gave a Stanford
athlete, Brock Turner, a mere six-month jail sentence for raping an unconscious woman; this deci-
sion has led to a petition to remove Persky from his position on the bench, the support for which
"swelled to over 1.2 million signatures[] . , . ." Christine Hauser, Judge in Stanford Sexual Assault
Trial Will No Longer Hear Criminal Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/us/judge-in-stanford-sexual-assault-trial-will-no-longer-hear-
criminal-cases.html. As of August 26, 2016, Judge Persky has requested and been granted a transfer
to a civil docket. Id. In Colorado, an online petition to remove Boulder District Judge Patrick Butler
garnered thousands of supporters after Butler sentenced a University of Colorado student o proba-
tion and work release for raping an unconscious woman. Boulder Daily Camera, Petition Seeks
Recall of Judge in Austin Wilkerson Case, but Judges Can't Be Recalled in Colorado, DENV. POST
(Aug. 12, 2016, 2:08 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/08/12/colorado-petition-recall-judge-
austin-wilkerson-case.
264. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 242, at 17.
265. See id ("Just three of Alabama's 67 counties account or nearly half of the life-to-death
overrides statewide. ... Mobile and Montgomery's override rates are higher even than their overall
death sentencing rates.").
266. Id. at 22.
267. See discussion supra Section III.C.205
268. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("The founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave [the criminal
justice system] to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial
provisions of the Bill of Rights."); see also Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 962-63, 971-72 (discuss-
ing empirical evidence showing that, in hybrid states, a judge's ultimate sentencing responsibility
leads to juries being more likely to feel less responsible for sentencing and being more likely to
misunderstand sentencing instructions).
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be the jury's role to determine, impose, and take responsibility for each
death sentence.269
Going forward, the Supreme Court should recognize this capital
sentencing limitation as required by both the Sixth and Eighth Amend-
ments. These Amendments, standing together, will serve as twin bul-
warks against the unjust administration of death, reminding state legisla-
tures, courts, and juries that death is different and the death penalty
should be hard to impose and carry out.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court should recognize the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments as twin guarantees that a jury pass the sentence of death in
every particular case. This can be achieved by using the Apprendi, Ring,
and Hurst decisions to require that a jury make all fact-finding determi-
nations required to make a defendant death eligible, including finding
mitigating circumstances and the subsequent weighing determination. In
addition, the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
requires the jury, reflecting and expressing the "conscience of the com-
munity," to determine and impose a sentence of death-it would be im-
proper for a trial judge, a state actor, to impose the ultimate penalty. Each
of these Amendments might suffice by itself, but taken together, they can
ensure that he death penalty, should a state employ it, undergo the most
rigorous constitutional review.
Jeffrey Wermer
269. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 1006 ("The law should not subject judges to undue
pressures to compromise judicial neutrality, especially not when it also weakens jurors' conscien-
tiousness and sense of responsibility and even more so when the defendant's life is at stake.").
* Staff Editor on the Denver Law Review and J.D. Candidate 2018 at the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law. Thanks to Professor Ian Farrell and Professor Justin Marceau for
guiding and challenging me throughout the writing and editing process. Special thanks to my wife
and constant editor, Sara Porterfield.
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ABSTRACT
The Framers of the United States Constitution created three distinct
bodies of government. The Legislature makes laws, the Executive en-
forces laws, and the Judiciary interprets the laws. The Framers designed
this three-part government to ensure no one branch became too powerful.
Accordingly, when Congress enacts legislation that tells courts how to
decide a pending lawsuit, it threatens the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers that defines the American government.
In Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the Supreme Court upheld federal leg-
islation that swept away the foreign sovereignty of Iran's central bank for
the Bank Markazi plaintiffs only. Previous Supreme Court precedent
allowed Congress to enact laws that identified cases by name or docket
number but only if the new law amended or repealed the underlying law
at issue in the case. The underlying statute at issue in Bank Markazi was
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Despite the FSIA's "ter-
rorism exception," which allows Americans to file suit against state
sponsors of terrorism in the courts of the United States, the FSIA still
shields from execution a foreign central bank. Instead of amending the
relevant portion of the FSIA that protects foreign central banks, Congress
drafted 22 U.S.C. § 8772, which removed the central bank barrier for the
Bank Markazi plaintiffs only.
This Case Comment argues that in enacting § 8772, Congress im-
permissibly commandeered the Judiciary's authority by picking the win-
ner of a pending lawsuit. In allowing Congress to do so, the Court greatly
expanded the power of Congress at the Judiciary's expense. Now Con-
gress can pick the winners and losers in pending litigation without
amending the underlying law. This Comment also argues that Congress
cannot single out specific parties when enacting legislation, even if the
new law amends or repeals the underlying statute. Finally, this Comment
proposes a three-factor test for courts to analyze separation of powers
issues when Congress passes a law that affects pending litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently ruled in Bank Markazi v. PetersonI that
a provision of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012, codified as 22 U.S.C. § 8772, does not offend the separation of
2
powers doctrine. This decision is significant because it departed from a
150-year-old Civil War-era precedent that prevented Congress from
picking the winner in a pending lawsuit and, in doing so, greatly expand-
ed the powers of the Legislature at the Judiciary's expense.3 What was
once a very defined line between the Legislature and the Judiciary is now
a gray line drawn heavily in Congress's favor.
The "judicial Power of the United States" is vested in the Federal
Judiciary.4 The Supreme Court has held that this provision "safeguards
the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system."5 In Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,6 the Court decided that so long as
Congress amends or repeals a statute underlying pending litigation, the
law is valid regardless of whether it alters the outcome of the lawsuit.7
Sixteen years later, the Court decided what is arguably the quintes-
sential separation of powers case. In United States v. Klein,8 the Court
established three core principles: (1) Congress cannot direct courts to
reach a certain outcome in specific litigation or command courts how to
resolve a particular case; (2) Congress cannot force courts to interpret
1. 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
2. Id. at 1329.
3. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855).
4. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1330 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1).
5. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 883, 850 (1986)).
6. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
7. Id. at 431.
8. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
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and apply the Constitution in a certain way; and (3) Congress cannot
enact laws that violate an individual's constitutional rights.9
Well over one hundred years after Klein, the Court faced similar is-
sues in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.'0 However, the Court de-
clined to address a Klein argument but reaffirmed the Wheeling Bridge
"amend or repeal" rule, holding that the newly enacted statute "com-
pelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law."" Section
8772 implicates Wheeling Bridge, Klein, and Robertson because it di-
rects a court to resolve the case in a particular way and fails to amend or
repeal the underlying law, namely the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 (FSIA).12
This Case Comment will argue that Bank Markazi was wrongly de-
cided. Part I of this Comment will first review the Court's history of cas-
es analyzing the separation of powers doctrine. Part II provides a brief
summary of the facts of Bank Markazi as well as the majority and dis-
senting opinions. Part III explains Congress's limits when it passes legis-
lation that directly impacts pending litigation. This Comment will then
provide a three-factor test that courts could apply to ensure Congress can
carry out its legislative duties without offending the separation of powers
doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
Separation of powers between the three branches of government is
derived from the "tripartite structure of the Constitution."'3 The Judici-
ary's primary function is "to say what the law is."l 4 When Congress at-
tempts to commandeer the Judiciary, the Supreme Court will strike down
the legislative act as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.'5 In
1855, Congress overturned a judicial order that declared a bridge a nui-
sance by reclassifying the bridge as a post road for the United States mail
9. See id. at 148; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Why Klein (Still) Matters. Congressional
Deception and the War on Terrorism, 5 J.NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 251, 252 (2011); Howard M.
Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 56 (2010).
10. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y (Robertson II), 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) (dis-
cussing how Congress's passing of a new law constitutes a modification of prior law).
11. Id. at 438, 441; see also William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protec-
tion, the Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpre-
tation, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 1055, 1069 (1999).
12. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1316 (2016) ("The question raised by peti-
tioner Bank Markazi: Does § 8872 violate the separation of powers by purporting to change the law
for, and directing a particular result in, a single pending case?").
13. Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When Congress Impermissibly In-
trudes on Judicial Power After Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal Appellate
Courts' Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to the New Section of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1993).
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
15. See Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525,
2525-26 (1998).
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service.1 6 Congress essentially amended the underlying law by legalizing
the structure.17 The Supreme Court upheld the legislation in Wheeling
Bridge because the bridge was no longer a nuisance in the eyes of the
law following the enactment of the new statute.18 Congress simply creat-
ed new legal circumstances, which the courts then applied to the ordinary
rules concerning nuisances.'9
Sixteen years later, in 1871, the Court decided its most important
separation of powers case: United States v. Klein.20 In Klein, the Court
declared a congressional statute unconstitutional because it prescribed a
"rule of decision" in a pending case.2' In the wake of the Civil War,
Congress enacted the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863
(1863 Act), which granted the proceeds the government collected from
the sale of seized property to the original owners of that property provid-
ed they had not supported Confederate soldiers or the rebellion.22 Later,
President Lincoln offered full pardons to persons engaged in the rebel-
23lion if they swore an oath of allegiance to the United States. One of the
pardoned rebellion supporters was a man named Wilson, whose cotton
was seized and sold during the Civil War.24 Klein, the administrator of
Wilson's estate, brought suit to recover the proceeds from the cotton
25because Klein received a presidential pardon in 1862.
While Klein was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Padelford.2 6 Padelford contained similar facts as those in Klein.
The Padelford Court affirmed a Court of Claims decision that deter-
mined that the beneficiaries of President Lincoln's pardon were cleansed
of their offense of giving aid and comfort to the enemy.27 Therefore, be-
cause the pardon recipients were legally cleansed of any consequences of
disloyalty, the property owners were entitled to the proceeds under the
1863 Act.28
16. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429 (1855).
17. Id. (explaining that Congress's newly enacted legislation, which declared that all bridges
across the Ohio River at Wheeling to be lawful structures for the postal service, amended the current
nuisance laws).
18. See id. at 436.
19. See Wasserman, supra note 9, at 66.
20. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
21. Id. at 146-47; see also Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Decep-
tion, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United
States v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 447 (2006); Sager, supra note 15, at 2525-26.
22. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 128-29; Sager, supra note 15, at 2525.
23. Sager, supra note 15, at 2525.
24. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 130-32.
25. See id. at 132.
26. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869), superseded by statute, Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16
Stat. 235, as recognized in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
27. Id. at 543.
28. See id.
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In response to the Padelford decision, a disgruntled Congress enact-
29ed the Abandoned and Captured Property Act in 1870 (1870 Act).
Congress passed the 1870 Act specifically to prevent certain individuals,
including Klein, from prevailing in their lawsuit to recovery property.30
The 1870 Act declared that if a person such as Klein accepted a presiden-
tial pardon, courts should consider the pardon as conclusive evidence
that the individual provided aid and comfort to the enemy and was there-
fore not entitled to recovery. 3 The 1870 Act went further and stated that
if a claimant prevailed in the Court of Claims by proving his loyalty
through a presidential pardon, the Supreme Court must remand the case
to the Court of Claims and order dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.32
The Court declared the Act unconstitutional.33 In rejecting the 1870
Act, the Klein Court determined Congress inappropriately meddled with
Supreme Court jurisdiction and stated that Congress was "prescrib[ing] a
rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way." 34 The Court distin-
guished Wheeling Bridge on the ground that the Klein Court believed
Congress prescribed an "arbitrary rule of decision."35 The statute forbade
the Court from giving a presidential pardon the evidentiary effect that the
Court believed it should receive and directed the Court to determine a
pending legal dispute according to Congress's judgment-both unconsti-
tutional acts.36 In contrast, the Court in Wheeling Bridge was "left to
apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances created by the act."37
There were no major cases analyzing Klein until the Court faced a simi-
lar separation of powers issue in Robertson.38
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the
Northwest Timber Compromise (Compromise), which was enacted in
response to ongoing litigation.39 Two parties representing opposite inter-
ests sued over the United States Forest Service's adoption of certain tim-
ber management guidelines.4 The Seattle Audubon Society argued that
the Forest Service's guidelines failed to properly protect northern spotted
owls, while the Washington Loggers Association claimed the guidelines
29. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 61-62.
30. Id.
31. Sager, supra note 15, at 2525.
32. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1044.
33. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 129 (1871); Sager, supra note 15, at 2525-
26.
34. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
35. Id.; see also Wasserman, supra note 9, at 64.
36. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 63-64.
37. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147; see also Sager, supra note 15, at 2526.
38. See generally Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
39. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson (Robertson 1), 914 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992); Araiza, supra note 11, at 1065-66; Ronner, supra note 13, at 1048-49
(explaining that Congress stepped in after the district court granted Seattle Audubon's preliminary
injunction).
40. See Araiza, supra note 11, at 1065; Ronner, supra note 13, at 1048.
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unfairly restricted timber harvesting.41 The litigation involved the classic
"jobs versus the environment" argument, and Congress felt the need to
42intervene. After the district court granted a preliminary injunction in
favor of the Seattle Audubon Society, Congress responded with the
Compromise, which provided some relief for owls and some relief for
loggers.43
The Compromise simultaneously expanded and restricted harvest-
ing in thirteen national forests that contained northern spotted owls.4
Subsection (b)(6)(A) of the Compromise stated that "compliance with
the spotted-owl protective provisions of subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5)
was to be considered 'adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting'
the statutory requirements alleged to have been violated in the pending
Seattle Audubon . . . litigation." 4 5
The Ninth Circuit ruled the Compromise was unconstitutional be-
cause instead of repealing or amending the laws at issue in the lawsuit,
Congress created entirely new obligations through the Compromise.4
Thus, Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine because it
directed courts that if the government satisfied the requirements of sub-
sections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of the Compromise, then the government met
the underlying environmental statutes at issue in the pending litigation.47
The Ninth Circuit determined the statute impermissibly "direct[ed] the
court to reach a specific result and make certain factual findings under
existing law in connection with two cases pending in federal court.""
Additionally, the unanimous three-judge panel found the Compromise's
format troubling because it was drafted with a specific result in mind.49
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
42. Araiza, supra note I1, at 1065.
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 ("[T]he Congress
hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of
this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Manage-
ment lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for
the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases cap-
tioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington
Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary
injunction) and the case Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-
FR. The guidelines adopted by subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section shall not be subject to
judicial review by any court of the United States."); see also Ronner, supra note 13, at 1048-49.
45. Araiza, supra note 11, at 1066 (quoting § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 745-50).
46. Robertson I, 914 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Congress did not amend or repeal
laws, as it unquestionably could do, but rather prescribed a rule for the decision of a cause in a
particular way, without changing the underlying laws, as it unquestionably cannot do."), rev'd, 503
U.S. 429 (1992); Araiza, supra note 11, at 1068; Ronner, supra note 13, at 1050.
47. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1050.
48. Robertson I, 914 F.2d at 1316.
49. See Araiza, supra note 11, at 1066. Note that there were no dissenting opinions among the
three-judge panel. See Robertson I, 914 F.2d at 1312, 1317.
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A unanimous Supreme Court reversed.so Justice Thomas authored
the opinion and concluded that the Compromise "replaced the legal
standards underlying the two original challenges . .. without directing
particular applications under either the old or new standards," and, there-
fore, the underlying law was not left intact.51 Further, Justice Thomas
brushed aside the Ninth Circuit's issue with the statute's format, finding
that Congress merely referenced the pending cases as a legislative
52shortcut to identify the five environmental statutes at issue in the case.
Although the Court ultimately determined Congress did amend the
underlying law, Justice Thomas made reference to a less stringent stand-
ard. He stated the following:
Congress might have modified [the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA)] directly, for example, in order to impose a new obligation
of complying either with the current § 2 or with subsections (b)(3)
and (b)(5). Instead, Congress enacted an entirely separate statute
deeming compliance with subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) to constitute
compliance with § 2-a "modification" of the MBTA. .. .
The Court, therefore, focused on the statute Congress could have
written whereas the Ninth Circuit focused on the statute Congress actual-
ly enacted.54
One final important aspect of the Robertson decision occurred in
dicta in the opinion's final paragraph. The Court acknowledged an espe-
cially insightful amicus brief argument that, despite amending a law, a
statute is not automatically constitutional under the Wheeling Bridge
"amend or repeal" rule. According to the brief, "even a change in law,
prospectively applied, would be unconstitutional if the change swept no
more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of applications at
issue in the pending cases."56 The Court declined to address this argu-
ment because it was "neither raised below nor squarely considered by the
Court of Appeal, nor was it advanced by respondents in this Court."57
Three years later in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., Justice Breyer,
in his concurring opinion, addressed a similar argument as that of the
Robertson amicus brief.59 In Plaut, the Court deemed a federal statute
50. Robertson 1!, 503 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1992) ("We conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A)
compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law."); Ronner, supra note 13, at 1052.
51. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 437; see also Ronner, supra note 13, at 1052.
52. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 430 ("[T]he subsection's explicit reference to the two pending
cases served only to identify the five statutory requirements that were the basis for those cases.");
see also Ronner, supra note 13, at 1053.
53. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 439-40.
54. Araiza, supra note 11, at 1070; Ronner, supra note 13, at 1053.
55. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 441.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
59. Id. at 213.
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unconstitutional that required federal courts to reopen judgments that
were previously final in securities fraud claimsi0 The new law stated that
claims previously dismissed for failing to satisfy the former statute of
limitations should be reopened if the claim meets the timeline under the
new statute.61
The majority focused on the "integrity of final judgments" when
striking down the law.62 However, the Court rejected a Klein challenge
and found that Congress acted permissibly with respect to Klein because
the law did not direct courts to decide a claim in a particular way.63 In-
stead, the new statute only directed courts to apply the new statute of
limitations and explained the legal consequences of meeting the new
time period.64 Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer focused on separation
of powers in his concurrence.65 He was convinced that Congress had
singled out particular parties for unfavorable treatment under the law.66
In Justice Breyer's view, when Congress applies a law to individuals, as
it did in Plaut, Congress impermissibly acts as a court rather than a legis-
lature.
Finally, in National Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 68 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a congres-
sional act that was passed in direct response to a pending lawsuit.69 Plain-
tiffs brought suit to enjoin construction of a memorial, alleging that mul-
tiple federal statutes were violated in approving and constructing the
memorial on the National Mall. 70 The court rejected the idea that specifi-
cally targeting a pending lawsuit rather than an anticipated lawsuit was
fatal, mainly because the statute did amend the underlying law.71 In fact,
the plaintiff conceded that the new statute would have been a valid
amendment to the underlying law had it been enacted before the plain-
tiffs filed the lawsuit.72 The Supreme Court denied certiorari to hear this
case.73
60. Id; see also Araiza, supra note 11, at 1093 (summarizing the facts and holding of Plaut,
514 U.S. at 218-19).
61. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 71.
62. Araiza, supra note 11, at 1093.
63. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 230 ("We considered and rejected separation-of-powers objections
to the statute based upon ... United States v. Klein."); Wasserman, supra note 9, at 71.
64. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 71.
65. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 243-44 (Breyer, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 242.
68. 269 F.3d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
69. Id. at 1097; see also Wasserman, supra note 9, at 68-69.
70. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 68-69.
71. Save Our Mall, 269 F.3d at 1097.
72. Id
73. Id at 1092.
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II. BANK MARKAZI V. PETERSON
A. Facts
The Bank Markazi respondents were victims and family members of
Iran-sponsored terrorism over the past four decades.74 There were over
one thousand respondents separated into sixteen discrete groups, each of
whom obtained judgment against Iran pursuant to the "terrorism excep-
tion"75 of the FSIA in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.76 The terrorism exception of the FSIA allows Americans to
sue state sponsors of terrorism in the courts of the United States.77 The
validity of the judgments obtained in district court was not in dispute in
Bank Markazi because Iran's liability to each plaintiff had already been
decided by convincing evidence.78
Despite obtaining judgment against Iran, respondents faced difficul-
ties trying to enforce the terrorism exception.79 The primary reason for
the difficulties was that, despite the terrorism exception, the FSIA shields
from execution the property "of a foreign central bank or monetary au-
thority held for its own account."80 To address these enforcement diffi-
culties, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(TRIA),81 which permits execution of judgments obtained under the ter-
rorism exception against a terrorist party's blocked assets.82 In February
2012, President Obama issued Executive Order No. 13599, which
blocked all "property and interests . . . of any Iranian financial institution,
including the Central Bank of Iran, that are in the United States."83 To
ensure there was no dispute about the availability of the assets called into
question in the Executive Order, Congress passed § 8772 of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,8 not as an
amendment o the TRIA or the FSIA, but as a freestanding law.85 Section
8772, the relevant provision in Bank Markazi, provided an additional
basis for executing judgments on Iran's bank assets and swept away the
74. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1319 (2016).
75. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 1605, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2012).
76. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1).
78. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319-20.
79. Id. at 1317-18.
80. Id. at 1318 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (2012), recognized as repealed by implication
in Weininger v. Castro, 462 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
81. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101, 116 Stat. 2322, 2322-
23 (2002).
82. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 2337-40; see also Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.
83. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,599, Blocking Property of
the Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012)).
84. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 501, 22 U.S.C. § 8772
(2012).
85. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.
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FSIA provision that set forth immunity for Iran's central bank for this
case only.86
B. Procedural History
To seek a court order to enforce their judgments, the sixteen groups
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in 2008. The district court reviewed the financial history of
Bank Markazi's (the Bank) assets and determined that the Bank owned
the assets.88 Following the issuance of President Obama's Executive Or-
der and the enactment of § 8772, the judgment holders updated their mo-
tions in 2012.89 All of Bank Markazi's defenses became irrelevant after
§ 8772's enactment, so the Bank changed its defenses.9 It conceded that
Iran held equitable title to the bonds in New York, but argued that § 8772
violated the separation of powers doctrine.91 The district court disagreed
and ordered the requested turnover of nearly two billion dollars in bond
assets held in a New York bank account owned by Bank Markazi.9 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the deci-
93sion. The Second Circuit stated that § 8772 did not violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine because it did not force or compel judicial find-
ings under the old law but simply changed the applicable law relevant to
this case.94 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider the separation of powers question.95
C. Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion of the Court.96 Justices Ken-
nedy, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan joined, and Justice Thomas joined in all
but Section II.C. 9 7 The Court affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling, con-
cluding that § 8772 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.98
86. Id. at 1321 ("Several of [Bank Markazi's] objections to execution became irrelevant
following enactment of § 8772, which, the District Court noted, 'sweeps away ... any ... federal or
state law impediments that might otherwise exist, so long as the appropriate judicial determination is
made."'); id at 1329 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The Bank has vigorously opposed those efforts,
asserting numerous legal defenses. So, in 2012, four years into the litigation, respondents persuaded
Congress to enact a statute, 22 U.S.C. § 8772, that for this case alone eliminates each of the defenses
standing in respondents' way."); see also Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ.
4518(KBF), 2013 WL 1155576, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013) (discussing 22 U.S.C.
§ 8772(a)(1)).
87. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320.
88. Id. at 1321.
89. Id. at 1320.
90. Id. at 1321.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1322.
94. Id
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1316.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1317.
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Justice Ginsburg began by discussing Klein, Robertson, and Plaut.9
Her review of the relevant cases solidified her belief that "Congress may
indeed direct courts to apply newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation
in pending civil cases."'" With the passage of the new law, Justice Gins-
burg found that "§ 8772 changed the law by establishing new substantive
standards" that the district court could apply to the facts of the case.'ot
Justice Ginsburg then rejected Bank Markazi's two main argu-
ments.102 First, she rejected the claim that § 8772 dictated certain fact-
findings and directed the outcome of the case under the newly enacted
law.1 03 Justice Ginsburg stated that a statute does not invade judicial
power when it requires courts to apply the new legal standard outlined in
the statute to undisputed facts.' She reiterated that Iran's liability in the
case, and its obligation to pay damages, was established four years be-
fore Congress enacted § 8772.105 However, the ownership of the blocked
assets was at issue.' Justice Ginsburg believed that the large volume of
filings suggested that "[t]here [was] . . . plenty . . . to [litigate]."' 07
Next, Justice Ginsburg dismissed Bank Markazi's argument that
§ 8772 was "unprecedented" because it "prescribe[d] a rule for a single
pending case-identified by caption and docket number."08 The Court
explained that he statute in question in Robertson identified two cases
by docket number.'" Additionally, the Court emphasized that § 8772
was not accurately portrayed as a one-case-only statute."10 Instead,
§ 8772 covered a host of post-judgment execution claims filed by several
plaintiffs, all of whom secured evidence-based judgments against Iran in
multiple civil actions."' Justice Ginsburg argued that individual cases do
not lose their identity simply because courts consolidate their claims." 12
To further quash the Bank's second argument, Justice Ginsburg noted the
Supreme Court and lower courts have upheld legislation that "govern[s]
one or a very small number of specific subjects," such as in Wheeling
Bridge and Save Our Mall."13
99. Id. at 1323.
100. Id. at 1325.
101. Id. at 1326.
102. Id. at 1325-26.
103. Id. at 1325.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1322.
106. Id.
107. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ.
4518(KBF), 2013 WL 1155576, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013)).
108. Id. at 1326-27 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 1326.
110. Id. at 1317.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1327.
113. Id. at 1328.
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Finally, the Court highlighted that § 8772 was an exercise of legis-
lative power regarding foreign affairs.114 Justice Ginsburg said it remains
Congress's prerogative to alter a foreign state's immunity even when it is
the subject of pending litigation.'15 Therefore, the Court ruled that when
Congress "alter[ed] the law governing the attachment of particular prop-
erty belonging to Iran, Congress acted comfortably within its authority
over foreign sovereign immunity and foreign-state assets."ll6
D. Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts authored the dissenting opinion and was
joined by an unusual ally, Justice Sotomayor.1 7 The Chief Justice began
by fiercely arguing that the Framers warned that legislative involvement
in judicial matters threatened democracy.118 He then addressed § 8772,
arguing that it was an unconstitutional interference with the Judiciary
because Congress ultimately decided the outcome of this particular
case."9 He declared that by changing the law-for these proceedings
only-simply to guarantee that the respondents win was a violation of
separation of powers.120 The Chief Justice quoted the majority, which
stated that § 8772 "sweeps away . . . any . . . federal or state law impedi-
ments that might otherwise exist" to bar respondents from obtaining
Bank Markazi's assets.121 The dissent had no doubt that "Congress's sole
concern [in passing § 8772] was deciding this particular case, rather than
establishing any generally applicable rules."'2 Indeed, the Chief Justice
noted that § 8772 stated that "nothing in the statute 'shall be con-
strued .. . to satisfy a judgment in any other action against a terrorist
party in any proceedings other than' [this case]."23
Chief Justice Roberts then addressed the majority's position that
§ 8772 left "plenty" of factual determinations for the district court to
adjudicate.124 In actuality, the dissent noted that § 8772 only required two
factual determinations-that Bank Markazi had an equitable interest in
the assets and that no other party did. 12 Both factual determinations were
simply legislative deception. President Obama already decided the assets
were the "property of the Government of Iran" when he froze the money
as part of his Executive Order.126 Next, on numerous occasions the Bank
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1329.
116. Id.
117. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1331-32.
119. Id. at 1332.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (majority opinion)).
122. Id. at 1333.
123. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1) (2012)).
124. Id. at 1335.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,599, Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and
Iranian Financial Institutions, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012)).
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insisted it was the sole owner of the blocked assets.12 7 Since both of these
determinations were undisputed and well established by the time Con-
gress enacted § 8772, Congress simply picked the winner.128
The dissent also challenged the majority's position that the Court
has previously allowed Congress to pass legislation that targeted specific
cases by docket number.129 Chief Justice Roberts noted that in Robertson,
the relevant statute merely referenced particular cases as a shortcut for
describing the environmental statutes at issue, not to limit the law's ef-
fect to those cases alone.130 Referring to statutes through case names is
permissible as long as the statute does not single out the defendant for
adverse treatment, and the statute amends the underlying law.'31
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the majority mischaracter-
ized the Executive's and Legislature's historical authority to recognize a
foreign state's sovereign immunity.132 He did not dispute that Congress,
with the approval of the President, may withdraw Iran's foreign sover-
eign immunity.'3 3 However, Chief Justice Roberts noted that by eliminat-
ing any protections that New York State law or international law might
have offered Bank Markazi, § 8772 did "considerably more than with-
draw sovereign immunity." 34
The Chief Justice ended his argument by returning to his original
point, discussing the long-term policy effects of the Legislature's intru-
sion into the Judiciary's arena.'3 1 Chief Justice Roberts stressed that
Congress can now "unabashedly pick the winners and losers in particular
pending cases" and professed that the Court laid the groundwork for ex-
tensive expansion of legislative authority at the Judiciary's expense.136
III. ANALYSIS
The Bank Markazi decision greatly expanded the powers of Con-
gress in such a way that Congress can now draft legislation that invades
the Judiciary's authority.'37 In actuality, the Court veered off-course in
Robertson, and both Robertson and Bank Markazi were wrongly decided
because neither relevant statute amended or repealed the underlying laws
in their respective cases. The following analysis proceeds in three main
sections. Section A will first argue that it is inherently within the Legisla-
ture's authority to prescribe rules to a court that alters the outcome of a
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1336.
130. Id.




135. Id. at 1337-38.
136. Id. at 1338.
137. See supra Section II.C.
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pending case so long as Congress amends or repeals the underlying
law-with limited exceptions. Section B will address the major limita-
tion, namely, that even if the legislation does amend or repeal the statute
in question, it must not target a specific party. Finally, Section C propos-
es a three-factor test that courts should apply each time Congress passes
a law specifically aimed at pending litigation.
A. Congress Has the Authority to Prescribe Rules That Alter the Out-
come of Specific Litigation Subject to Limited Exceptions
In the opinion for the Court, Justice Ginsburg makes clear in her in-
troduction that under Supreme Court precedent, "Congress . .. may
amend the law and make changes applicable to pending cases, even when
the amendment is outcome determinative."1 38 More often than not, the
amendment is constitutional and results in positive change. Consider, for
example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which superseded any law that
allowed employers to discriminate against an employee on the basis of
membership in a protected class.139 Congress prescribed rules of decision
that required courts to find in favor of plaintiffs if they could establish
evidence that they were fired because of their "race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 1a This new statute applied to prospective and pend-
ing cases and is an example of Congress permissibly affecting pending
litigation by altering the preexisting general substantive law.
However, the first limit 4 1 to Congress's power to prescribe rules
that alter the outcome of specific litigation is that Congress must actually
amend the underlying law. When Congress truly amends the underlying
substantive law, it can normally do so without referencing specific pend-
142ing cases.
Congress cannot deceive the electorate by passing a law that com-
mandeers the Judiciary in an attempt to achieve its political goals without
the responsibility of passing legislation.14 3 If Congress attempts to elimi-
nate an applicable defense, such as central bank immunity, it must "elim-
inate[] [the] applicable defense in all cases."l44 Congress would deceive
the public if it left the defense in place in the underlying statute but com-
pelled a court to reject the defense in other cases. 145
138. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (majority opinion).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012).
140. Id.
141. The second limitation is outlined below in Section II.B. As a preview, the second limita-
tion is that Congress cannot single out a specific party for adverse treatment even if it amends the
underlying law.
142. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 457.
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Legislative deception may occur "through either 'micro' or 'macro'
deception."'k Micro deception occurs when the Legislature "leaves the
generalized substantive law intact, but legislatively directs that a particu-
lar litigation (or group of litigations) arising under that law be resolved in
a manner inconsistent with the dictates of that pre-existing generalized
law."1 47 Congress employed this exact tactic in passing § 8772, and the
Supreme Court mistakenly approved it.
The similarities are striking between § 8772 and the Abandoned and
Captured Property Act of 1870, the statute at issue in Klein. The 1870
Act attempted to accomplish three feats, all of which threatened the sepa-
ration of powers. First, the 1870 Act did not amend the 1863 Act, which
was the underlying statute in question in Klein and Padelford.148 Rather,
the 1870 Act simply barred claimants who received a presidential pardon
from recovering monetary proceeds under the 1863 Act.1 49 The 1870 Act
manipulated the 1863 Act "without actually amending it." 5 o Second,
Congress enacted the 1870 Act immediately following Padelford in an
attempt to prevent Klein and similar claimants from prevailing on their
claims.151 It was precisely tailored to Klein's pending litigation. Con-
gress's goal in passing the 1870 Act was to circumvent the Padelford
rule so lawsuits such as Klein's would not succeed.152 Finally, the 1870
Act clearly favored the government. The Court of Claims awarded Klein
$125,300 for compensation.53 Thus, Congress would clearly have bene-
fited from withholding Klein's payment.
The first similarity between the 1870 Act and § 8772 is that neither
law amended the underlying statute at issue in the case. The majority
acknowledged that Congress "[e]nacted [§ 8772] as a freestanding meas-
ure, not as an amendment to the FSIA or the TRIA."'iM Yet later in her
opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated: "By altering the law governing the at-
tachment of particular property belonging to Iran, Congress acted com-
fortably within the political branches' authority over foreign sovereign
immunity and foreign-state assets."ss These two assertions are irrecon-
cilable. Subsection 8772(c) makes clear that the FSIA or the TRIA re-
main intact.156 In order to satisfy the Wheeling Bridge "amend or repeal"
146. Vladeck, supra note 9, at 253 (summarizing Martin H. Redish and Christopher R. Pu-
delski's article, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harness-
ing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 439 (2006)).
147. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 439.
148. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1044.
149. Id.
150. Vladeck, supra note 9, at 254.
151. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1044.
152. Id. at 1044, 1069.
153. Id. at 1043.
154. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318 (2016).
155. Id. at 1329.
156. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1) (2012) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed-(1) to
affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy a judgment in any other action against a
terrorist party in any proceedings other than proceedings referred to in subsection (b) .... ).
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standard, Congress needed to either amend the FSIA or the TRIA, or
remove the expiration date of § 8772. But Congress failed to do so and
tried to do exactly what it attempted to do in Klein-manipulate the un-
derlying law, namely the FSIA, without actually amending it.
Next, Congress passed § 8772, like the 1870 Act, in direct response
to pending litigation. Congress had a noble goal-assist the victims in
enforcing the judgment against Iran.m Therefore, Congress simply cir-
cumvented its own statute, the FSIA, which shields from execution the
prQperty of a foreign central bank, and drafted legislation precisely tai-
lored to Bank Markazi's case.158 Finally, Congress controls the purse of
the United States government. With America's growing debt, using
Iran's two billion dollars instead of taxpayer dollars to compensate ter-
rorist victims favors the government.
Despite Justice Ginsburg's claim that Klein "has been called 'a
deeply puzzling decision,"' Klein continues to stand as the standard for
maintaining separation of powers.159 Klein provided a separation of pow-
ers framework that ensures the unelected Judiciary polices the legislative
process to eliminate legislative deception.160
Scholars have argued that there is no plausible situation in which
Congress could permissibly alter the result in a pending lawsuit without
simultaneously amending the existing law at issue in the litigation.161 Yet
that is exactly what Congress did in passing § 8772. There are two key
differences between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 8772. First, the
anti-discrimination law applied to pending litigation and future instances
of discrimination. Here, Congress made clear that § 8772 has no effect
on future litigation.1 62 Second, despite amending the Civil Rights Act
during presumably multiple pending court cases, courts were required to
apply new outcome-determinative law to the facts of each individual
case. In Bank Markazi, there was no fact-finding required. The two fac-
157. See id. §8772(a)(1)(C).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (2012) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this
chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment and from execution, if-(1)
the property is that of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own account, unless
such bank or authority, or its parent foreign government, has explicitly waived its immunity from
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
which the bank, authority or government may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms
of the waiver. . . ."), recognized as repealed by implication in Weininger v. Castro, 462 F. Supp. 2d
457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
159. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1323 (quoting Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2538 (1998)); see id at 1334 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
("The majority characterizes Klein as a delphic, puzzling decision whose central holding-that
Congress may not prescribe the result in pending cases-cannot be taken at face value.").
160. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 440; Vladeck, supra note 9, at 262.
161. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 457.
162. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1).
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tual determinations were established prior to the enactment of § 8772,
leaving "nothing" for the district court to decide.1 63
B. Congress Cannot Single Out Specific Parties
The second major limitation to the rule discussed in the preceding
section is the prohibition on singling out specific parties. The Court men-
tioned the "targeting one party" question in Robertson but did not resolve
the issue.M The amicus brief referenced in the final paragraph of the
Robertson opinion challenged the long-standing position that a newly
enacted law is always valid under Wheeling Bridge as long as it amends
or repeals the law.165 Justice Thomas went out of his way to mention the
argument, but declined to answer the question it posed since neither party
raised the issue in their briefs or in the lower courts.'66
Three years after the Robertson decision, in Plaut, Justice Breyer
expressed concern that Congress applied the statute only to a discrete,
closed class of cases.167 He believed Congress had singled out specific
individuals for unfavorable legal treatment.168 When Congress targeted
specific parties, Justice Breyer believed Congress was applying the law
(as opposed to making law), which is the job of the Judiciary.16 9 This is
the primary reason that courts should be extremely critical of statutes that
are not of general applicability.
Laws that lack general character should always be suspect and pre-
sumed unconstitutional.170 Non-general laws are typically "odd-looking,
163. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1335 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
164. Robertson 1!, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) ("We have no occasion to address any broad
question of Article III jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(6)(A) was un-
constitutional under Klein because it directed decisions in pending cases without amending any law.
Because we conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) did amend applicable law, we need not consider
whether this reading of Klein is correct. The Court of Appeals stated additionally that a statute would
be constitutional under Wheeling Bridge if it did amend law. Respondents' amicus Public Citizen
challenges this proposition. It contends that even a change in law, prospectively applied, would be
unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of appli-
cations at issue in the pending cases. This alternative theory was neither raised below nor squarely
considered by the Court of Appeals, nor was it advanced by respondents in this Court. Accordingly,
we decline to address it here.").
165. Id (summarizing an amicus brief position); Ronner, supra note 13, at 1047 ("Congress
can prescribe rules of decision in pending cases as long as it does so by amending or changing the
law."); id. at 1055 ("The amicus had challenged the proposition that a statute is constitutional under
Wheeling Bridge if it amends the law.").
166. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 441.
167. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 243 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("It
lacks generality, for it applies only to a few individual instances.").
168. Id. at 243-44; see also Araiza, supra note 11, at 1094.
169. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 243-44; see also Araiza, supra note 11, at 1093-94 ("For Justice Brey-
er, the problem with section 27A was that it applied to a discrete, closed class of cases, indeed, a
class of cases, the particulars of which Congress seemed to be familiar. These characteristics con-
vinced him that there was simply too great a danger that Congress had singled out particular individ-
uals for unfavorable treatment-the resurrection of lawsuits against them. In other words, by legis-
lating so as to affect only a closed, limited, and apparently identified class of individuals, Congress
applied law to individuals, thereby acting like a court rather than making law.").
170. See Araiza, supra note 11, at 1090; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 445.
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[J]udiciary-intruding"171 laws and should only satisfy the separation of
powers doctrine when they concern truly unique subjects. For example,
the cases cited by Justice Ginsburg in the majority opinion primarily deal
with unique subjects. She argued that the Supreme Court and lower
courts have upheld statutes that "governed one or a very small number of
specific subjects."1 72 One such case was Save Our Mall.173 That case
concerned a single memorial that was "legitimately confined to 'a unique
public amenity."'1 74 Additionally, she cited Wheeling Bridge, which also
dealt with unique government property-a postal road.175 Both of these
cases, like the majority of her other cited cases, concerned federal prop-
erty.
Beyond federal property, Congress should not enact legislation di-
rected at a single class of cases. Essentially, Congress conducted its own
hearing and held a "trial by [L]egislature" in enacting § 8772.17' The
Framers specifically protected against legislative trials when they created
the tripartite government, and for good reason. Justice Powell correctly
noted in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha that "trial by a
[L]egislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of pow-
er." 1 77 He elaborated on his thesis and stated:
Unlike the [J]udiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not
bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the proce-
dural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an
impartial tribunal, that are present when a court or an agency adjudi-
cates individual rights. The only effective constraint on Congress'
power is political, but Congress is most accountable politically when
it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of
specific persons, those rights are subject to "the tyranny of a shifting
majority."1 7 8
As Chief Justice Roberts stated in his dissent, Congress's sole aim
in passing § 8772 was "deciding this particular case, rather than estab-
lishing any generally applicable rules."1 7 9
171. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 90.
172. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1328 (2016) (citations omitted).
173. Id. (referring to Nat'l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092 (D.C. Cir.
2001), along with a number of other cases).
174. Brief of Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 23-24, Bank
Markazi, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 7450417, at *23-24 [hereinafter Brief of Federal
Courts Scholars] (quoting Save Our Mall, 259 F.3d at 1097).
175. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1328 (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430 (1855)).
176. Brief of Federal Courts Scholars, supra note 174, at 20 (quoting United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965)).
177. Id. at 21 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring)).
178. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring).
179. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1333 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (referring to 22 U.S.C.
§ 8772(c)(1) (2012)); see also Brief of Federal Courts Scholars, supra note 174, at 23 ("No law is
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In the present case, Justice Ginsburg dismissed the singling out ar-
gument by claiming this statute is "not fairly portrayed as a one-case-
only regime." 80 Instead, she argued that § 8772 "covers a category of
postjudgment execution claims filed by numerous plaintiffs who, in mul-
tiple civil actions, obtained evidence-based judgments against Iran to-
gether amounting to billions of dollars."181 She quoted language from
§ 8772 that subjects the Bank's assets to execution "to satisfy any judg-
ment" against Iran for acts of terrorism.182 Despite the language quoted
by Justice Ginsburg, the statute makes clear in the following section that
it only applies to this specific case, identified by docket number, declar-
ing that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed . .. to affect the
availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy a judgment in any other
action against a terrorist party."l83
It is possible that Justice Ginsburg misinterpreted the Robertson de-
cision when she used it to argue that the Court has upheld statutes that
identify cases by docket number.1m In Robertson, the Court dismissed
the singling out argument because it determined that Congress used the
two pending cases as a shortcut to identify the five statutory require-
ments at issue.' 85 The Robertson Court stated that the statute named "two
pending cases in order to identify five statutory provisions."'86 Chief
Justice Roberts highlighted this discrepancy in his dissent. He said the
two cases mentioned by name in Robertson were only used as a reference
to describe the five underlying environmental statutes at issue; Congress
did not intend to "limit the statute's effect to only those cases alone.",8 7
Bank Markazi was wrongly decided because Congress explicitly
targeted the Bank when it enacted § 8772, violating the separation of
powers doctrine. The sequence of events in the case highlights the consti-
tutional violation. First, Bank Markazi invoked its sovereign immunity
under the FSIA in the district court, but § 8772 eliminated the Bank's
sovereign immunity. Next, the Bank raised the defense that its status
as a distinct juridical entity under international law and federal common
general if Congress may pick and choose when litigation under it will succeed and when it will
fail.").
180. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id.
182. Id (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1) (emphasis added)).
183. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1) (emphasis added).
184. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1326-27 ("The amended law in Robertson, however, also
applied to cases identified by caption and docket number, and was nonetheless upheld. Moreover,
§ 8772 . . . facilitates execution of judgments in 16 suits, together encompassing more than 1,000
victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks. Although consolidated for administrative purposes at the
execution stage, the judgment-execution claims . .. were not independent of the original actions for
damages and each retained its separate character.").
185. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992).
186. Id.
187. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1336 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1332.
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law released it from liability for Iran's debt.189 Section 8772 then re-
moved that defense to ensure the Bank was liable.)90 Finally, the Bank
raised a defense under New York law, claiming that the state law did not
allow plaintiffs to execute their judgments against the Bank's assets.'91
Again, § 8772 made the Bank's assets subject to execution.'9 The sole
purpose of § 8772 was to remove all legal defenses against the Bank so
that the plaintiffs would prevail. It is in this country's best interest to
maintain three separate branches of government. The Bank Markazi deci-
sion threatens this separation and the American governmental framework
the Framers carefully crafted.
C. Proposed Three-Factor Test for Separation ofPowers Issues
The Court should adopt a three-factor test for evaluating whether
Congress violates the separation of powers doctrine when it passes a
statute in response to pending litigation.1 9 3 The first factor would require
a court to closely examine the congressional legislation and consider
whether the statute actually amends or repeals the underlying law.194 The
second factor would require a court to decide if the statute is so closely
tailored to the pending litigation that it can be "said to fit glove-like
around the live case or controversy."19 5 The third factor would ask
whether the statute favors the government, especially if the government
is a party to the litigation.196 A court should weigh these three factors
each time Congress enacts legislation aimed at impacting pending litiga-
tion.
The first factor is the most important factor. Each time a court rules
on the constitutionality of a statute, it must closely examine the law at
issue. A court should ask the following question: Does the law actually
amend or repeal the underlying law at issue in the pending litigation
without telling a court how to decide a particular case? Supreme Court
precedent is clear that Congress may amend or repeal a law with the in-
tent of producing certain outcomes for certain facts.'97 However, Klein
established the principle that Congress cannot direct a court how to de-
cide a particular claim.'98
189. Id. at 1332-33.
190. Id. at 1333.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Ronner, supra note 13, at 1047-48.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 1048.
196. Id
197. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 ("Congress, our decisions make clear, may amend
the law and make the change applicable to pending cases, even when the amendment is outcome
determinative."); Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1992); see also Wasserman, supra note 9, at
71-72.
198. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1871).
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The second factor would require a court to decide if the statute is
too closely tied to a live case or controversy. Statutes aimed at one spe-
cific case should always be considered suspect, especially if the law ben-
efits one party. A court should ask the following question: Does the stat-
ute single out one party to the benefit of the other party? However, as
stated above in Section III.B, there are situations where Congress must
address a "unique public amenity," such as a national memorial or
bridge.199 In these rare situations, it is permissible for Congress to enact
laws that are precisely tied to pending litigation. But barring litigation
concerning unique public structures or amenities, any closely tailored
statute should be presumed unconstitutional.
Finally, a court should strictly scrutinize the statute when it favors
the government in pending litigation.200 As a matter of fairness, Congress
should not be its own judge in a case ruling on the constitutionality of
congressional action.20 1 The Klein Court rationalized its holding by stat-
ing the following:
In the case before us, the Court of Claims has rendered judgment for
the claimant and an appeal has been taken to this court. We are di-
rected to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the judgment must be af-
firmed, because of a pardon granted to the intestate of the claimants.
Can we do so without allowing one party to the controversy to decide
it in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that the
[L]egislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Depart-
ment of the government in cases pending before it? We think
not .... 202
Klein is the quintessential case in which Congress tried to resolve
pending litigation through legislative trial. If Congress can control either
the method or conclusion of the judicial decision making process, the
formal protections of independent branches of government would prove
to be of little value.203
This Comment will now apply the proposed test to the facts of Bank
Markazi. When the factors are applied to the Bank Markazi facts, all
three factors weigh against the constitutionality of § 8772.
199. Brief of Federal Courts Scholars, supra note 174, at 23; see Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429-30 (1855); Nat'l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Nor-
ton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1094, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("This seems particularly sound where Congress is
addressing a unique public amenity (or disamenity, depending on one's viewpoint), such as the
Memorial or the bridge at issue in Wheeling Bridge.").
200. See Ronner, supra note 13, at 1048 (explaining that the Klein Court struck down the 1870
Act in part because it favored the government); see also Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 444-
45 (explaining that Congress lacks constitutional authority to decide the outcome of lawsuits in its
favor).
201. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1071.
202. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
203. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 450.
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1. Factor One-Examining the Statute to Determine If It Amends
or Repeals the Underlying Law
Close examination of § 8772 reveals that the statute does not actual-
ly amend or repeal the underlying law-namely the FSIA. Justice Gins-
burg performs a precise analysis of § 8772(a) and § 8772(b) but fails to
mention § 8772(c) in her opinion.204 She dedicates all of Section L.A as a
review of the "statutory provisions relevant to this case," but through
omission, the majority opinion did not consider § 8772(c) relevant in this
case.205 Section 8772(c) states that "[n]othing in this statute shall be con-
strued-(l) to affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy
a judgment in any other action against a terrorist party in any proceed-
ings other than proceedings referred to in subsection (b). ...
Congress carefully drafted § 8772 to achieve its desired outcome in
"Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518
(BSJ) (GWG),"207 while not amending the FSIA. Congress convinced the
Bank Markazi majority because a reading of only § 8772(a) would make
208a judge believe the statute amended the underlying law. Section
8772(a) states generally that a blocked asset held in the United States,
including an asset of the central bank of Iran, shall be subject to execu-
tion or attachment in order to satisfy any judgment for compensatory
damages.209 But as noted in the preceding paragraph, a closer reading of
the entire statute reveals Congress's true intention in passing § 8772-to
pick the winner of this case.210 For unbeknownst reasons, Congress did
not want to amend or repeal the section of the "FSIA [that] shields from
execution property 'of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held
for its own account."'
211
The Court's misguided precedent concerning factor one originated
in Robertson. The Robertson Court significantly lowered the bar for the
"amend or repeal" standard established by the Wheeling Bridge Court in
1855.212 The Robertson Court concluded "subsection (b)(6)(A) com-
pelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law." 213 However,
careful analysis of the statute suggests otherwise.2 14
Subsection (b)(6)(A) states the following:
204. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318-19 (2016).
205. Id. at 1317.
206. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1) (2012).
207. Id. § 8772(b).
208. Id. § 8772(a)(1) (explaining that the statute subjects the designated financial assets to
execution "to satisfy any judgment" against the Government of Iran).
209. Id.
210. Id. § 8772(c)(1).
211. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318 (2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)
(2012)).
212. See Ronner, supra note 13, at 1047, 1055.
213. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 438 (1992).
214. See Act of Oct. 23, 1989 Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745.
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Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas
according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thir-
teen national forests . .. known to contain northern spotted owls is
adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory re-
quirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases captioned Se-
attle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160
and Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson,
Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case
Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-
1160-FR. The guidelines adopted by subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of
this section shall not be subject to judicial review by any court of the
United States.215
Congress essentially declared that if § (b)(3) and § (b)(5) are satis-
fied, a court is directed to find that the five statutes216 at issue in the two
pending cases are necessarily satisfied as well.2 17 Congress's directive
told the courts how to interpret the underlying statutes without actually
amending the statutes.218 Instead of applying the facts of the case to the
five valid environmental statutes at issue and allowing a court to interpret
the statute, a typical Judiciary function, Congress directed the courts to
interpret the statutes according to Congress's interpretation.219
For the Ninth Circuit, the "critical distinction" was between amend-
ing the law underlying the pending case, which is constitutional, and the
actual prescription of a rule of decision, which violates the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers.220 This is why the circuit panel unani-
mously ruled that "§ 318(b)(6)(A) 'does not, by its plain language, repeal
or amend the environmental laws underlying this litigation,' but rather
'directs the court to reach a specific result and make certain factual find-
ings under existing law in connection with two [pending] cases."'
221
222
In passing § 8772, Congress did not repeal the FSIA or the TRIA.
It simply created a new statute that applied to this case and this case on-
215. Id.
216. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) § 143(b), 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012); National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2012); National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 102,
43 U.S.C. § 1701; (2012); Oregon and California Railroad and Coos Bay Wagon Road Grant, 43
U.S.C. § 1181 (2012).
217. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 745.
218. Id.
219. See id; Araiza, supra note 11, at 1066-68.
220. See Robertson 1, 914 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990) ("More recent Supreme Court
authority also strongly suggests that the critical distinction, for purposes of deciding the limits to
Congress' authority to affect pending litigation through statute, is between the actual repeal or
amendment of the law underlying the litigation, which is permissible, and the actual direction of a
particular decision in a case, without repealing or amending the law underlying the litigation, which
is not permissible."), rev'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992); Araiza, supra note 11, at 1066-68.
221. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 436 (1992) (quoting Robertson I, 914 F.2d at 1316).
222. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318-19 (2016) ("Enacted as a freestanding
measure, not as an amendment to the FSIA or the TRIA, § 8772 provides that, if a court makes
specified findings, 'a financial asset . . . shall be subject to execution . . . in order to satisfy any
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ly.223 Admittedly, Justice Ginsburg stated that § 8772 was not enacted as
an "amendment to the FSIA or the TRIA."224 The statute did not repeal
either of the laws because the statute made clear it only applies to the
"proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case
No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG)."225 However, Congress could have
simply amended the FSIA to remove the central bank immunity, and the
victims could likely recover through that method.
The first factor weighs against the constitutionality of § 8772. The
Court strayed from its long-standing precedent in requiring actual
amendment of the underlying statute. Section 8772 decided this case
only, and it does not affect any other case dealing with Iran-sponsored
terrorism. Future terrorist victims may be left without legislative cover-
age because a central bank's assets, even if frozen by the President, will
be protected.
2. Factor Two-The Prohibition on Singling Out One Party
For Chief Justice Roberts, passing a statute that is expressly intend-
ed to affect only one case and then expire after the litigation is complete
is a major constitutional issue. The Chief Justice argued that § 8772 tar-
geted the Bank.226 He asserted that because the statute was so closely
tailored to this case, Congress might as well have said, "respondents
win." 22 7 This aspect of the statute is distinguishable from the Northwest
Timber Compromise. The dissent had less issue with the Compromise
because, as the name suggests, Congress drafted the legislation as a mid-
dle ground between both parties.228 1The Compromise did not favor one
party at the benefit of the other.229 This distinction is significant because
the majority heavily relied on Robertson in upholding § 8772.
When a court considers factor two, it ensures the statute can outlive
the pending litigation, and it prevents Congress from picking winners
and losers in pending litigation. When a law is tailored to one specific
party or case, except in situations as detailed in Section III.B such as
unique public amenities, Congress typically intends for the legislation to
judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal
injury or death caused by' the acts of terrorism enumerated in the FSIA's terrorism exception. Sec-
tion 8772(b) defines as available for execution by holders of terrorism judgments against Iran 'the
financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case
No. 10 Civ. 4518(BSJ)(GWG), that were restrained by restraining notices and levies secured by the
plaintiffs in those proceedings."' (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(b)-(c) (2012).
226. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1332-33 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 1330.
228. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 433 (1992).
229. Id.
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expire after the pending case is resolved. This type of legislation, which
picks the winner in a pending lawsuit, invades the judicial power of the
United States government.
Here, the statute states that it does not apply beyond the life of case
number 45 18.230 Section 8772 lacks any evidence of general application,
and removes all legal defenses for Bank Markazi in this one particular
case only. Section 8772 would not even apply to the respondents if the
district court were to dismiss the case without prejudice due to some evi-
dentiary technicality (this is further proof § 8772 did not amend the un-
231derlying law, thus, violating factor one)2. Section 8772 is so specific
that if the respondents were to re-file their case and receive a new case
number, § 8772 would no longer apply.232
By brushing aside the singling out argument in Bank Markazi, the
Court set the standard that "Congress can unabashedly pick the winners
,233and losers in particular pending cases." Contrary to the Court's deci-
sion, legislating against one specific party violates the separation of
powers doctrine. The second factor weighs heavily in favor of the Bank
in this case.
3. Factor Three-Government-Favoring Legislation
Congress passed § 8772 to favor itself. Congress enacted § 8772 in
2012 at the height of Iran's nuclear expansion.234 Potentially to maintain
diplomatic relations, Congress made the Court execute the assets against
Iran. Chief Justice Roberts alluded to this when he stated that Congress
"commandeer[ed] the courts to make a political judgment look like a
judicial one."235 He further stated that Congress has sufficient authority
to give relief to the plaintiffs through confiscating and disposing of Iran's
property without needing to "seize" the Judiciary's authority.236
230. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c).
231. Brief of Federal Courts Scholars, supra note 174, at 17.
232. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(b)(1) ("The financial assets described in this section are the finan-
cial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10
Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG), that were restrained by restraining notices and levies secured by the plain-
tiffs in those proceedings, as modified by court order dated June 27, 2008, and extended by court
orders dated June 23, 2009, May 10, 2010, and June 11, 2010, so long as such assets remain re-
strained by court order.").
233. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1338 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
234. Shreeya Sinha & Susan Campbell Beachy, Timeline on Iran's Nuclear Program, N.Y.
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-timeline.html
(last updated Apr. 2, 2015) (explaining Tran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the state of relations
between the United States and Iran in 2012).
235. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1337 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[N]o comparable history
sustains Congress's action here, which seeks to provide relief to respondents not by transferring their
claims in a manner only the political branches could o, but by commandeering the courts to make a
political judgment look like a judicial one.").
236. Id.
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Congress was not a party in this case, but the federal government
certainly had an interest in the outcome. Many of the plaintiffs were fam-
ily members of terrorism victims. For example, the lead plaintiff, Debo-
rah Peterson, lost her brother in the 1983 Marine Corps Barracks truck
bombing in Beirut, Lebanon.237 Through § 8772, Congress legislatively
supported their cause-compensating the victims of those killed on offi-
cial duty-by using seized money from the Government of Iran instead
of taxpayer dollars. 238When Congress compensated the victims from the
9/11 terrorist attacks, it paid out $15.8 billion from government programs
to support the victims.239 In Bank Markazi, Congress attained its desired
outcome by usurping the Judiciary's authority and deciding the case in
favor of the government.
Congress and the President should have simply confiscated the two
billion dollars in Iranian assets and "used, administered, liquidated, sold,
240
or otherwise dealt with" the money to benefit the victims and families.
The political branches have plenty of authority to confiscate and dispose
of Iran's sovereign property without seizing the Judiciary's jurisdic-
*241tion.
The third factor, much like the first two factors, weighs against the
constitutionality of § 8772. Congress passed this statute with one clear
winner in mind, which strongly favored the plaintiffs and Congress.
Congress compensated the terrorist victims by using seized funds from
the Government of Iran. The only cost is the threat to democracy, as the
Court allowed Congress to further invade the realm of judicial authority.
4. Weight of the Factors
When evaluating a newly enacted statute passed in response to
pending litigation, courts should ask three questions to determine wheth-
237. See Matt Ford, What the Supreme Court's Ruling on Iranian Assets Means, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/bank-markazi/479190/; Greg
Stohr, Iran Terror Victims Win at U.S. Supreme Court, Can Collect $2 Billion, BLOOMBERG POL.
(Apr. 20, 2016, 8:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/artices/2016-04-20/iran-terror-
victims-win-at-u-s-high-court-can-collect-2-bln.
238. Ford, supra note 237; Stohr, supra note 237.
239. LLOYD DIXON & RACHAEL K. STERN, COMPENSATING THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, RAND CORP.
(2004), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/researchbriefs/2005/RAND_RB9087.pdf;
Aaron Smith, The 9/11 Fund: Putting a Price on Life, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7, 2011, 9:38 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/06/news/economy/911 compensationfund/.
240. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1337 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(1)(C) (2012) ("The President may ... confiscate any property, subject o the jurisdiction
of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he deter-
mines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against he United
States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon
the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from
time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or
property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of
and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and
all acts incident o the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.").
241. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1337 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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er Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine: (1) Does the law
actually amend or repeal the underlying law at issue in the pending litiga-
tion without directing the courts to decide the case a particular way?; (2)
Does the statute single out one party to the benefit of the other party?;
and (3) Does that law favor the government? When applying these fac-
tors to Bank Markazi, all three factors weigh in favor of the Bank.
If courts fail to adopt and apply this test or a similar test, the impli-
cations of the Court's decision in Bank Markazi is the advent of a newly
empowered and unchecked Legislature. Both the Robertson statute and
§ 8772 threaten the separation of powers doctrine because they imper-
missibly invade the Judiciary's arena.242 The Court gave Congress a
blank check to "alter[] the legal and political impact of the controlling
generalized substantive law in specific contexts without also altering that
substantive law itself." 243 It can now undermine the separation of powers
by passing laws that enlist the Judiciary in an elaborate attempt to de-
ceive the public.24 Indeed, the dissent finds it troubling that the majority
opinion recognized no limit to its holding beyond the prohibition against
statutes that say "Smith wins."245 Because the Court failed to draw a firm
line, Congress will use the Court's decision as "a 'blueprint for extensive
expansion of the legislative power' at the Judiciary's expense,246 feeding
Congress's tendency to 'extend[] the sphere of its activity and draw[] all
power into its impetuous vortex."'
247
CONCLUSION
The separation of powers doctrine is the bedrock of the American
government. The Framers were paranoid of concentrating too much
248
power in one branch of government. When Congress attempts to ex-
pand its power and usurp the Judiciary's authority, it is the Judiciary's
249
job to police the action. If the Court continues to allow Congress to
whittle down the Judiciary's authority, like it did in Robertson and Bank
Markazi, it may be too late to avoid the danger of tyranny. Many legal
scholars have warned against congressional expansion, arguing that the
usurpation typically takes form when Congress attempts to achieve poli-
242. Araiza, supra note 11, at 1136 (arguing that "statutes such as section 318 threaten the
fundamental constitutional balance and, ultimately, the individual rights that that balance seeks to
protect").
243. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 450.
244. Id. at 451.
245. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1335 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Bank Markazi, 136
S. Ct. at 1326 (majority opinion)).
246. Id. at 1338 (quoting Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991)).
247. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison)).
248. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to Govern ": The Need for Prag-
matic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 451 (1991).
249. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); THE FEDERALIST NO.
78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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cy results not through direct enactments but through manipulation of the
courts.250 This is exactly what Congress accomplished with § 8772.
The Bank Markazi decision sends a message to Congress that the
Legislature can usurp the Judiciary's power with only the slightest re-
striction-it cannot say "Party A wins." Besides declaring a winner out-
right, Congress can now pass legislation so closely tailored to a pending
lawsuit that it might as well say "Party A wins." The Court erred in Rob-
ertson, where it reversed a unanimous Ninth Circuit decision, because
Congress exceeded its authority and decided the outcome of pending
litigation. That same Court acknowledged but failed to answer the harder
question of whether legislation violates separation of powers when it is
tailored to one specific case only. The Court concluded that the statute at
issue created "no occasion to address any broad question of Article III
jurisprudence."2 51
Using the dangerous precedent set in Robertson,252 the majority in
Bank Markazi further expanded Congressional power by upholding
§ 8772 without any restrictions other than the prohibition against explic-
itly telling a court who wins. But the underlying constitutional principle
of separation of powers is too important to avoid in cases such as Bank
Markazi or Robertson. It is the Supreme Court's duty to take "all possi-
ble care . . . to defend itself against [the] attacks" of the other govern-
mental branches.253 While it may be difficult to draw the line between
judicial and legislative authority, "the entire constitutional enterprise
depends on there being such a line."25
Cory J. Wroblewski-
250. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 438-39; Vladeck, supra note 9, at 255.
251. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
252. See id. at 440-41; see also Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 440-41 ("On occasion,
the Court has described the Klein holding in what are largely obscure and misleading terms. On
other occasions, it may have disingenuously ignored blatant violations by Congress of the democrat-
ically imposed limits on its authority to manipulate the judicial process, without either acknowledg-
ing or seemingly comprehending the serious stakes involved for purposes of the success of American
democracy.").
253. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
254. Id. at 1336 (emphasis added).
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